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FOREWARD
As Treasury and Finance Minister for the government of the Basque te-
rritory of Bizkaia and, especially, as President of the Ad Concordiam Asso-
ciation, it gives me great pleasure to present the work of Dr Caroline Gray.
The Bizkaian government and the Universities of the Basque Country and
Deusto, which together lead Ad Concordiam, share the concern that one of
the most significant shortcomings of the Basque Concierto Económico (Eco-
nomic Agreement) is the lack of knowledge about the history, meaning and
content of this special and unique instrument of self-government, especially
in the international sphere. Dr Gray’s thesis contributes directly to addres-
sing this shortcoming. 
Together with the informative activites within the Basque Country and
Spain that constitute Ad Concordiam’s constant framework for action, one
of our main aims in recent times has become to promote international un-
derstanding of the Concierto Económico in social, academic, technical or po-
litical spheres. It is not a question of seeking unconditional support for an
instrument known for both its longevity and its efficiency as a practical tool
of government. Rather, the intention is to generate interest in the critical
study of the development, scope and reach of the Concierto Económico and
to encourage research into the model, since it constitutes one of the most
unique examples of regional financing within the framework of comparative
fiscal federalism.
It will not come as a surprise to anyone that in today’s globalised world,
the lack of academic studies in English of the standard of Dr Gray’s make the
Concierto Económico an almost invisible, and therefore irrelevant, institution
in the international context. For this reason, the Bizkaian government, both
by itself and as a fundamental contributor to the Ad Concordiam Association,
considers it a priority to spread information and awareness about the Con-
cierto Económico, advocating initiatives that promote a thorough unders-
tanding of the instrument in said context. To this end, the Bizkaian
government considers disseminating information about the Concierto Eco-
nómico internationally one of the priority aims of its “Bizkaia 2030” pro-
gramme (“Bizkaia Goazen 2030”). Ad Concordiam, for its part, has also been
carrying out activities internationally, for example by participating in confe-
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rences, such as that held in 2014 at the Center for Basque Studies of the Uni-
versity of Nevada in Reno. Other initiatives have included the publication of
a book in English within Ad Concordiam’s collection, written by an eminent
Professor of the University of the Basque Country, which summarises the
history and content of the Concierto Económico in a way that makes it ac-
cessible to international specialists.
With the publication of Dr Gray’s thesis, we are making further progress
in this regard, giving the English-speaking academic world access to a work
which, as she herself points out, is aimed at researching the significance and
importance of the coexistence of two fundamentally different models of fis-
cal decentralisation, the Concierto Económico and the common financing
system (the latter as applied in Catalonia), for the current political situation
in Spain and for its protagonists. Both Euskadi and Catalonia have political
movements seeking to defend their respective national identities. This is cu-
rrently a source of intense debate, one of the main dimensions of which con-
cerns the very nature of the financing models and their possible alternatives.
To conclude, I would like to extend my warmest congratulations to the
author for her outstanding work and to thank her in particular for having
taken such an interest in our unique financing model. In so doing, she has
helped to draw attention to the Concierto Económico, facilitating the study
and understanding of the system in the international academic sphere. 
José María Iruarrizaga Artaraz
Treasury and Finance Minister of Bizkaia
8
PREFACE
It was my pleasure to supervise the doctoral thesis of Caroline Gray. From
the start this was conceived of as an independent contribution to a more
wide-ranging research project on ‘The Dynamics of Nationalist Evolution in
Contemporary Spain’, based at the University of Liverpool and funded by
the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK. While the historical
evolution of the Basque Country and Catalonia has been the subject of se-
veral major works, this project was a response to the lack of research (and
especially comparative work) on the recent evolution of the political parties
that have dominated the governments of their respective autonomous com-
munities, namely the Basque Nationalist Party and Convergence and Union
(within which Democratic Convergence of Catalonia always served as the
senior partner).
Caroline Gray made an outstanding contribution to this project, both
through her doctoral work and by collaborating with me in the organization
of a number of workshops and conference panels which were the vehicles
we used to engage in exchanges with other researchers working on specia-
lised aspects of the same topic. The main collective outcome of this activity
has been the book that we co-edited together, entitled Contesting Spain?
The dynamics of nationalist movements in Catalonia and the Basque
Country (London: Routledge, 2015).
Caroline’s most distinctive contribution has been to explain how different
financing models have affected the political evolution of the Basque Country
and Catalonia. Particularly admirable—and a very considerable achieve-
ment—has been her illumination of the workings and wider political reper-
cussions of the Basque Concierto Económico, demonstrated by means of a
complex tripartite analysis that focuses on the financial status of Euskadi vis-
à-vis Spain, the internal dynamics of the uniquely decentralized Basque
Country and its position within the European Union. The specificity of the
Basque Country is highlighted through the comparison made with Catalonia,
a participant in the common Spanish system of regional funding, although
an increasingly reluctant one. By following the financial thread through the
different phases of the Basque and Catalan relationships with the central
Spanish authorities and parties, and by going beyond a technical account to
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highlight the political repercussions, this thesis provides new insights that
help explain why, despite sovereignty having come onto nationalist agendas
in both places, the objectives have been different, as (so far) have the out-
comes.
Richard Gillespie
Chair of Politics, University of Liverpool
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AUTHOR’S PREFACE
I am delighted to be publishing my PhD within Ad Concordiam’s thesis
collection. I would like to take this opportunity to thank both José Rubí Cas-
sinello and Gemma Martínez Bárbara of the Treasury and Finance Depart-
ment of the Basque province of Bizkaia (Vizcaya) for the invitation and the
opportunity, as well as for the many conversations we held throughout my
PhD studies about the Concierto Económico. I would also like to thank the
provincial government of Bizkaia for generously financing the publication of
this thesis. Ad Concordiam, a non-for-profit association run by the Bizkaian
government and the two main universities in the Basque Country, is devoted
to promoting the study and understanding of the Concierto Económico, the
economic agreement which provides the fundamental basis of Basque re-
gional autonomy within Spain. The books which Ad Concordiam publishes
within its own collection available online, as well as the many other biblio-
graphic resources which it collates and makes available on its website
(www.conciertoeconomico.org), provide a digital library which is an essen-
tial resource for researchers and indeed anyone interested in the model. This
has been tremendously helpful to me throughout my PhD studies, and it is
therefore a real pleasure for me to now be able to contribute to this resource
myself with my thesis. Most of the existing studies which Ad Concordiam
makes available study the Concierto Económico from a legal and economic
perspective. Studying for a PhD in Politics, my approach has been somewhat
different, since my interest in the regional financing models in the Basque
and Catalan cases has been centred on how these have influenced the evo-
lution of the territorial strategies and behaviour of the nationalist parties in
both regions. I hope this different perspective will complement Ad Concor-
diam’s existing resources and prove of interest to readers. Since my thesis
is in English, I also hope it will go some way towards helping Ad Concordiam
in its aim to spread knowledge of the Basque financing model beyond
Spain’s borders. 
This thesis was completed at the University of Liverpool in England in
2013-2016, though I spent relatively little time living in Liverpool itself, and
far more time based in the Basque Country and Catalonia. I submitted my
thesis on 11 May 2016 and successfully defended it at the viva examination
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on 22 June 2016. My thesis covers political and economic developments in
the Basque Country, Catalonia and wider Spain from the transition to demo-
cracy up until the end of 2015. In recent years, the political landscape in
Spain has been undergoing a fundamental transformation, sparked in parti-
cular by three interrelated factors: the financial crisis and its aftermath, a po-
litical crisis characterised by widespread disillusionment with existing
political institutions and actors, and a territorial crisis as a result of the Ca-
talan challenge to the integrity of the Spanish state. In other regions apart
from Catalonia, fascinating developments are also taking place, all of which
both feed into, and are influenced by, wider developments in Spain: at the
latest Basque regional elections on 25 September 2016, for example, the
Basque Nationalist Party won with a minority of seats in the parliament as
usual, but the shift in the political landscape means that parliamentary sup-
port from its traditional partner the Basque Socialist Party would not quite
be enough to give it an absolute majority, since the Socialists have declined
at the hands of newcomer Podemos. The fundamental evolution we are se-
eing in Spain and its constituent regions is still very much ongoing at the
time of writing this introduction in October 2016, and I sincerely hope that
this study will contribute in a modest way to an understanding of some of
the many factors that have led Spain to the current conjuncture. 
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND FRAMEWORK

INTRODUCTION
This thesis investigates the influence of the regional financing models in
Spain on the evolution of the territorial demands of the mainstream Basque
and Catalan nationalist parties. Spain offers the opportunity to compare two
different models of fiscal decentralisation in relation to two different natio-
nalist movements. Spain’s 17 regional governments all gradually acquired
extensive public spending competences in the decades following the Spa-
nish transition to democracy of the late 1970s, but their revenue-raising po-
wers differ substantially since the historical development of the Spanish
state and its relationship with specific regions has resulted in asymmetric
fiscal decentralisation arrangements. On the one hand, Catalonia forms part
of the common financing system (régimen común de financiación), a reve-
nue-sharing system applicable to 15 of Spain’s 17 autonomous communities
or regions, under which the regions have some relatively limited tax-raising
competences while also depending heavily on financial transfers from the
central government. On the other hand, for historical reasons, the Basque
region raises almost all of its own taxes under a separate system of subs-
tantial fiscal autonomy, the Concierto Económico or Economic Agreement
(hereafter Concierto), as also does the neighbouring region of Navarre under
its respective Convenio Económico (hereafter Convenio). The two Economic
Agreements, the Concierto and the Convenio, together form the ‘foral’ finan-
cing system (régimen foral de financiación, where ‘foral’ stems from ‘fuero’
or medieval charter) (see Figure 1, p.20). How have these different regional
financing models contributed to contemporary shifts in the Basque and Ca-
talan nationalist parties’ territorial agendas, understood as their goals regar-
ding the relationship of their respective regions to the Spanish state?
Across Europe, the 21st century has witnessed a rise in demands for po-
litical sovereignty from nationalist parties that had previously seemed re-
conciled to seeking greater decentralisation or devolution rather than full
independence (Gillespie 2015a: 3-4). The Scottish National Party (SNP)’s
achievement of a referendum on independence for Scotland in September
2014 was a crucial example. Spain is a particularly interesting case where
pro-sovereignty movements have emerged in two different regions, yet with
important differences in the objectives pursued. The mainstream Basque
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and Catalan nationalist parties, traditionally preeminent in their regions in
the democratic period, have each sought, at different times since the turn of
the century, to secure a fundamental reconfiguration of their fit within or
with Spain. Notwithstanding different approaches, they share the demand
for their respective peoples to be granted the ‘right to decide’ their own po-
litical future and for their governments to be invested with sovereign political
power, rather than this being the sole preserve of the Spanish state. The na-
tionalist parties under consideration are the Basque Nationalist Party (Eusko
Alderdi Jeltzalea-Partido Nacionalista Vasco, EAJ-PNV, hereafter PNV) and
Democratic Convergence of Catalonia (Convergència Democràtica de Cata-
lunya, CDC), both of which are broadly centre-right parties. CDC was the do-
minant partner in a longstanding alliance with the smaller Christian
Democrat party, Democratic Union of Catalonia (Unió Democràtica de Cata-
lunya, UDC), which saw them enter elections together as Convergence and
Union (Convergència i Unió, CiU), initially as an electoral coalition from 1978
and then as a federation from 2001, until its dissolution in June 2015.1 Both
FIGURE 1: Different regional financing systems in Spain
1 Throughout this thesis, CDC/CiU will often be used when reference is made to CDC during
its time as part of the CiU federation. In mid 2016, CDC was refounded as the Catalan European
Democratic Party (Partit Demòcrata Europeu Català, PDECAT), but this study covers develop-
ments until the end of 2015 and so CDC will be referred to throughout by its original name.
the PNV and CiU won their first respective regional elections held in 1980
following Spain’s transition to democracy and became the predominant po-
litical force in their regions from then onwards. In the 35 years since, they
have formed governments (usually minority or coalition governments) after
almost all of their respective regional elections, apart from a period spent in
opposition to Socialist-led governments due to coalition politics (2003-2010
in the Catalan case; 2009-2012 in the Basque case).2
Throughout most of the 1980s and 1990s, CiU and the PNV both prioriti-
sed an essentially ‘accommodationist’ stance, which involved seeking fur-
ther autonomy within existing legal and political frameworks and by working
with Spanish political actors. This was achieved fundamentally by collabo-
rating with and supporting Spanish governments in return for gains in au-
tonomy. Of the two, CiU at the time came across as the more resolutely
pro-autonomy party, while the PNV’s long-term territorial goals appeared re-
latively more ambiguous due to its longstanding more factional party orga-
nisation, divided between those in favour of an ‘accommodationist’ strategy
aimed at winning more autonomy within the Spanish state and those taking
a more radical stance in favour of secession. From the turn of the century,
first the PNV and later CiU (especially CDC) would increase their demands
to advocate the right of the Basque Country and Catalonia to self-determi-
nation and some degree of statehood, if not outright secession. In the Bas-
que region, the PNV’s main shift would occur under the leadership of
regional president (lehendakari) Juan José Ibarretxe, with his frustrated at-
tempt from the turn of the century to upgrade the Basque region’s autonomy
to turn it into a semi-independent associated state of Spain. In Catalonia, the
change would come later, with CiU’s fundamental shift in strategy away from
accommodationist approaches towards a pro-sovereignty stance taking
place in 2012, presaged by developments from around 2007 onwards – dif-
ferences over which eventually led to the breakdown of the CiU coalition in
2015, when UDC rejected the secessionist agenda embraced by CDC. Never-
theless, the trajectory from accommodationist to pro-sovereignty politics
has not been wholly consistent, nor are the two always entirely mutually ex-
clusive: the PNV, for example, returned to more accommodationist tactics in
the years after Ibarretxe’s plan was thwarted, though by means of these it
would still seek to work towards a new political relationship with Madrid
based on a more bilateral partnership of equals, involving the possibility of
self-determination and co-sovereignty.
Such developments raise the question of why the pre-eminence of the
form of accommodationist politics practised by these parties in the 1980s
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2 In CDC’s case, at the latest regional election on 27 September 2015 it did not win alone
but rather as part of a single list Junts pel Sí comprising CDC, ERC and other independent can-
didates, and the party then changed its name to run as Democràcia i Llibertat in the December
2015 Spanish elections. This thesis focuses primarily on the development of CDC prior to this,
but an explanation of the these developments in late 2015 in relation to the party is provided in
Chapter 2 (pp.77-79).  
and 1990s has been transformed since then, leading to periodic shifts to-
wards more pro-sovereignty stances, which embrace a spectrum of potential
territorial projects from some degree of statehood and political sovereignty
within Spain to full secession from it. An emerging literature has identified
a number of different external dynamics influencing these parties’ shifts bet-
ween territorial accommodationism and pro-sovereignty demands: for
example, the state of bilateral relations between the region and the central
Spanish government; pressures from the support bases of nationalist parties
and civil society groups; competition from other parties in the home region;
and international influences (Gillespie and Gray 2015). Identifying the evo-
lution of the regional financing systems in Spain as one such external dyna-
mic, this thesis aims first and foremost to contribute to this literature by
investigating the influence of the regional financing systems on the evolution
of the territorial agendas of the PNV and CDC. Most existing research on the
regional financing models in Spain is by economists and focuses on econo-
mic outcomes (e.g. Zubiri 2015, De la Fuente 2013a, López Casasnovas and
Pons Novell 2005, etc.). This research focuses instead on the political drivers
behind regional financing reforms and the political consequences of these
for the evolution of nationalist party agendas.
The following sections introduce the specific aims and rationale of the
thesis; the research questions it poses; the time period under study; the pro-
posed terminology; and the analytical framework and methodology. The lat-
ter section includes subsections on the theoretical background to the thesis,
on the choice of elite interviews as the main research method and on the
choice of case studies. Finally, an introduction to the historical reasons for
two different regional financing systems in Spain is provided, followed by a
chapter outline for the thesis. 
BACKGROUND, AIMS AND RATIONALE
In Spain, the existence of two different models of regional financing, the
common financing system (régimen común) on the one hand and the ‘foral’
financing system (régimen foral) on the other, has been a source of endless
controversy and intense political debate, owing first and foremost to the dif-
ferent economic outcomes of each model. Since at least the late 1990s, nu-
merous studies have shown that the ‘foral’ financing system results in
significantly higher per capita financing levels than the common financing
system (e.g. Castells et el. 2000; De la Fuente 2012a, 2014; Uriel and Barberán
2007; Zubiri 2015). This is primarily on account of the fact that the Basques
and Navarrans do not contribute to the equalisation mechanism for finan-
cing public services included in the common regime, which has become the
main means of inter-regional solidarity in Spain, overtaking the Inter-Terri-
torial Compensation Fund originally designed for this purpose and to which
the Basques and Navarrans do contribute. The resources the Basque and
Navarran regions receive are based on their own fiscal capacity since, bro-
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adly speaking, they keep all their tax revenues, except for the small propor-
tion (in the Basque case, around 7%-10%) which they pay each year as a
quota to the Spanish government to cover their share of the few remaining
centralised spending competences in Spain, such as foreign affairs, defence
and areas of infrastructure. Since the Basque Country and Navarre are rela-
tively rich regions whose GDP per capita is among the highest in Spain, a
system in which their resources are based on their own fiscal capacity rather
than estimated needs (as in the common regime) gives them greater resour-
ces. This contributes, among other factors, to a level of per capita financing
far higher than the average of the other fifteen regions (De la Fuente 2012a:
4-5; Zubiri 2010: 112; see also Chapter 3) (see Table 1, p.24). 
This debate over the different levels of solidarity that the two regional fi-
nancing systems entail became increasingly politicised from the late 1990s
onwards, and in particular in the wake of the financial crisis of 2007-2008.
This was fundamentally due to opposition from Catalonia to its fiscal and fi-
nancial treatment under the common financing system, though several other
regions have also voiced dissatisfaction with aspects of the system that they
perceive as prejudicial to their respective territories. The equalisation me-
chanism included in the common financing system produces arbitrary out-
comes, proving overly redistributive in some cases but insufficiently so in
others (e.g. Bosch and Durán 2008; De la Fuente 2012b, 2012c, 2013a). Most
notably, the relatively richer regions under the system – particularly Madrid,
the Balearics and Catalonia – tend to be overly penalised, losing their com-
parative advantage post-equalisation and falling significantly in the ranking
of regions in terms of per capita resource levels. Political obstacles have re-
peatedly prevented a proper revision of the common financing system to
improve the equalisation mechanism and other flaws in the system, since
the fight for resources is a zero-sum game between different regions and
each reform has been at the mercy of central and regional governments’ po-
litical strategies (Blöchlinger and Vammalle 2012: 113-121; León 2009, 2010).
As a result, Catalonia started to make repeated calls, in particular from the
late 1990s onwards, for a form of bilateral fiscal pact akin to the Basque Con-
cierto instead. The Basque and Catalan regions are comparably wealthy (re-
lative to other parts of Spain) in GDP per capita terms, but Catalonia is much
larger, accounting for approximately 19% of Spain’s GDP, compared to
around 6% in the Basque case (see Table 2, p.24). Successive Spanish go-
vernments have refused to consider a bilateral deal for Catalonia akin to the
Basque Concierto – the Basque model is not easily generalizable (Spain
would not raise any revenues of its own otherwise) and Spain would strug-
gle to afford it for a region as large as Catalonia. This impasse over regional
financing became one of the key factors contributing to the deterioration in
Spanish-Catalan relations, particularly in the wake of the financial crisis and
thus the increased pressure on resources. The phrase ‘Spain robs us’ (Es-
paña nos roba) and reference to Catalonia as a victim of Spain’s ‘fiscal plun-
dering’ (expolio fiscal) became oft-repeated leitmotivs among Catalan
nationalist and pro-independence forces and supporters.
23
                    TABLE 1: Resources provided by the regional financing systems 
for homogeneous competences (average 2007-2011)
Source: Based on Zubiri 2015: 215
TABLE 2: Basic statistics for the Basque and Catalan regions
Sources: Anuario Estadistico de España, 2000, INE (area data); Padron 1 January 2016, INE
(population data – provisional); Contabilidad Regional de España, 2015, INE (GDP at
market prices and GDP per capita, estimates for 2015).
In the light of this intense debate, most of the recent literature on regional
financing in Spain has focused on analysing the shortcomings of the com-
mon financing system compared to the foral system, and on comparing the
two systems in terms of the different levels of resources they provide (e.g.
De la Fuente 2009, 2012a, 2012b, 2013a, 2014; Castells 2014, etc). It is gene-
rally accepted that Catalonia is disadvantaged by the common financing
system in the sense that it falls significantly in the ranking of regions post-
fiscal equalisation, a problem that also affects other regions of comparative
wealth per capita, most notably Madrid and the Balearics. Nevertheless, he-
ated political debate has emerged over the question of to what extent the
system disadvantages Catalonia and to what extent it is to blame for the re-
gion’s financial woes, relative to discretionary spending decisions taken by
the Catalan government. The debate has been exacerbated by the difficulties
inherent in quantifying Catalonia’s fiscal deficit with the Spanish state and
the political bias to which the different possible calculations are invariably
subject. Numerous studies have centred on the different methods of calcu-
lating the fiscal balances of each region with the central Spanish government
(where the net fiscal balance is usually based on the difference between the
amount of money a region receives from the central government to pay for
its public services and what its residents contribute to the central govern-
ment in taxes), and their relative merit and utility (e.g. Bosch et al. 2010;
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Basque Country Catalonia
Average (of 15 
regions under the
common system)
Resources per capita
(in euros)            4887 (204)            2433 (102)            2396 (100)
Resources as % of
GDP          16.2% (153)              9.0% (88)          10.6% (100)
Basque Country Catalonia Spain
Area (sq km)             7234 (1.4)           32113 (6.3%)          506030 (100%)
Population (million)          2.19 (4.7%)            7.52 (16.2%)             46.52 (100%)
GDP (€bn)          65.9 (6.1%)          204.7 (18.9%)           1081.2 (100%)
GDP per capita (€)       30459 (130.8)          27663 (118.8)               23290 (100)
López-Casasnovas and Rosselló-Villalonga 2014). More recently, a group of
economists undertook a project commissioned by the Madrid-based Sepi
Foundation, a government-linked public organisation, which involved deve-
loping a new methodology for calculating each region’s respective and rela-
tive position in terms of financing levels, to provide a new System of
Territorialised Public Accounts (Sistema de Cuentas Públicas Territorializa-
das, SCPT) (De la Fuente 2014). The new methodology, first made available
in July 2014, would thereafter be used by the Spanish government. The aim
was to go beyond the limitations of looking at traditional fiscal balances,
which are often based on the direct financial amount that each region derives
from central administration in comparison with their tax contribution, but
risk overlooking the benefits a region may derive from public policy deci-
sions which do not involve spending money directing in the region (for
example, Spanish embassies funded by the Spanish government around the
world are designed to benefit all Spaniards including Catalans, but the ex-
penditure is clearly not made in Catalonia itself). The SCPT inevitably gives
results that suggest that the territorial inequalities produced by the system
are not as large as other more traditional methods of calculating fiscal ba-
lances might suggest. 
Given the lack of one standard or universally accepted method of calcu-
lating the impact of the regional financing system on individual regions, the
issue has been heavily subject to political bias and interpretation, with poli-
ticians invariably citing versions of figures that best suit their argument and
rejecting those that do not. The announcements made in mid 2014, regar-
ding the fiscal balances for 2011 – the first time the Spanish government
used its new methodology – were emblematic of the discrepancy. In June
2014, the Catalan government published its report on the fiscal balance of
Catalonia with the Spanish state in 2011 with a headline figure that Catalonia
had suffered a EUR 15.006bn deficit that year (7.7% of its GDP).3 This was
the deficit the Catalan government had calculated under the monetary flow
method, which calculates the balance between taxes paid by residents of
the region to the central government and direct expenditure by the central
government in the Catalan region. Further down in the report, the Catalan
government acknowledged that the figure reduced to EUR 11.087bn (5.7%
of GDP) under the tax-benefit method of calculation, which also takes into
account central government expenditure on policy areas that may benefit
Catalonia but not involve a direct payment to the region. The monetary flow
method, which gives a higher deficit, is nevertheless the one almost always
cited by Catalan nationalist and pro-independence politicians and forces,
with repeated references in public declarations and the media to an average
annual Catalan deficit of around EUR 16bn or 8% of GDP.4 In contrast, the
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3 Generalitat de Catalunya, ‘Els resultats de la balança fiscal de Catalunya amb el sector
públic central l’any 2011’, June 2014. Available online here: http://file02.lavanguardia.com/2014/
06/12/54408942366-url.pdf 
4 For example, ‘La Generalitat cifra en 15.006 millones el déficit fiscal de Catalunya en 2011’,
La Vanguardia, 12.06.14.
new SCPT system (similar in principle to the tax-benefit method with some
further adaptations) gave a Catalan deficit of EUR 8.455bn (4.35% of GDP)
for 2011.5 Both sides accused the other of political bias in their calculations.
Beyond strictly academic literature designed primarily for an academic
audience, the debate has also spawned a plethora of paperback books de-
signed to make the issues as accessible as possible for a more general public
interested in understanding the economic issues at stake. Usually written by
academics and experts in their field or sometimes by more general com-
mentators, these books are designed to convince the reader firmly of one
side or the other. Either they have sought to explain Catalonia’s ‘poor’ finan-
cial treatment by the Spanish state and make the economic case for inde-
pendence (e.g. Bosch and Espasa 2014; Paluzie 2014) or, alternatively, they
analyse the smoke and mirrors in the figures and economic arguments re-
peatedly cited by nationalist and pro-independence politicians in order to
suggest flaws in those arguments (e.g. Borrell and Llorach 2015).              
TABLE 3: Regional debt to regional GDP (%)
Source: Bank of Spain
TABLE 4: Regional unemployment rates (%)
Source: INE: Annual average unemployment based on EPA quarterly unemployment data
Exact numbers aside, it is widely acknowledged that the issue of the Ca-
talan fiscal deficit – alongside other economic matters such as the perceived
lack of sufficient central government investment spending in Catalonia – has
contributed to the rise in pro-independence sentiment in Catalonia in parti-
cular from 2010 onwards, with tensions reaching a height in the wake of the
financial crisis. After Spanish prime minister Mariano Rajoy once again re-
fused to consider a fiscal pact for the region in 2012, Catalan regional presi-
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5 For example, ‘El déficit fiscal de Catalunya es de 8.455 millones según las balanzas del
Gobierno’, La Vanguardia, 23.07.14.
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Basque Country     1.5     4.1     7.7     8.6   11.4   13.2   14.1   14.4
Catalonia   10.0   12.7   17.5   22.0   26.7   29.9   32.7   35.3
Spain     6.6     8.6   11.4   13.6   18.1   20.3   22.7   24.2
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Basque Country      6.6    11.3    10.7    12.3    15.6    16.6    16.3    14.8
Catalonia      8.9    16.2    17.7    19.2    22.5    23.1    20.3    18.6
Spain    11.2    17.9    19.9    21.4    24.8    26.1    24.4    22.1
dent Artur Mas and his party CDC decided to join and lead the rising tide of
pro-independence sentiment. In stark contrast, in the Basque Country, the
fact that the region weathered the crisis better than most regions in Spain
(see Tables 3 and 4, p.26) helped the PNV to retain popularity with a more
moderate territorial agenda. Figures show that since tax collection in Spain
as a whole dropped more rapidly then in the Basque region during the crisis,
the Basque region’s comparative advantage in terms of resource levels re-
lative to other regions in Spain actually increased further during the crisis
(Zubiri 2015: 218). Since the Basque region clearly emerges at a distinct ad-
vantage in terms of final resource levels regardless of which method of cal-
culation is used, politicians in Basque government, technical teams within
the Basque treasuries, and a number of Basque academics have focused
their efforts on negating any untoward ‘privilege’ by explaining the historical
origins of the Basque model and attributing the region’s higher resource le-
vels to better fiscal management rather than a lack of solidarity, given the
level of fiscal responsibility that fiscal autonomy requires (e.g. Uriarte 2015).
Beyond the frenzied debate and value judgements as to which numbers
or calculations are right or wrong, there has been insufficient attention in
both the economic and political science literature to the question of how the
issue of regional financing in all its complexity has contributed to the evolu-
tion of the territorial agendas of CDC/CiU and the PNV in recent decades.
While economists have focused on the numbers to make specific economic
arguments, historians and political scientists have tended to focus their ef-
forts on analysing other external dynamics (social, institutional and political
factors) that have shaped strategic shifts in territorial agendas, usually with
only a cursory mention of regional financing in passing. Often, such cursory
mentions can be misleading, since statements suggesting that Catalonia suf-
fers an ‘annual deficit of 8% of GDP due to the financial arrangements im-
posed by the Spanish state’ (Guibernau 2014: 17), without acknowledging
the methodological disputes over this figure, fail to acknowledge the com-
plexity of the issue. The focus on the numbers by economists, and on other
social, institutional and political factors by political scientists and historians,
has obscured a fuller appreciation of the significance of the political dyna-
mics of regional financing for the evolution of territorial agendas. This thesis
hopes to help bridge the gap between the two types of study by providing
an in-depth analysis of this dimension. To do so will require providing an
extensive account of the many debates over regional financing and reforms
of both the common and ‘foral’ regional financing systems that have taken
place since the first regional financing systems of the democratic period
were designed in 1980, with a particular focus on the more conflictive period
since the late 1990s. Rather than entering into value judgements about the
relative merits of these, the intention will be to do justice to the full comple-
xity of the debates and the divide in perspectives as a foundation for analy-
sing what factors have shaped the stances and strategies of CDC/CiU and
the PNV towards their respective regional financing arrangements in diffe-
rent periods, and what the wider consequences have been for their territorial
agendas regarding the relationship of their respective regions to Spain. Re-
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gional financing preferences and the extent to which these have influenced
the territorial agendas of the Basque and Catalan nationalist parties have de-
pended not only on bilateral Catalan-Spanish and Basque-Spanish tensions
over the issue and wider inter-regional dynamics within Spain, but also on
intra-regional dynamics such as party competition, which require an ade-
quate exploration.
The main aim of this thesis, as stated, is thus to contribute to the literature
identifying the different dynamics influencing shifts in territorial agendas
undertaken by the PNV and CDC by investigating the influence of the regio-
nal financing systems as one such dynamic. As a qualitative case study in-
tended to provide an in-depth comparative case study of the Basque and
Catalan cases within Spain, this thesis does not intend to extract conclusions
that are necessarily generalisable to other countries and contexts, particu-
larly given the vastly different levels of fiscal centralisation or decentralisa-
tion in different European countries, which make generalisations
problematic. It is nevertheless hoped that the thesis will also be of wider in-
terest to political scientists interested in the evolution of nationalist party be-
haviour in Europe and to political economists studying the pros and cons of
different models of fiscal federalism. While comparisons between the com-
mon and foral financing systems are commonly made within Spain, cross-
country comparisons of fiscal federal systems tend usually to factor the
common system only in Spain into their comparative analyses, with little
more than a passing reference to the fact that the Basque and Navarran re-
gions come under a separate model (e.g. Blöchlinger and Vammalle 2012;
Cottarelli and Guerguil 2014). Since the foral financing system offers the
most substantial level of fiscal autonomy at substate level within any EU
member state, Spain offers a unique opportunity to compare and contrast a
revenue-sharing model (the common regime) with a model of substantial
fiscal autonomy, in terms of their implications for the accommodation of na-
tionalist movements within Spain. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
In the light of the above, the main research question this thesis will in-
vestigate is:
– How have the regional financing models in Spain contributed to sha-
ping the evolution of the territorial agendas of the mainstream Basque
and Catalan nationalist parties, in terms of their respective shifts along
a continuum between accommodationist and pro-sovereignty politics?
This will involve exploring the following sub questions:
– What shifts have occurred in the territorial agendas of the PNV and CDC
along the spectrum from territorial accommodation to pro-sovereignty
politics since the late 1990s?
– What political, social and economic drivers help to explain these shifts?
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– What influence have regional financing issues had on the shifts in con-
junction with other drivers? 
– What factors have driven the PNV and CDC’s evolving aspirations with
regard to the respective financing models in their regions since their
first design in the democratic period in 1980? And what have been the
main areas of contention with Spanish governments and other parties
in this regard?
– Why have reforms of their respective regional financing systems repe-
atedly failed to satisfy the PNV and CDC?
– How has the bilateral nature of the Concierto contributed to shaping the
PNV’s conception of sovereignty?
– Beyond bilateral Spanish-Basque fiscal and financial relations, what are
the consequences of the complex nature of the intra-regional dimension
of the Concierto (in terms of fiscal and political relations between pro-
vincial and regional administrations) for the PNV’s territorial agenda?
TIME PERIOD UNDER STUDY
The main focus of analysis in this thesis will be on the behaviour of the
PNV and CDC from the mid 1990s until the end of 2015, an approximately
20-year period in which a number of fundamental developments that would
impact their territorial agendas took place. Some of these factors enabled a
continuation of accommodationist tactics, but many favoured shifts towards
more pro-sovereignty agendas. Understanding some developments from
the mid 1990s nevertheless also requires knowledge of their origins or back-
ground in the earlier years of democracy. This thesis will therefore take into
account Spain’s national and territorial problematic from the transition to
democracy of the late 1970s onwards (after the death of dictator Franco in
1975), including the development of the regional financing systems ever
since both the common system and the Basque Concierto of the democratic
period were first designed in 1980.
A first significant development in the mid 1990s was the change from 11
years of absolute majority Spanish government under the Socialist party
(1982-1993) to the first of what would become a regular occurrence of mi-
nority Spanish governments dependent upon the regionally-based nationa-
list parties for support in the Spanish parliament, given the absence of
alternative state-wide coalition or alliance partners at the time for either the
PSOE or the PP. The turning point came in 1993, when the PSOE won the
Spanish general elections with only a relative majority, following its lengthy
period of absolute majority government from 1982 to 1993. At the next ge-
neral elections in 1996, the PP under José Maria Aznar won for the first time
but with a relative majority too, thus also forming a minority government
dependent upon the support of regionally-based nationalist parties. The start
of Aznar’s first mandate reinforced the emerging trend whereby CiU and/or
the PNV would negotiate gains in regional autonomy in return for lending
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support in the Spanish parliament to the governing statewide party. From
then on, this became the main ‘accommodationist’ tactic nationalist parties
could use to extract decentralisation or economic gains from the central go-
vernment (minority Socialist-led Spanish governments were also formed in
2004-2008 and 2008-2011), whereas their bargaining power during times of
absolute majority PP-led Spanish government (2000-2004 and 2011-2015)
would be severely diminished.6 Spain had previously experienced four years
of minority government under UCD following the first post-constitution elec-
tions (Suárez 1979-1981, Calvo Sotelo 1981-1983) and regional parties inclu-
ding CiU had lent their support, but at that stage regional governments were
still at the formative stage (the first regional elections were held between
1980 and 1983) and the consensual political context of the Transition was in
place. By 1993, when minority governments became a feature of the Spanish
political landscape again, the context was very different: a spirit of political
competition had replaced the spirit of consensus (Hopkin 2005), and regional
governments had become firmly established political arenas. 
However, other dynamics from the mid 1990s onwards contributed to
shifts away from accommodationism towards pro-sovereignty agendas. In
particular, the second half of the 1990s witnessed the beginnings of a signi-
ficant shift in the PNV’s territorial agenda. In 1998, the party’s longstanding
alliance with the Basque federation of the Socialist Party (with which it had
been in coalition in regional government since 1985) came to an end, and it
signed the Lizarra Pact (Pacto de Lizarra) to ally instead with left-wing natio-
nalist and secessionist parties. The alliance was short-lived, but a new PNV-
led Basque government headed by Juan José Ibarretxe would subsequently
attempt to take forward proposals (which were ultimately thwarted) to turn
the Basque region into a new semi-independent associated state of Spain. 
In Catalonia, an explicit shift within CDC towards a pro-sovereignty
agenda and alliances, such as that undertaken by the PNV in the late 1990s
and early 2000s, would not come until several years later. CDC started to
make moves in this direction from around 2008 onwards, before the shift
became explicit in 2012. Nevertheless, some crucial developments in this re-
gard began to take place earlier, from the late 1990s onwards. For example,
after the 1996 reform of the regional financing system very quickly proved
insufficient to satisfy Catalan interests, the then longstanding Catalan presi-
dent and leader of CDC/CiU Jordi Pujol came out publically in favour of a
new bilateral fiscal pact for Catalonia akin to the Concierto for the first time
from 1997. Such developments were tentative only, and at this stage mode-
rate and accommodationist tendencies continued to prevail within CDC and
CiU under Pujol. Artur Mas, Pujol’s successor, then ended up in opposition
to a left-wing coalition government headed by the Catalan Socialists and in-
cluding ERC and ICV, which would be the parties to take forward statute re-
form in Catalonia from 2003 onwards, with CiU in opposition. Many years
later, in 2012, when the opportunity came for Artur Mas, now president, to
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6 On the behaviour of minority governments in Spain, see Field 2009, 2014, 2015, 2016.
lead a pro-sovereignty process for Catalonia, CDC would this time want to
take the lead on issues relative to Catalonia’s autonomy. 
TERMINOLOGY 
Terminology in the field of nationalism studies is inherently problematic,
and particularly so in the case of nationalisms in Spain. This is because many
terms from the social sciences have become associated with a particular po-
litical standpoint, and often this has indeed become the expectation, since
political scientists and historians carrying out academic research in Spain
are often associated with a partisan stance. This study attempts to provide
an analysis that spans the divide in perspectives, and the following clarifi-
cations are thus essential to avoid misinterpretation of meaning. In all cases,
the terminology chosen is not intended to convey any political bias or value
judgement, either positive or negative.
This thesis investigates shifts in territorial agendas by mainstream natio-
nalist parties between accommodationism and pro-sovereignty politics,
where ‘territorial accommodation’ is understood as ‘the capacity of states
to contain conflict within the mechanisms and procedures embedded in exis-
ting institutional arrangements’ (Gillespie 2015a: 4; after Muro 2009: 453).
Accommodationist strategies, when used by Basque and Catalan nationalist
parties, have involved working with Spanish political actors to seek incre-
mental gains in autonomy within the existing legal frameworks of the Spa-
nish Constitution and the regional statutes of autonomy. These statutes
themselves have allowed for flexibility, making accommodationism compa-
tible in principle with initiatives for new statutes. Accommodationism invol-
ves accepting, at least temporarily, the existing structures of the Spanish
state to concentrate on what can be achieved within that context. Often, this
has been achieved through informal pacts or mutual support arrangements
with the central government, whereby the nationalist party supports the go-
verning Spanish party in central parliament in specific areas of legislation,
and in return secures a commitment from the Spanish government to certain
advances in decentralisation or a favourable resolution to certain pending
central-regional government disagreements regarding regional competen-
ces. Such ‘accommodationist’ politics is often also referred to as ‘moderate’
or ‘pragmatic’ nationalist politics in the media and academia – words with
positive connotations, and thus often indicative of the general sympathy in
the media and the wider Spanish political arena for accommodationist be-
haviour by nationalist parties (in contrast with pro-sovereignty politics that
risks a rupture with the Spanish state). The terms ‘accommodation’, ‘mode-
ration’ and ‘pragmatism’ will all be used within this thesis but in the full kno-
wledge that whether or not a nationalist party can behave in a ‘moderate’
and ‘pragmatic’ way is not always down purely to party choice. External con-
texts and constraints, including the behaviour of the central Spanish govern-
ment, can limit the viability of moderate and pragmatic nationalist politics.  
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In contrast, pro-sovereignty politics involves a determined push by Bas-
que and Catalan nationalists for their respective territories to be granted the
‘right to decide’ their own political future and to be invested with sovereign
political power, rather than this being the sole preserve of the Spanish state.
It refers to their desire for substantial changes to the Spanish legal and cons-
titutional framework, or to break with it, to secure a fundamental reconfigu-
ration of their respective territories’ fit within or with Spain. Pro-sovereignty
politics can, but does not have to, imply a push for full independence or se-
cession. It can also imply attempts to reconstruct centre-periphery relations
on a different basis from the existing ‘state of autonomies’, involving a push
for some form of confederalism involving bilateral relations and co-sove-
reignty with the Spanish state (Gillespie 2015a: 10). Former PNV regional
president Juan José Ibarretxe, for example, sought to upgrade the status of
the Basque region to that of a semi-independent associated state of Spain,
based on bilateral relations and co-sovereignty between the Basque Country
and Spain. After adopting an explicitly pro-sovereignty lexicon from 2012
onwards, CDC still maintained a degree of ambiguity for a while as to whe-
ther the ‘state structures’ it sought for Catalonia implied full secession or,
rather, could be incorporated into a more confederal Spain. Shifts away from
traditional accommodationism towards such pro-sovereignty stances by
Basque and Catalan nationalist parties thus take place on a continuum which
can involve various different options ranging somewhere between the polar
opposites of the status quo and secession.7 Moreover, accommodationist
and pro-sovereignty politics are not necessary entirely mutually exclusive.
From 2009 onwards, for example, the PNV under the new leadership of Iñigo
Urkullu would return to more accommodationist tactics in the years after
Ibarretxe’s plan was thwarted, though he would use accommodationist tac-
tics to seek to work more gradually towards a new political relationship with
Madrid based on a more bilateral partnership of equals, involving the pos-
sibility of self-determination and co-sovereignty, hoping to build a greater
consensus among political parties in the Basque region (including the Bas-
que federation of the Spanish Socialist party) in this regard. 
There is no consensus in Spain as to the language used to describe such
shifts towards pro-sovereignty politics. For political opponents, it marks a
‘radicalisation’ of agendas, while Basque and Catalan pro-sovereignty forces,
on the other hand, reject the pejorative connotations of such a word and see
their actions as healthy democratic practice. This thesis will refer fundamen-
tally to shifts between accommodationism and pro-sovereignty politics.
Where ‘radicalisation’ is very occasionally used in reference to territorial
agendas, it is intended only to denote movement along the continuum bet-
ween accommodationist and pro-sovereignty politics, without any value jud-
gement intended. ‘Radical’ itself is reserved for reference to the
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7 For a more in-depth description of the wide-ranging continuum of ‘autonomist’, ‘federalist’
and ‘independentist’ options that regionally-based parties can embrace, see Lluch 2014. 
anti-capitalist, anti-systemic and secessionist left-wing parties of the iz-
quierda abertzale in the Basque region, and the CUP in Catalonia (see below).  
Terminology regarding place names also needs to be clarified. Within the
Spanish ‘state of autonomies’, the Basque Country refers to the autonomous
community of that name (also officially denominated Euskadi), while Cata-
lonia refers to the autonomous community of Catalonia. However, there can
be some confusion since the Basque Country in its widest sense, for histo-
rical reasons long prior to the creation of the Spanish state of autonomies,
also incorporates Navarre (an autonomous community of its own) and parts
of the south of France. In the Catalan case, the wider Catalan-speaking terri-
tories in Spain (primarily Valencia and the Balearics, as well as Catalonia)
and France are known as the ‘Catalan Countries’ (Països Catalans in Catalan)
rather than Catalonia, thus reducing the risk of confusion. In the Basque case
in particular, there remains an attachment among Basque nationalists to the
wider Basque homeland, which they refer to as Euskal Herria in Basque (me-
aning ‘country of euskera’, the Basque language). Certainly, greater coope-
ration with Navarre is something to which many Basque nationalists would
still aspire, if there were sufficient political will from Navarre itself. From a
practical perspective, however, the PNV focuses its efforts regarding the po-
litical future of the Basque Country first and foremost on what is achievable
for the Basque autonomous community, just as CDC’s efforts are centred on
the autonomous community of Catalonia, since the autonomous communi-
ties are the most significant levels of political action for these parties in the
period under analysis. The PNV does have a reasonably significant presence
in Navarre but it has never attained anywhere near the dominance there that
it has had in the Basque autonomous community. In addition, the regional
financing arrangements under study here apply to the autonomous commu-
nities. In the light of this, since the analysis in this thesis is focused on poli-
tical action and regional financing arrangements at the level of the
autonomous community, the term ‘Basque Country’ is usually used to refer
strictly to the Basque autonomous community or region. Basque Country
and Basque region will be used interchangeably in this thesis. In all cases,
where possible, English translations of names of territories and places are
used rather than the Spanish, Catalan or Basque versions. However, where
there is no widely used translation in English, the most commonly known
version (in Spanish/Catalan/Basque) will be used. For example, the capital
of Guipúzcoa will be referred to as San Sebastián (rather than by its Basque
name Donostia) and the capital of the Basque Country as Bilbao (rather than
Bilbo).
For historical reasons and to respect their tax-raising tradition, the Basque
provinces retained elected governments (diputaciones forales) and parlia-
ments or assemblies (juntas generales) under the Basque statute of auto-
nomy, in contrast to the provinces elsewhere in Spain which are more purely
administrative levels of authority. These will be referred to as Basque pro-
vincial governments and provincial parliaments or assemblies in this thesis.
The Basque provinces, also known as ‘foral territories’ or ‘historical territo-
ries’ (as reflected in the First Additional Disposition of the Spanish Constitu-
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tion) are thus endowed with far more substantial powers than the provinces
elsewhere in Spain. Some Basque officials dislike the use of the term ‘pro-
vincial’ to refer to their territories, governments and parliaments at provincial
level, arguing that it risks confusion with other provinces in Spain which
have fewer powers, and thus they tend to use ‘foral’ or ‘historical’ instead.
The view here, however, is that it is preferable wherever possible to use ‘pro-
vincial’ in English, while fully acknowledging and explaining the specific cha-
racteristics of the Basque provinces, since ‘foral’ and ‘historical’ are specific
to the Basque history and context and have no direct equivalent in English. 
The term ‘nation’ is hotly disputed in Spain. The Spanish Constitution
only recognises Spain as a nation, while the Basque Country and Catalonia
are considered ‘nationalities’ but not ‘nations’, and in an administrative
sense they are designated as autonomous communities. Nevertheless, Bas-
que and Catalan nationalists consider the Basque Country and Catalonia to
be nations and have sought their official recognition as such. The then Spa-
nish prime minister Zapatero agreed to allow the 2006 Catalan autonomy
statute to refer to Catalonia as a nation in the preamble, but not in the body
of the text itself, which would have been required to make the term official.
Basque and Catalan nationalists tend to avoid any designation of their auto-
nomous communities as ‘regions’ or use of the term ‘regionalist’ to describe
themselves or their projects, since they consider themselves a nation. ‘Re-
gionalist’ has only been used historically in the Catalan case by pre-Civil War
pro-autonomy forces (e.g. the Lliga Regionalista) and very occasionally in
relatively more recent times to refer to the pro-autonomy stance of the Ca-
talan Socialists, though more often than not the latter’s stance has been re-
ferred to instead as ‘Catalanist’. Catalanism also requires definition here,
since it is an umbrella term used to cover all parties (not just nationalist, but
also the Socialists and other left-wing parties such as ICV) that have at times
sought recognition of Catalonia as a nation and/or its right to shape its own
autonomy (be it on specific issues such as language, or on matters more ge-
nerally), thereby taking a stance able to compete with the nationalists. In
more recent years, the Catalanist phenomenon has also evolved to embrace
a fluid relationship between parties and civil society in support of Catalonia’s
‘right to decide’. Returning to the question of regions and nations, however,
the Spanish autonomous communities are regularly referred to in literature
in English as ‘regions’ and their governments as ‘regional governments’ for
purely practical reasons, since ‘autonomous community’ is a term unique
to the Spanish setup and ‘region’ is its closest generic equivalent in English.
As a result, ‘region’ and ‘autonomous community’ will be used interchan-
geably in this thesis to refer to that level of political administration. The de-
cision to use the term ‘region’ does not reflect any judgement as to whether
or not the Basque Country and Catalonia should be officially recognised as
nations. It is simply a shorter means of referring to the administrative level
of government of the autonomous communities, widely used in English
translation. 
Use of the term ‘Spanish state’ also requires clarification here. Basque
and Catalan nationalists who consider themselves first and foremost Basque
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or Catalan rather than Spanish, and who wish to distance themselves from
Spain, frequently refer to ‘the Spanish state’ (‘el Estado español’) instead of
Spain. ‘Spanish state’ has thus become a rather pejorative and negative
means of referring to Spain when used in this sense. In political science li-
terature, however, the term ‘state’ is widely used in a neutral sense as part
of standard terminology to distinguish between supranational, state and
substate levels of government. In this thesis, where frequent reference is
made to the ‘Spanish state’, it is strictly in this neutral sense, without any
negative connotations intended, in order to make clear the distinction bet-
ween state and substate levels using the standardised political science ter-
minology. 
Another area of terminological confusion is how to refer to non state-
wide or stateless political parties based in specific regions of a state. In the
wider literature on such parties throughout Europe, they have variously been
referred to as ‘ethnoregionalist’, ‘nationalist’ or ‘autonomist’ parties, among
various other labels (Hepburn 2009). This thesis, in accordance with general
usage in the literature on Catalan and Basque parties, will refer to the PNV
and CiU as nationalist parties, while acknowledging that the term ‘nationa-
list’ is a problematic one. Many within the PNV and CiU do not consider
themselves as such and dislike the term, since they tend to believe the term
‘nationalist’ is more appropriate for Spanish centralist parties like the PP.
They argue that the PP is more ‘nationalist’ since it seeks to use the Spanish
state to create a Spanish nation, in contrast to Catalonia and the Basque
Country which they consider pre-existing nations seeking to create a state.8
Some within the PNV would in fact prefer to change the party’s name to Bas-
que National Party instead of Basque Nationalist Party.9 Still, there is a ge-
neral acceptance amongst the PNV and CDC/CiU that they form part of the
nationalist party family as broadly conceived of in the social sciences, and
the term will be widely used in this thesis in this sense. The term nationalist
will not only be used to refer to the substate nationalist movements (also
often described in the literature as ‘peripheral nationalisms’), but also to Spa-
nish nationalist discourse, which sectors of the PP in particular have sought
to reassert to create a Castilian-centred national identity, in particular on the
occasions where the party has been able to form absolute majority govern-
ments in Madrid (2000-2004 and 2011-2015). In Spain, there is thus a clash
between competing nationalisms at state and substate levels. 
Aside from the PNV and CDC/CiU, the traditionally dominant centre-right
nationalist parties, both the Basque and Catalan regions are also home to
left-wing, separatist parties. In Catalonia, the main left-wing secessionist
party has traditionally been the Republican Left of Catalonia (Esquerra Re-
publicana de Catalunya, ERC), while another secessionist party with more
radical left-wing views has been the Popular Unity Candidacy (Candidatura
d’Unitat Popular, CUP). These parties will usually be referred to in this thesis
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8 For example, personal interview with Germà Bel, 27 April 2015.
9 For example, personal interview with Iñaki Goikoetxeta, 7 July 2014.
primarily as secessionist or pro-independence parties, while acknowledging
that in the case of ERC, the party has not always formally pushed for inde-
pendence, even since it formally committed itself to this goal in the late
1980s – most notably, it moderated its territorial ambitions to enter govern-
ment during the years of tripartite coalition government in Catalonia in 2003-
2010. These parties may also be grouped under the label ‘nationalist’ if a
generic term is needed to describe them together with CDC. In Catalonia,
around the time when CDC shifted to a more pro-sovereignty lexicon from
2012 onwards, many citizens who had never been Catalan nationalist sup-
porters previously were joining the separatist cause, and the distinctions bet-
ween the more mainstream nationalist party and other more traditionally
separatist parties (ERC and the CUP) in terms of their territorial agendas be-
came more blurred. The terms soberanista or independentista have become
the preferred term by many within those parties and their supporters to des-
cribe themselves, since many do not see themselves as nationalists from
the Catalan nationalist tradition (and since the traditional ‘nationalists’ often
do not like that term in any case). Those terms, soberantista and indepen-
dentista, or alternatively pro-sovereignty and pro-independence politicians
and voters, may also be used in this thesis where appropriate.
In the Basque region, the radical left, secessionist alternative has been
the parties of the izquierda abertzale (literally, ‘the patriotric left’, where ‘iz-
quierda’ is the Spanish word for ‘left’ and ‘abertzale’ the Basque word for
‘patriotic’). The ‘izquierda abertzale’ is an umbrella term used to denote the
various left-wing, separatist parties and organisations in the region which
have tended to ally together. Aside from their vision of an independent Eus-
kal Herria, they are also known for their radical anti-capitalist and anti-
system ideology. The term ‘izquierda abertzale’ will thus be used in this
thesis but it requires some clarification here, since it has embraced a com-
plex and changing mix of parties and party names over the decades. The
izquierda abertzale was originally considered first and foremost the political
wing of ETA when the terrorist group was in operation, though it would also
come to embrace left-wing, secessionist parties critical of ETA but sharing
the radical left-wing, secessionist ideology of that milieu. The main forma-
tion was Herri Batasuna (HB, Popular Unity) from 1978 onwards, which re-
gistered as a political party in 1986 and was later refounded as Batasuna in
2001, at which stage a minority faction which formed a critical current
against ETA chose to leave and found a separate party, Aralar. In a contro-
versial decision, Batasuna was outlawed in 2003 under the Spanish Law of
Parties of 2002, which banned any political parties with links to terrorism.
Previous formations HB, Batasuna and Euskal Herritarrok (‘Basque Citizens’)
– the latter of which was a coalition including HB Batasuna formed in 1998
– were also banned. Sortu (‘Create’), a new party created in 2011, was con-
sidered the main heir to Batasuna. Since Sortu was initially outlawed too
(though the decision was later reversed on appeal), the izquierda abertzale
formed instead a coalition called Bildu (‘Gather’) to stand at the 2011 regio-
nal and municipal elections. Bildu brought together the two parties Eusko
Alkartasuna (EA, Basque Solidarity) and Alternatiba (‘The Alternative’), as
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well as some other organisations and independents of the izquierda abert-
zale. EA was the party that had formed after the split within the PNV in 1986,
which had often allied with the PNV thereafter, but from 2009 onwards it
had shifted definitively to join the izquierda abertzale. Alternatiba, mean-
while, was founded in 2009 as a result of the split within the Basque fede-
ration of the Spanish United Left party (Izquierda Unida, IU). While Bildu
was the denomination used in the Basque region for the purpose of Basque
regional and provincial elections, it presented itself as Amaiur (‘Mother
Earth’) at the 2011 Spanish elections. The Bildu coalition would be succee-
ded in 2012 by Euskal Herria Bildu (EH Bildu), a new version of the coalition
also incorporating Sortu (now legalised following a successful appeal
against its outlawing) and also Aralar, to stand at the 2012 Basque regional
elections for the first time.
Finally, the definitions of and distinction between fiscal autonomy and
fiscal sovereignty used in this thesis need to be explained here, since these
are not clear-cut. In brief, fiscal autonomy when applied to substate govern-
ments usually describes a large degree of freedom in raising and spending
taxes but still within the boundaries of some rules set by the wider state, as
is currently true of the Basque region. Fiscal sovereignty, meanwhile, is more
often applied to states themselves and suggests complete autonomy in set-
ting fiscal policies without any outside interference. In practice, complete fis-
cal sovereignty has now become almost obsolete in Europe since individual
member states are subject to some wider European fiscal legislation, espe-
cially in the case of indirect taxation. In this thesis, however, fiscal sove-
reignty when applied to the Basque provinces describes the aspiration to
reach the same level of sovereignty in setting tax structures and policies in
most respects as held by Spain itself. Representatives of the Basque institu-
tions refer to the provinces as fiscally sovereign already in the case of taxes
for which they have been granted  regulatory autonomy (within the limita-
tions of the harmonisation rules with Spanish legislation). 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY
This study is interested first and foremost in achieving an in-depth kno-
wledge of the distinctiveness of the particular cases under study, in order to
be able to contribute both to the specific debates surrounding their individual
relationships to the Spanish context and to comparative Catalan-Basque
analysis of the subject. A qualitative methodology will be used, informed by
the conviction that in-depth inductive, qualitative case studies of the Basque
and Catalan nationalist parties are still much needed to unearth the different
dynamics and drivers shaping their evolving behaviour. By investigating the
impact of regional financing on the evolving territorial agendas of nationalist
parties, this thesis is located in the political science literature on the beha-
viour of regionalist and nationalist parties in Western Europe. This section
serves first to situate this thesis within the context of some of the relevant
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European literature in this field, using this as an introduction to the justifica-
tion and explanation of the methodological approach chosen. The next sub-
section explains the choice of elite interviews as the main research method.
Separate subsections then look at the reasons for the choice of a Basque-
Catalan comparative case study (including key works on the topic) and the
exclusion of Galicia and Navarre, while a final subsection provides an intro-
duction to the two regional financing systems.
Theoretical background: The literature on regionalist and nationa-
list party behaviour
The literature on nations, nationalisms and nationalist parties encompas-
ses a very wide field of study. This thesis does not intend to enter into theo-
retical debates on the definition of nations or nationalisms, but rather it is
located in the literature which seeks ‘to investigate the complex heteroge-
neity of political orientations within national movements and their temporal
evolution’ (Lluch 2014: 3). Lluch (2014) points out that theorists have too
often assumed that nationalist parties who seek increasing increments of
sovereignty are ultimately aiming towards the full and ultimate goal of full
independence or secession, when in actual fact their visions of sovereignty
can embrace a range of autonomist, federalist and secessionist options and
their ‘orientations can evolve over time’ (2014: 4), which calls for a deeper
exploration of what causes such shifts in nationalist party orientation. Mo-
reover, this thesis is located in the wider growing body of literature seeking
to understand and explain the behaviour of stateless regionalist and natio-
nalist parties (hereafter regionalist-nationalist parties) as they strategize
along both the territorial and left-right dimensions of party competition (e.g.
Hepburn 2009, Massetti 2009, Elias and Tronconi 2011a and 2011b, Elias et
el. 2015; Massetti and Schakel 2015). Notwithstanding the diversity of the
ideological identities of the parties included under this definition, they are
widely considered a ‘party family’ since they are united by the fact that their
‘party politics is firmly anchored in the specificity of their territorial claims’
(Gómez-Reino 2008:9, as cited in Hepburn 2009: 480-1). This subsection the-
refore provides an overview of the growing literature on regionalist-natio-
nalist party behaviour and considers how this thesis fits within and
contributes to it. 
When political scientists from Anthony Downs (1957) onwards first star-
ted to devise analytical frameworks for the study of party systems and com-
petition in Western Europe, the focus was almost exclusively on the level of
the nation-state and the left-right axis of competition (Alonso et al. 2015:
851). Jeffery (2009: 640) points out that when scholars from Stein Rokkan
and his colleagues onwards then looked for evidence of the resurgence of
territorial identities in the 1960s and 1970s having a significant impact on
statewide party systems, ‘they did not find it’.  Nationalist-regionalist parties
were largely dismissed at the time as ‘niche’ or ‘single-issue’ parties concer-
ned with the territorial rather than left-right dimension, which commanded
too little support to have an impact on the main pattern of competition.
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Alonso et al. (2015: 851) suggest that this interpretation of party competition
‘was later complemented by the notion of valence issues (Stokes 1963) and
by the idea that parties also strategize by emphazising issues, positional or
valence, in which parties have a reputational or credibility advantage while
ignoring issues for which these advantages do not exist (Budge and Farlie
1983).’ This, in turn, led to the interpretation that the issues raised by ‘niche’
or ‘single-issue’ parties tended to be absorbed by the mainstream parties
and subsumed into the dominant left-right dimension (Alonso et el. 2015:
851). 
The outlook would however change as the sub-state level in Western Eu-
rope was strengthened with the introduction of regional elections in Spain,
France, Belgium and the UK in the 1980s and 1990s and powers were gra-
dually devolved to the regional or substate government level. As the number
of regionalist-nationalist parties began to grow, so did their electoral and po-
litical success at substate level. Thereafter, a substantial number of regiona-
list-nationalist parties began to successfully gain control at sub-state level
as majority or minority governments, or to contribute to substate govern-
ments through coalitions or more informal parliamentary support arrange-
ments and alliances. In turn, the increased success of regionalist-nationalist
parties at sub-state level would lead to many entering government coalitions
at the state level (in Italy, Belgium and Germany) or supporting the central
government through alliances, as seen in Spain, usually in return for con-
cessions at the regional level. 
This has prompted political scientists in the past decade to start to deve-
lop new analytical frameworks for the study of party systems in Western Eu-
rope to account for their multi-level and multi-dimensional nature. Swenden
and Maddens (2008) describe how reconceptualising party systems as multi-
level requires taking into account the nature of regional party systems as
well as the state-wide one; how regional party systems within a state interact
with each other; and how they interact with the state-wide system via both
top-down and bottom-up processes. Similarly, new frameworks now seek
to account for the fact that party systems operate in multidimensional policy
spaces where the left-right divide is only one among various axes of com-
petition. In the case of Spain, for example, studies have emphasized that that
the main issues driving party competition are territorial decentralisation, im-
migration and the state-Church relationship, rather than the classic left-right
divide (Sánchez-Cuenca and Dinas 2012; Dinas 2012). Importantly, in the new
literature on nationalist-regionalist party behaviour, ‘spatial and salience the-
ories of party competition are increasingly seen as complementary rather
than competing approaches’ (Elias et al. 2015: 839-840).
In this context, various studies from around 2008 onwards have focused
in particular on the following three elements of party systems and competi-
tion in multi-level and multi-dimensional policy settings in Western Europe:
1) The adaptation of state-wide parties to regional party competition.
Analytical frameworks have been developed to account for the strate-
gic and organisational adaptation of state-wide parties to substate elec-
toral arenas (e.g. Roller and Van Houten 2003, Fabre 2008, Swenden
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and Maddens 2008, Hopkin 2009) and the role of state-wide parties in
decentralisation processes in Western Europe (e.g. Toubeau and Mas-
setti 2013). State-wide parties show varying levels of organisational
decentralisation and give varying degrees of autonomy to their regio-
nal branches in terms of campaign strategies, coalition formation op-
tions and policy decision-making. The main independent variables
which have been cited as determinants of these variations include ins-
titutional features, cleavage structures, electoral and party system va-
riables and party-specific variables. 
2) The behaviour of regionalist-nationalist parties. This strand of the litera-
ture focuses primarily on how regionalist-nationalist parties make the
transition from being niche parties focused almost exclusively on terri-
torial questions to becoming mainstream parties, developing broader
policy agendas in order to cross thresholds of representation (e.g. De
Winter and Tursan 2004; Hepburn 2009; Massetti 2009). It also considers
the consequences of government incumbency for regionalist-nationalist
parties if and when they reach the stage of entering government (e.g.
De Winter et al. 2006; Elias and Tronconi 2011a and 2011b). 
3) Government formation in regional party systems, especially in terms
of coalition arrangements and behaviour. This literature (e.g. Stefuriuc
2009) has sought to develop new models to explain government and
coalition formation at sub-state level in multi-dimensional and multi-
level political contexts. In so doing it has sought to combat the longs-
tanding theoretical and practical problems plaguing classical coalition
theories originally devised in the 1950s and 1960s, which were based
on assumptions that the policy space was unidimensional (focusing
solely on the left-right axis) and treated parties as unitary actors with
clear goals (thus essentially ignoring intra-party divisions and bargai-
ning) (see De Winter and Dumont 2006). 
The second of these areas of literature is of particular relevance to this
thesis. The emergence of regionalist-nationalist parties has inspired a gro-
wing literature in recent years seeking to develop analytical frameworks to
explain their positioning and behaviour. In this regard, as stated, the domi-
nant trend has been to focus on the trajectory of these parties from ‘niche’
or ‘outsider’ to ‘mainstream’ or ‘normal’ (e.g. Hepburn 2009, Massetti 2009,
Elias and Tronconi 2011a and 2011b, Elias et el. 2015, Massetti and Schakel
2015). This has involved combining sociological, institutional and rational
choice approaches to analyse the evolving priorities of regionalist-nationalist
parties and their changing role in party systems as they seek to cross various
thresholds of representation by gaining votes, policy influence and office,
thus forcing them to develop mainstream policy agendas in addition to their
traditional focus on their territorial goals. It has also involved analysing the
opportunities, challenges and consequences for parties of seeking to com-
pete in both a multidimensional policy space (beyond just the traditional left-
right axis) and a multi-level sphere (comprising sub-state, national and
supranational levels), in contrast to the almost exclusive focus on the left-
right axis and the state level in early political science frameworks. 
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In this regard, the literature has focused on the increased complexities
which regionalist-nationalist parties face in seeking to reconcile different ob-
jectives. Elias (2011a: 508), for example, argues that: ‘There are often trade-
offs between being in office, on the one hand, and policy influence and/or
future electoral performance, on the other; these tradeoffs may be particu-
larly complex in a multi-level context.’ Hepburn (2009: 479) points out that,
‘Experience in government has created new challenges for these actors. In
particular, they must strike a balance between establishing themselves as
an effective and competent party of government, whilst at the same time
maintaining their commitment to radically overhauling the state.’ For exam-
ple, a regionalist-nationalist party forced to moderate its territorial goals to
enter office and then suffer the attrition that comes with having to take ‘hard
choice’ policy decisions must weigh up the risk of losing its hard-line sup-
porters (e.g. ERC lost support after its experience as part of a tripartite coa-
lition in Catalonia). At the opposite end of the spectrum, a regiona-
list-nationalist party which is successful in promoting its territorial goals
once in office may risk losing its raison d’être. Deschouwer (2009) argued
that the fate of the original regionalist-nationalist parties seeking greater au-
tonomy for their regions in Belgium is a case in point. Said parties became
obsolete after years of collaboration with state-wide parties in coalitions had
narrowed the distinction between the two, the state-wide parties had assu-
med the regionalist-nationalist parties’ demands for more autonomy, and
new secessionist parties had emerged.
In seeking to show that regionalist-nationalist parties can no longer be
considered ‘niche’ or ‘single-issue’ actors, academics have focused in parti-
cular on the importance of the class-based or economic interests and cha-
racterization of these parties, which has traditionally been neglected.
Hepburn (2009: 490), for example, recalls Freeden’s (1998: 751) argument
that nationalism focused narrowly on the idea of nation and national self-
determination is too ‘thin’ an ideology for a political party seeking office and
must therefore be supplemented with other ‘idea systems’ which mains-
tream ideologies address, such as social justice and the distribution of re-
sources. In their study of regionalist-nationalist parties in Spain and the UK,
for example, Alonso et al. (2015) explore the party strategies used in a two-
dimensional space (compriing the left-right and centre-periphery axes of
competition) and the circumstances in which the parties use one or another
strategy, finding that ‘regionalist parties engage mostly in blurring and two-
dimensional strategies’ and do not use the one-dimensional strategy (2015:
859). Moreover, Hepburn (2009: 479) reminds us that, ‘In many cases, the te-
rritorial goals of SNRPs are strongly informed by their socio-economic pro-
grammes, which shape their vision of the kind of society that they would like
to create for the territory.’ Thus, adopting positions on mainstream left-right
political issues is not just a mere rite of passage in order to gain votes, policy
influence and enter government, and the centre-periphery and left-right axes
of competition are not necessarily independent of one another. Rather, the
socio-economic vision that a nationalist-regionalist party has regarding its
territory very often forms a strong part of its vision of what the nation should
41
be. Socio-economic goals and territorial goals, in this sense, often go hand
in hand. 
The proposed study of the PNV and CiU in this thesis offers an opportu-
nity to contribute insights to develop these emerging analytical frameworks
on the  behaviour of the regionalist-nationalist party family. Since the
mainstream nationalist parties CiU and PNV are among the regionalist-na-
tionalist parties in Western Europe which have governed at sub-state level
for the longest, they offer excellent case studies to explore in more detail
the challenges that regionalist-nationalist parties face both to retain voters
and achieve their goals once in power. Both parties are a somewhat awk-
ward fit for the ‘niche-to-normal’ framework since this assumes the gradual
movement of regionalist-nationalist parties into the mainstream, whereas
the PNV and CiU became mainstream parties from winning their first res-
pective post-Constitution regional elections in 1980 onwards, and due to
Spain’s specificity as a relatively young democracy it had no great period
of centralised democratic rule pre-devolution. Moreover, the two parties
have managed to hold onto power for far longer than most regionalist-na-
tionalist parties. The PNV’s 29 years in power in the Basque Autonomous
Community from 1980 to 2009 (30 if we include its leadership of the Basque
General Council from 1979) gave it the longest regional incumbency record
in Western Europe after the SVP in the South Tyrol region of Italy (De la
Calle and Sánchez Cuenca 2009: 211), and it returned to power in 2012. CiU
is not far behind, governing in Catalonia for an uninterrupted 23-year period
from 1980 to 2003 and returning to power from 2010 onwards. Not only do
the PNV and CiU feature among the regionalist-nationalist parties with the
longest incumbency records, but during that period they also practiced ‘ac-
commodationist’ politics for a longer period than most, prioritising pro-au-
tonomy rather than secessionist positions and cooperation with state-wide
parties and the central government in Madrid, certainly in the 1980s and
1990s. For much of their time in power in their respective regions, the two
parties’ moderate approach led to increasing gains in regional autonomy,
and yet these neither led to a waning in their raison d’être nor to a need to
‘radicalise’ their territorial agendas to maintain their relevance – frequent
outcomes for regionalist-nationalist parties once in power. From the mid
1990s pressures on the ability of both CiU and PNV to continue to garner
support while maintaining their traditional autonomist stances would ne-
vertheless emerge amid changing circumstances, some shared by both re-
gions and some specific to each.
While the ‘niche-to-normal’ framework has often focused on the prior
conditions (social, institutional, political and ideological) which shape the
positioning of emerging regionalist-nationalist parties, the Basque Country
and Catalonia thus offer excellent case studies to explore in more detail the
challenges that regionalist-nationalist parties already in the mainstream face
to stay in power and the implications for their territorial agendas. Cross-
country studies have begun to emerge to provide analytical frameworks for
assessing the consequences of government incumbency for regionalist-na-
tionalist parties (e.g. De Winter at al. 2006; Elias and Tronconi 2011a and
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2011b). We are concerned here with the implications in particular for their
territorial agendas. In the Basque and Catalan cases, the strategic behaviour
of the PNV and CDC/CiU on territorial matters has been analysed in terms of
the external dynamics acting upon their shifting agendas (Gillespie and Gray,
eds. 2015). This thesis hopes to be innovative by looking in detail at the in-
fluence of the regional financing models on the evolution of territorial stra-
tegies and behaviour of the PNV and CDC/CiU as both have fought to stay in
power in their respective regions. Spain is a particularly interesting case in
that it offers the opportunity to investigate two different models of fiscal de-
centralisation in relation to two different substate nationalist movements,
since the Basque and Catalan regions are each afforded different levels of
fiscal authority. 
Generalised theories cannot account adequately for the specific charac-
teristics, nuances and complexities of the individual cases under study here,
which need to be analysed in depth in order to provide a more comprehen-
sive account of the impact of the regional financing systems on territorial
agendas in those cases, which constitutes the purpose of this thesis. This
research thus seeks to uncover explanatory factors to explain individual
cases for which existing theories are lacking or too generalised, making a
qualitative, inductive approach appropriate. This is in contrast to much quan-
titative research which derives hypotheses from pre-existing theoretical fra-
meworks and seeks to improve those frameworks by discovering
explanatory variables that are generalizable across different cases. Since the
regional party systems at work in different countries – as well as their res-
pective relationships to the state-wide party system in each – vary widely,
large-N cross-country quantitative studies can risk overlooking important
country-specific explanatory factors which a qualitative approach is more li-
kely to capture. In seeking to explain the dynamics behind shifts in the orien-
tation of nationalist parties, regional financing is certainly one such factor
whose full significance in Spain risks being overlooked in cross-country com-
parative studies. Spain offers the opportunity to investigate two different
models of fiscal decentralisation in relation to two different substate natio-
nalist movements, since the Basque and Catalan regions are each afforded
different levels of fiscal authority. While some other federal and decentrali-
sed states in Europe also have federal and decentralised fiscal frameworks,
the characteristics of these differ considerably, making generalisations pro-
blematic, and there is no other region (apart from Navarre) in Europe with
the extent of fiscal autonomy afforded to the Basque Country.10
Recent studies seeking to analyse party systems and competition in multi-
level political contexts and multi-dimensional policy environments have cle-
arly demonstrated the need for inductive, qualitative methods to gain a fuller
understanding of the factors driving the behaviour of parties in such com-
plex settings, thus also justifying the approach selected in this thesis. The
traditional focus almost exclusively on the framework of the nation-state and
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10 The closest similarities are with the Italian regions of Val d’Aosta and South Tyrol-Trentino
(Colino 2010:1).
the left-right axis of competition in early political science literature placed
significant emphasis on rational choice approaches of understanding party
ideology and positioning as a function of the conditions of electoral demand
and supply and tended to treat parties as unitary actors with clear goals.
Such rational choice institutionalist approaches were combined with clea-
vage-based sociological approaches. The factors which these approaches
failed to take adequate account of – most notably, the internal life of parties
and the human behaviour of the actors involved – become ever more im-
portant in multi-dimensional and multi-level contexts, and in regionalist-na-
tionalist parties where strong internal disagreements may emerge over
issues such as the level of compromise members are prepared to accept bet-
ween office-seeking goals and their ideological tradition. 
As an example, Stefuriuc’s case study (2009) of regional government for-
mation in Spain demonstrates as much. She compiles a dataset of a total of
55 regional coalition and minority governments that formed in Spain from
the mid-1980s to 2007, using average policy scores from post-electoral sur-
veys carried out by the Spanish Centre for Sociological Research (Centro de
Investigaciones Sociológicas, CIS) to measure party policy positions, and
implements a conditional logit model to estimate the effects of a series of
determinants of coalition choice (see Stefuriuc 2009: 105ff). The results of
her quantitative analysis confirm the relevance of classical predictors of co-
alition formation (related to size, ideology and familiarity) as the model fit
gradually improves with the addition of each. Yet when new variables are
added to the model to investigate multi-level variables including the territo-
rial dimension of party competition and coalition congruence, they surpri-
singly do not prove statistically significant. However, when Stefuriuc
proceeds to carry out a more in-depth qualitative analysis of two coalition
formation processes in Catalonia (2003 and 2006) using qualitative process-
tracing, this contradicts the results of the quantitative analysis by showing
clearly the crucial role of multi-level factors and the territorial policy dimen-
sion. The rationales for the two coalition formations comprise an ‘intricate
mix’ of policy-, office- and vote-seeking motivations as well as multi-level
considerations, and both the left-right and territorial policy dimensions con-
tribute to the outcomes. Noticeably, CiU – the median legislator on the terri-
torial dimension – was absent from both coalitions and hence the coalition
that formed was disconnected, thus indicating that ‘[classical rational choice]
characteristics, such as the median legislator or policy connectedness, do
not always adequately grasp the policy calculations of political parties in
multi-level settings’ (Stefuriuc 2009b: 112). 
Stefuriuc thus concludes that sufficient data for quantitative comparative
analyses of regional government coalition formation is currently lacking.
More in-depth qualitative studies are needed to fully capture the multi-level
dynamic in different countries in order ultimately to build a better model.
This thesis, in a similar spirit, starts from the premise that an in-depth qua-
litative study is needed to reach an understanding of the full complexity of
the relationship between the regional financing models in Spain and the evo-
lution of Basque and Catalan territorial agendas.
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Research method: The choice of elite interviews
This research is qualitative and inductive in nature, informed first and fo-
remost by an extensive programme of in-depth semi-structured elite inter-
views in the Basque and Catalan regions carried out by the author in
2014-2016 during extended periods of fieldwork based in the Basque Country
and Catalonia, respectively (see Appendix 1 for a full list of interviewees and
short biographies of each, Appendix 2 for the information sheet provided to
interviewees about the project, and Appendix 3 for a selection of sample in-
terview questionnaires). Interviews with elite actors involved in Basque and
Catalan politics at different times since the 1980s were considered essential
in order to explore why party decisions were taken at certain junctures and
what happened in their interactions with other elites over time. Given the
often opaque nature of many of the negotiations over regional financing in
Spain, elite interviews with a range of actors with direct experience of regio-
nal financing negotiations were also deemed essential in order to elucidate
the different dynamics involved specifically in regional financing negotia-
tions and ultimately their impact on the behaviour of CDC and the PNV. 
The original strategy was to aim to interview subjects who had been cen-
trally involved in policy making in the Basque and Catalan regions at different
periods since the 1980s (i.e. key members of current and former regional go-
vernments and party executive members), but also to obtain responses from
different currents within the party (in the case of the PNV and CDC) and to ac-
cess party subjects across the region where relevant (particularly in the Bas-
que case, where interviews needed to be conducted at both regional and
provincial level, since it is the Basque provinces that raise and collect the taxes
for the region). While this original strategy was pursued as much as possible
by identifying and contacting a wide range of appropriate interview subjects,
the fact that some interviewees subsequently provided introductions to other
interviewees during the project was seen as a bonus, providing additional in-
formation and further accounts of the same events – and thus a safeguard
against the fragility of human memory – and sometimes additional documen-
tation regarding negotiations. Some interviews were conducted with repre-
sentatives of the other parties in the region about the main nationalist parties,
which was also intended to ward against bias insofar as possible.  
A ‘general inductive approach’ (Thomas 2006) was deemed most appro-
priate, whereby the research was guided by overall evaluation objectives ra-
ther than concrete hypotheses, since the aim was to unearth explanations
rather than to test pre-existing theories. Potentially relevant areas of interest
were identified which might contribute to gaining a fuller understanding of:
(1) the impact of the different regional financing models in the two regions
on the evolution of the territorial agendas of the respective mainstream na-
tionalist parties in each, in comparison with or in interaction with other dri-
vers; and (2) the in-depth dynamics of regional financing negotiations at
different periods, and ultimately their impact on the behaviour of the PNV
and CDC. Some interviews were also conducted on the evolution of Basque
and Catalan nationalist politics more generally, to put regional financing con-
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cerns in context. In all cases, interviews were semi-structured, with interview
questionnaires being used as an approximate guide only and questions
being deliberately open. Such flexibility allowed a wider range of findings
to emerge from interviewees’ accounts of their experiences, rather than the
interviewer seeking to test pre-existing ideas and theories. 
Questionnaires were also tailored to each specific interviewee and his/her
experience of party politics in general and/or regional financing negotiations,
since different interviewees had been involved in politics at different times
and had taken part in different negotiations, therefore it was not possible to
use just one interview template since the aim was to understand different key
junctures and negotiations in as much depth as possible (see Appendix 3 for
a sample of interview questionnaires). Tables 5 and 6 (pp.47-48) provide details
of the main topic areas which interviewees were asked about, and which in-
terviewees contributed to which topic. Sometimes interviewees were asked
about a particular topic in more depth than in other cases, depending on their
level of involvement. In the case of all key negotiations or key turning points,
at least two or three different actors involved were interviewed in order to en-
sure different perspectives were sought, so that the comments of one inter-
viewee could be corroborated with at the very least one other, as a safeguard
against bias. For example, interview questions on the debates over regional
financing during the negotiations for the drafting of a new Catalan regional
statute were posed to the main relevant spokespeople for each of the three
parties forming the Catalan tripartite coalition government at the time – Antoni
Castells (PSC), Josep Huguet (ERC) and Jaume Bosch (ICV) – as well as the
CDC spokesperson, Francesc Homs. To give another example, questions re-
garding how the PSOE and the PNV reached an agreement in 1987 to settle
existing disputes over the Concierto as part of a tradeoff to allow the formation
of a PNV-PSE coalition government in the Basque region were posed to re-
presentatives of both the PSE (Carlos Aguirre, Gonzalo Múgica, Manuel Sali-
nero) and the PNV (José Antonio Ardanza, Pedro Larrea) who had been
directly involved in the negotiations at the time.  
In total, personal interviews were conducted with approximately 45 in-
terviewees in the Basque and Catalan regions (see Appendix 1). These in-
cluded current and former politicians and their advisers representing
political parties across the spectrum in both regions, as well as, in the Bas-
que case, some relevant technical officials in the provincial administrations.
These technical officials were interviewed not simply for technical informa-
tion, but also because they had participated in key intraregional negotiatons
over the Concierto, giving them first hand insight into the political dynamics
between the provinces. Moreover, they often reflected the policy of the tra-
ditionally dominant party in their province. Most notably, since Vizcaya has
been governed consistently by the PNV throughout the democratic period,
key treasury officials there, albeit not affiliated to a political party themselves,
tend both to reflect and inform PNV policy.11
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11 This was raised by PNV representative Pedro Azpiazu himself at interview. 
TABLE 5: Interviews in the Basque Country
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TOPIC INTERVIEWEES (in alphabetical order)
1) What factors explain shifts in the PNV’s
territorial strategy (along a continuum from
accommodationist to pro-sovereignty poli-
tics) in the contemporary period? The main
focus here was on the shift away from ac-
commodationist politics and towards pro-
sovereignty politics from the end of the
1990s under the regional premiership of
Ibarretxe, and the subsequent shift back to-
wards a more moderate agenda under
Urkullu.
Xabier Agirre (PNV); Carlos Aguirre (PSE);
Iñaki Anasagasti (PNV); Xabi Anza (trade
union ELA); José Antonio Ardanza (PNV);
Sabino Arrieta (PNV); Pedro Azpiazu (PNV);
José Ramón Beloki (PNV); Antón Dambore-
nea (PP); Joseba Egibar (PNV); Josu Erkoreka
(PNV); Jonan Fernández (social movement
Elkarri); Iñaki Goikeotxeta (PNV); Juan José
Ibarretxe (PNV); Rafael Larreina (EA); Koldo
Mediavilla (PNV); Laura Mintegi (Bildu);
Txema Montero (formerly HB, subsequently
close to PNV); Emilio Olabarria (PNV); Andoni
Ortuzar (PNV); Manuel Salinero (PSE)
2) How does the bilateral dimension of the
Concierto work? And what have been the im-
plications for Spanish-Basque relations? The
main focus here was on key instances of bi-
lateral negotiations since the 1980s, includ-
ing the 1981 Concierto law; the 1985
negotiation to devolve VAT collection pow-
ers; the agreements reached in 1987 be-
tween the PNV and the PSE to resolve
discrepancies over the quota law and pay-
ments; the modifications made in 1997 to the
1981 Concierto law; the negotiations for the
new 2002 Concierto law; and disagreements
since 2007 over the quota law and settle-
ment of the annual quota payments.
Carlos Aguirre (PSE); Iñaki Anasagasti (PNV);
José Antonio Ardanza (PNV);  Pedro Azpiazu
(PNV); Antón Damborenea (PP); Juan José
Ibarretxe (PNV); Pedro Larrea (PNV); Gemma
Martínez Bárbara (technical team, treasury of
Bizkaia); Gonzalo Múgica (PSE); Emilio
Olabarria (PNV); José Rubí Cassinello (tech-
nical team, treasury of Bizkaia); Manuel
Salinero (PSE); Pedro Luis Uriarte (PNV);
Aitor Uribesalgo (PP)
3) How does the Concierto fit within the EU
framework? And what have been the impli-
cations for Spanish-Basque relatios? The
main focus here was on the two main areas
of controversy concerning the fit of the
Concierto within the EU that have emerged
since Spain joined the European Community
in 1986: Basque legislative powers over cor-
poration tax, and the quest for Basque rep-
resentation in fiscal matters at EU level.
Carlos Aguirre (PSE); Pedro Azpiazu (PNV);
Antón Damborenea (PP); Juan José Ibar-
retxe (PNV); Gemma Martínez Bárbara (tech-
nical team, treasury of Bizkaia); Gonzalo
Múgica (PSE); José Rubí Cassinello (techni-
cal team, treasury of Bizkaia); Aitor
Uribesalgo (PP)
4) How does the Concierto work internally
within the Basque regions? And what have
been the implications for political relations
and agendas within the region? The main
focus here was on the nature of fiscal and fi-
nancial relations between the three Basque
provinces (which each have tax-raising pow-
ers).
Carlos Aguirre (PSE); Joseba Egibar (PNV);
Helena Franco (Bildu); Juan José Ibarretxe
(PNV); Gemma Martínez Bárbara (technical
team, treasury of Bizkaia); Itziar Miner (Bildu);
Xabier Olano (Bildu); José Rubí Cassinello
(technical team, treasury of Bizkaia) (Bildu);
Aitor Uribesalgo (PP); Sebastian Zurutuza Mu-
jika (technical team, treasury of Guipúzcoa)
TABLE 6: Interviews in Catalonia
Each interview lasted at least one hour; a number of interviewees were
subsequently re-interviewed a second (and in some cases a third) time; and
a number of more informal meetings and conversations with politicians and
other experts such as academics were also held to unearth areas of inquiry.
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TOPIC INTERVIEWEES (in alphabetical order)
1) What factors explain shifts in CDC’s terri-
torial strategy (along a continuum from ac-
commodationist to pro-sovereignty politics)
in the contemporary period? The focus here
was not only on CDC’s explicit shift towards
a pro-sovereignty agenda and alliances in
2012, presaged by developments from
around 2008 onwards; but also significant
developments preceding this from the late
1990s onwards, with Jordi Pujol’s public shift
towards support for a fiscal-type pact for
Catalonia from 1997 onwards, followed by
CDC’s behaviour prior to and during the ne-
gotiations for the regional statute reform in
the early 2000s.
Germà Bel (formerly PDC, now Junts pel Sí);
Jaume Bosch (ICV); Antoni Castells (PSC);
Agustí Colomines (previous affiliations to
left- wing nationalist parties as well as CDC);
Lluís Corominas (CDC); Francesc Homs
(CDC); Josep Huguet (ERC); Andreu Mas-
Colell (CDC); Heribert Padrol (linked to CDC);
Jordi Pujol (CDC) 
2) Why have repeated reformed of the com-
mon financing system failed to satisfy CDC
despite the leading role played by CDC/CiU
in negotiating each reform?
Germà Bel (formerly PDC, now Junts pel Sí);
Jaume Bosch (ICV); Antoni Castells (PSC);
Agustí Colomines (previous affiliations to
left- wing nationalist parties as well as CDC);
Lluís Corominas (CDC); Francesc Homs
(CDC); Josep Huguet (ERC); Andreu Mas-
Colell (CDC); Heribert Padrol (linked to CDC);
Jordi Pujol (CDC)
3) What role did dissatisfaction with the
common financing system play in the quest
for a new statute for Catalonia and the
statute reform negotiations? Why did the
2006 statute reform fail to resolve the issue
of regional financing?
Germà Bel (formerly PDC, now Junts pel Sí);
Jaume Bosch (ICV); Antoni Castells (PSC);
Agustí Colomines (previous affiliations to
left- wing nationalist parties as well as CDC);
Lluís Corominas (CDC); Francesc Homs
(CDC); Josep Huguet (ERC); Andreu Mas-
Colell (CDC); Heribert Padrol (linked to CDC);
Jordi Pujol (CDC)
4) What role has dissatisfaction with regional
financing played in the rapid rise in CDC’s re-
cent shift towards a pro-independence
agenda?
Germà Bel (formerly PDC, now Junts pel Sí);
Jaume Bosch (ICV); Antoni Castells (PSC);
Agustí Colomines (previous affiliations to
left- wing nationalist parties as well as CDC);
Lluís Corominas (CDC); Francesc Homs
(CDC); Josep Huguet (ERC); Andreu Mas-
Colell (CDC); Heribert Padrol (linked to CDC);
Jordi Pujol (CDC)
The majority of the interviews (approximately 35) were conducted in the Bas-
que region, since the extensive role afforded to the provincial administra-
tions there under the Concierto and the territorial complexity of the Basque
region (which is more heterogeneous than Catalonia) made it necessary to
conduct interviews not only at the regional government level, but also at the
level of the three provincial governments. The dynamics of inter-provincial
relations within the Basque region in relation to the Concierto are particularly
opaque, given the very little existing literature on the subject, which made
extensive interviewing at the level of the three provincial administrations
necessary. This is in contrast to Catalonia, where the common financing
system governs financial relations with the regional government level only,
and thus interviews were focused only at this level.12
All interviews were conducted in Spanish and each interview was recor-
ded and subsequently transcribed, but interviewees were informed at the
outset (in the information sheet provided to them – see Appendix 2) that the
recordings and transcriptions would be for the author’s use only and would
not be made publically available. Similarly, interviewees were informed that
they would not be quoted directly without their permission. This method
was designed purposefully in order to encourage interviewees to reveal de-
tails about negotiations which they might not have been willing to reveal if
the recordings and transcripts were to be made public. Despite this reassu-
rance, a few interviewees still requested that the recording device be turned
off at certain stages of their interviews in order to disclose certain details,
which was proof of the fact that interviewees were willing to provide more
information without fear of being quoted directly or of interview recordings
being published. Since the aim of this study was precisely to probe particular
events and policy developments and get interview subjects to speak about
them in detail, it was deemed fundamentally important to give the intervie-
wees the opportunity to be as open about their experiences as possible by
removing any potential fears about interview recordings or transcripts being
made public. This process (including the information sheet provided to in-
terviewees) was approved by the University of Liverpool’s ethics committee
in the application I made to them to gain approval for my interview method
prior to undertaking the fieldwork. It follows the same method used by my
supervisor Professor Richard Gillespie in the wider ESRC-funded project on
‘The Dynamics of Nationalist Evolution in Contemporary Spain’
[ES/J007854/1] to which my PhD research was linked. 
Paraphrasing interviewees’ responses in English, rather than providing
direct quotations, was also considered appropriate in order to provide a suc-
cinct and economical account, especially since this study is not concerned
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12 A wider range of interviews were also conducted in the Basque region since it was where
I first started my fieldwork and the scope of my research project was initially wider (on regional
financing but also other dynamics impacting the Basque and Catalan nationalist movements),
but I narrowed the focus solely to regional financing in the early stages of my fieldwork there. 
with discourse analysis, but rather with obtaining information about the po-
litical processes and relationships that are rarely discussed in official dis-
course. This also justified the use of semi-structured interviews, in order to
ask supplementaries when initial responses were too general or evasive.
Again, paraphrasing rather than using direct quotations follows the method
used by Professor Gillespie in the publications produced as part of the wider
ESRC-funded project to which my PhD research was linked. 
Inevitably, basing research first and foremost on interviews runs the risk
of giving subjective, imbalanced accounts. I attempted, within the cons-
traints of a PhD project, to minimise this risk by undertaking interviews with
political actors representing a range of parties operating in the Basque and
Catalan regions and obtaining their respective views on key turning points
in party trajectories and key episodes in regional financing negotiations, in
order to be able to reflect different perspectives in an attempt to counteract
bias. While the interview sample covered a wide political and geographical
spread, it was not possible to contrast perspectives of all the key actors in-
volved at certain junctures through interviews alone, thus the information
obtained in interviews has also been supplemented by extensive reading of
media reports and, where possible, of other publically available accounts of
particular key junctures and negotiations, for example as published in me-
moirs. With more time and resources I would also have undertaken inter-
views with current and former elite actors in the central administration in
Madrid representing the main Spanish parties (particularly the PP and the
PSOE), but for the purposes of this project it was decided to focus instead
on the spectrum of perspectives within the Basque and Catalan regions
themselves, taking into account the views expressed by the Basque and Ca-
talan branches or federations of those Spanish parties in question in order
to contrast these with the nationalist parties’ views. More informal consul-
tations with Madrid-based academics and other analysts working on regio-
nal financing were, however, also undertaken.
The choice of case studies: Basque-Catalan comparison
The nature of the Basque and Catalan nationalist movements and the pro-
blematic question of their accommodation within the Spanish state have ins-
pired an abundant literature, and yet there have been few Basque-Catalan
comparative studies. This section will give an overview of relevant areas of
research that have been undertaken to date and outline the reasons for the
existing lack of Basque-Catalan comparative studies, before explaining why
there are strong grounds for a comparative study in this thesis. 
Prominent examples of existing literature include historically-informed
individual case studies of the Basque and Catalan nationalist movements
covering various periods from their nineteenth-century origins through to
the present day (e.g. on the Basque case, Castells and Cajal 2009, De la
Granja 2009, Lecours 2007, Pérez-Agote 2006; on the Catalan case, Dowling
2013, Guibernau 2004, McRoberts 2001, Smith 2014). In the Basque case,
this has included in-depth study of the more radical, violent strain of natio-
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nalism under ETA (e.g. Muro 2008, Watson 2007). Various individual case
studies of the two mainstream nationalist parties under consideration here
have been published to date which analyse some of the internal and external
factors which help to explain the relative success of the two parties, as well
as the reasons for their usually moderate form of nationalist politics during
much of the democratic period and their more recent swings towards pro-
sovereignty politics (e.g. Barrio and Barberà 2006, 2011; Mees and De Pablo
2005; Pérez-Nievas 2006, 2011; Vazquez 2010). 
On the wider context of Spain’s territorial problematic, there has been ex-
tensive study of the compromise on decentralisation that was agreed during
the transition to democracy in Spain and enshrined in the Constitution of
1978, resulting in the creation of the 17 autonomous communities (e.g. Co-
lomer 1999, Moreno 2001) and consideration of how the multi-level political
dynamic in Spain, including both central-regional and inter-regional govern-
ment relations, has shaped subsequent attempts by both Basque and Cata-
lan nationalists at renegotiation of the state of the autonomies (e.g. Keating
and Wilson 2009, Muro 2009). Other studies have addressed the rise in Spa-
nish nationalism too, particularly its re-emergence in times of PP domination
in Spain at various periods since the party won power for the first time in
1996, and how it impacts the Basque and Catalan nationalisms by means of
competing nationalist dynamics (e.g. Núñez Seixas 2001; Balfour and Qui-
roga 2007; Mar-Molinero and Smith 1996; Molina 2010; Muro and Quiroga
2004, 2005). A number of studies have reflected on how territorial and cul-
tural diversity could be accommodated in Spain today as part of broader
theoretical and empirical reflections on the changing nature of the state in
the modern and contemporary eras, the nature of plurinational states and
means of recognition of their component parts, and the relationship between
democracy and nationalism (e.g. Keating 2008, 2012; Guibernau 2014; Re-
quejo 2005, 2010). 
Despite this, there have been few direct comparative studies of the Bas-
que and Catalan nationalist movements and their respective parties in aca-
demic research, notwithstanding frequent comparisons in the media and in
general conversation (Gillespie 2015a: 5). Catalonia is more often compared
to Scotland, Flanders and Quebec as examples of ‘civic nationalism’, classi-
cally being described as ‘one of the closest [among all the stateless nations]
to being a ‘civic nation’, in other words, one whose nationalism is based not
on ethnicity but on a common project, both political and cultural, to which
all citizens can subscribe’ (McRoberts 2001: 183). In contrast, the Basque si-
tuation has tended to be compared to other ethnic conflicts with a terrorist
dimension, especially the case of Northern Ireland. Thus attention has focu-
sed on ‘the puzzling question of why Basque nationalism is exclusionary and
violence-prone, while Catalan nationalism is politically inclusive and accom-
modating’ (Encarnación 2008: 92). In contrast to the traditional desire among
Catalan nationalists to articulate visions of a Spain in which Catalonia would
play a fundamental role, there has also been a historically stronger tendency
among Basque nationalists to seek ‘more fundamental constitutional and
institutional rearrangement than in Catalonia, when not outright secession’
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(Lecours 2007: 58). This, too, has traditionally mitigated against comparison
of the two cases. 
Most of the few comparisons of the Basque and Catalan nationalist mo-
vements that do exist (e.g. Conversi 1997, Díez Medrano 1995, Payne 1971)
are generally historically-informed and focus on the origins and early deve-
lopment of the Basque and Catalan nationalist movements in the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, not the more recent period, and they tend to
reflect the civic-ethnic divide in interpretations. In this vein, for example,
Conversi (1997) argues that widespread use and accessibility of the Catalan
language served to create cohesion among the inhabitants of Catalonia and
alleges violence was more likely to emerge in the Basque Country to fill this
gap, given the more limited diffusion of the Basque language (euskera) and
the privileging of other ethnic traits. Such black-and-white characterisations
have nevertheless been problematised since then in nationalism studies in
general (e.g. Harris 2009: 28-34) and also in relation to the specifics of the
Basque and Catalan cases which concern us here. While the original Basque
and Catalan nationalist ideological discourses and tropes of the late ninete-
enth and early twentieth centuries did to a large extent exemplify an ethnic-
civic divide, this distinction can be more of a hindrance than a help when
describing the nationalist movements in the contemporary period, for it im-
poses a black-and-white divide between the two cases that does not reflect
the more nuanced reality. For example, there has been considerable debate
over whether the privileging of Catalan language can genuinely be conside-
red ‘civic’ (e.g. Miley 2006, Franco-Guillén and Zapata-Barrero 2014), while
Basque nationalism is no longer so heavily based on ethnicity. Interestingly,
it was ETA, not the PNV, that pioneered the attempt to bridge the traditional
community divide by defining a Basque as anyone who lived and worked in
the Basque Country (Ugarte 2009: 368). 
Focus on the above differences between the two nationalisms has risked
obscuring more fruitful comparative study from other angles in the contem-
porary period. In particular, the focus on the history of violence in the Basque
case has detracted from study of the more moderate form of nationalist po-
litics under the PNV in the contemporary period. Although there were nota-
ble differences in the nationalist party politics in the Basque Country and
Catalonia in the early decades of the twentieth century prior to Franco’s dic-
tatorship, there have been marked similarities since the transition to demo-
cracy in the late 1970s in terms of the behaviour of the mainstream
nationalist parties in each region and the contexts in which they operate.
While the PNV re-emerged after the Franco period as the dominant nationa-
list party in the Basque Country, in Catalonia the newly founded CDC, con-
ceived in the early 1970s under Jordi Pujol, formed an alliance with UDC,
one of the few Catalan parties of the Republic to re-emerge strengthened
after the Franco era, to become the main political force of Catalan nationa-
lism (Dowling 2001, 2012). The alliance, later becoming a federation, would
last until 2015. Both the PNV and CDC/CiU have traditionally been centre-
right parties of business and the middle classes, which very quickly establis-
hed themselves as the mainstream nationalist parties in their respective
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regions. Since winning their first respective regional elections in 1980, both
have held onto power aside from a few years in opposition to Socialist or
Socialist-led regional governments, in both cases earlier in the 2000s (2003-
2010 in the Catalan case, 2009-2012 in the Basque case). And yet they have
usually only secured a relative majority of seats in their respective parlia-
ments (the PNV has never won an absolute majority, while CiU lost its abso-
lute majority in 1995 and never recovered it thereafter), thus both have been
heavily reliant on informal alliances (or at times formal coalitions in the Bas-
que case) with other parties in order to govern. Throughout the 1980s and
1990s, both parties tended to prioritise accommodationist politics whereby
they sought to negotiate further autonomy within the context of the Spanish
state, even if the PNV remained relatively more ambiguous regarding its ul-
timate territorial goals. Since the late 1990s, both parties have nevertheless
undergone shifts in their territorial agendas between accommodationism
and pro-sovereignty politics at different times, seeking a fundamental recon-
figuration of their relationship to the Spanish state. 
In further similarities, both parties have had the capacity at times to affect
Spanish government formation or survival, gaining influence in Madrid by
lending parliamentary support to minority Spanish governments on various
occasions from 1993 onwards, in return for decentralisation or economic
gains, in what has become known as a system of ‘mutual backscratching’
(Field 2014: 293). Since the turn of the century, both have nevertheless lost
much of their bargaining power in Madrid during times of PP absolute ma-
jority government (2000-2004 and 2011-2015). Meanwhile, within their res-
pective regions, both parties have faced similar kinds of party competition
of varying degrees at different times: as moderate mainstream nationalist
parties, both have faced competition on the nationalist axis from more radi-
cal left-wing, pro-independence forces, as well as across the nationalist/unio-
nist divide from regional branches or federations of the state-wide parties
(especially of the socialist PSOE). Competition on both the territorial and the
left-right dimensions contributed to increasing pressures on the viability of
their form of moderate, accommodationist nationalist politics from the late
1990s (see Chapter 2). Although both parties returned to power after losing
control to the Socialists in their respective regions earlier in the 2000s, they
would be constrained by other parties upon whom they would have to de-
pend for parliamentary support. Other contextual factors are important too:
both parties operate in regions with a comparable record of economic suc-
cess relative to most other regions in Spain in recent decades (e.g. Zipfel et
al. 2015: 1).
Differences in nationalist party politics in both cases, in particular due to
the history of terrorism in the Basque Country, inevitably remain and must
be acknowledged and accounted for where relevant when comparing the
parties. The differences on account of the history of violence have however
been gradually reducing since ETA ceased its activities in 2011 and as the
Basque Country becomes accustomed to a more normalised political envi-
ronment, without violence. The radical pro-independence forces under the
izquierda abertzale became a genuine competitor in the political sphere to
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more moderate, mainstream nationalist party politics for the first time upon
entering political life properly from 2011 onwards after bans on previous
parties during the last ten years. Adaptation and habituation to democratic
competition takes time and many of the ramifications of the years of violence
still condition Basque politics (e.g. unresolved questions regarding the re-
grouping of ETA prisoners, and victims’ rights), but the initial phase towards
a more normalised political environment is underway, thus creating genuine
competition between nationalist parties within the region. At the same time,
in Catalonia, competition between nationalist parties has also increased,
with CDC facing stronger electoral competition in recent years from ERC and
the CUP, though this has to some extent been offset by the phenomenon of
pro-independence political pacts involving CDC and ERC since 2012.  
The above similarities between the PNV and CDC, in terms of their beha-
viour and the contexts in which they operate, provide a strong basis for com-
parative study. The territorial agendas of the PNV and CDC seem clearly to
have shifted beyond accommodationism in the 21st century and much of the
older literature in no way anticipated such a development, particularly with
regard to Catalonia. It is hoped that the comparative dimension of this thesis
will serve to contribute new insights into reasons for the parties’ shifts and
the significance of their contrasting regional financing arrangements in this
regard. 
A stronger focus on the Basque case
While the thesis offers a comparative Basque-Catalan study, greater at-
tention will be paid to the Basque case. This is because the relationship bet-
ween regional financing and territorial agendas is more complex and less
understood in the Basque case, and also since the Basque financing model
has become a point of reference for Catalan demands, notwithstanding
some inconsistencies over the extent to which the Catalans have wanted to
follow it. The Basque case is particularly complicated due to the complexity
of political and fiscal relations within the Basque region itself (between re-
gional and provincial administrations, since the provinces are endowed with
tax-raising authority), and also due to the question of how the Basque fiscal
autonomy model fits within the European context given that it offers the
most advanced level of substate fiscal autonomy in Europe. These intrare-
gional and supranational dimensions require adequate analysis, beyond pu-
rely Spanish-Basque bilateral dynamics over the Concierto, thus separate
chapters will address each of these dimensions (bilateral, supranational and
intraregional), as reflected in the chapter outline below. Catalonia does not
have the same internal territorial complexity as the Basque region, and the
regional financing system as applied to Catalonia is focused on the level of
the regional government only, thus the focus here is first and foremost on
the level of the regional government. Local financing in Catalonia and in the
other regions under the common system comes under a separate system
which is not the focus of this thesis, except insofar as the centralised nature
of the local financing system, designed and controlled exclusively by the
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Spanish government, is another source of grievance for Catalan nationalist
and pro-independence parties since they argue that this should be a Catalan
government competence.
Why not Galicia?
Like the Basque Country and Catalonia, Galicia has a distinct historical
tradition of self-government and its own language and culture, and was also
recognised in the Spanish Constitution of 1978 as one of Spain’s ‘historic
nationalities’. The region has a significant nationalist movement too, but it
is excluded from this study since it differs from the Basque and Catalan cases
in almost all of the above commonalities identified (Gillespie 2015a: 5 fn. 8).
Most fundamentally, the nationalist movement in Galicia has never gained
the same level of support as in the Basque Country and Catalonia and the
main Galician nationalist party, the Galician Nationalist Bloc (Bloque Nacio-
nalista Gallego), has never held power at regional government level. The re-
gion has, instead, been governed by the Galician federations or branches of
the two main Spanish statewide parties, the PP and the PSOE. While it is of
interest to consider the reasons why the Galician case has evolved differently
from the Basque and Catalan cases, this is not the purpose of this thesis,
which aims instead to compare the evolving behaviour and territorial stra-
tegies of nationalist parties which have a long record of governing at regio-
nal government level and have shifted between accommodationist and
pro-sovereignty strategies in that time.   
Why not Navarre?
Like the Basque Country, as mentioned earlier, Navarre comes under the
‘foral’ financing system for historical reasons, and its Convenio is very simi-
lar to the Concierto (the main difference being that Navarre only has one
province and therefore one treasury, whereas the Basque region has three
provinces and three treasuries). However, Navarre differs from both the Bas-
que and Catalan cases in that it has not traditionally had a strong nationalist
party presence.13 The dominant party in the region since the start of the
1990s has been the Navarran People’s Union (Unión del Pueblo Navarro,
UPN) which governed Navarre from 1991 until 2015, apart from one year out
of government in 1995-1996. UPN is a strictly regionalist rather than a natio-
nalist party which does not have sovereignty ambitions for Navarre. It is a
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13 This may now be changing. A major shift in governance occurred when the July 2015 re-
gional elections resulted in a very fragmented parliament and UPN was unable to form a gov-
ernment despite winning the most votes and seats of any party. The nationalist coalition Geroa
Bai (‘Yes to the Future’) entered into power instead, supported by Bildu, Podemos and Izquierda-
Ezkerra (the latter of which is a coalition of the Navarran branch of the United Left and other
left-wing, nationalist forces). This put nationalist forces in power in Navarre for the first time.
Geroa Bai includes the PNV in Navarre and the left-wing nationalist forces of Atarrabia Taldea
– a political party which split from EA in 2011 – and Zabaltzea – a political association created
in 2011 from ex-members of EA and Aralar. 
conservative party which has traditionally been affiliated to the Spanish PP
party and it has essentially behaved as a Navarran federation or branch of
the PP, rather than as a nationalist party seeking to distinguish its territory
from the Spanish state. Indeed, between 1991 and 2008 UPN officially acted
as the Navarran branch of the PP, under an agreement which meant that the
PP did not run at Navarran elections and in return the UPN supported the
PP in other areas. This thesis aims to compare the evolving behaviour and
territorial strategies of nationalist parties which have a long record of gover-
ning at regional government level and have shifted between accommoda-
tionist and pro-sovereignty strategies in that time, thus Navarre was not
selected for study since it has not had such a party.14
TWO DIFFERENT REGIONAL FINANCING SYSTEMS: SOME INITIAL CLARI-
FICATIONS 
While the two financing systems will be explained in fuller detail in Chap-
ter 3, this section provides an introduction to the historical reasons for the
existence of different financing systems in the Basque and Catalan regions.
The reasons why the Basque and Catalan regions have separate regional fi-
nancing arrangements in contemporary Spain date back centuries. The va-
rious medieval kingdoms and regions of the Iberian Peninsular were
ultimately combined to form modern day Spain through a gradual process
culminating in the union of the Crowns of Castile and Aragón in 1469 and
their subsequent conquest of the last remaining territories of Granada and
Navarre (Lecours 2007: 31-39). Thereafter, the Catalan and Basque regions
still enjoyed substantial political and fiscal automony over periods through
to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries respectively, due to the mainte-
nance of their own institutions of self-government and medieval fueros,
which afforded them significant political and fiscal autonomy (e.g. Lecours
2007: 32-33). The fueros were legal statutes which applied to a specific pro-
vince or locality, setting the rules and rights for that province granted by the
King. They were the main system of local law used in the Iberian Peninsular
from the middle ages onwards. However, the specific constitutional system
in Catalonia was abolished in 1714 following the War of Succession and the
Basque fueros were eliminated in 1876 after the Basque provinces had lost
the Third Carlist War. And yet the fiscal dimension of the Basque fueroswas
essentially reinstated again two years later by a new arrangement, soon to
be named the Concierto Económico-Administrativo (from 1882 onwards),
and then simply the Concierto Económico, which would grant the three Bas-
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14 I nevertheless made a visit to Navarre in May 2014 to interview Mikel Aranburu (then
member of the technical team of the Navarran treasury) and to meet with academics at the Pub-
lic University of Navarre specialising in the Convenio, for purposes of comparison vis-à-vis the
Concierto.
que provinces the right to collect taxes again.15 Castile had originally agreed
to the arrangement in 1878 primarily for practical reasons since the central
treasury did not immediately have the technical means or capacity to collect
taxes in the Basque provinces after the abolition of their fueros. A vestige of
the fueros in economic terms thus remained while any political dimension
in the form of self-government had been abolished. The agreement was ori-
ginally intended to be a temporary one for a transitional period of eight years
until the Basque provinces became fully integrated into the Castilian tax
system, but instead ended up staying in force thereafter, until Franco abo-
lished the Concierto in Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa in 1937 (Álava, however, re-
tained the Concierto by supporting the Francoist side). 
During the transition to democracy of the late 1970s and early 1980s, a
new updated agreement based on the ethos of the original Concierto would
become one of the fundamental bases of Basque regional autonomy. The
Spanish Constitution of 1978 pledged in its First Additional Disposition to
respect the ‘historical rights’ of the ‘foral territories’, which was fundamen-
tally taken as a reference to the historical tradition of the Basque and Nava-
rran provinces in raising their own taxes (Navarre, too, had retained
tax-raising powers after its fueros had been abolished in 1841, and like Álava,
it had retained them under Franco by supporting the dictator). In the Basque
case, the Basque and Spanish authorities reached an agreement in 1980, ap-
proved by law in 1981, to restore tax-raising powers to the provinces of Viz-
caya and Guipúzcoa and update them for Álava. While the three Basque
provinces retained or regained their responsibility for tax collection, the new
Concierto governed fiscal and financial relations with the Basque region as
a whole rather than each individual province, following the creation of the
autonomous community. Thus, only one annual quota payment would be
made to Madrid, not three. The financing systems in the Basque and Nava-
rran regions, the Concierto and the Convenio respectively, became known
as the régimen foral de financiación (foral/charter financing regime, from
fuero or medieval charter), in contrast to the régimen común de financiación
(common financing regime). The latter was developed for Spain’s other au-
tonomous communities (all except the Basque and Navarran regions) during
the transition and first legislated under Organic Law 8/1980 on the Financing
of the Autonomous Communities (Ley Orgánica de Financiación de las Co-
munidades Autónomas, LOFCA). Both the Concierto legislation and the com-
mon financing system legislation would undergo significant reforms and
changes in the following decades, but the starting point for the two systems
in the democratic period were the first laws of 1981 (Concierto) and 1980
(LOFCA) respectively. This study considers the evolution of both regional fi-
nancing systems from then onwards. 
For clarification purposes, it is important to note that the regional finan-
cing systems govern the raising of taxes only, not social security contribu-
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15 On the historical origins of the Concierto, see Alonso Olea 1995. For a shorter overview,
see Colino 2012.
tions. In Spain, the Social Security fund has remained centralised (and is
often referred to as the ‘caja única’ or ‘single fund’) since devolving social
security has long been one of the ‘red lines’ for the PP and the PSOE alike
that they are not willing to cross, given the PP’s ideological centralism and
the PSOE’s longstanding view that one centralised fund and centralised le-
gislation regarding pensions and other benefits is essential to ensure equa-
lity among Spaniards. Some administrative functions of the system (i.e.
making payments) can be devolved to the regions under certain conditions
under the provisions of the Spanish Constitution and the regional autonomy
statutes, but not the authority to vary social security contributions or legis-
lation regarding pensions and other benefits. The issue is a contentious one,
since the centralisation of social security has been one of the main com-
plaints of the PNV and CDC. For the PNV, in particular, the failure to devolve
administration of the social security system is one of the main pending is-
sues where it has accused the Spanish government of failing to fulfil the Bas-
que autonomy statute.16 Article 18 of the Basque regional autonomy statute
grants the Basque region the right to implement and develop the basic Spa-
nish state legislation in relation to social security, apart from legislation re-
garding the financial system of social security (where it must abide by
Spanish legislation), though it can manage the financial system. This article
was worded to respect Article 141.1.17 of the Spanish Constitution, which
attributes to the Spanish state the responsibility for developing both the
basic legislation and the financial system of social security, while recognising
that these services may then be implemented by regional governments, in
accordance with the relevant Spanish legislation. A Constitutional Court ru-
ling in the late 1990s, however, determined that not even management of
the financial system of social security could be transferred to the Basque re-
gion due to the risk that this would infringe the principle of the caja única,
an interpretation which the PNV has disputed ever since. Some representa-
tives of non-nationalist forces in the Basque region – e.g. the Basque Socia-
lists – also dispute that interpretation of the Constitutional Court, arguing
that the decentralisation of purely managing the social security system (e.g.
paying pensions), while remaining fully subject to Spanish legislation regar-
ding the raising of quotas, would not break the principle of the caja única.17
However, at the same time, the Basque Socialists warn against the PNV’s in-
tentions, arguing that the latter’s goal is fundamentally to go beyond pure
management to have legislative competence (Ibarretxe sought legislative
power over social security for the Basque region, and under Urkullu, the PNV
commissioned a report into the viability of the Basque Country having its
own pensions system). This would violate the caja única and, Basque So-
cialists suggest, thus risk inequality in Spain (in line with the view of PSOE
headquarters in Madrid). 
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16 Personal interviews with PNV representatives, 2014.
17 Personal interview with Manuel Salinero, 2 September 2014.
The current centralisation of social security in Spain is thus a contentious
issue subject to intense debate, and a fundamental source of grievance for
Basque and Catalan nationalists – notwithstanding the widespread view that
the Basques in particular benefit in terms of resource levels under the current
system, due to the particularly high pension costs and ageing population
there (see, for example, Galende 2015). While this must be acknowledged
and recognised, it is not the intention to investigate this further in this thesis.
In Spain, there is a clear-cut distinction between general taxes and social se-
curity contributions (to a greater extent than in the UK, for example, where
there is some overlap in some respects between general taxation and the
National Insurance system). The regional financing systems under study
here govern general taxation only.
CHAPTER OUTLINE
While this thesis focuses first and foremost on strategic shifts in the te-
rritorial agendas of the Basque and Catalan nationalist parties since the
1990s, some developments in recent decades need to be understood within
the context of a longer history. Following this first introductory chapter,
Chapter 2 provides an analysis of the evolution of Spain’s national and terri-
torial problematic and the challenges of accommodating the Basque and Ca-
talan nationalist movements from the transition to democracy onwards. It
then identifies specific factors underlying the strategic shifts in the territorial
agendas of the Basque and Catalan nationalist parties, in order to contex-
tualise this thesis. 
The rest of the thesis then focuses specifically on how, within this context,
the different financing arrangements of the two regions have contributed to
shaping the evolution of the nationalist parties’ territorial agendas and ideas
on sovereignty. Chapter 3 is primarily technical in nature, for it is designed
to explain how the Basque Concierto and the common financing system
work. The explanation of each system is also used as a foundation to provide
an analysis of the controversial question of whether the Basques contribute
enough revenues to Spain compared to other comparably wealthy regions
under the common system such as Catalonia, a longstanding source of po-
litical debate in Spain which has intensified in recent years. 
Chapter 4 addresses the bilateral nature of the Basque Concierto. It in-
vestigates how Spanish-Basque bilateral fiscal and financial relations work,
what the main areas of contention have been, how these differences have
(or have not) been resolved, and, ultimately, what the implications have been
for the PNV’s territorial agenda. Chapter 5 then investigates in more detail
one of the areas of contention raised in Chapter 4: the question of how to
update the Concierto in the post-1986 EU context. Chapter 5 goes beyond
the purely domestic Spanish-Basque debate over the Concierto’s fit within
the EU context to consider the opportunities or obstacles at EU level itself
that impact the development of the Concierto as well, and what the implica-
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tions of these debates have been for the PNV’s attitudes towards the place
of the Basque Country in Europe.
After this analysis of the Concierto’s bilateral dimension and its place in
the European context, the final chapter devoted to the Basque case (Chapter
6) then analyses the other side of the Concierto coin, namely its intra-regio-
nal nature, since the Concierto affords tax-raising powers to each of the three
Basque provinces, rather than to the regional government. This chapter ex-
plains how the Concierto works internally within the Basque region and it
explores the consequences of the complex nature of this intra-regional di-
mension of the Concierto for fiscal and political relations between different
provinces and political forces within the Basque region. This allows for an
assessment of the ways in which the intra-regional dimension of the Con-
cierto has contributed to shaping the PNV’s territorial strategies and beha-
viour.
Chapter 7 turns to the Catalan case, examining how and when the issue
of regional financing has contributed to shaping shifts in the territorial
agenda of CDC. The main focus of analysis is on the history of debates over
regional financing reforms and the quest for a fiscal pact and beyond, since
demands for a significant reform of regional financing for Catalonia have
been a major theme of political debate for more than a decade, thus long
preceding the recent context of major economic  recession. As well as analy-
sing the evolving nature of relations with Madrid, the chapter considers how
intra-regional factors such as party competition and pressures from civil so-
ciety have had a significant bearing on the timing of CDC’s shifts in attitude
towards the financing question and beyond. 
Chapter 8 then concludes by outlining the main findings of the thesis and
where it makes a contribution to knowledge, considering each of the two
case studies individually as well as the benefits of the comparative approach.
A final section outlines potential future areas of research arising from this
project.
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CHAPTER 2
BASQUE AND CATALAN NATIONALISMS: 
UNRAVELLING THE DRIVERS BEHIND 
SHIFTING PARTY AGENDAS

While this thesis focuses first and foremost on strategic shifts in the te-
rritorial agendas of the Basque and Catalan nationalist movements and par-
ties since the 1990s, many developments in that period need to be
understood within the context of a longer history. This chapter provides an
analysis of the evolution of Spain’s national and territorial problematic and
the challenges of accommodating the Basque and Catalan regions from the
transition to democracy of the late 1970s onwards until the end of 2015, in
order to contextualise this thesis. It then identifies specific factors underlying
the strategic shifts in the territorial agendas of the Basque and Catalan na-
tionalist parties during the democratic period. This paves the way for a more
in-depth analysis in subsequent chapters of the ways in which, within this
broader context, the different financing arrangements of the two regions
have contributed to shaping the evolution of the nationalist parties’ territorial
agendas and ideas on sovereignty. Throughout this chapter, the focus is on
identifying a series of political dynamics within Spain (centre-periphery,
inter-regional and intra-regional), as well as international influences, that
have contributed to shaping the territorial agendas and conceptions of so-
vereignty of the mainstream Basque and Catalan nationalist parties. The
chapter starts with an analysis of Spain’s national and territorial problematic
in general in order to provide the overall context, before proceeding to ac-
count for the specific trajectories of the PNV and CDC respectively, investi-
gating the drivers behind their shifting party agendas. The conclusion then
compares the main differences that emerge between the two cases.
SPAIN’S NATIONAL AND TERRITORIAL PROBLEMATIC
Arguably the biggest challenge of the transition to democracy following
the death of the dictator Franco in 1975 was how best to accommodate Spai-
n’s different regional identities within the Spanish state, bringing them back
into the fold in a way amenable to both the nationalists themselves and a
range of Spanish forces (conservative, centrist, socialist and communist)
(see Colomer 1998). The founding fathers of the Constitution of 1978 desig-
ned an ‘ambiguous constitutional compromise’ on the issue of decentrali-
sation as part of an attempt to create a consensual text that would straddle
the demands of the different political forces in Spain (Colomer 1998: 40).
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This involved maintaining the provinces created in the 19th century and grou-
ping them into 17 autonomous communities or regions, each with its own
regional parliament and government. Three of the autonomous communi-
ties, which represented the ‘historic nationalities’ of the Basque Country, Ca-
talonia and Galicia, were given a ‘fast-track’ route to a certain degree of
autonomy in an attempt to satisfy the nationalists in those regions (Galicia,
like the Basque and Catalan regions, had approved a regional autonomy sta-
tute for the first time in the 1930s, before this was abolished under the dic-
tatorship of Franco). While the Spanish Constitution did not recognise them
as nations, conceiving of one Spanish nation only, it did nevertheless desig-
nate them as ‘historic nationalities’. The remaining 14 essentially more ‘ad-
ministrative’ autonomous communities were given a slower route to
autonomy. Of these, Andalusia, arguing its right to be considered a historic
region, was later also fast-tracked (Colomer 1998: 45). Overall, the decentra-
lisation formula was left deliberately vague in terms of exactly what compe-
tences the regions would eventually achieve and whether the
‘administrative’ regions would request the same level of competences as
the historic regions or not – eventually they would, thus the system would
later be dubbed one of ‘café para todos’ or ‘coffee for all’. 
In the consensual spirit of the Transition, this formula was approved in
1978 with the support of CDC, but the PNV abstained, primarily since the
Constitution did not recognise Basque sovereignty and the PNV wanted to
be able to push for greater autonomy via a flexible interpretation of the Cons-
titution thereafter (Corcuera 2009: 336; De Pablo and Mees 2005: 389-390;
Lecours 2007: 88-89). Many Basques also disapproved of the fact that the
founding fathers of the Constitution had included a representative of the Ca-
talan nationalists (from CDC) but not the PNV. The PNV did, however, sub-
sequently approve its regional statue of autonomy (the Statute of Gernika)
in 1979 and Concierto legislation in 1981, both of which derived their legiti-
macy from the Constitution. Crucially, the Basques had secured recognition
under the First Additional Disposition of the Constitution of the ‘historical
rights of the foral territories’, a reference to the tradition of raising taxes in
each of the Basque provinces. This Additional Disposition would provide the
legal basis for the restoration of tax-raising powers to all the Basque provin-
ces under the new Concierto Económico, which would become the main
basis of Basque autonomy and main differentiating factor between it and
other regional levels of authority in Spain (except for Navarre, which also
retained its tax-raising tradition). The bases for a common financing system
for the rest of Spain’s regions apart from the Basque Country and Navarre
were later set under Organic Law 8/1980 on the Financing of the Autono-
mous Communities (Ley Orgánica de Financiación de las Comunidades Au-
tónomas, LOFCA). While the Constitution of 1978 had granted special
recognition to the three ‘historic nationalities’ and promised them a fast track
route to autonomy, a clear step towards ‘café para todos’ came in 1982 when
the main Spanish political forces at the time (the PSOE and UCD) approved
the Organic Law on the Harmonisation of the Autonomy Process (Ley Orgá-
nica de Armonización del Proceso Autonómico, LOAPA), in the difficult cli-
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mate after the attempted coup of 23 February 1981 by the Spanish military.
The LOAPA was designed in part to slow down the process of transferring
powers and competences to the regions – a move which was vehemently
rejected by Basque and Catalan nationalists, as well as other regional go-
vernments (Ugarte 2009: 358; De Pablo and Mees 2005: 40; Magone 2009:
195-196). 
After the numerous difficulties of the Transition period of the late 1970s
and early 1980s, the mid 1980s then saw the beginnings of a more settled
pattern which would endure for at least a decade, as the regionalisation of
Spain into autonomous communities seemed to be undergoing consolida-
tion (Gillespie 2015a: 9). This involved the gradual transfer of competences
to regional governments under the provisions of the Spanish Constitution
and each region’s autonomy statute. Spain developed one of the most de-
centralised political systems in Europe over the period from the 1980s
through to the early 2000s in terms of spending competences. The regions
gradually acquired responsibility for spending in fundamental policy areas
such as health, education and social services, among others, though the de-
centralisation of revenue-raising competences was much more limited, ex-
cept in the case of the Basque Country and Navarre. The ambiguity of the
Constitution, compounded later by the recurring reliance of minority Spanish
governments from 1993 onwards on alliances with regionally-based parties
with representation in the Spanish parliament (primarily CiU and PNV) to
secure working majorities, gave these parties bargaining power to negotiate
increasing decentralisation gains, which other regions then sought to emu-
late. Ultimately, however, this led to a greater degree of policy decentralisa-
tion in Spain than some of the founding fathers of the Constitution might
ever have envisaged and ended up sowing more discord than it generated
consensus, as the multi-level political dynamic in Spain resulted in frequent
competition among the regions for competences and resources (Colomer
1998: 40). Regional governments resorted to competitive bargaining with
the central government for competences and/or resources, with each see-
king to secure the best deal. The few forums that bring together the central
government and the regional governments in Spain – primarily the fiscal
and financial policy council (Consejo de Política Fiscal y Financiera, CPFF),
meetings of the national and regional education ministers and the consulta-
tive conference on European affairs – have also tended to descend into con-
flictive rather than cooperative dynamics, as each regional government has
sought the best outcome for its own territory. Spain lacks a fully-fledged ins-
titutionalised framework for intergovernmental cooperation since the Spa-
nish Senate (upper house) is not a proper territorial chamber typical of
federal systems. While there is extensive decentralisation in Spain, it is not
constitutionally a federal state, and there is general agreement among aca-
demics that ‘Spain does not meet the most important criteria found in fede-
ralist systems generally regarded as prototypes’ (Encarnación 2008: 103).
By the late 1990s the constitutional compromise on the national and te-
rritorial question was starting to come apart at the seams. In this context,
growing calls would thereafter emerge from Basque and Catalan nationalists
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for a revision of their regional autonomy statutes and also of the Spanish
Constitution. This also contributed to a wider wave of statute reform in other
regions. While the decentralisation of policy competences has been exten-
sive, Basque and Catalan nationalists lament the fact that the extension of
the system to 17 regions has in practice put limits on their own ambitions
and hindered their ability to negotiate bilaterally with the Spanish state on
their own terms, without inter-regional conflict and competition. While the
nationalists are usually in power in the Basque and Catalan regions, state-
wide parties govern in the other regions of Spain, which has meant that the
party in power in Madrid has often sought to appease the regions where it
governs. Although Spain is, to all appearances, one of the most decentrali-
sed countries in Europe, Basque and Catalan nationalists argue that this is
only a façade for an ultimately still centralised Spanish state, in which the
traditionally dominant parties refuse to acknowledge the existence of diffe-
rent nations within the state or share sovereignty with these.18 They also see
such centralism in the fact that the Spanish government can still introduce
basic laws that override regional laws even in the case of decentralised com-
petences, and that it has often been known to renege on promises in regard
to the devolution of competences and their financing. Notable sources of
grievance in recent years include, for example, the highly controversial 2013
education law, known as the ‘Ley Wert’ after its creator the then PP education
minister José Ignacio Wert, which sought to increase Spanish control over
regional education systems, the language of instruction, and course content.
The politicisation of Spain’s Constitutional and Supreme Courts, the deci-
sions reached in which tend to correspond to the interests of the statewide
parties, has intensified the sense of an unfair system biased towards the cen-
tre. 
Both the disposition and ability of the Basque and Catalan mainstream
nationalist parties to cooperate with the Spanish government in return for
decentralisation gains declined thereafter in this context. The limits of the
‘coffee for all’ model became clear since the Basque and Catalan regions
seek greater autonomy and also sovereignty for their regions than other re-
gions of Spain, and the Catalans perceive their lack of fiscal autonomy and
the fiscal deficit they suffer as a result of the overly redistributive nature of
the common financing regime as an additional injustice. Moreover, the fact
that supporting minority central governments became the main bargaining
tool of the Basque and Catalan nationalists to secure decentralisation gains
was inherently subject to the risk of instability, since it has given the natio-
nalists’ extensive leverage at times and yet has left them with little leverage
at other times when a party has won the Spanish general elections with an
absolute majority, as the PP has done twice since 2000. Looking beyond
Spain to the wider European sphere, the nationalists’ hopes in the 1990s that
the notion of a ‘Europe of the regions’ and the revisiting of the concept of
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the state would afford them greater prominence were largely frustrated as
it became clear by the turn of the century that the development of the su-
pranational sphere was not facilitating the strengthening of the sub-state
level to the extent they had hoped (Burgess and Vollard 2006). 
Although both the Basque and Catalan mainstream nationalist parties are
dissatisfied with the status quo and both have called for the right of their te-
rritories to self-determination, some degree of statehood and recognition as
nations, there has been little direct collaboration between them over the
years on possible ways forward since they each conceive of their own re-
gions as being in a different position, especially due to their different finan-
cing arrangements and to the history of terrorist violence in the Basque
region but not Catalonia. There has been no consensus on how to deal with
Spain’s national and territorial problematic among Spanish statewide parties
either, which each clash with Basque and Catalan nationalists on the matter
for different reasons. Right- and left-wing ideologies among the statewide
parties in Spain have broadly become synonymous with centralist and de-
centralist positions, respectively (Dinas 2012: 477; Verge 2013). Certainly, the
PP is known for its stronger ideological centralism than the PSOE, with right-
wing parties in Spain historically associated with the vision of a unitary and
centralised state (Grau Creus 2005: 264). And yet this distinction is only re-
lative, since both the conservative PP and the socialist PSOE, the two tradi-
tionally dominant Spanish parties since the transition to democracy, defend
the idea of one Spanish nation and Spanish sovereignty. 
This stance is also shared by emerging party Ciudadanos, a centre-right
party which was founded in Catalonia in 2006 to provide an alternative to
Catalan nationalism, before it expanded to operate throughout the whole
Spanish state and became one of the two new parties to thwart the traditio-
nal two-party dominance of the PP and PSOE at the Spanish elections in De-
cember 2015, coming fourth with 40 seats (out of 350).19 Ciudadanos can be
seen as even more centralist than the PP and the PSOE in the sense that it
was one of two new parties in Spain’s recent history to campaign for the
abolition of the Basque and Navarran ‘privileges’ in term of their regional fi-
nancing arrangements (the other, UPyD, never attained the same degree of
electoral success as Ciudadanos). In stark contrast, the other other newco-
mer on the scene, the left-wing Podemos, which came third in the 2015 Spa-
nish elections (with 69 seats) and reaped some of its best results in the
Basque and Catalan regions, is the only Spanish party ever to have campaig-
ned for the ‘right to decide’ (in other words, self-determination) of Spain’s
constituent parts, arguing that only it can keep Spain together going forward
by recognising and respecting its plurinational character and allowing Cata-
lonia to hold a referendum. 
With the rise of both Podemos and Ciudadanos, the December 2015 Spa-
nish elections marked a sea change in the Spanish political scene, bringing
67
19 For the election results, see El País, http://resultados.elpais.com/elecciones/2015/
generales/congreso/index.html
an end to the traditional dominance of the PP and PSOE, amid a political cri-
sis characterised by widespread disillusionment with existing political insti-
tutions, parties and politicians. While the PP and the PSOE still came first
and second respectively, the inability of either to form a government for the
first time since the PSOE won the 1982 elections was in part caused by the
lack of agreement between possible coalition partners on the national and
territorial question, among other factors. One of the many obstacles to a po-
tential coalition of the PSOE, Podemos and a handful of other left-wing and
peripheral nationalist parties, for example, was the disagreement between
the PSOE and Podemos on how to address the situation in Catalonia.
With regard to the PSOE, while it is relatively more pro-decentralisation
than the PP and Ciudadanos, it remains clearly in favour of a symmetric form
of decentralisation to ensure equality for all Spaniards, in contrast to the
Basque and Catalan nationalists who have traditionally sought a greater de-
gree of asymmetric decentralisation to give their regions something appro-
aching a more confederal arrangement (Balfour 2005: 5). The PSOE, like
Ciudadanos, also strongly supports centralisation of competences in cases
where it believes centralised management will best ensure equal treatment
of all Spaniards.20 Most notably, the Socialists have therefore opposed calls
from nationalist parties to devolve the caja única (single fund) of the social
security system. While the PSOE’s current leader Pedro Sánchez claims to
be in favour of a federal model for Spain, Basque and Catalan critics argue
that the PSOE’s vision of federalism is a distortion of the reality of federalism
in other countries and its theoretical conception in political science, where
federalism is not subordinated to the ultimate purpose of ensuring equality
of outcomes for all citizens but rather is designed to allow for a proper level
of self-government at substate level.21
The PSOE leadership’s support for broadly symmetric federal-type mo-
dels stems first and foremost from its desire for an egalitarian model that
treats all Spaniards the same, but it has has been strengthened by the fact
that the party has traditionally had electoral strongholds in many of the non-
historic regions and in particular the relatively poorer regions in the south
of Spain (Andalusia, Castilla-La Mancha and Extremadura), and thus it has
needed to fight their corner. This has affected discussions over the common
financing regime in particular, since any reduction in the relatively richer re-
gions’ contribution to the wealth redistribution system has usually been fier-
cely opposed by some of the poorer, traditionally Socialist-led regions that
benefit from it, most notably Extremadura.22 The situation has been compli-
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22 Note, however, that the current common financing system does not uniformly benefit all
of the poorer regions of the south, for example Andalusia’s per capita financing remains below
average post-equalisation, in stark contrast to Extremadura which reaps the benefits of over-
redistribution. On the arbitrary outcomes of the equalisation mechanism, see Chapter 3.
cated by the fact that the PSOE has at times been pulled in a different direc-
tion by its regional federation in Catalonia. The Catalan Socialists (PSC) have
greater autonomy than the regional levels of the PSOE elsewhere in Spain
since they are a federation of the party (Fabre 2008: 320; Hopkin 2009: 188-
189; Van Houten 2009: 176-177). As the PSC gradually ‘Catalanised’ its
agenda in the late 1990s and first decade of the 2000s in order to compete
and govern more effectively at regional level, this led to tensions and com-
peting priorities with the PSOE headquarters in Madrid and the regional
branches of the party elsewhere in Spain (Fabre 2008; Roller and Van Houten
2003; Van Houten 2009). The PSC’s decline in popularity in Catalonia during
and following the experience of the PSC-led tripartite coalition governments
in Catalonia in 2003-2010 can in part be attributed to the fact that it became
clear the regional federation, despite its extensive autonomy, was ultimately
still subordinate to the party headquarters in Madrid. 
At statewide and inter-regional level in Spain, competing political
dynamics have thus reduced the possibility of a viable solution to Spain’s
territorial problematic. There is no consensus among nationalists, socialists
and conservatives and any significant change to the status of the Basque
Country and Catalonia would require a willingness on all sides to agree sig-
nificant amendments to the Spanish Constitution, which has not been forth-
coming. This situation has been complicated further by intra-regional
dynamics within the Basque and Catalan regions that impact their respective
nationalist movements and parties, such as the pressures of intra-regional
party competition23 and influence of civil society movements. The following
sections look at each of the Basque and Catalan cases in more detail, inves-
tigating the shifts in territorial strategies the nationalist parties in each have
undergone and the contributing factors to these shifts.
THE PNV’S EVOLVING TERRITORIAL AGENDA
In the early post-Franco years, there were significant differences within
the PNV over the party’s territorial agenda, continuing the original factional
division that the party had experienced earlier in the twentieth century bet-
ween those seeking independence and those in favour of a more moderate
pro-autonomy agenda (Pérez-Nievas 2011). One consequence of a traumatic
split within the party in 1986 was a reduction in internal factionalism there-
after and a strengthening of moderate pro-autonomy stances within the
party, though shifts in the PNV’s territorial agenda would still occur in sub-
sequent decades (Pérez-Nievas 2006: 44). The party’s oscillation since its cre-
ation between territorial options ranging along a continuum from autonomy
to independence has been likened by scholars to the party’s ‘two souls’, or
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the swing of a pendulum from one extreme to the other (De Pablo and Mees
2005). 
Party members themselves see the situation somewhat differently, ar-
guing that throughout the democratic period they have all shared more or
less the same ideology and end goal of the right to self-determination, na-
tionhood, sovereignty and some degree of statehood (though not necessa-
rily full independence) for the Basque Country, even if there are
discrepancies over the exact formula under which this would be achieved
and the degree of connection that would remain to Spain.24 Differences wi-
thin the party (e.g. during the Ibarretxe period), they suggest, have been
more to do with questions of speed and timing (i.e. when it is appropriate to
take active steps towards this goal, depending on both Basque and Spanish
contextual factors) rather than the fundamental essence of the end goal it-
self.25 Thus some party members who have generally been described in aca-
demic literature and the media as emblematic of the ‘moderate’ sector within
the PNV – examples include former lehendakari José Antonio Ardanza and
current party president Andoni Ortuzar – describe themselves instead as firm
advocates and supporters of the end goal of self-determination and sove-
reignty for the Basque people, when the time is right to pursue it. Their cri-
ticism of Ibarretxe was not directed against the nature of the Plan itself, but
rather Ibarretxe’s attempt to try and forge ahead with it even once it had be-
come clear that circumstances were not propitious. There is also a clear ack-
nowledgment within the party that how to articulate conceptions of
sovereignty and nationhood for the Basque Country differ depending on
which particular city, town or village each member comes from, given the
vastly different geographic and sociodemographic makeup of different areas
within the Basque region: in some the PNV coexists with the Basque Socia-
lists while in others it coexists with the izquierda abertzale, which inevitably
contributes to PNV members from different areas prioritising the need to se-
cure agreement on the Basque Country’s relationship to Spain with the one
or the other.26 Thus questions of timing and place have contributed to diffe-
rences within the PNV on how to achieve its end goal, even if there is more
or less agreement within the party that this end goal involves the right to
self-determination and sovereignty for the Basque Country in some shape
or format. In the light of this, rather than talking of shifts between pro-auto-
nomy and pro-sovereignty stances within the PNV, it may be more appro-
priate to speak of a de-emphasis of the party’s pro-sovereignty territorial
agenda during times of territorial accommodationism. 
Such a de-emphasis of more ambitious territorial agendas came during
the fourteen-year period of PNV-led regional governments headed by lehen-
dakari José Antonio Ardanza from 1985 to 1999, for the most part under sta-
ble coalition arrangements with the Basque federation of the Socialist Party
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Ortuzar and Iñaki Goikoetxeta, 10 April 2014.
26 On the complexity of Basque nationalism, see, for example, Gurrutxaga 1996.
(PSE). The PNV under Ardanza’s regional premierships became known for
its moderation and territorial accommodationism, seeking to develop Bas-
que autonomy within the parameters of the Basque autonomy statute and
the Spanish Constitution, and in collaboration with Spanish parties. Ardanza
himself makes a distinction between ‘the important’ and ‘the urgent’, where
the former involves pursuing the PNV’s longstanding goal for the Basque
Country to be recognised as a legal subject and the articulation of this via
self-determination, while the latter involves addressing immediate day-to-
day crises that affect the Basque people’s everyday wellbeing.27 When Ar-
danza took over the reins of Basque government in 1985, he was clear that
addressing the ‘urgent’ had to be his priority, for three main reasons: (1) the
trauma and instability within the PNV itself given the recent split within the
party, which would result in the party’s poor performance at the subsequent
1986 regional elections; (2) the context of severe economic crisis in the Bas-
que region; and (3) ongoing political violence under the terrorist group ETA.28
In this context, with such issues of immediate urgency to address, the PNV’s
territorial agenda during the Ardanza years was focused on seeking and ne-
gotiating the transfer of competences to the Basque autonomous commu-
nity envisaged within the Gernika statute, while more ambitious territorial
goals aimed at achieving sovereignty and self-determination for the Basque
region were for a long time put on the backburner. 
Ardanza first assumed the role of lehendakari in 1985 in very difficult
circumstances for the PNV, following the acrimonious split which had seen
then lehendakari Carlos Garaikoetxeta resign and found a new party, EA (De
Pablo and Mees: 412-421; see also Chapter 6). The split weakened the PNV
significantly at the time, with the party performing poorly in the subsequent
regional elections in November 1986. This resulted in the first of a series of
stable PNV-PSE coalition governments headed by Ardanza until the late
1990s. In this difficult context, Ardanza aimed first and foremost to get the
party back on track and to address the immediate challenges of the econo-
mic crisis afflicting the Basque region and the ongoing political violence in
the second half of the 1980s. To tackle the economic crisis, the late 1980s
and early 1990s were marked by Basque government initiatives agreed bet-
ween the PNV and the Socialists. These included programmes to fight po-
verty to address deprivation in the immediate term by making subsidies
available to the unemployed (the unemployment rate was over 25% at the
time), as well as investment plans with a medium- to long-term impact to
develop the appropriate infrastructure to facilitate a fundamental industrial
reconversion in the Basque Country, away from the traditional sectors of ste-
elworks, mining and shipbuilding (Ardanza 2011: 233-234). Meanwhile, to
address the question of political violence, Ardanza spearheaded the Agree-
ment for the Pacification and Normalisation of Euskadi (the Ajuria Enea
Pact),29 which was signed in January 1988 by all parties operating in the Bas-
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29 For the full text of the agreement, see Ardanza 2011: 481-492.
que region (including the Basque branches of statewide parties) apart from
HB. The Pact’s twofold plan involved (1) forming a joint front against violence
and (2) seeking to ensure the full implementation of the Basque autonomy
statute of 1979, by agreeing criteria for the transfer and financing of pending
competences. The aim was to work towards a ‘final dialogado’ (in other
words, an end to the conflict via dialogue) and to make it clear that acts of
violence and demands for autonomy were two entirely separate issues, in
order to isolate ETA and HB and encourage them to join the political mains-
tream to undertake legitimate negotiations regarding the relationship of the
Basque Country to Spain (Pérez-Nievas 2006: 33).
The PNV and the Basque Socialists collaborated together as coalition
partners to reach numerous agreements with PSOE-led Spanish govern-
ments in Madrid over the transfer of competences to the Basque govern-
ment and their financing. Under the first PNV-PSE Basque coalition
government headed by Ardanza from 1987 to 1990, several key competences
were devolved, including health and social services, and the relevant arran-
gements for a Basque regional justice system and a Basque regional police
force (Ertzaintza) were put in place (Ugarte 2009: 369-370). In all cases, ne-
gotiations for the transfer of each competence also involved agreeing the
valuation of the competence in financial terms and how the competence
would be financed. Inevitably, negotiations over the devolution of compe-
tences and their financing were often subject to significant dispute between
the Basque and Spanish authorities, particularly over the valuation of the
competences (see Chapter 4). In almost all cases, the PNV and the Basque
Socialists would agree their aims and objectives with regard to each com-
petence, but the PSE would leave it to the PNV to take the lead in negotia-
tions with Madrid, in order to avoid internal conflict within the Socialist party
between the regional federation and party headquarters.30 Once the transfer
was secured, a PSE member would then take charge of its implementation
in the Basque Country. Notwithstanding the inevitable Spanish-Basque tugs-
of-war over the transfer of competences and their financing, this system wor-
ked relatively well under the first 1987-1991 Ardanza government, in the
sense that major agreements over the transfer of a number of competences
were reached and implemented within the space of a few years. Ardanza
would thereafter praise his Socialist deputy Ramón Jauregui for his ‘talante
conciliador’ (conciliatory nature) (Ardanza 2011: 247) and both the PNV and
many Socialists alike still speak of the period as one of fruitful collabora-
tion.31
Such collaboration would continue under subsequent Ardanza-led PNV-
PSE Basque coalition governments in the 1990s. One of the most notable
developments under the 1991-1994 regional government term, for example,
was PNV-PSE collaboration for the creation of a Basque education model for
the first time since the policy competence for education had been devolved
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in 1981 (Ugarte 2009: 370). The PNV, the PSE and EE reached the Pacto Es-
colar (‘School Pact’) in 1992, and subsequently approved legislation on this
basis in the years immediately thereafter. This laid the legal and organisa-
tional framework for a Basque education model, which remains the general
basis for the system today. It was a Socialist (Fernando Buesa) who was Bas-
que education minister at the time. Creating a specifically Basque education
system was thus not solely the preserve of the nationalists, but rather the
result first and foremost of joint PNV-PSE collaboration, with the contribution
too of other parties. The fact that such cross-party agreements could be re-
ached to address specifically Basque interests meant the PNV could reap sa-
tisfactory results while working within the bounds of the Gernika statute and
the Spanish Constitution. 
While the PNV’s territorially accommodationist approach would thus pre-
vail for most of the 1990s, from the late 1990s the party would undergo a
fundamental change in territorial strategy (Pérez Nievas 2006). First, the PNV
shifted away from cooperation with statewide parties to seek cooperation
with Basque separatist forces. It broke its long-established regional coalition
arrangements with the Basque Socialists to pursue an alliance instead with
the izquierda abertzale under the Lizarra Pact, a declaration of principles sig-
ned in September 1998 by the PNV, HB, EA and around 20 other nationalist
and pro-independence organisations (including, for example, nationalist
trade unions). Following the regional elections a month later on 25th October
1998, the PNV, EA and the Basque federation of the United Left (Izquierda
Unida, IU) would form a coalition government with the external support of
Euskal Herritarrok (the name which the izquierda abertzale used to stand at
those elections). When that arrangement quickly fell through (due to ETA
breaking the requisite ceasefire), following new elections in 2001, PNV le-
hendakari Juan José Ibarretxe would spearhead a new initiative which be-
came known as the ‘Ibarretxe Plan’, seeking a revised regional autonomy
statute to allow for a referendum on self-determination in the Basque region
and a redefinition of its relationship with the Spanish state as one of ‘free
association’. What was proposed was essentially a confederal solution rather
than full independence, but it would have left the Basque Country with a
very loose connection to Spain, going well beyond its already extensive fis-
cal and policy competences to reconceptualise the region as a nation on an
equal footing to the Spanish one and to establish a bilateral relationship of
equals sharing sovereignty between them. The proposal was thus rejected
by both the PP and PSOE as unconstitutional and a challenge to the integrity
and national sovereignty of Spain. What factors and developments throug-
hout the 1990s led to this change in the PNV’s territorial strategy? 
Party representatives attribute the shift to two main factors: first, a gro-
wing sense within the party by the late 1990s that the Basque Country would
struggle to make further gains in competences under the Spanish state of
autonomies; and second, the need to address the ongoing problem of poli-
tical violence by seeing a realignment with nationalist forces, in the hope
that concerted joint efforts towards securing a new political relationship for
the Basque Country with Spain might persuade ETA too to abandon violence
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and join the political route.32 Political opponents and critics of the PNV see
the situation differently, however, arguing that the PNV’s shift in strategy
marked a sign of the party being swept along by the radicals at the time, or
becoming ‘radicalised’ itself. 
On the first point, the feeling within the PNV that it would struggle to se-
cure further competences within the context of the Spanish state of autono-
mies had gradually grown over the course of the 1990s. Once the main
competences had been transferred in that period (in relation to health, edu-
cation, justice and police, among other areas) as well as several other more
minor competences, PNV interlocutors suggest they began to detect an in-
creasing reluctance from the PSOE governments in Madrid to accede to fur-
ther devolution in other areas.33 By 1995, Ardanza had concluded that the
PNV’s relationship with the PSOE had reached its limits (Ardanza 2011: 332).
Two years previously, the PNV and their Basque Socialist colleagues had
drawn up what would become known as the Zubia Report (Informe Zubia),
named after PNV deputy Joseba Zubia who led the process. In the spirit of
the Ajuria Enea agreement of 1988, this document offered a shared diagnosis
agreed by different parties in the Basque Country as to which articles of the
Gernika statute had not yet been fulfilled, specifically in terms of which com-
petences could still be devolved under the statute’s provisions, and it was
approved by the Basque parliament in 1993. A further text based on the In-
forme Zubia, establishing the priorities in terms of the transfer of competen-
ces, was also approved unanimously in the Basque parliament in 1995. The
PSOE’s reluctance immediately to accept and act upon this text approved
unanimously in the Basque parliament, with prime minister Felipe González
saying that an agreement reached in a regional parliament was not binding
for the Spanish government, was the culmination of a growing list of frus-
trations for Ardanza and the PNV, another being the increasingly politicised
decisions of Spain’s Constitutional Court.
The tables seemed initially to turn again under the new PP government.
Despite the PP being a more centralist party than the PSOE, the agreements
then struck with the new PP minority Spanish government in 1996 to en-
hance Basque autonomy gave rise to the oft-cited comment by the then PNV
party leader Xabier Arzalluz, ‘I’ve achieved more in 14 days with Aznar than
in 13 years with Felipe González.’34 While PNV members themselves have
subsequently warned against taking this one off-the-cuff comment entirely
at face value,35 it certainly reflected the spirit of optimism and satisfaction
with developments at the time. Parliamentary support from CiU and the Ca-
naries Coalition (Coalición Canarias, CC) would have been enough to allow
the PP minority government to govern, but Aznar was keen to get the PNV
on board too. Although the PNV was initially very hesitant to lend parlia-
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35 Personal interviews with PNV representatives, 2014.
mentary support to the PP, to its surprise, Aznar agreed to the list of enhan-
ced competences that the PNV drew up as a condition, including significant
developments to the Concierto to increase the region’s fiscal autonomy (see
Chapter 4), and thus a deal was struck. Such optimism would nevertheless
soon prove short-lived. From the PNV’s perspective, Aznar’s initially conci-
liatory stance only lasted about a year and a half. From autumn 1997, they
started to detect a new, very different phase, in which the PP adopted a more
centralist stance and relations between it and the PNV cooled considerably.
Ardanza would come to the conclusion that Aznar had only taken a concilia-
tory approach for an initial period as he sought to take hold of ‘the reins of
power’ in Spain, making profound changes to institutions and structures that
had long been in the hands of the Socialists, but once he had those reins
firmly in his grasp, he and his party showed their ‘true colours’ (Ardanza
2011: 337). 
Ever since it was drawn up, the Informe Zubia has to this day provided
the main basis for the PNV’s criticism of Spanish governments for failing to
transfer all the competences envisaged under the Gernika statute. When the
Report was first approved in 1993, the number of competences still subject
to potential transfer was put at 54 (out of a total of 144 initially). Given that
some of the competences have been transferred in the past two decades,
this number has since reduced to approximately 35, according to a report
published by the PNV in 2015 criticising the central government for not ful-
filling the Gernika statute.36 Critics of the PNV nevertheless argue that the
party has exaggerated the issue, since the qualitative weight of the compe-
tences still to be transferred is not the same as their quantitative number.37
Only a few of the remaining pending competences are qualitatively signifi-
cant – most notably, management of the social security system and of the
prison system – while others tend to be competences of relatively minor qua-
litative importance, such as coastal search and rescue services or weather
forecasting. While the PNV tends to put the emphasis on what has not been
devolved, its critics thus argue that this can be misleading since it detracts
from a focus on the extensive competences that have been devolved, which
make the Basque Country one of the most autonomous regions in Europe.
Moreover, agreement over the numbers of competences still to be transfe-
rred is not unanimous. PSE members who were involved in the drawing up
of the Report suggest that the PNV has thereafter at times misrepresented it
for political purposes as a black-and-white list of competences to be trans-
ferred, when the wording is more complex in the case of some competences
where an overlapping of state and regional obligations and dual competence
which does not always allow for a simple transfer.38
Regarding the need to address the ongoing problem of political violence
in the late 1990s (the second main point above, identified by the PNV as a
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reason for its shift in agenda), it was informal contacts between PNV inter-
locutors and Herri Batasuna (HB), the main party of the izquierda abertzale
affiliated with ETA in the late 1990s, that led the former to argue in favour of
a realignment with nationalist forces, in the hope that concerted joint efforts
towards securing a new political relationship for the Basque Country with
Spain might persuade ETA too to abandon violence and join the political
route. At the time, the Ajuria Enea Pact, after nearly ten years in operation,
was starting to founder due to increasing discrepancies between the parties
signatory to the agreement. The PP was distancing itself from the notion of
a ‘final dialogado’ to which the conservatives had subscribed under the 1988
Pact, since many within the party accused this of being too conciliatory to-
wards terrorists and called for a tougher, more confrontational approach.
From January 1997, Ardanza, heeding the request of the Ajuria Enea Com-
mittee, would make a final attempt to get the Pact and the notion of a ‘final
dialogado’ back on track by drawing up a new plan for an agreement bet-
ween the parties of the committee on how to bring the Basque conflict to an
end, which became known thereafter as the Plan Ardanza.39 In the midst of
these efforts, ETA kidnapped and killed the PP town councillor for Ermua (in
Vizcaya), Miguel Ángel Blanco, in July 1997, which resulted in a further har-
dening of the PP’s stance. 
In January 1998, Ardanza presented the Plan to the Ajuria Enea Commit-
tee, knowing full well (following prior personal negotiations) that both the
Basque Socialists and PSOE headquarters in Madrid were in favour of bac-
king the plan, but the PP was not so forthcoming, and the PSOE was reluc-
tant to sign unless Aznar agreed to as well, given the pressure the PSOE was
now under in Madrid having been forced into opposition. Although it was
the Basque federations or branches of the statewide party that had to agree
and sign, they could not do so on such an important issue without the bac-
king of their party headquarters in Madrid. In the end, the PP would not sup-
port the plan. When the Basque PP representative Carlos Iturgáiz refused to
sign, the by then PSE leader Nicolás Redondo also refused to sign. The dyna-
mics within the PSE had changed following the loss of the PSOE’s power in
Madrid in 1996. Amid the party’s organisational crisis, both Ramón Jauregui
and Txiki Benegas, the PSE members who for the past ten years had esta-
blished a close working relationship with the PNV (especially Jauregui), left
the Basque political scene to take up positions in Madrid. Jauregui was re-
placed in his role of general secretary of the PSE by Nicolás Redondo who,
according to Ardanza and his PNV colleagues, would lack Jauregui’s conci-
liatory nature and disposition for dialogue.40 The refusal of both the Basque
PP and PSE to sign the Plan Ardanza in March 1998 marked the final meeting
of the Ajuria Enea Committee and effectively brought the Ajuria Enea Pact
to an end. Nicolás Redondo would also have the Socialists leave the PNV-
PSE coalition government a couple of months later. Many within the PSE
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were in profound disagreement and uncomfortable with Redondo’s deci-
sions, though at the same time there was a feeling within the party that the
gradual shift of the PNV towards a territorial agenda going beyond the pa-
rameters of the Gernika statute from 1996/1997 onwards had reduced the
viability of continued PSE-PNV collaboration. 
In the meantime, the PP had won the Spanish general elections in Madrid
in 2000 with an absolute majority for the first time. No longer needing the
support of nationalist parties in the Spanish parliament, it could toughen its
centralist stance and its opposition to Basque nationalism in general, with
its most hardline members seeking to equate all Basque nationalism with
terrorism. This rise of the PP meant the Basque nationalists faced a stronger
Spanish nationalist discourse than they had under the previous Spanish So-
cialist governments, pitting Basque and Spanish nationalisms against one
another. The PP had also gained significant traction in the Basque Country
throughout the 1990s to become the second largest party in the 1998 regio-
nal elections. The fact that ETA had begun to target PSE and PP politicians
led to increasing polarisation between nationalist parties on the one hand
and statewide parties on the other, with the PSE essentially joining forces
with the PP – its arch political rival – against the PNV and the izquierda abert-
zale. 
Despite the failure of the Lizarra Pact (since ETA broke the ceasefire on
which it depended), a significant win for the PNV under Ibarretxe at the 2001
elections propelled the party – and particularly Ibarretxe himself – to conti-
nue alone on its new trajectory. The Ibarretxe Plan, like the Lizarra Pact be-
fore it, was motivated to a significant extent by the fact that many within the
PNV had by then lost patience with the fact that the ongoing problem with
terrorist violence was limiting the political progress they could make in terms
of gains in autonomy and sovereignty for the Basque Country, thus the party
wanted to make its own progress in this regard. For Ibarretxe, the extensive
fiscal autonomy afforded to the Basque region under the Concierto was ma-
nifestly insufficient without full political self-government: using the analogy
of a body, he likens fiscal autonomy to the ‘blood’ and political self-govern-
ment to the ‘bones and muscles’ needed to allow that blood to flow.41 The
PNV also again argued that an improved status for the Basque Country
would, as a by-product, remove ETA’s justification for violence, and Ibarretxe
made it a condition that there would have to be a new ETA ceasefire before
any referendum on an improved status could take place (a referendum
would have been held to obtain societal backing for the plan if the plan had
been approved by both the Basque and Spanish parliaments). The plan thus
closely followed the moves in this direction under the Lizarra Pact, though
in this case the PNV had to take the lead rather than establishing any firm
alliances with HB, since ETA’s renewed activity had made any alliance with
the HB politically unviable at the time. The Ibarretxe Plan was also motivated
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by international influences, since it resembled attempts by other nationalist
movements to seek a ‘third way’ between state centralisation and devolu-
tion, proposing instead a form of ‘sovereignty-association’ with the member
state (a notion the Parti Quebecois had attempted to formulate with Canada),
in a new ‘post-sovereign’ era (Keating and Bray: 206: 348).
Several contextual factors help to explain the leading role Ibarretxe as-
sumed and his determination to take forward a pro-sovereignty agenda in
that particular period. In contrast to Ardanza, who had taken hold of the reins
of Basque government at a time when contextual circumstances made it im-
portant to focus on ‘the urgent’, Ibarretxe became lehendakari at a time when
circumstances seemed to make it relatively more possible to concentrate on
‘the important’ again, in particular since the Basque economy was by then
much stronger. Also, ETA had been weakened by years of police action
against it and figures within HB were working hard to bring an end to ETA’s
violence and bring the izquierda abertzale into democratic practice, making
the possibility of ceasefires and an end to violence relatively more likely. The
intensification of the PP’s Spanish conservatism and nationalism under
Aznar also caused intense polarisation, encouraging Ibarretxe, in turn, to in-
tensify his position further in the opposite direction. The PP was increasingly
perceived as a serious threat to Basque competences and institutions as
Aznar started to make attempts to recentralise powers in some areas or ap-
prove basic state legislation that would take precedence over regional legis-
lation.42 Other steps which caused a furore included attempts by some PP
representatives to associate all Basque nationalism with terrorism and the
PP’s decision to approve a controversial Law on Political Parties in 2002, first
and foremost to enable it to outlaw Batasuna for links to terrorism – a move
which many Basque nationalists interpreted as an illegitimate attempt to
prevent the incorporation of the political ideology of the izquierda abertzale
into the democratic, political arena.43 Such decisions and the climate of po-
larisation between statewide and nationalist forces mobilised voters that
might not usually back the PNV to do so (especially izquierda abertzale sup-
porters, but also non-nationalists concerned about the intensity of the PP’s
anti-Basque nationalism), contributing to Ibarrexte’s strong victory in the
2001 elections, which further convinced him to forge ahead.44
Changes in party leadership during the parliamentary term would
also become a contributing factor. The PNV is unusual in that the party leader
and the party’s candidate for lehendakari are separate roles, resulting in ‘a
more dispersed style of leadership’ (Acha and Pérez-Nievas 1998: 101). Xa-
bier Arzalluz, longstanding president of the PNV since 1980, would announce
in 2003 his decision to step down. Under Ardanza’s years as lehendakari, a
pattern was established whereby the president of the party (Arzalluz) be-
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came associated with stronger defence of the party’s ultimate territorial ob-
jectives, while the role of the lehendakari became known for relatively gre-
ater moderation, given the need to combine the PNV’s ultimate territorial
goals with the practicalities of day-to-day governance. When Arzalluz neared
retirement, however, the roles seemed to be reversed and Ibarretxe seemed
to step into his shoes, taking the lead on the party’s territorial project. New
party leader Josu Jon Imaz – the more moderate candidate of the two for
the party leadership at the time, the other being Joseba Egibar – was more
moderate in comparison and would ultimately contribute in his four years
in the role to returning the PNV to a relatively more moderate position on
territorial matters. 
The Basque parliament approved the Ibarretxe Plan in December 2004
but the vote was only just won due to the last-minute u-turn of three deputies
from Batasuna (HB had been refounded as Batasuna in 2001), which had by
then been outlawed under the controversial Spanish Law on Political Parties,
due to its links with ETA. Most Batasuna members had deemed the Ibarretxe
Plan insufficiently far-reaching. The plan then failed as it was rejected over-
whelmingly by the Spanish parliament as unconstitutional after being pre-
sented to it in January 2005, and the PNV then suffered electoral decline at
the early regional elections called by Ibarretxe in April 2005 – in contrast to
Ibarretxe’s own expectations of a strong win. Ibarretxe proposed holding an
official vote in the Basque region incorporating two questions – one asking
citizens whether they supported a negotiated end (‘final dialogado’) to vio-
lence, if ETA were to definitively renounce violence beforehand as a precon-
dition; and a second asking whether Basque parties should initiate
negotiations to reach an agreement on exercising the ‘right to decide’ of the
Basque people – and submitting the agreement to a referendum by end
2010. The Basque parliament approved a Basque Consultation Law to this
effect in 2008, but it was rejected by the Constitutional Court as unconstitu-
tional, for infringing state competences under Article 149 of the Spanish
Constitution. The subsequent year, the PNV lost power in 2009 for the first
(and so far only) time despite winning the most seats, since coalition politics
(a PSE-PP alliance) forced it into opposition, upon which Ibarretxe retired
from political life. 
In analysing why the Ibarretxe Plan failed and why the PNV’s support in
the Basque region decreased immediately after rejection of the Plan by Ma-
drid, there is widespread feeling within the PNV that in the end the timing
was not right.45 Critics, on the other hand, argue that it was not simply a
question of timing, but rather of the fact that the plan was too divisive, aimed
at nationalist voters only (see, for example, Keating and Bray 2006: 360).
Such an ambitious plan, which was almost inevitably going to be deemed
unconstitutional by Madrid, needed ample support from Basque politicians
and society to stand a chance of being taken seriously, not just a narrow ma-
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jority dependent upon the support of politicians from HB, a party which had
still not managed to sever links with ETA and its violence, of late directed at
PP and Socialist politicians. ETA’s renewed activity at the turn of the century
had made much of Basque society very wary, the process of devising the
Ibarretxe Plan was too heavily party-led without sufficient backing from so-
ciety, and in the climate of political polarisation there lacked a much-needed
cross-party consensus with non-nationalist political forces in the region (at
least the Basque Socialists). Ibarretxe was also penalised for losing sight of
more everyday matters, most noticeably the social conflicts over health and
education that emerged during his 2001-2005 mandate, which is thought to
have contributed to the party’s poorer performance than expected by Iba-
rretxe himself at the 2005 regional elections. By then, the change from the
PP Spanish government under Aznar to a new Socialist government under
Zapatero in 2004 also heralded the promise of a less conflictive Spanish-Bas-
que dynamic, thus traditionally non-nationalist voters who had turned to vo-
ting the PNV in 2001 during Aznar’s particularly belligerent period now had
hope for a different future under the PSOE.46
The thwarting of the Ibarretxe Plan and subsequent loss of power led the
PNV to de-emphasise its territorial agenda once again, as became clearly
evident when the party returned to power in the 2012 regional elections with
Iñigo Urkullu as lehendakari, and again in 2015. Urkullu put the PNV’s terri-
torial agenda temporarily on the backburner to focus first and foremost on
ensuring the Basque Country would emerge from the economic crisis of
2007-2008. And in 2013 he prioritised restoring the PNV’s traditional rela-
tionship with the Basque Socialists (which had been broken for over a de-
cade when the parties in the Basque Country divided into nationalist and
non-nationalist blocs) to ensure his minority government would receive their
support for the everyday matters of governance. The PNV had originally
hoped to be able to govern by shifting alliances from the outset of its term
following the 2012 elections, but its inability to secure parliamentary support
for the region’s 2013 budget made it realise a more stable alliance was ne-
cessary. Noticeably, the areas covered by the pact or alliance which Urkullu
re-established with the Basque Socialists in September 2013 to secure their
support in regional and provincial administrations did not include any issues
of Basque sovereignty or the region’s relationship with Spain – the focus
was instead on fiscal reform during a time of economic crisis. The izquierda
abertzale had re-entered formal politics under the Bildu coalition (subse-
quently EH Bildu) from 2011 onwards, gaining control over Guipúzcoa at the
2011 provincial elections. This followed ETA’s decision to make its ceasefire
permanent in 2011. Batasuna had been refounded as Sortu, which joined
the Bildu coalition (becoming EH Bildu) shortly afterwards, as soon as it was
clear the party was not to be outlawed. And yet the PNV preferred to return
to an alliance with the Socialists rather than pursuing collaboration with the
izquierda abertzale, which had only just entered properly into formal politics
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and would take time to gain experience in democratic practice. Following
the 2015 regional and provincial elections, which returned the PNV to power
in the regional government and the province of Vizcaya as well as restoring
it to power in Álava and Guipúzcoa (where it had been in opposition to the
PP and Bildu respectively), the PNV consolidated its alliance with the Basque
Socialists.
The relative de-emphasising of territorial politics under Urkullu’s 2011-
2015 government term, and the return to collaboration with a statewide party
rather than the separatists, did not however mean the PNV had renounced
its territorial objective. The party remained committed to seeking a new sta-
tus which would allow for bilateral relations between the Basque Country
and Madrid as equal partners and the Basque right to self-determination and
co-sovereignty. Under Urkullu, the PNV’s conception of the notion of co-so-
vereignty that it seeks has envisaged an extension of the bilateral nature of
the economic Concierto (whereby both Spanish and Basque delegations
have equal negotiating rights and veto power) to wider political relations,
with explicit calls for a ‘political Concierto’.47 In 2013, the PNV launched a
parliamentary committee on self-government to investigate possibilities for
a new autonomy statute defining a new political relationship with Madrid
involving self-determination and co-sovereignty. However, the committee’s
progress would be slow, and reach the end of 2015 without any definitive
conclusions as to the best way forward. Even within sectors of the party itself
there had been scepticism it would achieve much, since the fundamental di-
lemma for the PNV remains how to secure a broader consensus within the
Basque Country for a project which would in essence resemble the Ibarretxe
Plan in many ways, so that it is not just a nationalist project.48 Political op-
ponents accused the PNV of using the committee simply to buy time without
defining its ultimate intentions, thereby avoiding ‘getting its feet wet’. This
time around, the PNV has been taking its time so as not to risk the same mis-
takes of the Ibarretxe period. It is reluctant to take any plan forward which
does not have the backing of both the izquierda abertzale and the Basque
Socialists, to ensure cross-party support which spans the nationalist-state-
wide divide – a very difficult feat to achieve – as well as sufficiently clear sup-
port from society. It has also been biding its time to wait and see what
happens in Catalonia. 
The ongoing ramifications of the history of terrorism in the region still
condition the PNV’s political project and the feasibility of nationalist alliances
with the izquierda abertzale, since the izquierda abertzale is still very new to
the democratic arena and issues such as the regrouping of ETA prisoners in
the Basque Country, their reinsertion in society, and victims’ rights remain
unresolved. Both the PNV and the izquierda abertzale are also in competition
with one another to lead the process of securing a new relationship of the
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Basque region to Spain, which further complicates the potential for natio-
nalist alignment. At the same time, Basque society has been concerned first
and foremost in recent years with the impact of the economic crisis, which
it is the sole responsibility of the Basque government to address, since the
fiscal autonomy model means it cannot look to Madrid for additional finan-
cing or blame Madrid for the region’s financial woes (in contrast to Catalo-
nia). Like everywhere the Basque region has suffered during the crisis, but
in comparative terms, it has fared significantly better than much of the rest
of Spain (Zubiri 2015; see also Tables 3 and 4, p.26). This is both because the
Concierto affords it relatively more resources than comparable regions
under the common financing system, and because construction was not a
major sector in the Basque region, so it was not hit by the crash of the cons-
truction boom that badly afflicted Spain elsewhere. All of these factors mean
that securing a new status for the Basque Country has not been an imme-
diate priority in recent years for many within Basque society nor indeed for
many within the PNV itself.
CDC’S EVOLVING TERRITORIAL AGENDA
In CDC’s case, a long period of a relatively stable, accommodationist ap-
proach came during the 23 years of Jordi Pujol’s role as Catalan president
from the first regional elections in 1980 until 2003. Under Pujol’s leadership,
CDC, as part of CiU, committed to seeking incremental gains in self-govern-
ment within the framework of the Spanish Constitution and state of autono-
mies, achieving this via bilateral pacts and collaboration with central Spanish
governments (Barrio and Barberà 2011; Dowling 2005, 2013). The party’s ori-
ginal statutes (CDC was founded in 1974) had included the objective of de-
veloping ‘full national sovereignty’, so in a limited sense, party members
could claim that the party’s ultimate goal from the outset was to secure so-
vereignty as the culmination of incremental gains in autonomy (Gillespie
2015c). In practice, however, evidence of the party’s actual behaviour throug-
hout the Transition and under Pujol’s Catalan regional premierships sugges-
ted that it wanted to be able to realise its ambitions for Catalonia via an
accommodationist approach through a flexible interpretation of the Spanish
Constitution, in a way which would enable Catalonia to play a leading role
in Spain. Thus CDC did at this stage seem more genuinely pro-autonomy
and less ambiguous in this regard than the PNV. An explicit shift within CDC
towards a pro-sovereignty agenda and alliances would not come until much
later, from 2012 onwards, presaged by developments from around 2008 on-
wards, as discussed below. 
During the Transition, CDC representatives – especially Miquel Roca Jun-
yent, one of the seven ‘founding fathers’ of the Spanish Constitution – gave
their Spanish and Basque counterparts the clear impression that CDC wan-
ted Catalonia to be a leading example for the Spanish transition and to play
a leading role in designing the state of the autonomies, rather than to risk
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destabilising the system. Following the transition, the lack of a real compe-
titor on the left in Catalonia in regional government elections throughout the
eighties and most of the nineties contributed significantly to CDC’s ability,
working together with UDC as part of the CiU coalition, to maintain control
of the Catalan political scene for 23 years under Jordi Pujol and his ability to
use ambiguity on the territorial question to strategic affect and modify the
strength or tone of his nationalism depending on whether his audience was
Madrid or Catalonia (Dowling 2005, 2013).49 CiU’s privileging of an accom-
modationist approach was clear, as Pujol established close working relations
with PSOE and PP politicians in Madrid and, when the opportunity arose,
extracted decentralisation gains in returning for supporting the minority Spa-
nish governments of Felipe González (PSOE, 1993-1996) and José María
Aznar (PP, 1996-2000) (e.g. Dowling 2005: 107; Dowling 2009: 188). Like the
PNV, CiU secured strong gains for Catalonia in particular when Aznar first
gained power – this included CiU playing a significant role in negotiating a
new reform of the common regional financing system in 1996. Throughout
the 1980s and 1990s, CiU often secured competences for Catalonia prior to
the Basque region, since it preferred to secure a particular competence even
without an optimal deal on the financing for it, with a view to subsequent
further negotiations to improve the financing, whereas the PNV only accep-
ted the competence in each case once it had reached agreement with Madrid
on the valuation of the competence it wanted. This difference in approach
was in part due to the different financing systems in each region – under the
Concierto, the Basques would not easily be able to claim additional financing
for a competence once the deal on its valuation had been reached, whereas
for Catalonia it was in theory relatively more feasible to negotiate future im-
provements in financing under the common financing system.50 In practice,
however, the Catalan approach risked leaving the region relatively under-fi-
nanced in some respects, and complaints would later emerge that funda-
mental competences such as health and education had been transferred with
a sizeable deficit (see Chapter 7).51
By the late 1990s, there were signs of emerging pressures on the conti-
nued viability of CiU’s accommodationist approach, although the party fe-
deration under Pujol remained committed to it at the time, notwithstanding
the emergence of some degree of internal pressure from pro-sovereignty
sectors within CDC (Gillespie 2015c). There was a growing sense within Ca-
talan society that the provisions of the existing Catalan autonomy statute
were too limiting to enable Catalonia to be able to face new policy challenges
such as rapidly increasing immigration, slow economic growth and deterio-
rating public services and infrastructures (Elias 2015). CiU had lost its abso-
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lute majority of seats (achieved at three successive Catalan elections in 1984,
1988 and 1992) to secure only a relative majority in 1995, and thereafter it
started to face increased party competition within Catalonia with the rise of
both ERC and the Catalan federation of the Socialist Party (PSC) as genuine
competitors from the mid 1990s onwards, providing a left-wing alternative
to CiU’s centre-right agenda (Dowling 2009; Wilson 2012: 135). From the mid
1990s, Pujol had brought some clearly pro-sovereignty figures into key po-
sitions in CDC and, with the support of pro-sovereignty forces, he resisted
attempts by the clearly moderate UDC leader Duran to inherit the CiU lea-
dership from him, as the question of who would succeed him came to the
fore (Gillespie 2015c). Against a backdrop of the fall of the Berlin wall and
the dissolution of the Soviet Union, pro-sovereignty theories had started to
take shape within some sections of CDC (especially the younger genera-
tions), who wanted to push for sovereignty for Catalonia and adequate re-
cognition of the Spanish state as multinational (Barberà and Barrio 1996:
114, 127). 
Still, such developments were only very tentative at this stage and were
not indicative of a party shift towards a pro-sovereignty stance. At this stage
moderate and accommodationist tendencies continued to prevail within
CDC/CiU, which remained reluctant even to seek reform of the regional au-
tonomy statute, despite the increasing pressure the party was under from
ERC over the issue. During 1996-2000, Pujol prioritised instead providing
parliamentary support to the PP government in Madrid in return for the PP’s
support in the Catalan parliament back home (the PP had been the main be-
neficiary of CiU’s losses at the 1995 regional elections). This reliance on PP
support in the Catalan parliament – which continued in 2000-2003, once the
PP had an absolute majority in the Spanish parliament and no longer needed
CiU there – significantly limited CiU’s room for manoeuvre.52 ERC did offer
its support to CiU on a number of occasions, but CiU declined (Barberà and
Barrio 2006: 131). When a parliamentary committee was created in 2001 to
study improvements in self-government for Catalonia, one of the objectives
of the Pujol government at the time, the debate ended up being characteri-
sed by a divide between ERC, ICV and the PSC on the one hand, and the PP
and CiU on the other. It was the former group who argued convincingly in
favour of a statute reform to achieve improvements to Catalan autonomy,
whereas CiU, under pressure from the PP, was reluctant to commit to a sta-
tute reform, arguing instead that the necessary changes could be achieved
within the context of the existing statute.53 This was in stark contrast to the
situation in the Basque region at the time, where frustration with the limita-
tions of the state of autonomies had by then contributed (among other fac-
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tors) to the PNV’s breaking of its collaboration with statewide parties and
turn towards pro-sovereignty alliances and projects. 
CiU’s explicit alliance with Spain’s right-wing PP party, a centralist party
with a strong unitary conception of the Spanish nation and profound ideo-
logical scepticism about decentralisation, emphasized the centre-right posi-
tioning of CiU, which in previous years had been able to span right and left
dimensions relatively more easily.54 CiU’s privileging of this relation over any
serious consideration of statute reform at the time alienated some CiU vo-
ters, who started to look to either the PSC or ERC as alternatives.55 The PSC,
under the leadership of Pasqual Maragall from 2000 onwards, shifted to-
wards a more ‘Catalanist’ agenda at the same time as ERC began to prioritise
its efforts on what was more immediately possible (a reform of the Catalan
autonomy statute, as well as improvements in social issues) rather than its
long-term goal (independence).56 ERC representatives at the turn of the cen-
tury also clearly perceived the PSC as a more viable potential partner than
CiU, not only in terms of left-wing agendas but also territorial agendas, since
the PSC, under the leadership of Pasqual Maragall, embraced the goal of a
reform of the Catalan regional autonomy statute in the leadup to the 2003
Catalan elections more convincingly then CDC/CiU.57 Artur Mas, Pujol’s cho-
sen successor and previously CDC secretary general, took a back seat on the
issue in comparison, since the leadership change from Pujol to Mas was cha-
racterised, at least at first, by a continuation of moderate, accommodationist
behaviour. Despite winning the 2003 elections, CiU ended up in opposition
to a left-wing tripartite coalition headed by the PSC and incorporating both
ERC and ICV. They would be the parties to take forward statute reform in Ca-
talonia from 2003 onwards.58
Throughout the statute reform process under the tripartite coalition go-
vernment, CiU, from its position in opposition, would try to outbid ERC with
more territorially ambitious proposals in order to reassert itself as the best
defender of Catalan interests, leading to what has been described as an ‘out-
bidding competition’ resulting in a radicalisation of agendas (Barrio and Ro-
dríguez-Teruel 2014) (see Chapter 7). Although not in power in Catalonia,
CiU would use its leverage in Madrid (where the PSOE minority government
at the time often needed CiU support in the Spanish parliament) to ensure
direct involvement in the final agreement over the text, in an attempt to re-
assert its role as the primary actor in Catalonia. After the Catalan parliament
had approved its proposed reform of the statute of autonomy in September
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2005 and this had been sent to the Spanish parliament for review, then prime
minister Zapatero and Artur Mas reached an agreement in January 2006 to
amend the most controversial aspects of the text – particularly in relation to
the definition of Catalonia as a nation (which was now to be included in the
preamble only) and a new financing agreement for Catalonia, in order to se-
cure sufficient backing for it in the Spanish parliament. 
Mas’ acceptance of this deal, which involved a significant watering down
of key parts of the statute (especially in relation to regional financing – see
Chapter 7), showed that CiU was still at this stage willing to be flexible with
its territorial goals, prioritising instead its aim to recuperate electoral support
and a return to government (Barrio and Barberà 2011: 93). In this case, this
could best be achieved by compromising with the PSOE in order to be seen
as the party responsible for striking the best possible deal in the circums-
tances with Madrid. Thus Artur Mas appeared in the final photo with Zapa-
tero – much to the irritation of members of the tripartite Catalan coalition
government, who felt this was fundamentally inappropriate of Zapatero in
institutional and procedural terms, given that CiU was the opposition party
in Catalonia. Some PSC representatives (including Antoni Castells) had al-
ready agreed with the PSOE behind the scenes most of what Zapatero and
Mas announced, while ERC felt left out of the whole process.59
Ahead of the 2010 regional election, CiU shifted its focus away from the
statute reform and back to the economy in its campaign, in order capitalise
on its reputation for strong economic management in a time of economic
crisis (Barrio and Barberà 2011: 93; Elias 2015). And yet it still combined eco-
nomic and territorial agendas, in that it focused on securing greater fiscal
autonomy for Catalonia in its 2010 regional election campaign as one way
of addressing the economic crisis. Since tensions over the statute reform
had eventually contributed to the breakdown of the tripartite coalition, CiU
managed to return to power in 2010, by which time a pro-independence mo-
vement was rapidly growing in the region, in a climate of increasing dissa-
tisfaction among politicians and citizens alike, as attempts to secure both
greater autonomy and recognition for Catalan identity had been met with
rebuffs from Spanish political parties (especially the PP) and institutions. 
A particular catalyst was the Spanish Constitutional Court ruling in 2010,
which declared totally or partly unconstitutional several articles of the new
Catalan statute, in particular the recognition of Catalonia as a nation. This
was the result of various appeals, some lodged by the PP, with the Constitu-
tional Court against aspects of the statute considered by critics as unconsti-
tutional. The Constitutional Court ruling came four years after the statute
had been approved in the Spanish parliament in 2006 as well as in a refe-
rendum in Catalonia that year. This, on top of the changes already made to
the statute in 2006 to secure the Spanish parliament’s backing, finally put
paid to Zapatero’s pledge years earlier to respect whatever statute was
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agreed in the Catalan parliament. Such developments coincided with the be-
ginnings of political wrangling from 2010 onwards over the central govern-
ment’s handling of Catalonia’s financial woes during the crisis and the extent
of Catalonia’s indebtedness, which Catalan politicians could in part attribute
to the overly redistributive nature of the common financing regime – a pro-
blem which the 2009 reform of the common financing system quickly proved
insufficient to resolve (see Chapters 3 and 7). 
Once in power, however, CDC, which formed a minority government in
Catalonia, reestablished a working relationship with the PP (then in power
in Madrid from 2011), relying upon its support in the Catalan parliament in
some fundamental areas of legislation, for example its 2012 regional
budget.60 It was not until 2012 that CDC would make an explicit break with
alliances with statewide parties and an overt shift away from accommoda-
tionist politics towards a pro-sovereignty lexicon in 2012. Caught unawares
by the extent of the pro-independence march in the region on 11th Septem-
ber 2012, Catalan national day, Mas chose to ride the wave, deciding to re-
ceive a delegation from the organisers, the Catalan National Assembly
(Assemblea Nacional Catalana, ANC), at the end of the march. The march,
which attracted an estimated 1.5 million participants according to estimates
in press reports,61 had been organised by the then newly formed ANC, which
would quickly become the leading pro-independence civil society organisa-
tion. About ten days later Mas travelled to Madrid to meet with prime mi-
nister Rajoy to make one last ditch attempt at securing a fiscal pact for
Catalonia, almost certainly knowing that the request would be refused again,
but also that this refusal could help to garner support for him to take matters
to the next stage and lead a pro-sovereignty process going forward. There-
after he called snap elections to be held in November 2012 with the ‘right to
decide’ as the main feature of CiU’s electoral manifesto, thus stepping up
his demands from greater fiscal autonomy to political sovereignty and ho-
ping to secure a resounding majority for CiU. 
The timing of the elections also promised to give Mas the chance to se-
cure a sufficient majority to avoid needing the support of the Catalan PP to
pass his 2013 regional budget, which it had needed in 2012. And yet the early
election plan backfired somewhat, since CiU, despite winning again, lost
ground in the elections to the pro-independence party ERC, with which it
subsequently formed an alliance to give it a working majority. The year 2012
thus marked a clear turning point in CiU’s strategy as Artur Mas explicitly
started to advocate that the way forward for Catalonia involved achieving
political sovereignty and some degree of statehood (the terminology used
was deliberately ambiguous to embrace options short of full independence
too). CiU then formed an alliance in parliament with a pro-independence
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60 In interviews held in 2016, CDC representatives nevertheless suggested that there was a
strong feeling within the party against the alliances with the PP on this occasion, far more so
than during the Pujol years of PP-CiU collaboration.
61 For example, ‘Masiva manifestación por la independencia de Catalunya’, La Vanguardia,
11.09.12. See also Crameri 2015: 105.
party for the first time with the goal of working towards a referendum, and
events would snowball thereafter. What factors explain this shift and the ti-
ming of it?
It has often been suggested that Mas and his party were essentially over-
taken by events, surprised by the extent of citizen mobilisation in favour of
the ‘right to decide’ and independence that had been growing in Catalonia
under the aegis of civil society groups – most notably the ANC established
in early 2012 and, on a smaller scale, the cultural association Omnium Cul-
tural, among others. The dominant view has tended to see the turn towards
a pro-sovereignty agenda in Catalonia as a ‘bottom-up’ process, in which
CiU ended up turning towards a pro-sovereignty agenda in response to pres-
sures from society itself. According to Guibernau (2014), for example, the
nationalist movement is bottom-up, civic and ‘emancipatory’ in nature and
thus Catalan calls for self-determination may be regarded as the ‘ultimate
consequence’ of the notion of popular sovereignty inherent in democracy.
This seems to provide a sharp contrast to the elite-led or ‘top-down’ process
led by Ibarretxe in the Basque Country several years beforehand. In this con-
text, Mas has frequently been accused in the media of political expediency
in jumping on the pro-sovereignty bandwagon, in an attempt to increase po-
litical support for both himself and CDC, and thereafter becoming constrai-
ned by his alliances with pro-independence parties (e.g. The Economist
2014a and 2014b). Certainly, it seems that a degree of political expediency
was involved, but black-and-white depictions of the civil pro-independence
movement as a purely grassroots one which caught Artur Mas entirely un-
prepared nevertheless require nuance. 
Grassroots mobilisation can be traced back in particular to 2007, when
the first march in favour of the ‘right to decide’ was held in Barcelona in De-
cember to demonstrate against the poor investment by the Spanish govern-
ment in Catalonia’s ageing local rail network, three lines of which had just
been temporarily shut down due to problems at the time with the works to
link Madrid and Barcelona by fast train (AVE).62 The demonstration, which
was convened by the Platform for the Right to Decide and widely supported
by civil society groups in Catalonia, attracted tens of thousands of citizens
and politicians, who marched under the banner ‘We’re a nation. We have
the right to decide on our infrastructure’. On 10 July 2010, an estimated one
million people took to the streets, convened by civil society organisations,
behind banners proclaiming ‘We are a nation, we decide!’ after Spain’s Cons-
titutional Court had ruled against key aspects of the Catalan statute, inclu-
ding its designation as a nation in the preamble.63 The demonstration which
would prove a real game-changer and turning point, forcing politicians to
react decisively, was however the afore-mentioned march on 11 September
2012 – larger numbers would follow on the same day in 2013, 2014 and 2015.
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62 Personal interview with Germà Bel, 27 April 2015.
63 For example, ‘Masiva manifestación en Barcelona en apoyo al Estatut y contra el Consti-
tucional’, El Mundo, 11.07.10. Also Crameri 2015: 104-105.
Traditional Catalan nationalists who had long fought for greater recognition
for Catalonia’s language and culture were increasingly being joined by a new
wave of disaffected Catalans who were not necessarily traditional nationalist
party supporters, but had come to resent Catalonia’s economic treatment at
the hands of the Spanish state and the austerity measures being imposed
during the crisis, as well as the PP’s recentralisation measures in other areas
such as education.
While Mas was indeed taken by surprise by the size of the 2012 demons-
tration, as he himself has since acknowledged, his turn to a pro-sovereignty
stance was not entirely unexpected nor did it come from nowhere, since it
can be seen as the culmination of the process of moving towards a ‘national
transition’, a project he had started working on around 2006/2007 (Hugh
2014). In 2007, Mas had announced a relaunch of the Fundació Catalanista
Demòcrata Trias Fargas (CatDem), a foundation linked to CDC, appointing
Agustí Colomines as its director to turn it into the ‘Casa Grande del Catala-
nismo’ (‘big house of Catalanism’). Aware that CDC’s electoral base was di-
minishing even though it was still winning elections (coalition politics rather
than electoral loss that had put CiU in opposition in 2003 and 2006), Mas de-
signed this new initiative to increase the party’s social base and recover vo-
ters disenchanted with years of CiU-PP collaboration.64 The intention, as
explained by Artur Mas himself in various declarations at the time, was to
go beyond the party’s frontiers and reach out to civil society to refound Ca-
talanism through collaborative efforts and reflections on how best to take
Catalonia forward, though sceptics described it instead as a rather desperate
attempt to regain popularity for a struggling CiU.65 Academics, lawyers, eco-
nomists and representatives of other liberal professions joined the project.
Mas explicitly made clear he wanted the ‘casa’ to bring together all those in-
terested in working on Catalonia’s future, from those in favour of more self-
government through to those in favour of full independence, the idea being
to join forces in a transversal project designed to rethink Catalanism and
make it hegemonic. CDC under Artur Mas, via the ‘casa del catalanismo’,
would gradually evolve towards a pro-sovereignty stance in a step-by-step
process, moving on to a new phase each time one was thwarted by Madrid:
first the idea of a bilateral financing pact specifically for Catalonia, then the
‘right to decide’, then ‘state structures’ (with ambiguity intended, leaving
open the possibility of whether or not this would imply full independence
from Spain or an alternative arrangement within Spain).66 The origins of
Artur Mas’ change of stance towards a pro-sovereignty position in 2012 can
thus be traced back to several years earlier. The unexpectedly high partici-
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64 Personal interview with Agustí Colomines, 23 March 2015. See also, for example, ‘CDC
se prepara para el congreso que consagrará la “Gran Casa del Catalanismo”’, El Mundo,
11.07.08.
65 For example, ‘Mas propone a la desesperada crear una “gran casa del catalanismo” para
acceder al poder’, Libertad digital, 03.09.07.
66 Personal interview with Agustí Colomines, 23 March 2015. 
pation in the 2012 pro-independence march on Catalan’s national day cer-
tainly seems to have accelerated his plans to lead a pro-sovereignty agenda,
but the seeds of this had been in the making for a while. After the experience
of being forced into the backseat when the tripartite coalition took forward
plans for a new Catalan statute of autonomy, Mas and his party were not
going to miss the chance again to play the lead role in taking forward a na-
tional and territorial agenda for Catalonia.
There had also been a gradual generational change within CDC since the
1990s, which contributed to the shift.67 Members of CDC’s youth organisation
Catalonia’s Nationalist Youth (Joventut Nacionalista de Catalunya, JNC), as
well as the Catalan National Federation of Students (Federació Nacional d’Es-
tudiants de Catalunya, FNEC), had gradually been incorporated into CDC.
From the mid 1990s, the JNC had pronounced itself clearly in favour of so-
vereignty for Catalonia, often articulating its own viewpoint in contradiction
to Pujol’s accommodationist stance, but at the time, moderate tendencies
within CDC itself had prevailed. Under Artur Mas, however, a gradual gene-
rational change took place, with the incorporation of an increasing number
of party representatives that had originally been formed in the JNC and
FNEC, who were more in favour of a pro-sovereignty agenda than their pre-
decessors and also far less tolerant of the tradition of CiU-PP alliances, wan-
ting CiU to adopt a more socially progressive agenda. 
The nature of the civil society movement also requires nuance, since
black-and-white depictions of the Catalan civil society movement as a purely
bottom-up process do not adequately account for the complexity of the in-
terplay between political and civil factors, and have thus come under scru-
tiny. Analyses of top-down nation-building activities and discourses by
nationalist political elites over the decades, and the impact of these on citizen
identity formation processes in Catalonia, have pointed to a complex picture,
since some top-down, elite-led processes can be seen to some extent to have
preceded and influenced the emergence of an apparently bottom-up move-
ment. Catalan nationalists themselves acknowledge the importance of Pujol
and the party in this regard. Long prior to the turn to secessionism in Cata-
lonia, the 23 years of Catalan government under Pujol from 1980 to 2003
saw the Catalan president and his party consistently employ discourses to
convince Catalans and others that Catalonia was a nation worthy of special
treatment, contributing to a rise in survey respondents describing Catalonia
as such (Crameri 2015: 106 endnote 10). Fer país (‘making a country’) formed
a central part of Catalan nationalism under Pujol (Dowling 2005: 109; Ma-
gone 2009: 236; Barberà and Barrio 2006: 127). While it was to be expected
that Catalans would seek to bring Catalan heritage and history to the fore-
front again after decades of being suppressed under Franco, some aspects
of such nation-building activities and discourses have nevertheless been
subject to questioning given the inevitable risks of the use (and abuse) of
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67 Personal interviews with Agustí Colomines, 23 March 2015; Lluís Corominas, 27 January
2016; and Francesc Homs, 28 January 2016. See also Gillespie 2015c.
history and culture for nationalist purposes. Crameri (2006), for example, ex-
plores CiU’s failure to reflect a plurality of views in the version of history
given in the Catalan history museum, which it designed and conceived of
for nation-building purposes. Using social data about citizens’ and politi-
cians’ background and attitudes, some academics have gone further to in-
terpret Catalan citizens’ evolving preferences on the national question in the
21st century as a consequence of the role played by political parties and po-
litical elites in a context of power relations and partisan struggles within Ca-
talonia’ (Miley 2007: 3). Miley (2006, 2007, 2013 and 2014; De la Calle and
Miley 2008), for example, uses data on social structures and public opinion
to suggest that the strength of Catalan nationalism has been the result of an
elite-led creation of ‘micro-nationalist ideological hegemony’ in the Catalan
political sphere over the decades, which has in turn impacted and influenced
society rather than reflecting any prior societal consensus (Miley 2014: 291).
He contrasts this with the situation in the Basque Country where he suggests
‘the nation-building project promoted by the regional authorities has con-
sistently faced much higher levels of resistance among opposition parties’
and thus ‘the region’s representative institutions have been consistently
more divided, responsive to the divergent preferences of different segments
of Basque society’ (Miley 2014: 306). In a similar vein, Barrio and Rodríguez
(2014) attribute the radicalisation of people’s demands on self-government
to the outbidding process by Catalan political parties during the statute re-
form process during the 2000s, in an atmosphere of increased party compe-
tition on the territorial axis (with CiU in opposition for the first time to a
coalition led by PSC, which had ‘catalanised’ its agenda). 
Interpretations of the evolution of Catalan territorial agendas have thus
become strikingly polarised, with Miley’s view emblematic of one extreme
(top-down) and Guibernau’s of the other (bottom-up). Both interpretations
have their limitations, with top-down approaches tending to rely heavily on
survey data only, and bottom-up approaches showing clear signs of parti-
sanship. In this context, Crameri (2014, 2015) offers a more nuanced inter-
pretation which seems more appropriate to the evidence, reconceptualising
the multidimensional relationship between political power and civil coun-
terpower as one of ‘co-construction’ (2015: 107). She also examines the com-
plexity and multidimensionality of civil counterpower itself, given the
extensive role of cultural and media elites within the civil pro-independence
movement and its highly organised nature, which problematises bottom-
up/top-down distinctions (2015: 109-11).  
The alliance between CiU and ERC that was established following the
2012 elections was necessitated by the fact that CiU fell short of the absolute
majority it had hoped for, but nevertheless it was not unexpected, in the
sense that CiU, ever since its experience in opposition to the tripartite coali-
tion governments, had clearly sought to move away from the traditional CiU-
PP alliance arrangements (despite briefly resurrecting these in 2010-2012) in
an attempt to become the leading voice within the nationalist camp again.
Its efforts such as the ‘Gran Casa del Catalanismo’ had showed that it wanted
to bring an end to the division in Catalan politics at the time between left
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wing parties (the tripartite coalition) and right-wing parties (PP and CiU) in
order to refocus on a Catalanist sphere in which it aimed to ensure its posi-
tion as the dominant party. The alliance established with ERC in 2012 would,
however, inevitably limit CiU’s room for manoeuvre, especially since ERC
provided parliamentary support without entering into a formal coalition with
CiU, which gave it power to put pressure on CiU – pressure which was com-
pounded by the high levels of mobilisation by civil society groups campaig-
ning for the ‘right to decide’ and independence. 
From then onwards, confrontation with the PP Spanish government in-
creased as the PP remained intransigent in term of its views on the existence
of one Spanish nation only and sole Spanish sovereignty. On 23 January
2013, the Catalan parliament approved a declaration recognising the sove-
reignty of the Catalan people and their right to determine their relationship
with Spain. The following year, CiU and ERC passed a ‘Law on Consultations’
to seek to hold a consultation on 9 November 2014 to put two questions to
Catalan society, offering the option of a federated Catalan state within Spain
or full independence. Catalan nationalist politicians argued that it was an
opinion-sounding vote, with no legal consequences, and thus within the
competences assigned to it under the Catalan statute, while Spanish politi-
cians interpreted it as a pseudo-referendum and therefore illegal (mirroring
what had happened a few years earlier in the Basque Country with Iba-
rretxe’s proposed consultation law). The Constitutional Court sided with the
Spanish government’s interpretation, but Catalan nationalist politicians, ar-
guing that the Court is biased, still went ahead and held the consultation.
The result reached 80.8% in support of Catalonia’s secession from Spain, but
turnout was only 35% (Elias 2015: 84), since the vast majority of those
against secession saw it as a partisan pro-independence initiative and stayed
at home. Surveys in recent years have consistently shown that a large ma-
jority of Catalan citizens are in favour of a referendum on independence, but
whether or not a majority would vote for secession in such an instance has
not been so clear since constitutional preferences have varied from poll to
poll.68
CiU’s room for manoeuvre was by then very limited, given both the in-
transigence of Madrid and the continued pressure it faced from pro-inde-
pendence parties and civil society groups in Catalonia. In the light of the
Spanish government’s ongoing refusal to allow Catalonia to hold a referen-
dum, Artur Mas’ next proposal was to call early elections again, this time as
a plebiscite on independence, but only if ERC would join it in a common list,
in part to avoid the risk of losing to the latter. Having maintained an ambi-
guous stance since 2012 in terms of whether CiU would seek full secession
or rather a confederal arrangement involving nationhood and a degree of
statehood for Spain, CiU now had to define its stance more firmly. The issue
led CiU to split in 2015, with the traditionally more moderate UDC rejecting
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68 According to opinion polls published by the Catalan Centre of Opinion Studies (Centre
d’Estudis d’Opinió, CEO).
the secessionist stance chosen by CDC and its ever closer alliance with the
left-wing pro-independence party ERC.69 CDC ran for the early elections in
September 2015 as part of a common list with ERC incorporating key figures
from civil society too, named Junts pel Sí (‘Together for Yes’). Junts pel Sí
won with 62 seats, short of the 68 needed for an absolute majority on its
own, but the pro-independence camp overall did win an absolute majority
if the anti-capitalist pro-independence CUP (10 seats) is included. It never-
theless still fell short of 50% of votes, reaching 47% in total. Junts pel Sí an-
nounced the pro-independence camp had secured an overwhelming
majority (using seats as a measure) giving it the mandate to continue with
its plans to create a new Catalan state, while the opposition decried the lack
of democratic legitimacy for such action. In practice, the lack of support from
the CUP to the investiture of Artur Mas, given its preference for a new figu-
rehead for the independence movement not associated with austerity cuts
and corruption, forced Artur Mas to step down at the last minute and be re-
placed by a figure of consensus in the form of Carles Puigdemont, until then
mayor of Girona. 
Notwithstanding such obstacles and difficulties, the prospect of CDC re-
turning to an accommodationist stance in the near future, while not impos-
sible, looked much less likely or feasible in early 2016 than it was for the PNV
when Urkullu took over the reins from Ibarretxe. Most CDC politicians – albeit
not all – are now very strongly in favour of independence, given the strength
of feeling within the party that they have exhausted all other alternatives
and that engagement with Madrid is no longer genuinely possible.70 The fu-
ture for CDC remains uncertain, however, given that its attempt to ride the
pro-independence wave has not resulted in growing support for the party
itself in recent years, but rather in a gradual loss of support which has gone
instead to left-wing pro-independence parties, namely ERC and the CUP. The
rise in support for the ‘right to decide’ and pro-independence sentiment in
Catalonia in recent years has not just been down to dissatisfaction with Spa-
nish-Catalan relations. It has also been a form of response to the austerity
cuts that ensued in particular from 2010 onwards in the wake of the financial
crisis, imposed by both the EU and member state governments; as well as
to the political crisis in Spain in general, characterised by widespread disi-
llusionment with existing institutions and actors, who have been associated
with so many corruption scandals in the boom years that came to light when
the economic bubble burst. As Shea Baird (2015) states, ‘For many in Cata-
lonia, the “double crisis”, national and economic, is really one and the same:
a crisis of popular sovereignty, whether it be in the face of “authoritarian”
state institutions or the global financial markets.’ The win at the May 2015
municipal elections for the new left-wing Barcelona En Comú alliance (in-
itially Guanyem Barcelona), which incorporates Podemos in Catalonia, sho-
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69 UDC declined thereafter and failed to gain representation at the 2015 Catalan regional
elections.
70 Personal interviews with CDC representatives, 2016.
wed that the new type of left-wing politics in Spain, with its origins in anti-
austerity movements and citizen platforms, was a strong feature of the Ca-
talan political landscape too. This alliance then triumphed again in Catalonia
at the December 2015 Spanish elections. Left-wing pro-independence parties
ERC and the CUP thus also face competition from a left-wing alliance of par-
ties under Barcelona en Comú in favour of the ‘right to decide’ but ambi-
guous about independence.71
In many ways, CDC, given its traditional right-of-centre political orienta-
tion, its history of pacts and alliances with the PP and the PSOE, and its own
involvement in corruption scandals (most notably, but not only, in relation
to former president Jordi Pujol), is seen by the new wave of soberanistas as
part of the old Spanish politics that they want to get away from. CDC has to
some extent been able to disguise its decline through pacts and alliances
and single lists with other left-wing pro-independence parties and indepen-
dents, but only to an extent. Aware of the need to rebrand itself, the party
presented itself under a new name (Democràcia i Llibertat) at the 2015 Spa-
nish general elections, and Artur Mas, having stepped down from the role
of Catalan president, has since been tasked with refounding the party anew.
The new generation of the party wants it to take a more left-wing orientation,
in line with current preferences in Catalan society,72 but it faces a challenge
to do so to compete credibly with other the left-wing pro-independence ac-
tors already present. 
CONCLUSION
Both the Basque and Catalan cases have seen a rise and fall in accom-
modationist politics on the part of the PNV and CDC respectively, due to a
combination of factors, including (but not limited to) declining opportunities
for accommodationist practices due to the evolving political situation in Ma-
drid; increasing Basque and Catalan demands for greater autonomy and in-
deed sovereignty, which go beyond what is feasible within the current
Spanish constitution; and an array of factors within the home region which
ultimately have a bearing on relations with the centre, such as party compe-
tition. The decline in accommodationism came first in the Basque case, with
the PNV’s shift to the Lizarra Pact and then the Ibarretxe Plan, due first and
foremost to the need to deal with the ongoing problem of terrorist violence
in the region and to the increasing clash between Basque nationalism and
Spanish nationalism that this created in the political sphere too, which spu-
rred the PNV on to seek new alliances. In Catalonia, CDC’s shift away from
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been focused on the municipal level of government, but leader Ada Colao suggested in 2016
that the possibility was being studied.
72 For example, personal interview with Lluís Corominas, 27 January 2016.
accommodationism came later, but it has been more consistent so far. Unlike
in the Basque case, where the thwarting of the Ibarretxe Plan led to a return
to more accommodationist tactics under Ibarretxe’s successor Urkullu, in the
Catalan case, continued rejections from Madrid of the attempts made by
CDC and other Catalan parties to take steps towards independence – or at
least the holding of a referendum – in recent years have so far not reduced
their determination. 
In this regard, the difference in societal and party dynamics in both re-
gions has been a fundamental explanatory factor. In the Basque Country, the
longstanding division both between parties and in society itself created by
the problem of terrorist violence, and the heterogeneity of Basque society
given the vastly different geographic and sociodemographic makeup of dif-
ferent areas within the Basque Country, resulted in insufficient societal or
political backing for the Plan spearheaded by Ibarretxe. This left the PNV ac-
ting largely in isolation and gave it little option but to return to more accom-
modationist behaviour when the Ibarretxe Plan was thwarted. In recent
years, the division between parties – not only between statewide and Basque
nationalist parties, but also within the nationalist camp itself between the
PNV and the izquierda abertzale – has continued. This, combined with other
factors such as the need to focus first and foremost on the financial crisis,
and indeed the recognition that the Basque Country has suffered less than
most of Spain due in part to a fiscal arrangement that gives it far more re-
sources than other regions receive, has meant that securing a new status
for the Basque Country has not been an immediate priority in recent years
for many within Basque society nor indeed for many within the PNV itself.
The PNV has still made clear its intentions to work more gradually towards
a new political relationship with Madrid based on a more bilateral partners-
hip of equals, involving the possibility of self-determination and co-sove-
reignty, but this is combined with an acknowledgement within the party that
it would first need to achieve a greater consensus among political parties in
the Basque region (including the Basque federation of the Spanish Socialist
party) in this regard, as well as stronger backing from society. 
The Catalan case is very different, as such a consensus among several po-
litical parties within the region, as well as a strong backing from society, alre-
ady exists. The lack of history of violence in Catalonia has allowed for a more
widespread Catalanist phenomenon to develop over the decades, and indeed
centuries. From the late 1990s, this saw left-wing parties in Catalonia (both
the Catalan Socialists and ICV) compete with the nationalists (ERC and CiU)
in seeking recognition of Catalonia as a nation and/or its right to shape its own
autonomy, and in more recent years it has also evolved to embrace a fluid re-
lationship between nationalist and pro-independence parties and civil society
organisations. In stark contrast to the PNV and its isolationism, CDC thus came
under pressure to move from an accommodationist to a pro-sovereignty
agenda, not only to outbid other parties in a context of increasing party com-
petition, but also eventually to respond to demands from civil society. The de-
cline in scope for accommodationist politics in Madrid has thus combined with
intraregional pressures to push CDC to evolve in a certain direction. 
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While this chapter has alluded in places to the different regional financing
systems in each region, this has not been a main focus, since the chapter
has served instead to set the broader context in which the PNV and CDC
have been operating and to provide an overview of the different dynamics
and drivers affecting their territorial agendas. The rest of the thesis will now
focus more specifically on the ways in which, within this broader context,
the different financing arrangements of the two regions have contributed to
shaping the evolution of the nationalist parties’ territorial strategies and be-
haviour, starting with a fuller explanation of the Basque and Catalan finan-
cing systems in Chapter 3. 
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CHAPTER 3
BASQUE AND CATALAN FINANCING: 
THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE CONCIERTO
AND THE COMMON SYSTEM 

This chapter is first and foremost technical in nature, for it is designed to
explain how the Basque Concierto and the common financing system work,
as a foundation for the analysis in subsequent chapters of the ways in which
the different regional financing systems have contributed to shifts in Basque
and Catalan territorial agendas and conceptions of sovereignty. The sections
that follow explain first the Basque Concierto, in terms of both its fiscal and
financial dimensions, and second the common financing system, focusing
particularly on the problems inherent in the latter relevant to Catalonia. Fi-
nally, the third main section provides an analysis of the controversial debate
over the Concierto versus the common system, concerning the question of
whether the Basques contribute enough revenues to Spain compared to
other comparably wealthy regions under the common system such as Cata-
lonia. 
HOW THE CONCIERTO WORKS
Under the Concierto, the three Basque provinces (otherwise known as
‘historical territories’ or ‘foral territories’) are responsible both for collecting
almost all taxes and for regulating the majority of them.73 The Basque regio-
nal government uses most of the tax revenues raised by the provinces to
cover the costs of the policy competences the region has assumed (which
include the most fundamental areas of public services such as health and
education) and a smaller share to pay an annual quota (cupo) to the Spanish
government towards the few remaining centralised or non-assumed com-
petences for which the Spanish state remains responsible (e.g. foreign and
defence policy) (see Figure 2). A relatively small share of the total tax reve-
nues they raise is used to pay the quota, which in recent years has accounted
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relatively limited number of print sources explaining  the Concierto in depth, the subsections
here explaining the fiscal and financial dimensions of the Concierto draw primarily upon the
works of Zubiri (especially 2010, 2014a and 2015), in conjunction with analysis of the relevant
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for around 7%-12% of the Bas-
que budget (Zubiri 2015: 218). Of
the remaining revenues, appro-
ximately 70% are passed up-
wards to the Basque regional
government to cover its compe-
tences, while the rest are split
between the provincial govern-
ments (diputaciones) and the
local or municipal authorities
(Zubiri 2010: 74; Zurutuza 2014).
The internal organisation of the
region is thus essentially confe-
deral in nature. 
The first Concierto of the de-
mocratic period was designed in
1980 and approved by law in
1981 (Law 12/1981, of 13 May).
While the three Basque provin-
ces retained their responsibility
for tax collection, for the first
time they would combine to pay
one single Basque quota to Ma-
drid following the creation of the
autonomous community. The
Concierto of 1981 marked a sig-
nificant departure from  its pre-
decessors, most notably in the
design of the quota. The size of
this had previously been equal to the total estimated sum of taxes raised by
each Basque province, following deductions to allow for Basque spending
on competences covered by the central government elsewhere in Spain and
some tax exemptions (e.g. some villages were exempt from taxes for having
supported the liberals during the Carlist wars) (Zubiri 2010: 35; Uriarte 2015:
Pt IV 86). Spain had originally conceded to the first such arrangement in 1878
primarily for practical reasons since the central state treasury did not imme-
diately have the technical means or capacity to collect taxes in the Basque
provinces after the abolition of their fueros or legal charters in 1876 following
the Basque defeat in the Third Carlist War.74 The agreement was originally
intended to be a temporary one for a transitional period of eight years until
the Basque provinces became fully integrated into the Spanish tax system,
but instead ended up staying in force thereafter.
The Basque Concierto of 1981, which was set to expire on 31 December
2001, was updated in 2002 with a new permanent agreement (Law 12/2002,
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FIGURE 2: Basque revenue flows
of 23 May). The Concierto comprises both a fiscal dimension (concerning
the region’s tax-raising powers) and a financial dimension (concerning the
financial flows between the Spanish and Basque governments, including
most notably the quota), which constitute chapters I and II of the Concierto
law of 2002 respectively. The following sections analyse these in more
detail.75
The fiscal dimension
The Concierto is dependent upon the Spanish tax structure and system
in the sense that the Basque provincial governments cannot create their own
taxes at will, but rather they must seek the authority to collect and regulate
each Spanish tax in their own territory. Under the 2002 Concierto law, if
Spain introduces a new tax or modifies an existing one, this calls for bilateral
negotiations to be held between Spanish and Basque government delega-
tions to agree whether to delegate the relevant tax-raising power to the Bas-
que provinces and, if so, how. Fundamentally, this involves deciding whether
they will only collect the tax (while remaining subject to Spanish legislation
regarding the tax base and rates) or whether they will also be granted regu-
latory autonomy, within certain parameters.76 ‘Points of connection’ are es-
tablished, which determine who will pay the tax in the Basque provinces and
whether it will be according to Spanish legislation or Basque provincial le-
gislation (Zubiri 2010: 49-51). Thereafter the tax becomes known as an
‘agreed tax’ (impuesto concertado) governed by these parameters. All the
general taxes in Spain have sooner or later been agreed in this way over the
decades since the 1981 Concierto law, granting the Basque provinces at the
very least the power to collect each tax, and in most cases substantial legis-
lative autonomy too. This makes the Basque Country the only region in the
world where the central government does not collect any tax revenues (aside
from the minor exceptions detailed below) – in contrast even to the Swiss
cantons, the US states and the province of Quebec, which have high levels
of fiscal autonomy within their respective federations (Zubiri 2010: 49). 
Under these agreements, beyond mere powers of tax collection, the Bas-
que provinces have acquired regulatory powers to design the main direct
taxes (personal income tax, corporation tax, non-residents tax, wealth tax,
and inheritance and gift taxes) and the minor indirect taxes (capital transfer
tax and stamp duty, and gaming duties).77 They only remain subject to Spa-
nish legislation over the main indirect taxes (fundamentally VAT and excise
duties, which account for around 90% of total indirect tax revenues), which
are in turn circumscribed by EU legislation, since there is a large degree of
tax harmonisation over indirect taxes at EU level. In the case of VAT, for
example, the EU sets a standardised tax base, as well as a range of tax rates
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75 The third chapter of the Concierto law, on bilateral relations, is addressed in Chapter 4.
76 Personal interviews with senior officials in the provincial treasury departments, 2014.
77 Personal interviews with senior officials in the provincial treasury departments, 2014.
which member states must choose between, and it stipulates that each state
can only charge one standard VAT rate, which cannot be varied at regional
government level. Thus EU rules do not permit the full devolution of legis-
lative competence over VAT to the substate level (Trench 2015). 
Where the Basque provinces have legislative autonomy (fundamentally
over direct taxes), they are still subject to some general harmonisation rules
within the Spanish state, as follows: they must adhere to the international
agreements signed by Spain; they must not distort competition among firms
or free movement among Spanish regions; and fiscal pressure (tax to GDP
ratio) in the historical territories should be ‘equivalent’ to that in the rest of
Spain. The latter two of these principles are, however, inherently ambiguous
and open to different interpretation, which has resulted in decades of con-
flicts with the Spanish state and also with neighbouring regions (e.g. De la
Hucha Celador 2009: 727; Zubiri 2010: 53-54).78
There are only three minor exceptions where the relevant tax-raising au-
thority has not been delegated to the Basque provinces (Zubiri 2010: 48).
First, the Spanish government collects the taxes on the salaries of Spanish
state (central government) employees such as civil servants in the Basque
region. Second, it collects the taxes on the interest on debt and other inte-
rest-bearing assets issued by the state (or any other Spanish region or local
authority). However, in both these cases, the Basque provinces are compen-
sated for the revenue loss since an estimation of the relevant taxes withheld
on salaries and interest is deducted from the annual Basque quota payment
to the Spanish government. Third and finally, the Spanish state collects the
customs duties, but these in any case are almost all channelled to the EU for
they constitute one of its resources.   
The financial dimension
The main financial transfers between the Basque region and the central
government under the Concierto are: (1) the annual quota (cupo) paid by the
Basque region to cover its share of the competences fulfilled by the Spanish
state; and (2) the VAT adjustment paid by the central government to com-
pensate for the difference between what the Basque provincial treasuries
collect in VAT and what Basque residents pay, plus a few other smaller fi-
nancial flows between the Spanish state to the Basque region (Zubiri 2010:
60-69). The following sections explain the quota and VAT adjustments more
fully (see also Figure 3, p.106):
(1) The quota
The annual quota, in basic terms, is designed to cover the Basque share
of Spanish state expenditure on the competences fulfilled by the central go-
vernment on behalf of the whole of Spain (the cargos no asumidos, i.e. ‘non-
assumed charges’ or ‘non-assumed competences’). Importantly, the value
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78 The history of litigation is discussed in Chapter 5.
of the non-assumed competences in Spain is determined by subtracting
state expenditure elsewhere in Spain on competences already assumed by
the Basque region (the cargos asumidos) but not other regions, from total
state expenditure in the Spanish budget (De la Fuente 2009: 4; Zubiri 2010:
62; López Labora 2006: 7-8; Monasterio Escudero 2010: 64). More specifically,
the Basques contribute to the expenditure on non-assumed competences fi-
nanced exclusively by central government tax revenues (not deficit) which
are not covered by any revenues the central government collects in the Bas-
que region (fundamentally, the few non agreed taxes detailed in the previous
section). The quota does not include a contribution towards the part of state
expenditure on non-assumed competences that is financed by deficit be-
cause that would require the Basque region to use revenues to pay upfront
for expenditure that the central government is deferring by issuing debt
(bonds and loans) (De la Fuente 2009: 5; Zubiri 2010: 61-62). Instead, the in-
terest on and repayments of the debt incurred by the state to finance the de-
ficit spending become a non-assumed competence to which the Basques
contribute their share via the quota in future years (De la Fuente 2009: 5; Zu-
biri 2010: 61-62). 
The Concierto legislation stipulates that the Basque share of the relevant
expenditure should basically reflect the region’s share of Spanish GDP, de-
termined by a percentage known as the ‘imputation index’. The exact logic
of the choice of 6.24% for the imputation index under the 1981 Concierto
agreement was unknown until very recently, since the figure was agreed pri-
vately between the heads of the Spanish and Basque delegations at the time.
It was generally assumed to have been a compromise between the Basque
position (that the imputation index should reflect the Basque share of Spa-
nish population) and the Spanish position (that it should reflect the Basque
share of Spanish GDP), since the figure was more or less halfway between
the two at the time: 5.66% and 7.50% respectively in 1981, according to ap-
proximate figures from the Spanish National Statistics Institute (Instituto Na-
cional de Estadística, INE) (Zubiri 2010: 65). Only in 2015 did Pedro Luis
Uriarte, head of the Basque delegation that negotiated the Concierto of 1981,
finally clarify the logic behind the 6.24% figure in a book recounting his ex-
periences of the 1980 negotiations. He and the then Spanish Treasury Minis-
ter, Jaime García Añoveros, had agreed to base the imputation index at the
time on relative Basque GDP measured at factor cost (rather than market pri-
ces, the more usual method), with a slight reduction as a concession to the
Basque Country given the depth of the economic crisis the region was in,
and also the unreliability of official figures at the time (Uriarte 2015: Pt VIII,
423-4). The decision was thus a political compromise. The imputation index
has never been changed since it was first set at 6.24% in the Concierto law
of 1981. Thus it has broadly rather than exactly reflected the region’s relative
GDP, which has declined from 7.5% in 1981 to approximately 6.2% in the pre-
sent day, due first and foremost to the decline in Basque population relative
to that of Spain (Zubiri 2015: 211). 
Following the calculation of the Basque share of the relevant expenditure,
some deductions are then applied to the resulting quota to cover other trans-
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fers and compensations paid by the Spanish state to the Basque region (Mo-
nasterio Escudero 2010: 65; Zubiri 2010: 63). For example, on occasions
where the central government has provided additional financing to the re-
gions for certain competences to improve the provision of services, the re-
levant Basque share of the funds has usually been deducted from the quota.
Most notably, in the Basque case, since 1981 there has always been a de-
duction to compensate the Basques for the fact that the Basque police force
(Ertzaintza) costs significantly more to run than the police elsewhere in Spain
(due in large part to the history of terrorism). 
Since 1981 the Concierto legislation has stipulated that the quota should
be governed by five-yearly quota laws negotiated bilaterally between Spa-
nish and Basque delegations (see Bilbao 2002). Under this system, the net
quota is not calculated from scratch each year but rather for the first year
(or ‘base year’) of each five-year period. The net quota payable for the follo-
wing four years is calculated by applying an ‘updating index’ (índice de ac-
tualización) to the net quota of the base year and then deducting the relevant
compensations, which are agreed during the quota law negotiations. The
updating index is based on the rate of increase (or decrease) in the state co-
llection of the agreed taxes covered by the Concierto in the rest of Spain re-
lative to the base year (i.e. the tax revenues of the state that have not been
ceded to the regions). Since the Spanish budget is used to calculate the non-
assumed charges for the base year, the quota is based on the projected cost
of competences, in contrast to the common financing system where finan-
cing levels are calculated on the basis of the real cost of competences. The
base year quota including all its components (the imputation index, the com-
pensations, etc.) and the updating index are all subject to bilateral agreement
during the quota law negotiations.
(2) The VAT adjustment
In 1985, the responsibility for collecting VAT in the Basque region was
transferred to the Basque provincial treasuries (Atxabal and Muguruza 2006:
26). From then on this would necessitate an adjustment to compensate for
the difference between how much the Basque provincial treasuries collect
and how much they are owed, since VAT is a tax on individual consumption
but collected through a tax on corporate production (Monasterio Escudero
2010: 67; Zubiri 2010: 67-68). The aim is to ensure that the final VAT resources
of the Basque region are relative to its weight in Spain’s total consumption.
Therefore, there are two dimensions to the VAT adjustment: first, an adjus-
tment for imported goods from outside the EU whereby the Spanish state,
which collects the VAT on such goods, gives the Basque region a share rela-
tive to the consumption of Basque residents; and second, an adjustment for
the internal market, to reconcile the difference between the VAT the Basque
treasuries collect on the value added of firms in the Basque region and the
VAT paid by Basque residents on purchases of goods produced in the EU
(Zubiri 2010: 127-128). The second component of the adjustment could the-
oretically imply a transfer in either direction between the Basque region and
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the Spanish state but in practice the Basque region has consistently been
the recipient since it is a net importer from the rest of Spain (i.e. the con-
sumption of Basque residents is greater than the value added of Basque
firms). Under the Concierto legislation, both the relative rate of Basque con-
sumption and the relative rate of Basque VAT collection capacity are pres-
cribed by the quota law and thus subject to revision every five years. In
practice, both rates have remained unchanged since they were first set in
1985: 6.875% and 5.765% respectively (Zubiri 2010: 128). 
While the VAT adjustment involves a far more sizeable transfer of funds,
a similar adjustment procedure also applies to excise duties (on alcohol and
alcoholic beverages, intermediate products, beer, mineral oils and manufac-
tured tobacco) – the other main source of indirect taxation which the Basque
provincial treasuries have been responsible for collecting since 1997 (Mo-
nasterio Escudero 2010: 68). In this case, however, the Spanish state is the
overall beneficiary of the sum of all excise adjustments. Other smaller finan-
cial flows also include some other transfers and compensations from the
Spanish state to the Basque region. In relation to excise duties, for example,
it was agreed that the transfer in 1997 of the responsibility for collecting the
duties should not have a positive or negative impact on total Basque resour-
ces, which in practice resulted thereafter in a compensation from the Spa-
nish state to the Basque provinces. Another transfer relates to the share of
the Basque municipal or local councils in Spanish state revenues. The mu-
nicipalities in Spain are in part financed by a share of Spanish tax revenues.
In the Basque region, it is the responsibility of the Basque provincial govern-
ments to pay the respective share of the agreed taxes which it collects, but
the state still makes a small transfer to the Basque municipalities for their
share of the reduced number of taxes collected centrally (Zubiri 2010: 68). 
(3) The final balance 
The final balance of financial flows is more or less equal, since the quota
payment that the Basque region pays to the Spanish state each year comes
to approximately the same amount as the sum the Spanish state pays to the
Basque region for the VAT adjustment (Zubiri 2010: 69; Monsterio Escudero
2010: 70).  The Basque government pays three provisional instalments per
year to cover the quota (in May, October and December) calculated on the
basis of the figures in the Spanish budget – payments which are then recon-
ciled the following year when the final budgetary figures are known – while
the Spanish state makes quarterly payments to the Basque region to cover
the VAT adjustment. The fact that the final balance of flows is more or less
equal is very significant: when there are political disputes between Spanish
and Basque governments over issues such as the final amount owed under
the quota payment, both sides have almost equal power to withhold money
from each other until an agreement is reached.79
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79 Personal interviews with senior officials in the Guipúzcoan provincial treasury depart-
ment, 2014. 
FIGURE 3: Spanish-Basque fiscal and financial flows 
HOW THE COMMON FINANCING SYSTEM WORKS
Aside from the Basque Country and Navarre, the remaining fifteen of
Spain’s regions conform to the common financing regime (régimen común
de financiación), a revenue-sharing model under which the regions receive
revenue transfers from the central government and obtain some additional
resources via more limited regional taxation powers and local charges for
services. The model was first regulated by the 1980 regional financing law
(Ley Orgánica de Financiación de las Comunidades Autónomas, LOFCA) and
was subject to five-yearly revisions from 1986 until 2001, at which stage the
five-yearly requirement for a reform was removed (Blöchlinger and Vamma-
lle 2012: 114; López Laborda 2006: 2-3). The next reform took place in 2009
and was motivated first and foremost by the fact the new Catalan autonomy
statute of 2006 had necessitated a reform of the LOFCA, though other re-
gions had also approved new statutes in those years in ways which called
for a new reform too (Blöchlinger and Vammalle 2012: 117; Bosch 2010: 1).
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At the time of writing, a new reform is considered long overdue and is ex-
pected to take place under the new government due to be formed in 2016. 
Unlike the Basque Concierto and the Navarran Convenio, where resource
levels per capita are based fundamentally on each region’s own fiscal capa-
city, the common financing system is primarily a needs-based system (e.g.
López Labora 2006: 7). The final resource levels afforded to each region by
the central government are based first and foremost on estimates of what
each region needs to fulfil its competences, calculated in a way which is
meant to respect the principles of sufficiency and solidarity. In other words,
each relevant administration should have appropriate revenues to provide
a similar level of basic services, thereby ensuring equality among Spaniards.
Articles 156 and 157 of the Spanish Constitution outline the basic principles
to inform the regional financing system, establishing that the fifteen regions
under the system will obtain resources primarily from two main revenue
sources: (1) taxes which are fully or partially ceded to the regions and (2) a
contribution derived from non-ceded tax revenues. Some additional, limited
funds are raised via regional taxes in the few cases where their creation at
regional level is permitted by the central government, in instances where
there is no overlap with state taxes (though in practice any such taxes are
often faced with legal challenges from the Spanish government). Additional
resources also come from local charges for services and debt issuances. 
These basic principles established in the Constitution were fleshed out
and developed into a regional financing system regulated by the LOFCA of
1980. While there was some parliamentary debate and discussion at the time
regarding the need and desirability for the regions to have some tax-raising
powers of their own rather than being entirely dependent on revenue trans-
fers from the central government, the LOFCA of 1980 afforded very little in
the way of genuine fiscal competences to the regions and emphasis was pla-
ced instead on ensuring sufficiency and solidarity in the final distribution of
resources (Alonso Olea 2014: 80-82). Fiscal co-responsibility, which required
a meaningful increase in regional fiscal competences, would not properly
start to be introduced in the model until the major reform of 1996, increasing
further in the subsequent reforms of 2001 and 2009 (Alonso Olea 2014: 71;
Ordóñez and Rivas 2007). This was gradually achieved by increasing the le-
gislative competences of the regions by devolving or ‘ceding’ a greater share
of taxes to the regions. This was done under the provisions of the LOFCA
and the related Law 30/1983 regulating the Cession of Taxes from the State
to the Autonomous Communities, which was later updated in 1996 (Mora
Lorente 2004: 109-110). Taxes are ‘partially ceded’ in the case where some
but not all taxable events related to that tax are ceded to the regions. 
Over the decades, since the first cession of 15% of IRPF (impuesto sobre
la renta de las personas físicas, income tax) in 1993, the share of taxes ceded
to the regions has gradually increased (as have their legislative and admi-
nistrative powers over these taxes) (see also Chapter 7). This has led to a
proportional reduction in the share of revenue transfers to the regions deri-
ved from non-ceded tax revenues. By 2009, under the reform of that year,
the share of IRPF ceded to the regions had increased to 50% (Blöchlinger
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and Vammalle 2012: 115). Other ‘partially ceded’ taxes under that reform in-
clude VAT (50%) and excise taxes (58%), though as indirect taxes the regions
do not have any legislative autonomy over these shares but rather are sub-
ject to Spanish legislation. The fully ceded taxes are generally relatively more
minor taxes, including taxes on wealth, inheritance and donations, capital
transfers and documented legal acts, gambling, certain modes of transport,
electricity, and the retail sale of certain hydrocarbons. Importantly, only the
fully ceded taxes are collected by the regions themselves, while the central
government remains responsible for collecting the partially ceded taxes in
their entirely (as well as non-ceded taxes), with the requisite revenues then
being transferred to the regions as part of the transfers from the central go-
vernment.80 The regions are thus heavily dependent on the revenue trans-
fers.
A key feature of the model is an equalisation mechanism to redistribute
wealth to ensure each region has more or less the same financing per unit
of need. Prior to 2009, this was achieved via the so-called Sufficiency Fund
(Fondo de suficiencia) (Bosch 2010: 5). The Sufficiency Fund provided re-
sources to each region to the value of its estimated expenditure needs to
cover three areas of basic services (common, healthcare and social), minus
the volume of resources collected in the regions themselves from the fully
ceded taxes. Under the 2001 reform, the base year used to calculate the Suf-
ficiency Fund transfers required for each region was 1999, and the growth
rate of the non-ceded tax revenues was defined as the adjustment rate for
subsequent years. The 2009 reform of the LOFCA then sought to improve
the equalisation mechanism via the creation of three new Funds in addition
to a revised Sufficiency Fund (see Bosch 2010: 13-16; Blöchlinger and Vam-
malle 2012: 115), the details of which are given in Table 7. Since 2009, the
majority of the resources within the system have been pooled instead into
what is known as the Fund for the Guarantee of Fundamental Public Services
(Fondo de Garantía de Servicios Públicos Fundamentales), which has repla-
ced the previous Sufficiency Fund as the main vehicle of redistribution and
solidarity in the common system. 
Despite the frequency with which the system has been reformed, it has
long been criticised by economists for its technical flaws that successive re-
forms have failed to resolve (e.g. Bosch 2010, León 2010, De la Fuente 2013a,
Paluzie 2010), as well as by politicians in the regions which have been di-
sadvantaged by the system. The main complaint comes from the relatively
richer regions who contribute most to the system, and yet often end up with
below-average per capita resource levels post-equalisation, due to over-re-
distribution: the three regions most affected in this way are usually Madrid,
the Balearics and Catalonia (see, for example De la Fuente 2012b and 2013a).
In the case of Catalonia, it is usually the third largest contributor to the
system in terms of tax revenues per capita (after Madrid and the Balearics),
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80 This point was raised by several interviewees in Catalonia of different political affiliations
(CDC, PSC, ERC) as a source of considerable grievance.
but ends up approximately ninth in the final list of resources per capita post-
equalisation (see, for example, Castells 2014: 285). Each reform has always
been fraught with political tension since all the regions have always fought
to ensure their respective status quo would improve with each reform, ma-
king it politically very difficult to correct the arbitrary effects of the equalisa-
tion mechanism (Bosch and Durán 2008; Borraz and Cantalapiedra 2010;
Blöchlinger and Vammalle 2012: 113-121). 
TABLE 7: The funds to distribute resources under the common system 
(2009 reform)
While the common financing system is an inter-regional system which is
negotiated at the inter-regional Fiscal and Financial Policy Council (Consejo
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Fund for the Guarantee of Fundamental Pu-
blic Services (Fondo de Garantía de Servicios
Públicos Fundamentales)
The largest Fund, which distributes approxi-
mately 80% of the revenues due to the re-
gions (75% of ceded tax revenues plus 5%
from central government transfers derived
from non-ceded taxes). This Fund divides the
resources among the regions to ensure that
they each have the same level of resources
per ‘unit of need’ to provide essential public
services (education, health and social servi-
ces) to their citizens. These ‘needs’ are deter-
mined according to each region’s ‘adjusted
population’, calculated via a formula to take
into account various demographic and geo-
graphical weightings (such as population
size, proportion of over 65s, surface area,
dispersion and insularity).
Global Sufficiency Fund (Fondo de Suficien-
cia Global)
Designed to ensure the regions have suffi-
cient resources for the remainder of their de-
volved competences (i.e. beyond the
essential services) and are net winners with
the change of model in 2009.
Two regional convergence funds: Competiti-
veness Fund (Fondo de Competitividad) and
Cooperation Fund (Fondo de Cooperación)
The smallest Funds, together distributing
less than 5% of resources in the system. The
Competitiveness Fund compensates the
usually richer regions with typically higher
population growth (e.g. Catalonia and Ma-
drid) if the outturn figures go against them,
in an attempt to reduce the anomaly whe-
reby their financing had often ended up
below average under the previous model.
The Cooperation Fund is aimed at increasing
resources in the poorer regions with lower
per capita incomes and/or negative popula-
tion dynamics (ageing or declining popula-
tions).
de Política Fiscal y Financiera, CPFF), there is also a bilateral dimension to it
between the central government and each region, since the central govern-
ment has usually also negotiated individually with each region to ensure it
will accept the relevant reform. This is because each reform of the LOFCA
must be approved in each regional parliament for it to be applied in that re-
gion. Notably, Spanish-Catalan bilateral negotiations have in particular played
a leading role in shaping each reform of the LOFCA and each reform has been
approved by the Catalan government and parliament, and yet each has proved
a stopgap rather than a long-term solution, due to the conflict between the
nature of some Catalan demands and wider inter-regional considerations that
have needed to be taken into account by the central government.81 The main
complaints regarding the system from both Catalonia and other regions di-
sadvantaged by the existing system have centred on (1) the arbitrary outco-
mes of the fiscal equalisation mechanism, which proves overly redistributive
in some cases; and (2) the fact that the system affords only very limited fiscal
powers to the regional governments, which reduces their autonomy and their
control over the taxes raised in their territory. This also reduces incentives for
good fiscal management, thus running the risk that poorer regions become
too reliant on generous hand-outs funded by relatively richer regions. The fo-
llowing paragraphs address these complaints in more detail. 
The common financing model was given a very complex design under
the 2009 reform in order to straddle the demands of different regions, and
the central government promised an increase in its own contribution to help
achieve consensus (Blöchlinger and Vammalle 2012: 120-121). Nevertheless,
progress towards solving the longstanding problem of the arbitrary effects
of the equalisation mechanism has proved limited (e.g. De la Fuente 2012b,
2012c and 2013a). The equalisation mechanism seeks to provide equal re-
sources per unit of need (i.e. based on adjusted population rather than actual
population), but the way in which ‘need’ is measured tends to respond more
to political rather than economic factors (e.g. Zubiri 2015: 216). Moreover,
the mechanism should ideally bring each region as close as possible to the
mean in terms of level of financing per adjusted capita, but it still proves ei-
ther overly or insufficiently redistributive in some cases. This flaw has per-
sisted over the years largely because all the regions have always fought to
ensure their respective status quo would be maintained or improve with
each reform, and the central government has repeatedly obliged since it
would be politically costly for it to do otherwise (León 2009, 1010; De La
Fuente 2012b; López Laborda 2006: 10). Political considerations have thus
taken precedence over technical optimality. 
Blame for the failure of the 2009 reform to address the longstanding pro-
blems with the equalisation mechanism, for example, has been attributed
in part to the fact that the design of the Guarantee Fund was then complica-
ted by other smaller funds designed to appease individual regions and en-
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81 Personal interviews with current and former PSC and CDC Catalan government represen-
tatives, 2015 and 2016.
sure they would not end up prejudiced relative to their status quo – a pro-
blem which was then exacerbated further by other unexpected factors such
as the extent of the economic crisis, as well as the central government’s de-
lays in making payments from the Competitiveness Fund (see Chapter 7).
The new system was implemented in 2009 with some one-off effects specific
to that year only which gave the impression of a significantly improved equa-
lisation mechanism, but much of that apparent progress was reversed from
the first year of full implementation in 2010 onwards (De la Fuente 2012b,
chapter 4). Central government transfers of the funds due to the regions
(known as entregas a cuenta) are made throughout the relevant year based
on initial revenue estimates, before being revised when the outturn revenue
figures are confirmed and the regional financing system is finally settled (li-
quidado) 18 months after year-end. Thus it was not until mid 2012 that the
full impact of the new model applied in 2010 came to light.82 The results
show that the regions of Madrid and Catalonia, for example, remained
among the top three contributors to the common financing model in terms
of per capita tax revenues, and yet both ended up ranked below average for
the 15 regions in 2010 in terms of total financing per adjusted capita post-
equalization.83 In contrast, some of the regions that benefitted disproportio-
nately from the 2001 model continued to do so. Extremadura, for example,
one of the lowest tax revenue contributors per capita, maintained its third
position out of the 15 regions post-equalisation in 2010. Meanwhile, since
the system is inconsistent and not overly redistributive in all cases, some of
the relatively richer regions in per capita tax revenues remained relatively
richer post-equalisation (e.g. Cantabria and La Rioja) and some of the relati-
vely poorer ones ended up equally poor or poorer still (e.g. Valencia, Murcia,
Andalusia and Castilla-La Mancha). Similarly disparate outcomes emerged
again in the final settlement of the 2011 regional financing system published
in July 2013 and others thereafter.84 These longstanding shortcomings of the
equalisation mechanism, and the exemption of the Basque Country and Na-
varre from contributing to it, have created ample fuel for political divisions
between the regional and central governments over the years, with Catalonia
voicing the most grievances. 
Complaints about the flaws of the equalisation mechanism are combined
with criticism from the relatively richer regions such as Catalonia of the lack
of regional tax autonomy within the system (e.g. Bosch 2010: 4). Although
the share of the partially ceded taxes granted to the regions over the years
has gradually increased, and in some cases so too have their legislative po-
wers over those taxes, the fact remains that the central government still co-
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82 The annual final settlement (liquidación) statements for the common financing regime
are published by the Spanish Ministry of the Treasury and Public Administration. Available here:
http://www.minhap.gob.es/es-ES/Areas%20Tematicas/Financiacion%20Autonomica/Paginas/
Informes%20financiacion%20comunidades%20autonomas2.aspx 
83 For a detailed analysis of the outcomes of the new regional financing system for each
autonomous community in 2009 and 2010, see De la Fuente 2012b and 2013a.
84 For example, ‘Cataluña es la tercera comunidad que más recauda pero la décima en
recibir’, El País, 10.07.13.
llects all of the partially ceded taxes. Rather than giving their respective sha-
res to each of the regions, it pools most of these (around 80%) into the Gua-
rantee Fund and the other smaller funds within the system, in order then to
redistribute the resources throughout Spain, primarily according to unit of
need. The apparent increase in regional fiscal powers due to their increase
in their share of the partially ceded taxes is thus somewhat deceptive to a
degree, since the regions receive only a small part of the benefit from their
increased fiscal effort or their tax decisions. 
Other problems include the fact that the revenue transfers from the cen-
tral government to the regions are based on revenue estimates made by the
central government, which are not revised until the outturn revenue figures
are confirmed 18 months after the end of the year in question, which also
makes it difficult for the regions to balance their finances if there is a sharp
discrepancy between the initial estimates and the final outturn figures. This
occurred, for example, in 2008 and especially 2009. In those years, the initial
revenue projections on which the central government transfers to the re-
gions were based were much greater than the final outturn revenue figures,
since the government had not anticipated the extent of the effect of the crisis.
Overall the regional governments were due to repay the central government
in 2010 and 2011 for total windfall gains of EUR 5.514bn received in 2008
and a particularly substantial EUR 18.736bn in 2009 (in contrast, the liquida-
tions of the 2010 and 2011 financing systems went in the regions’ favour,
showing the central government owed them EUR 5.102bn and EUR 4.358bn,
respectively). Ultimately, due to the regions’ inability to repay these windfall
gains in full in 2010 and 2011, a repayment schedule was set up over a ten-
year period.
In addition to the very different levels of fiscal and financial autonomy at
regional level, another significant difference between the foral and common
systems concerns local financing: how funds are allocated to the provincial
authorities (diputaciones) and town halls (ayuntamientos). In contrast to the
Concierto, where the Basque provincial authorities raise their own taxes and
thus are responsible for providing funds to provincial and local authorities
as well as the regional authorities, the common financing system governs
the provision of resources to the regional governments only. Financing to
the local authorities within the common regime regions is a completely se-
parate system, the control of which is centralised in the hands of the Spanish
government. In other words, the central government provides funds directly
to the provincial level, bypassing the regional governments. 
THE CONCIERTO VERSUS THE COMMON FINANCING SYSTEM: THE DE-
BATE OVER WHETHER THE BASQUES CONTRIBUTE ENOUGH REVENUES
TO SPAIN
Under the general principles governing both taxation and financial rela-
tions, the Concierto law states explicitly that the model must respect the prin-
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ciple of solidarity in the terms envisioned in the Spanish Constitution and
the Basque autonomy statute. Article 2 of the Spanish Constitution guaran-
tees the right to solidarity among the nationalities and regions that constitute
the Spanish nation, a principle then expounded in Articles 138 and 156. Ar-
ticle 138 prescribes the implementation of such solidarity in practice – the
Spanish state must oversee the establishment of an appropriate and fair eco-
nomic balance between the different parts of the Spanish territory and en-
sure that different regional statutes by no means imply economic or social
privileges. Article 156 – the first of three (156-158) prescribing the main prin-
ciples of the regional financing system – stipulates that the financial auto-
nomy enjoyed by the regions to develop and implement their competences
must comply with the principle of solidarity among all Spaniards. In turn,
Article 41.2f of the Basque autonomy statute states that the Concierto will
be applied in accordance with the principle of solidarity referred to in Articles
138 and 156 of the Spanish Constitution.
Whether or not the Concierto contributes sufficiently to solidarity with
the rest of Spain has nevertheless become subject to fierce debate since the
model provides the Basques with significantly greater resources than other
regions receive. The Concierto affords the Basques a level of per capita fi-
nancing in the region of 60%-75% higher than the average received by the
fifteen regions under the common financing regime, according to figures for
2007 (De la Fuente 2012a: 5; Zubiri 2015: 217). The difference increased fur-
ther following the financial crisis, reaching up to 100% in 2011, since Basque
tax revenues fell less than revenues in Spain as a whole (Zubiri 2015: 217).
When measured as a percentage of GDP instead of per capita, the difference
is smaller but still substantial, with the Basque resources reaching 45% more
than the average of the regions under the common financing system in 2011
(equivalent to 5.6% of GDP) (Zubiri 2015: 217). This is primarily because the
Concierto is a system based on the region’s own fiscal capacity, which has
proven very beneficial to it, since it has been one of the relatively richer re-
gions in Spain since the late 1990s, and the richest since 2008 (Zubiri 2015:
211). The Concierto involves a lower contribution to inter-regional solidarity
than that made by other comparatively wealthy regions in Spain under the
common financing system, which is redistributive in nature and provides re-
source levels based on each region’s estimated needs rather than fiscal ca-
pacity. It has also been suggested in a number of economic studies that
some aspects of the Concierto are calculated in a way that is favourable to
the Basque region, such as the valuation of assumed competences and the
calculation of the VAT adjustment (e.g. De la Fuente 2012a: 4-5; Monasterio
Escudero 2010) (see further details below). Such problems have generally
been attributed to the frequent influence of politics over economics in bila-
teral negotiations over the Concierto, which has at times enabled Basque
governments to secure beneficial financing deals in return for lending sup-
port to Spanish governments in other areas.
Ultimately, it is certainly clear that the Basque region obtains more re-
sources than it would were it under the common financing system. Never-
theless, Basque officials vigorously dismiss accusations that the Concierto
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is a ‘privilege’ or entails a lack of solidarity, arguing that the question of so-
lidarity is one of degree and that there is another side to the coin in that fiscal
autonomy encourages greater fiscal responsibility.85 Thus they argue that
the healthier position of Basque finances and higher resources per capita
enjoyed by Basque residents is in large part attributable to the better finan-
cial management encouraged by the responsibilities that a model of fiscal
autonomy entails. The unilateral risk which the fiscal model involves for the
Basque region and the lack of any guaranteed minimum revenue from the
central government encourages accountability and responsibility. The size
of the quota does not depend on what the Basque provincial treasuries co-
llect but rather on the size of the Spanish state budget for non-assumed com-
petences, which encourages efficiency since the Basque region loses out if
its own tax collection increases more slowly (or decreases more quickly)
than that of the Spanish state (Zubiri 2015: 70-71). This contrasts with the
convoluted revenue-sharing arrangements under the common regime, in
which the regions have greater spending than revenue-raising competences
– a form of fiscal decentralisation which creates an accountability gap and
can encourage substate governments to seek further funds from the central
government if they over spend.86
In the context of the recent financial crisis, clashes between these inter-
pretations of the Concierto and the resources it provides reached new
heights. The Basque region’s comparative advantage in terms of resource
levels relative to other regions in Spain actually increased further during the
financial crisis and its aftermath, since tax collection in Spain as a whole
dropped more rapidly then in the Basque region. Whereas the Basques had
previously spent around 10%-12% of their revenues on the quota payment
to Spain prior to the crisis, this fell to around 7%-8% in the wake of the crisis
(Zubiri 2015: 218). The Basque region weathered the crisis far better than
most other regions in Spain due to a number of factors, including the fact
that it had prioritised developing an industry-based economy centred on ex-
ports in recent decades and avoided the domestic-focused construction
boom that prevailed elsewhere in Spain before collapsing. The accountabi-
lity the model fosters also discouraged overspending in the boom years, un-
like in many regions under the common regime where spending increased
drastically, current income was insufficient to cover current expenditure, and
the regional authorities would look to the central government for extra funds
and the regional savings banks (cajas de ahorros) for loans to cover the gap
– until the crisis hit, the central government was no longer so forthcoming
with funds, and many of the savings banks collapsed. While the central go-
vernment had to set up various mechanisms from 2012 onwards to lend
money under strict budgetary compliance conditions to numerous cash-
strapped regions under the common regime unable to cover their needs or
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85 Personal interviews with senior officials in the provincial treasury departments and PNV
representatives, 2014.
86 On this theory, see Rodden 2006.
access any other financing sources, the Basque region remained self-suffi-
cient.
There is little common ground between those who attribute this relatively
healthier financial position of the Basque region fundamentally to better eco-
nomic decisions and financial management by the Basque institutions under
the Concierto in comparison with the behaviour of some of the regions
under the common regime, and those who suggest the Basques unfairly re-
ceive surplus financing through the Concierto in comparison to other com-
parable regions under the common regime.87 The reality would in fact seem
a complex combination of both sides of the argument: the fiscal accounta-
bility that fiscal autonomy entails does encourage good financial manage-
ment, but at the same time the Basques contribute very little to inter-regional
solidarity compared to other comparatively wealthy regions in Spain under
the common financing system. As stated, accusations of surplus financing
in the Basque case not only relate to the lack of contribution to the equalisa-
tion mechanism for financing public services included in the common finan-
cing system, but also to other features such as the valuation of non-assumed
competences and the VAT adjustment rate, both of which are interpreted by
critics as overly favourable to the Basque region. The following sections
analyse the most problematic areas of the Concierto in this regard, before
the final section addresses the different political perspectives that make it
very difficult to reach any sort of Spanish-Basque consensus or resolution
over the matter.
Problematic areas of the Concierto system and quota payment
(a) Inter-regional redistribution mechanisms
One of the main criticisms of the Basque Concierto is that it involves a
lower contribution to inter-regional income redistribution in Spain than that
made by comparatively wealthy regions under the common system. This is
first and foremost because the Basque model does not incorporate a contri-
bution to the equalisation mechanism for financing public services included
in the common regime (primarily via the Fund for the Guarantee of Funda-
mental Public Services under the 2009 reform), which reduces the Basque
contribution to inter-regional redistribution. The resources the Basque region
receives are based on its regional fiscal capacity since, broadly speaking, it
keeps all its tax revenues except for those used to pay the quota to the cen-
tral government to cover the Basque share of the few competences which
the region has not assumed. The quota only uses a very small share of Bas-
que tax revenues (around 7%-12% in recent years), with the rest staying in
the region itself. Since the Basque Country and Navarre are relatively rich
regions whose GDP per capita is among the highest in Spain, a system in
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87 Perspectives gained through a range of personal interviews with Basque and Catalan
politicians of different political affiliations, 2014-2015.
which their resources are based on their own fiscal capacity rather than es-
timated needs (as in the common regime) gives them greater resources (Zu-
biri 2010: 112). One of the required harmonisation rules with Spanish tax
legislation stipulates that overall Basque fiscal pressure (tax to GDP ratio)
must be equivalent to that in the rest of Spain (in the 15 regions under the
common financing system). And yet since the Basque Country is a relatively
rich region, it can maintain an equivalent or even slightly higher fiscal pres-
sure and raise significantly more resources than the regions under the com-
mon system, even when the rates of the main taxes it raises (e.g. personal
income tax, corporation tax) are usually lower than in the latter regions (Zu-
biri 2015: 207).
The main reason why this problem has arisen is due to the shift in the
primary means by which inter-regional solidarity has been achieved in Spain
since the Transition, from the Inter-Territorial Compensation Fund (to which
the Basques do contribute) to the fiscal equalisation mechanisms in the com-
mon financing regime (to which the Basques do not contribute). The quota
includes a 6.24% contribution to the Inter-Territorial Compensation Fund (a
non-assumed competence), which is designed ultimately to achieve inter-
regional income redistribution by promoting development in less prospe-
rous regions. This was originally envisaged during the transition to
democracy as the main means of inter-regional solidarity, as explicitly indi-
cated in Article 158 of the Spanish Constitution: ‘In order to correct inter-te-
rritorial economic imbalances and put into practice the principle of solidarity,
a Compensation Fund will be created, intended for investment expenditure,
the resources of which will be distributed by the Spanish parliament among
the autonomous communities and provinces, where appropriate.’ Neverthe-
less, the purpose of the Inter-Territorial Compensation Fund was largely
taken over by European structural and cohesion funds to Spain particularly
in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Álvarez et el. 2004). The Fund also ended
up acquiring a much more secondary role in terms of inter-regional redistri-
bution compared to the financial flows involved in the equalisation mecha-
nism for financing public services (via the redistribution of tax revenues)
included in the common regime, to which the Basques do not contribute.
Thus, while the Basques would continue to pay into the ever diminishing
Inter-Territorial Compensation Fund for inter-regional solidarity via inves-
tment expenditure designed to promote income redistribution, they would
not contribute to the much more sizeable inter-regional redistribution me-
chanism included in the common regime for financing public services. De
la Fuente (2012a: 4) suggests this reduces the Basque contribution to the
state coffers by approximately EUR 1.79bn per year, according to figures for
2007. Representatives of the Basque institutions argue that such calculations
are hypothetical and therefore unreliable,88 but regardless of the exact figure,
it can be safely concluded that it would be a substantial one. Matters became
more complicated still following the reform of the common financing regime
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88 Personal interviews with Basque officials in the Vizcayan treasury department, 2014.
in 2009, which included the creation of a small Cooperation Fund which ful-
fils a similar purpose to the Inter-Territorial Compensation Fund (Fernández
Llera and Delgado Rivero 2010). 
All in all, what is clear is that most of the mechanisms to achieve inter-re-
gional solidarity, a concept which is now generally understood to apply to
public service provision as well as to income redistribution, have come to
be included in the common financing regime, rather than being articulated
via the Inter-Territorial Compensation Fund, as initially envisaged during the
Transition. 
(b) Imputation index in the quota
The quota, although it only accounts for a small proportion of Basque tax
revenues (7%-12% of Basque revenues in recent years), is often interpreted
as fulfilling a redistributive purpose since the imputation index which deter-
mines the Basque contribution towards non-assumed competences is bro-
adly in line with its share of Spain’s GDP (6%-7%) rather than population
(4%-5%). This is a standard line of defence used by Basque politicians to jus-
tify that the Concierto does show solidarity beyond the 6.24% contribution
specifically to the Inter-Territorial Compensation Fund, particularly whenever
the Concierto comes under political attack.89 This nevertheless risks simplif-
ying a more complex reality that requires clarification and nuance. 
The Concierto agreement itself stipulated that the imputation index
should reflect the Basque region’s relative income. One of the many discre-
pancies between Basque and Spanish delegations in the years that imme-
diately followed the choice of the 6.24% figure in 1980 was the Spanish
desire to raise the imputation index (closer to the relative GDP figure), before
a political pact between the Spanish and Basque governments in 1987 re-
sulted in the PNV winning the argument to keep the index stable (see Chap-
ter 4). Over the decade from 1981 to 1991 Basque relative GDP declined from
approximately 7.50% to 6.25%, and ever since then has stayed in the region
of 6.1%-6.3%. This means that the 6.24% figure – which has never been chan-
ged since it was first established in 1981 – has by chance become a closer
representation of Basque relative GDP, even exceeding it slightly in recent
years. Nevertheless, the Basque relative population has shown a more con-
sistent, gradual decline since 1981, from around 5.7% of Spanish population
in that year to around 4.6% in 2015. The consistent decline of relative popu-
lation combined with a more constant level of relative income since the early
1990s has in turn led to an increase in Basque relative GDP per capita in that
period, since relative population has declined more quickly than relative GDP
(Zubiri 2010: 66; 2015: 211). This, in turn, has increased the Basque region’s
comparative advantage relative to the regions under the common regime in
terms of resources per capita.
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89 As seen, for example, in lehendakari Iñigo Urkullu’s response defending the Concierto
against accusations of ‘privilege’ in his interview with El País on 2 October 2014, http://politica.
elpais.com/politica/2014/10/02/actualidad/1412266786_167452.html 
As competences have gradually been transferred to the Basque region
over the decades, the Basques have ceased to pay the 6.24% share of each
of those competences to Madrid, which is why the quota payment now only
accounts for a very small share of Basque revenues. For the Basques, this
inevitably means they keep more of their revenues for themselves, since
when competences were still centralised, Madrid often did not invest the full
6.24% paid by the Basques back in the Basque region. In some cases, howe-
ver, the Basques do still pay 6.24% towards a centralised competence where
they secure little direct benefit themselves, for example they have paid 6.24%
towards the costs of building Spain’s high speed rail lines (the AVE) over the
years, even though no line to the Basque Country has been built yet. In areas
such as infrastructure spending, Madrid has often spent a much smaller sum
in the Basque region than the 6.24% the Basques have paid to Madrid. Thus,
in seeking to justify the claim that the Basques contribute more than an
ample amount to Spain, it is often argued that the Basques pay much more
via the quota to Spain than what is actually spent by the Spanish state in the
Basque region (Uriarte 2015: Pt VIII, 123, 128, 216). While this is certainly true
in the case of some competences, such calculations are nevertheless pro-
blematic to a degree, since they do not take into account Spanish govern-
ment expenditure designed to benefit all Spaniards including the Basques,
which is not necessarily spent in Basque territory itself (the same problem
that occurs with fiscal balances calculated under the monetary flow method).
Most of the competences that remain centralised to which the Basques con-
tribute a 6.24% share are matters such as foreign affairs, defence, the mo-
narchy, etc. In such cases, Spanish government expenditure may not be
spent directly in the Basque region, but it is nevertheless designed to benefit
all Spaniards including the Basques: for example, any Basque citizen in dif-
ficulties abroad would be able to use the Spanish network of embassies and
consulates. 
Furthermore, it is often overlooked that the imputation index applies to
financial flows in both directions (from the Basque Country to the Spanish
state but also vice versa), thus sometimes the fact that it is designed to reflect
relative GDP rather than relative population benefits the Basque Country.90
For example, the 6.24% figure applies not only to the Basque share of non-
assumed competences when calculating the quota, but also to the Basque
share of central government tax revenues and deficit that is subtracted from
that value. Moreover, it also usually applies to the valuation of the assumed
competences used in the quota calculation – in other words, Basque expen-
diture on its own competences is usually valued at 6.24% of what Spain
spends elsewhere in the country on the same competences (or in some
cases even more – see section (c) below) (Zubiri 2015: 212). PNV-led Basque
governments have consistently maintained since the 1980s that the 6.24%
should apply to financial flows in both directions under the ‘quota system’ –
not only to the Basque contribution to the competences fulfilled by the Spa-
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90 Personal interview with Carlos Aguirre (PSE), 13 October 2014.
nish state, but also to both the valuation of Basque assumed competences
(incorporated in the quota calculation) and to the Basque share of any addi-
tional funds from the Spanish state to fulfil specific competences (often de-
ducted from the quota).91 This problematises suggestions that the 6.24%
incorporates a solidarity contribution to Spain on the grounds that it reflects
relative income rather than population. Representatives of the PNV and se-
nior officials in the Basque provincial treasury departments justify their
stance by arguing that it is ‘logical’ that if the Basques contribute a 6.24% to
competences carried out centrally, they should also receive a 6.24% share
for competences carried out by the region.92 In this regard, they also argue
that the imputation index first agreed in 1981 was never explicitly designed
to incorporate a solidarity component and that solidarity is achieved via the
Inter-Territorial Compensation Fund instead. 
A number of Concierto-related debates between Spanish and Basque go-
vernments since the 1980s have reflected discrepancies over this matter in
cases where the Basques have sought a 6.24% of funds, while the Spanish
government has argued they should instead receive a share in line with their
population size. This occurred in the 1980s, for example, when the PNV se-
cured a 6.24% share of Spanish social security funds for health and social
services at a time when these were still funded by centralised social security
contributions rather than taxes (Larrea Jiménez 1989). More recently, a si-
milar situation occurred under the PSOE minority governments from 2004
to 2011 when a dispute emerged as to how much the Basque government
should receive of the funds provided by the Spanish government to other
regions for (1) extraordinary financing for the health system; (2) a new law
governing education for children aged under three; and (3) a new depen-
dency law. Again, the PNV won its argument for a 6.24% share of the funds
in agreements reached in 2005 and 2007,93 though dispute over the matter
continued thereafter. 
(c) Valuation of the non-assumed competences in the quota calculation                
Aside from the imputation index, another of the most criticised aspects
of the quota methodology is the valuation of the non-assumed competences
to which the Basques contribute a 6.24% share. As stated earlier, the valua-
tion of the non-assumed competences is not calculated directly, but rather
it is determined by subtracting state expenditure on competences already
assumed by the Basque region (the ‘assumed charges’) from total state ex-
penditure on those competences in other regions in the Spanish annual bud-
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91 Personal interviews with Pedro Azpiazu (PNV) and with senior officials in Basque provin-
cial treasury departments, September-October 2014.
92 Personal interviews with Pedro Azpiazu (PNV) and with senior officials in Basque provin-
cial treasury departments, September-October 2014.
93 For the agreements reached, see Informe Anual Integrado de la Hacienda Vasca 2011,
http://www.ogasun.ejgv.euskadi.net/contenidos/informe_estudio/iai/es_iai_2011/adjuntos/2011%
20IAI.pdf, pp. 204-205.
get. All regions in Spain have extensive spending competences but the Bas-
que (and Navarran) regions have yet more than most. The ‘assumed char-
ges’ are essentially competences which have been devolved to the Basque
region but not other regions in Spain (or at least not to the same extent),
thus expenditure on those competences elsewhere in Spain still features in
the Spanish budget. Critics suggest that the Basque share of the assumed
competences is significantly over-valued, and thus the non-assumed com-
petences are significantly under-estimated in the figures used to calculate
the Basque quota (e.g. De la Fuente 2009: 11-19; Zubiri 2015: 212; Sevilla
2001: 149; JCyL 2008: 8-10; Monasterio Escudero 2010: 71-75). For example,
according to the value of the non-assumed competences given in the quota
laws for the base year quotas for 2002 and 2007, only approximately a quar-
ter of the central government’s non-financial expenditure corresponds to
competences not assumed by the Basque region and thus to which it must
contribute a 6.24% share. De la Fuente (2009: 11-19) argues the figure should
be much higher than a quarter since fundamental competences (such as he-
alth and education) had been assumed by all of the regions in Spain at least
by 2007, and thus expenditure on those competences no longer features in
the Spanish budget (with the small exception of any additional state contri-
butions) but rather in the respective regional budgets. This, he argues, leaves
the central government primarily in charge of providing and budgeting for
nationwide services, most of which the Basques should contribute to.
The lack of transparency regarding the calculation of the value of the non-
assumed competences is a fundamental problem here, therefore any esti-
mates of what the figure should be are provisional at best and can only be
used to give a general idea, as De la Fuente himself acknowledges (2009: 13-
14). Neither the five-yearly quota laws nor any other publicly available legis-
lation or documentation provide details as to exactly which of the chapters
(part or whole) in the Spanish budget are considered assumed or non-assu-
med by the Basque region. Neither is the valuation of each assumed com-
petence available publicly (De la Fuente 2009: 6; JCyL 2008: 8). Only the final
value of the total non-assumed competences to which the Basques contri-
bute a 6.24% share is given in an Appendix to the quota law, without any
breakdown in figures to show how this is reached (with the exception of the
calculation for the financing of the Basque regional police, an assumed com-
petence which is described in more detail). The Spanish budget does not
provide a functional or geographical breakdown for each item either. Thus
there are a lot of grey areas, for example in the case of some competences
which have been assumed by the Basque region to a greater degree than in
other regions, or indeed fully assumed by almost all and yet the Spanish
state still provides some level of funding to all regions to maintain program-
mes of general statewide interest. To what extent does the Basque region
benefit from state spending in such areas or not? 
To err on the side of caution, when in doubt De la Fuente (2009) considers
a competence fully assumed by the Basque region and thus excludes any
spending on this competence in the Spanish budget from the non-assumed
competences to which the Basques should contribute. Even so, he still esti-
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mates that the Basque region should have contributed to 60% of the state’s
non financial expenditure in 2002 and 67% in 2007 rather than the actual 24%
and 26% figures respectively under the quota laws (De la Fuente 2009: 16).
One sizeable debatable inclusion here in the non-assumed competences as
calculated by De la Fuente is the regional equalisation funds (he includes the
value of the equalisation mechanism in the common financing regime as a
non-assumed competence, since the Basque region does not contribute to
this equalisation mechanism via the Concierto). If these are excluded, the
amount of the state’s financial expenditure the Basques should have contri-
buted to comes to 41% and 46%, still more than the amount included in the
quota laws, resulting in an estimated shortfall not paid by the Basque
Country of EUR 1.065bn and EUR 1.756bn respectively (De la Fuente 2009:
17). 
Basque officials dispute Angel de la Fuente’s figures, arguing that his cal-
culations are based on approximations only and thus unreliable, since the
breakdown of figures is not publicly available. And they suspect a degree of
political intent in his calculations.94 A fundamental problem, however, lies in
the fact that neither Spanish nor Basque officials provide alternative official
figures either to clarify matters. Uriarte (2015), who addresses De la Fuente’s
criticisms, refutes the latter’s calculations as based on estimated figures, but
does not provide alternatives, stating instead that ‘the determination of the
base of the calculation of the gross quota, due to its complexity, is only
known to the negotiators of the Spanish state and the Basque autonomous
community who prepare the Annex that accompanies the five-yearly quota
laws’ (Uriarte 2015: Pt VIII, 539). This lack of transparency as to the figures
used to calculate the quota only serves to fuel speculation that Spanish-Bas-
que political deals behind-the-scenes have influenced many of the valuations
of competences reached over those years, rather than purely technical and
economic arguments. Every time a competence has been transferred to the
Basque region over the decades, bilateral Spanish-Basque negotiations have
taken place to determine the valuation of that competence, with political fac-
tors often influencing the final agreements reached. 
(d) The VAT adjustment 
Critics also suggest the VAT adjustment has become overly favourable to
the Basque region. While the logic of the adjustment is in itself correct, it
has been argued that the failure to update the main coefficients prescribed
in successive quota laws to calculate it has led to significant inaccuracies.
None of the main indices used to calculate certain variables in the Concierto
have ever been changed since they were first established (in most cases in
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94 Personal interviews with Pedro Luis Uriarte and with Basque provincial treasury repre-
sentatives, 2014. Carlos de la Fuente has been the most vocal and published the most on this
subject, however, several other authors share his view that the non-assumed competences are
under-valued in the quota calculations (e.g. Monasterio Escudero 2010: 71-75).  
the 1980s) since the dominance of politics over technicalities has impeded
proper negotiation and led to a mutual atmosphere of distrust of the other
side’s motives for suggesting particular changes. Thus the imputation index
and the main coefficients used in the VAT adjustment rate have never been
changed since they were first agreed in 1980 and 1986 respectively. By
chance, the Basque relative income has remained broadly stable at just
above or below 6.24% since the 1990s, which has avoided any pressing need
to change the imputation index, but it is argued that the VAT adjustment rate
is now favourable to the Basque Country (e.g. Zubiri 2014a: 156; Monasterio
Escudero 2010: 84). The main error is attributed to the coefficients used to
calculate the adjustment for the internal market (see above), which adjusts
for the difference between (a) Basque consumption relative to that of all
Spain and (b) Basque VAT collection capacity relative to that of all Spain.
Both (a) and (b) have remained unchanged since they were first set in the
mid 1980s: 6.875% and 5.765% respectively. It has been suggested that the
quota laws now significantly underestimate (a) and partially underestimate
(b). Again, there is however no consensus on the matter.
An eternal stalemate?
Overall, combining both the under-estimation of the quota (which com-
prises both the under-estimation of the non-assumed competences and the
insubstantial contribution to regional equalisation) and the over-estimation
of the VAT adjustment, De la Fuente estimates, using the years 2002 and
2007 as examples, that the Basque region has frequently paid less than it
should have to the Spanish state by an amount equivalent to around 6% of
its GDP. The Basque and Navarran regions are the only regions in Spain with
relatively high per capita incomes that have a positive fiscal balance with
the Spanish state while the other regions with similar GDP per capita levels
(Catalonia, the Balearics and Madrid) have a negative fiscal balance, contri-
buting between 5% and 12% of their GDP to the Spanish state (De la Fuente
2009: 21-22). As stated, such figures are refuted by senior Basque officials
as unreliable since they are based on estimations. And yet the lack of trans-
parency inherent in the fact that a number of figures used in calculating the
quota are not made publicly available is itself problematic, making estima-
tions the only option available. Uriarte (2015) seeks to counter De la Fuente
and other critics by calculating how much the Basques have contributed to
the Spanish state via the quota over the decades and comparing this with
the amount spent by the Spanish state in the Basque region in the same pe-
riod, showing that the Basques have paid more than they have received. As
stated above, however, this too is problematic to some extent, since much
of the Spanish state spending to which the Basques have contributed may
not have been spent directly in the Basque region, but has nevertheless been
designed to benefit all Spaniards including the Basques. Ultimately, while it
is unanimously recognised that per capita financing levels are far higher in
the Basque region than in all the regions under the common financing
system, there is a seemingly irreconcilable discrepancy in perspectives as
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to the reasons for the discrepancy, and therefore whether the Basques pay
enough to Spain. 
In the wake of the financial crisis, given the increased pressure on resour-
ces, the issue has become increasingly politicised. At the political level, at-
tacks against the Concierto’s perceived lack of sufficient contribution to
Spain have at times been voiced by PP and PSOE politicians in other regions
(especially Catalonia). Among relatively newer parties, the centralist party
Union Progress and Democracy (Unión Progreso y Democracia, UPyD) foun-
ded in 2007 became the first statewide party actively to oppose the Concierto
even in the Basque Country.95 Its influence in Spanish politics declined ra-
pidly, but a similar stance was also taken up by the centre-right Citizens’
party (Ciudadanos), founded in Catalonia in 2006, which subsequently be-
came a statewide party and gained traction in particular in 2015 ahead of the
Spanish general election that year, at which it came fourth. Criticisms of the
model from politicians elsewhere in Spain are sometimes directed at the
very existence of the Concierto system itself, as in the case of UPyD and Ciu-
dadanos. This is first and foremost because the model is not easily genera-
lisable to other parts of Spain, and thus it is perceived as a ‘privilege’ in
comparison with the common financing system. Often, however, it is not so
much the Concierto itself which is criticised, but rather its design and appli-
cation in practice, with suggestions that the annual quota payment ought to
be increased in order to bring final per capita financing in the Basque region
more into line with the resources of comparable regions under the common
financing system. The PP and the PSOE, for example, uphold the model of
the Concierto itself, but some party representatives have indicated they sup-
port a review of the size of the quota.
In theory, if the Basque contribution to Spain were universally considered
insufficient, part of the problem could be dealt with by adapting the Con-
cierto accordingly, without any need to call into question the essence of the
Concierto itself and the fiscal autonomy it affords the Basque region. Eco-
nomists suggest one way could be to adapt the Concierto (and Convenio)
legislation to incorporate a contribution to the equalisation mechanism for
financing services in the common system; or indeed to remove the equali-
sation mechanism from the common financing system (where it is currently
included primarily in the Fund for the Guarantee of Fundamental Public Ser-
vices and also to a lesser extent in the Sufficiency Fund, since the 2009 re-
form) and either make it an entirely separate fund or incorporate it into the
Interterritorial Compensation Fund (e.g. Bosch 2010: 17; Zubiri 2015: 221;
López Labora 2006: 18-19). The Basques would then contribute 6.24% of the
resources, as they do for other non-assumed competences. In theory, the
Spanish authorities could do so, since it is within their remit to establish the
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95 Mikel Buesa, Economics professor at the Complutense University of Madrid and founding
member of UPyD in 2007-2009, coined the term ‘el pufo vasco’ (‘the Basque swindle’) in a study
by the same name he published in 2007 criticising the methodology used to calculate the
Basque contribution to the Spanish state via the quota (see Buesa 2007).
solidarity funds they deem appropriate (since this is a non-assumed com-
petence). In practice, however, this would almost certainly prove politically
very difficult, since it would require the Basques to accept a reduction in their
resource levels. 
Any suggestions from Madrid that the quota should be revised upwards
are generally rejected by Basque officials as an imposition and a unilateral
attack on the Concierto system, exacerbating Spanish-Basque tensions,
since the Basque nationalist authorities do not agree that the Basque region
should pay more to the Spanish state.96 Both sides (Spanish and Basque)
are mutually suspicious of each other’s intentions when it comes to any re-
visions to the quota payments and neither readily accepts the other’s figures,
even for matters such as calculations of GDP levels.97 Rather than reducing
the Basque level of resources, current and former Basque officials tend to
suggest the focus should instead be on increasing accountability in the com-
mon financing system to encourage better financial management by other
regions, and also increasing the level of resources provided to the regions
under the common financing system, many of which are deemed to be
under-financed (e.g. Uriarte 2015: Pt VIII 504). Basque officials also reject di-
rect comparisons of the economic results of the Concierto and the common
financing system in any case, arguing that the two systems are different and
thus cannot be expected to produce the same economic outcomes.98
Other regions with comparable GDP levels to the Basque Country will,
however, almost inevitably continue to desire a system that gives them si-
milar resource levels to the Basque Country, and Spain is clearly unable to
afford to provide a similar amount of per capita financing to comparably we-
althy regions under the common financing system as that enjoyed by the
Basque region. The stalemate thus looks set to continue. For the PNV, the
increased attacks on the perceived lack of solidarity of the Concierto by po-
liticians elsewhere in Spain, in particular in the wake of the financial crisis
of 2007-2008, have put the party on the defensive. The situation has led party
representatives to vigorously reassert their claims of a right to a separate fi-
nancing system and to argue that such a bilateral system should not only
be protected, but also extended to wider Spanish-Basque political relations. 
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96 For example, ‘El Parlamento advierte contra cualquier intento de revisión “unilateral” del
Cupo’), Deia, 11.04.14. 
97 Personal interviews with Basque provincial treasury representatives, 2014. 
98 Personal interviews with Basque provincial treasury representatives, 2014.
CHAPTER 4
SHAPING THE PNV’S CONCEPTION 
OF SOVEREIGNTY (1): 
BILATERAL SPANISH-BASQUE 
RELATIONS OVER THE CONCIERTO

The fact that the Concierto has given the Basque region greater control
over its finances and has proved comparatively favourable to it in terms of
resources per capita, as well as being based on strictly bilateral relations
with Madrid without inter-regional negotiations, explains why regional fi-
nancing in the Basque case has not become a strong point of contention as
in Catalonia. The bilateral nature of the Concierto has nevertheless still in-
fluenced the PNV’s territorial agenda in other ways, for example by shaping
the conception of sovereignty that it seeks for the Basque region. The aim
of this chapter is therefore to investigate what the implications of the bilate-
ral nature of the Concierto have been for the PNV’s territorial agenda. The
predominant focus in both the media and academia on the politicised debate
over whether or not the Concierto is a ‘privilege’ in comparison with the
common financing system has neglected a fuller analysis of how bilateral
relations between Madrid and the Basque region over the Concierto have
played out in recent decades, which this chapter investigates.  
The bilateral dimension of the Concierto, which gives both Spanish
and Basque delegations equal veto power, makes it the closest current equi-
valent to the form of ‘bilateral relationship between equals’ that the PNV
seeks in wider Spanish-Basque political relations, under the party’s latest ite-
ration of its longstanding desire to seek a new political relationship with Ma-
drid based on a more confederal model involving self-determination and
co-sovereignty. However, while the bilateral nature of the Concierto is much
valued by the PNV since it prevents the Spanish authorities from taking uni-
lateral decisions, this does not mean that the Concierto has produced con-
sensus over fiscal and financial matters between Spanish and Basque
governments. Notwithstanding the PNV’s underlying satisfaction with the
Concierto framework, the model has often resulted in clashes with Madrid
over the detailed workings of the arrangement. And yet bilateral relations
over the Concierto have offered scope for deals and pay offs to resolve such
disagreements, as well as for frustration and conflict. Hence, the main ques-
tions posed in this chapter are: Why have bilateral fiscal and financial rela-
tions over the Concierto often been characterised by more discord than
harmony since the 1980s? How have the differences been resolved? And
what have been the implications for the PNV’s territorial agenda? 
The chapter will start with an analysis of the bilateral mechanisms con-
cerning the Concierto, examining why this underlying bilateral framework
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is satisfactory to the PNV. The subsequent sections will then investigate dif-
ferent key bilateral negotiations relative to the Concierto from the 1980s to
the present, in order to identify the discrepancies that there have been over
both (1) the finances of the Concierto (in terms of calculations of the num-
bers) and  (2) how to develop the model (in terms of its scope and frame-
work, to give the Basques greater fiscal authority). The chapter then
considers the implications of the growing difficulties in reaching bilateral
agreements over the Concierto for Spanish-Basque fiscal, financial and wider
territorial relations. 
THE BILATERAL NATURE OF THE CONCIERTO
The Concierto law and other legislation deriving from it (fundamentally
the five-yearly quota laws governing the Basque contribution to the Spanish
state) require mutual agreement between Basque and Spanish government
delegations. The bilaterally agreed legislation is then always presented to
the Spanish parliament as a single act, thus it can only be accepted or rejec-
ted following parliamentary debate (in practice it has always been accepted),
without being subject to the potential amendment of individual articles. The
main body which exists to ensure the bilateral nature of the Concierto is the
Mixed Commission (Comisión Mixta), which involves a six-strong Spanish
delegation and a six-strong Basque delegation.99 The Spanish delegation
usually includes the Minister of the Treasury and Public Administration, the
State Secretary of the Treasury and the General Secretary of Public Admi-
nistration plus three others. The Basque delegation comprises three repre-
sentatives of the Basque government (again, usually including the highest
representatives of the treasury and the public administration) and one from
each of the three provinces (usually the head of the provincial government,
the diputado general). The Mixed Commission is responsible for agreeing
any changes to the Concierto law, commitments in terms of collaboration
and coordination over budgetary stability, and the methodology for each
five-yearly quota law. The latter includes agreeing the calculation of the base
year quota, the updating index and all relevant indices (such as the imputa-
tion index and the indices involved in the adjustment rates for the indirect
taxes), as well as determining the relevant compensations from the Spanish
state to the Basque region to be deducted from the quota.100
All of the areas subject to agreement by the Mixed Commission require
the unanimous approval of all twelve members, with each holding veto
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99 The understanding of bilateral relations over the Concierto expressed in this chapter is
informed first and foremost by personal interviews in 2014 with Basque provincial treasury of-
ficials (representing the three provincial treasuries) and current and former political represen-
tatives (PNV and PSE) with direct experience of bilateral negotiations. 
100 See Chapter 3 pp.101-105 for definitions of the imputation index, VAT adjustment, com-
pensations, etc.
power. Many of the preliminary negotiations prior to meetings of the Mixed
Commission nevertheless take place between the Basque and Spanish go-
vernments without necessarily involving the representatives of the Basque
provinces.101 Thus the Mixed Commission meets infrequently, usually only
when the main lines of an agreement have already been sketched out
through preliminary negotiations. Relatively more mundane matters such
as the settlement of the annual quotas once the final budget figures are
known are also dealt with directly between Basque and Spanish govern-
ments. 
The bilateral nature of the Concierto was consolidated in the 2002 law,
building on the steps taken by the Basque delegation in the 1980 negotia-
tions for the 1981 law to ensure that the Concierto would thereafter continue
to be negotiated and thus prevent the Spanish government from unilaterally
imposing new taxes or changes in the Basque region in the future. For exam-
ple, while the 1981 Agreement established (under the Second Additional Dis-
position) that future changes to Spanish tax legislation that affected any of
the taxes already devolved to the Basque region would necessitate bilateral
negotiations to adapt these taxes as required, this provision was expanded
under the 2002 agreement to make bilateral negotiations obligatory if the
Spanish government introduced any new taxes too. Henceforth, if the Spa-
nish government introduced any new taxes, it would be obliged to negotiate
the delegation of the relevant tax-raising authority to the Basque provinces.
Aside from the Mixed Commission, the Concierto legislation of 2002 also
provides for two further bilateral committees, a Normative Coordination and
Evaluation Commission (Comisión de Coordinación y Evaluación Normativa)
and an Arbitration Board (Junta Arbitral) (e.g. Rubí Cassinello 2003: 36-37).
Both were designed to facilitate and encourage bilateral discussion over Bas-
que tax measures to resolve possible discrepancies with the Spanish state
before the Basque legislation is passed (in the case of the Commission) or
before any disputes reach the courts (in the case of the Board), in an attempt
to reduce litigation. The creation of these bodies was a significant develop-
ment, since the Spanish authorities’ frequent recourse to the courts to cha-
llenge Basque tax measures in the 1980s and 1990s was perceived by the
Basques as an attack on Basque fiscal autonomy, putting Spanish-Basque
fiscal relations under intense pressure.102
Overall, these bilateral features of the Concierto give both Spanish and
Basque delegations equal veto power in key negotiations relating to the Con-
cierto, preventing unilateral decisions taken by the central Spanish govern-
ment. This makes the Concierto the closest current equivalent to the form
of ‘bilateral relationship between equals’ that the PNV seeks in wider Spa-
nish-Basque political relations, under the party’s latest iteration of its longs-
tanding desire to seek a new political relationship with Madrid based on a
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101 Personal interviews with senior officials in the Guipúzcoan provincial treasury depart-
ment, 2014.
102 On the history of litigation in relation to Basque tax measures, see Chapter 5.
more confederal model involving self-determination and co-sovereignty. Fo-
llowing the PNV’s frustrated attempt under former lehendakari Juan José
Ibarretxe to revise the Basque regional autonomy statute to turn the region
into a semi-independent associated state of Spain, this notion of co-sove-
reignty has since been reconceptualised under lehendakari Iñigo Urkullu to
envisage an extension of the bilateral nature of the economic Concierto to
wider political relations, with explicit calls made by PNV party leaders for a
‘political Concierto’ (Chapter 2, p.81). The bilateral nature of the Concierto
has thus had a significant influence in shaping the PNV’s conception of the
political sovereignty that it seeks for the Basque region. 
Nevertheless, bilateral negotiations over the Concierto have often been
characterised by more discord than agreement. The Concierto receives
cross-party support from the two main statewide parties, the PP and the
PSOE, as well as the PNV, but this does not mean that they all always agree
on the exact finances of the model or how it should be developed. There
have been frequent disagreements between Spanish and Basque authorities
over technical issues concerning the exact numbers and finances of the
model over the years, including matters such as what the imputation index
should be, the valuations of transferred competences and their impact on
the quota, and what bases to use for the annual updating index of the quota.
Beyond such technicalities concerning the numbers themselves, there have
also been substantial disagreements over how much fiscal autonomy the
Concierto gives the Basques (with a long history of disputes over matters
such as the degree of harmonisation required with Spanish tax legislation),
and how to update the Concierto to continue to develop Basque fiscal auto-
nomy. 
In terms of its development, the Concierto has proved surprisingly adap-
table to the times, and yet developments over time have also led to some-
what different perspectives on what the model can and should be, even
within the self-proclaimed pro-Concierto camp: where some continue to see
a taxation model subject to and adapted to Spanish legislation, others now
envisage more fully-fledged fiscal authority, in which the Basque provinces
would be sovereign in fiscal matters within Europe to more or less the same
degree as the Spanish state, rather than being subordinate to it.103 From the
turn of the century in particular, there emerged a growing rift in perspectives
as to how the Concierto should be developed in a changing regulatory con-
text with the addition of the supranational European sphere, which had not
featured when the Concierto of 1981 was negotiated. Discrepancies in the
views of Spanish and Basque governments have fed into the broader clash
in views over the degree of autonomy that the Basque Country should be
afforded within the Spanish state. 
Usually, the Basque PP and PSE share the same or similar views as the
PNV regarding the finances and development of the Concierto, and thus the
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103 Personal interviews with PNV politicians and senior officials in the Vizcayan provincial
treasury department, 2014. 
clashes over the model tend to be between the Spanish authorities and the
Basque parties, rather than among parties within the Basque region itself.104
Thus, the Basque branches of the PP and the PSOE almost always support
measures pertaining to the Concierto in the Basque parliament, yet at times
these are then rejected by their colleagues in Madrid due to wider implica-
tions for other regions in Spain, which can cause internal party contradic-
tions between the Spanish headquarters and Basque branches of the parties.
This occurred, for example, in the case of the ‘Shield Law’ (Ley de Blindaje)
designed to upgrade Basque provincial tax regulations to afford them the
same legal status as legislation passed by regional or central Spanish go-
vernments, a measure which was supported by the Basque PP but not by
the party in Madrid, which voted against the law approved by the PSOE in
2009 (see Chapter 5, p.154).
However, clashes in views over how the Concierto should be developed
have also taken place occasionally between the different political parties ope-
rating within the Basque region itself, not all of which share exactly the same
conceptualisation and vision of the Concierto. Most notably, while the PNV
presents itself as the only true defender of the Concierto, the Basque PP has
argued that the PNV ‘misappropriates’ it as a nationalist instrument of fiscal
sovereignty for the Basque Country.105 The Basque PP and the PNV each con-
sider themselves the strongest defenders of the Concierto,106 but they con-
ceive of it differently in some respects. The Basque PP shares the same view
as the party’s headquarters in Madrid in interpreting the Concierto as a fiscal
model subject to and subordinate to the Spanish tax system, since the Bas-
que provinces cannot simply create their own taxes and are subject to har-
monisation rules with Spanish tax legislation. In consequence, the Basque
PP also considers it appropriate that the Spanish government alone should
represent the Basques in fiscal matters at European and international level.
In contrast, the PNV has come to envisage the Concierto as an instrument
of fiscal sovereignty in its own right, which gives the Basques almost the
same fiscal powers as Spain or any other EU member state. Ironically, the
izquierda abertzale shares to some extent the view of the PP, in the sense
that it also considers Basque tax legislation strongly subordinate to Spanish
legislation, but precisely for this reason it is vehemently against the Con-
cierto, considering the model – and the PNV’s allegiance to it – a hindrance
to the fullest development of sovereignty that it seeks for the Basque Country
(see Olano 2002; also Chapter 6).
The roots of these discrepancies in views can be seen to date back to the
origins of the Concierto itself. While the PP generally takes the starting point
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104 The izquierda abertzale, however, has always rejected the Concierto as an insufficient
basis for Basque sovereignty. See Olano 2002. 
105 Personal interviews with Antón Damborenea, head of the Basque PP in Vizcaya, 9 July
2014; and Aitor Uribesalgo, PP treasury minister of the provincial government of Álava, 10 Oc-
tober 2014.
106 In the case of the Basque PP, this is due to the historical association between the Spanish
right and the Concierto.
of the Concierto as the first such agreement of 1878 with the Basque provin-
ces spearheaded by their predecessors among the liberal elites and in Álava
in particular (a historical stronghold of the Spanish right), the PNV tends to
look further back, remembering the first Concierto arrangement as the last
vestige of what had originally been a wider set of political rights based on
mutual equality governing the relationship between Spain (or previously
Castile) and the Basque provinces. While the first economic agreement of
1878 did not imply a bilateral pact between equals, the notion of a ‘pact’
would start to be associated with the Concierto from 1886 onwards and
would evolve gradually thereafter, echoing the spirit of the original Basque
fueros.107 In opposition to the PNV’s conception of the Concierto as an ins-
trument of fiscal sovereignty for the Basque region as a whole (albeit res-
pecting the role of the provinces as home to the treasuries), the PP issues a
reminder that the three Basque provinces have only shared a Concierto agre-
ement involving one joint quota payment since 1981, which in itself was fa-
cilitated by the fact that the Concierto had never been abolished in Álava.
Even among the parties who consider themselves supporters of the Con-
cierto, conceptions of the model and its ultimate aim and purpose thus differ
somewhat. 
In this context, the rest of this chapter analyses examples of different key
negotiations relative to the Concierto from the 1980s to the present, in order
to identify the different political and contextual factors that have either faci-
litated or impeded Basque-Spanish agreements over both (1) the finances
of the Concierto (in terms of calculations of the numbers) and  (2) how to
develop the model (in terms of its scope and framework, to give the Basques
greater fiscal and financial autonomy). It then considers the implications of
the growing difficulties in reaching bilateral agreements over the Concierto
for Spanish-Basque fiscal, financial and wider territorial relations. Instances
where substantial differences of opinion over the finances and/or develop-
ment of the Concierto have been resolved using technical arguments first
and foremost, without one side ceding ground to the other in light of other
contextual or political factors, have been relatively rare in the decades since
the Concierto of 1981 was approved. Such agreements have only tended to
be reached on relatively minor issues, or on the few more substantial issues
where both sides have held a very similar position from the outset of nego-
tiations, as in the case of the decision taken by the Aznar-led Spanish go-
vernment and the PNV-led Basque government to make the Concierto a
permanent rather than time-limited agreement for the first time under the
2002 law. Differences in views between the Basque and Spanish delegations
have often (though not always) made it difficult to find a common middle
ground and thus prevented agreements until if and when other contextual
factors (usually political support or alliance arrangements) have led the Spa-
nish government to accept the Basque government’s proposals, as seen in
several of the following examples.
132
107 On the origins of the Concierto and the concept of a ‘pact’, see Alonso Olea 1995.
KEY NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE CONCIERTO
(1) Debating the Concierto’s figures and finances 
After the Concierto law had been approved in 1981, significant Basque-
Spanish differences over the finances of the model set in almost immedia-
tely. The Concierto legislation had set a provisional quota for the first year
of its application (1981) and the rules for its final settlement (liquidación) at
year end, but stipulated that the Joint Commission should agree a five-yearly
quota law thereafter to prescribe the methodology for calculating the quota.
This would involve specifying both a base year quota (the result of multipl-
ying the imputation index by the total non-assumed charges, plus some ad-
justments) and a rate to update this (índice de actualización) over the
subsequent four years. A draft law for the first five-year period (1982-1986)
was meant to be presented by July 1981, but no agreement was reached
then or in the following years due to Spanish-Basque discrepancies over
both the imputation index (6.24%) and the valuation of the competences the
region was due to assume (such as health and social services), among other
issues (Larrea Jiménez 1989). This latter dimension was inflated by decisions
taken in Madrid during the climate of nervousness and instability following
the attempted coup of 23rd February 1981, following which new Spanish
prime minister Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo and PSOE leader Felipe González
agreed the Autonomy Pacts (Pactos Autonómicos) and subsequently appro-
ved the Organic Law on the Harmonisation of the Autonomy Process (Ley
Orgánica de Armonización del Proceso Autonómico, LOAPA) in 1982 to re-
orientate and slow down the process of regional devolution. In this context,
the Spanish government decided to try to retain control over the cost of re-
gional competences by not devolving responsibility to the regions for the
following budgetary chapters: Current Transfers (Chapter IV), New Inves-
tment (part of Chapter VI) and Capital Transfers (Chapter VII). This would di-
rectly affect the valuation of competences the Basques were due to assume,
but was rejected by the Basque government since it went against what had
already been agreed in the Concierto law (Larrea Jiménez 1989). As disputes
over these matters prevailed, provisional rules kicked in (as per Transitional
Provision Five) to set provisional quotas for the years 1982 to 1986 which
were broadly based on the 1981 quota, but none of these were finally settled
(liquidados) due to Spanish-Basque disagreements over the amount due. 
By late 1986, amidst broader political uncertainty following the split wi-
thin the PNV and its setback at the 1986 regional elections, none of the pro-
visional quotas from 1981 onwards had been finalised, and the transfer of
competences was frozen due to disputes over their valuation. No quota law
had ever been approved for the period 1982-1986, and no new quota law
agreement was on the table for the next five-year period 1987-1991. And yet
all of these issues would be resolved in 1987 when the PSE formed a coali-
tion government with the PNV in February that year. As part of the arrange-
ment, the government in Madrid conceded to the PNV’s wishes in relation
to the Concierto then and in subsequent months, accepting the valuations
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and methods of calculation proposed by the PNV. The deals were largely po-
litical and struck directly by Ardanza with prime minister Felipe González, ef-
fectively bypassing his treasury minister Carlos Solchaga. By compromising
on the Concierto and the quota, the Socialists could ensure the stability of
the PSE-PNV Basque coalition, bring the PNV into the fold of Spanish state
governance and emphasise their achievement of a Basque-Spanish unders-
tanding that had not been possible under a one-party PNV government.108
The main details of the arrangement were as follows. Although the Bas-
ques already collected most taxes in their territory under the Concierto (al-
beit without legislative autonomy over a number of taxes at this stage), at
the time, some key competences, most notably health and social services,
were still financed by social security contributions paid into a single state-
wide fund (the General Social Security Treasury), rather than general taxa-
tion. Agreements over the transfer of these competences thus inevitably
involved agreeing what share of the social security quotas the Basques
would receive to cover the competences. The deal struck between the PNV
and the Socialists enabled the pending transfer of the fundamental compe-
tences of health and social services from the Spanish to the Basque govern-
ment under a financing method and terms in accordance with the Basque
proposal: while the Basque population at the time was about 5.2% of the
Spanish population, it was decided instead to give the Basques a 6.24%
share to ensure their acceptance of the deal, matching the level of their con-
tribution via the quota to non-assumed competences. Importantly, the afore-
mentioned budgetary chapters in dispute (IV, VI and VII) were included in
the transfer and valuation of the competences. A few months later, after the
summer break, lehendakari José Antonio Ardanza tackled the pending issue
of how to reconcile the outstanding quotas since 1981, given the substantial
discrepancy in figures between the Spanish and Basque authorities. He pro-
posed that the final quotas for that period should simply more or less match
the provisional quotas paid, and struck the broad lines of an agreement to
this effect with Felipe González. This was then entrusted to their respective
technical teams under treasury ministers Carlos Solchaga (Spanish) and Fer-
nando Spagnolo (Basque) to draw up and implement (Ardanza 2011: 236-
237). At the Joint Commission meeting on 4 December 1987, a Quota Law
for 1982-1986 was finally approved retrospectively and the quotas from 1981
to 1986 were settled in accordance with Spagnolo’s criteria, resulting in the
Basque government paying a final sum (to settle the difference between pro-
visional and final quotas) much lower than the Spanish side had initially ex-
pected (Ardanza 2011: 237; Larrea Jiménez 1989). 
In recent years, similar debates over the finances of the Concierto – in
terms of disputes over the valuation of competences, the imputation index,
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mer lehendakari José Antonio Ardanza (PNV), 28 April 2014; Gonzalo Múgica (PSE), legal ad-
viser to former deputy lehendakari Ramón Jáuregui, 18 July 2014; and Carlos Aguirre (PSE),
then Economic Planning Director of the Basque government, 13 October 2014. On the technical
specifics of the dispute, see Larrea Jiménez 1989.
the final settlement (liquidación) of quota payments, among other matters –
have once again beset Spanish-Basque fiscal and financial relations. As of
late 2015, none of the provisional quotas since 2007 had been settled due to
continuing Basque-Spanish government discrepancies over the amount due
to be paid by the Basque region, and no agreement had been reached on a
new quota law for the period from 2012 onwards (the 2007-2011 quota law
was simply rolled over). Even in 2009-2011, a period when the Basque So-
cialists were in power in the Basque government at the same time as their
PSOE colleagues were in power in Madrid (and reliant there upon the par-
liamentary support of the PNV to give them a working majority), an agree-
ment could not be reached to settle differences over the quota law. By the
time the PNV returned to power in the Basque region in 2012, the PP had re-
turned to power in Madrid with an absolute majority. Ahead of the Spanish
elections of December 2015, Basque officials were hoping for an outcome
that might increase the PNV’s bargaining power in Madrid again to reach an
agreement.109
One major source of discrepancy which has contributed to the longstan-
ding stalemate over the settlement of quotas since 2007 and the lack of a
new quota law for the period 2012-2016 has concerned Basque calls to revise
the methodology to calculate the rate to update the quota (índice de actua-
lización).110 Each five-yearly quota law establishes a base year quota and a
rate to update it thereafter based on the increase (or decrease) in the state
collection of taxes covered by the Concierto agreement elsewhere in Spain.
The 2007-2011 quota law stipulated that the rate would be subject to revision
following the reform of the common financing regime in 2009 since this
could affect it, but the Spanish government was reluctant to respond to Bas-
que requests for negotiation in this regard, due to its reluctance to undertake
negotiations that might result in a reduction of the quota. Other matters
which have caused discrepancies over the quota law and quota payments
in recent years include discrepancies over the VAT adjustment rate and also
valuations of certain competences. For example, as mentioned in Chapter 3
(p.119), when the 2007-2011 quota law was designed, a dispute emerged as
to how much the Basque government should receive of the funding provided
by the Spanish government to regions under the common financing system
for (1) extraordinary financing (i.e. beyond the original budget allocation) for
the health system; (2) extraordinary financing to develop the Education Law
(in this case, in relation to children aged under three); and (3) a new depen-
dency law (governing the provisions for persons incapacitated to some de-
gree by age or disability). The debate was further complicated by opposition
from some sectors, most notably the PP (including the Basque PP), to giving
the Basques any share of the extraordinary financing for competences alre-
ady transferred since they usually pay for such competences with their own
taxes. Echoing the debates in the 1980s over the valuation of the Basque
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share of health and social services, the PSOE government argued the Basque
region should receive an amount of funding in proportion to its population
size rather than the 6.24% share (matching the imputation index in the quota)
proposed by the Basque delegation, but the PNV won the argument since
the PSOE needed their support in the Spanish parliament at the time. The
PSOE nevertheless backtracked on the 6.24% agreement afterwards, and de-
bate on this subject dragged on thereafter, continuing under the subsequent
PP government that came into power in 2011. 
(2) Debating the Concierto’s scope and framework
Aside from questions concerning the calculation of the finances involved
in the Concierto, there have also been considerable debates regarding how
to develop it as a model of fiscal autonomy. The negotiations to devolve the
competence to collect VAT in 1985 were one of the first tests of the new Con-
cierto’s adaptability to a changing regulatory context through bilateral ne-
gotiations: the Spanish treasury was initially opposed to the Basque request
to transfer the responsibility for VAT collection to the Basque provinces citing
technical difficulties, but it came to accept the Basque proposal including
their suggested adjustment rate.111 From then onwards, VAT (and later excise
duties too) in the Basque region would be collected by the Basque provincial
treasuries and then undergo an adjustment to compensate for the difference
between how much they actually collect (i.e. the VAT on the value added of
firms in the Basque region) and how much they should collect (i.e. the VAT
on the consumption of individuals in the Basque region), since VAT is a tax
on consumption but collected through a tax on production.       
The most significant developments to the Concierto law of 1981 took
place in the 1990s under the reform of 1997 (Atxabal and Muguruza 2006:
28-30; Zubiri 1997). Following the years of Socialist government in Madrid,
the PNV made rapid progress in developing the Concierto once the PP had
won power for the first time in 1996 but lacked an absolute majority. Under
an agreement in May 1997, the authority to collect excise duties and non-re-
sident taxes was devolved to the Basque provinces for the first time and they
were also granted significant regulatory autonomy over some other taxes –
most notably income tax (impuesto sobre la renta de las personas físicas,
IRPF), as well as the wealth tax (impuesto sobre el patrimonio) – which they
had previously only collected. These agreements substantially increased the
fiscal autonomy afforded to the Basques under the Concierto. These deve-
lopments formed a crucial part of the package of measures that the PNV
agreed with the PP, in return for which the PNV supported the investiture of
José María Aznar and promised to provide legislative support for his mino-
rity government in the Spanish parliament thereafter. The provisional lines
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of an agreement over the Concierto were reached in 1996 before the final
deal was signed and sealed in May 1997. This, combined with agreements
to enhance the Basque level of self-government in other spheres governed
by the Basque autonomy statute, gave rise to the oft-cited comment by the
then Basque president Xabier Arzalluz that the PP had done more for Basque
autonomy in 14 days than the PSOE in 13 years.112
The PP’s support for these changes has been attributed first and foremost
to the fact that it needed PNV legislative support in the Spanish parliament.
In this vein, for example, it has been argued that the need for legislative sup-
port facilitated such an extensive agreement despite the fact that the only
technical reason which required the Basque and Spanish sides to negotiate
a small modification to the Concierto at the time was the need to agree the
new tax on insurance premiums introduced in the 1996 Spanish tax measu-
res law (Atzabal and Muguruza 2006: 28). Similarly, it has been argued that
the need for legislative support enabled potential obstacles to be overcome
where otherwise there might not have been the political will to do so: thus
the possible legal hurdles involved in granting the Basque treasuries levying
capacity for the special tax on alcohol when the 1981 agreement had ex-
pressly prohibited this were overcome by justifying the move as a ‘second
assignment’ (segunda concertación) of taxes in the 1997 law (Ley 38/1997)
(Atzabal and Muguruza 2006: 29-30).
Certainly, reasons of political expediency (Aznar’s desire to secure the
PNV’s support) played a very significant role in facilitating the agreement.
PP members nevertheless argue that the decision to give the Basques a sig-
nificant degree of regulatory autonomy over IRPF in particular also reflected
the PP’s support at the time for the hypothesis that fiscal co-responsibility
encourages fiscal discipline.113 Under the previous Socialist government, a
white paper on fiscal co-responsibility had been commissioned and presen-
ted by a technical delegation in 1995, in response to calls from some regions
(most fundamentally Catalonia) with a view to reforming the common finan-
cing regime. In response, the new PP government proposed to start by sha-
ring IRPF with the regions first. In 1996 it granted some regulatory autonomy
over IRPF to the regions under a reform of the common financing regime,
while the agreement with the Basques over the Concierto followed in 1997.
Only the PSOE genuinely did not agree with the move and attempted to
block it, arguing that different income tax rates in different regions of Spain
threatened equality and efficiency. 
The assignment of the excise duties to the Basque treasuries under the
1997 reform was also considered advisable for technical reasons in order to
stop the annual Basque quota paid to the Spanish state from becoming ne-
gative. The quota paid is 6.24% of the total amount remaining when the
amount the state collects in non-assumed taxes is subtracted from the
amount of taxes it spends on non-assumed competences (i.e. not including
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the part of the non-assumed competences financed by deficit). The increase
in the transfer of resource-intensive competences to the Basque region (and
thus the decrease in non-assumed competences) over the years following
the Transition, combined with strong tax collection by the Spanish state in
the non-assumed taxes (which included, most notably, the excise duties),
had resulted in a rapid reduction in the size of the quota, to the extent that
by 1996 it had almost reached zero and would have ended up becoming ne-
gative in subsequent years, which risked being conceptually misleading. 
By the time the Basque and Spanish delegations were due to negotiate a
new Concierto law in 2001 (with the 1981 agreement set to expire at year
end), the PP under Aznar had an absolute majority in the Spanish parliament.
The law eventually passed in 2002 to renew and update the Concierto was
welcomed by the PNV regional government and perceived by both it and
the Basque provincial authorities as a very good outcome overall in terms
of both technicalities and competences.114 Most notably, it made the Con-
cierto a permanent rather than time-limited agreement for the first time. As
explained earlier (p.129), it also consolidated the bilateral nature of the Con-
cierto: thereafter, if the Spanish government introduced any new taxes, it
would be obliged to negotiate with the Basque delegation how to delegate
the relevant tax-raising authority to the Basque provinces (previously it had
only been obliged to negotiate bilaterally over changes to taxes already de-
volved to the Basques). The Concierto of 2002 also provided for the creation
of two new bilateral committees, a Normative Coordination and Evaluation
Commission and an Arbitration Board. This was to provide specific bilateral
forums for addressing Spanish-Basque discrepancies over Basque tax me-
asures, in an attempt to resolve potential disputes via political channels and
thereby reduce Spain’s recourse to the courts. 
In another important development, the Concierto of 2002 incorporated
new provisions in terms of coordination and collaboration on budgetary
matters between the Spanish and Basque authorities (Rubí Cassinello 2003:
35). One of the longstanding Basque complaints at the time had been that
the Concierto was focused almost exclusively on fiscal matters (i.e. taxation),
while the financial dimension was under-developed in comparison (see La-
rrazábal Basáñez 2002). Apart from regulating the quota payment, the Con-
cierto of 1981 contained no provisions for Spanish-Basque coordination over
other financial matters, such as budgets and indebtedness, which meant the
Basque treasuries were subject to Spanish legislation where relevant in
these spheres. Under the Concierto of 2002, the first steps were taken to-
wards changing this situation, for example by authorising the Mixed Com-
mission to draw up bilateral agreements concerning collaboration and
coordination over relevant budgetary matters (Rubí Cassinello 2003: 35). At
138
114 Personal interviews with representatives of Basque regional and provincial administra-
tions, 2014. For a review of the negotiations and outcome from the Basque perspective, see
Rubí Cassinello 2003. 
a time of absolute majority PP government, reaching such substantial agre-
ements to update the Concierto was no mean feat. 
Nevertheless, the Spanish PP government’s reluctance to develop the
Concierto in line with the wishes of the PNV in some areas was also clear.
Discrepancies in the vision of the two parties as to how the Concierto should
evolve began to become evident, particularly in terms of how to adapt the
model to the regulatory context of Europe.115 In this regard, the main source
of discrepancy between the Basque and Spanish delegations at the 2001 ne-
gotiations was the Basque desire to ensure the participation of the Basque
treasuries in the Spanish delegation in international (especially European)
decision-making bodies addressing fiscal matters that impact the Concierto
(Atxabal and Muguruza 2006: 31; Lucas Murillo 2005: 97-131; see also Chap-
ter 5). The lack of agreement between the two sides on this issue led the
Spanish government to extend the existing Concierto (approaching its expiry
date) on 27 December 2001 while negotiations continued. This sparked cri-
ticism from the Basque negotiators on account of the unilateral nature of the
decision, while the PP itself defended the measure as a means to save the
Concierto, since otherwise it would technically have ceased to exist on its
expiry date in the absence of a new agreement. Ultimately it was the Basque
side that conceded temporary defeat on the issue of representation in Eu-
rope. The Basques nevertheless still requested that the Joint Commission
on the Concierto should reach a bilateral agreement within six months to
establish the effective participation of the Basque institutions in all spheres
which impact the Concierto. This would nevertheless not be achieved until
almost nine years later, as part of a package of transfers from the central to
the Basque governments agreed in mid 2010 as a quid pro quo when the
minority Socialist government of Zapatero needed the PNV to support its
2011 budget. From 2011, Basque representatives would start to participate
alongside their Spanish state counterparts in the key Ecofin working groups
addressing questions that impact the Concierto (Martínez Bárbara 2014a:
214-215; see also Chapter 5). 
This has been interpreted by some Basque officials as an indication that
the Basque government only gains proper negotiating power at times when
the party in power in Madrid has a minority and needs legislative support
from the PNV in the Spanish parliament – which, for the PNV, suggests that
the Spanish governments do not always fully respect the bilateral nature of
the fiscal relationship. While clearly important, the degree of leverage the
PNV has in the Spanish parliament is, however, not the only issue at stake.
As stated, an equally important and interrelated issue that has affected the
development of the Concierto since the turn of the century has been the dis-
crepancy in the views of the PP and the PNV as to what the model should
be: a Basque taxation system subject to and adapted to Spanish legislation,
as it has been traditionally, or an instrument of more fully-fledged fiscal so-
vereignty, as the PNV now envisages it. 
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Under the PP’s subsequent term in government from 2011-2015, the
Mixed Commission reached an agreement over the Concierto in January
2014: collection powers (and in some cases, legislative autonomy) over a se-
ries of minor taxes were transferred to the Basques (including the taxes on
gaming activities, on deposits in credit entities, on the value of electrical
energy production, on nuclear waste, and on greenhouse gases).116 Under
the terms of the Concierto of 2002, bilateral negotiations are required to
agree the transfer of tax-raising powers to the Basque authorities every time
the Spanish authorities introduce a tax, thus the agreement reached in Ja-
nuary 2014 was necessitated by the provisions of the Concierto itself. The
PNV welcomed the agreement, and it clearly showed the benefits of the bi-
lateral nature of the Concierto: even if the central Spanish government has
an absolute majority and does not need PNV support, there are instances
where it is obliged to sit down and negotiate developments to the Concierto
law. Despite the overall satisfaction that an agreement was reached, howe-
ver, some officials on the technical side complain behind the scenes that it
has been impossible to get the PP to negotiate anything beyond the absolu-
tely essential developments during its 2011-2015 term, and suggest that the
Spanish authorities had the upper hand in the 2014 agreement, only granting
the Basques collection powers but not legislative autonomy over some of
the taxes under question.117
AN EVOLUTION IN BILATERAL RELATIONS?
Support arrangements between statewide parties and the PNV have pro-
ven the primary facilitator of agreements over the Concierto since the 1980s,
enabling the PNV to secure their proposed figures and develop the model
as desired in return for supporting other statewide party policies or goals.
In particular, as seen above, major agreements were reached with the PSOE
majority Spanish government in 1987 as part of a deal to enable the PSE to
form a Basque coalition government with the PNV, and subsequently with
the PP minority Spanish government in 1996 and the PSOE minority Spanish
government in 2010, when the statewide parties needed the PNV’s support
in the Spanish parliament. In contrast, the occurrence of two absolute ma-
jority PP governments since 2000 has reduced the PNV’s bargaining power
over the Concierto relative to previous decades – crucial deals have still been
reached in relation to the Concierto in those periods, including the new Con-
cierto agreement of 2002, but there have also been more stalemates on cer-
tain issues. Nevertheless, the failure to resolve differences over the
2007-2011 quota law under the PSOE-led minority government before the
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PP returned to power in 2011 would suggest that resolving differences over
the Concierto is not always feasible even under minority Spanish govern-
ments seeking PNV support in parliament. Of course, the contrast between
majority and minority governments is not a straightforward one, for at times,
minority governments have had other potential sources of support in the
Madrid parliament, while at others they have relied more heavily on the PNV
and therefore had less room for manoeuvre.118 Beyond the question of par-
liamentary alliances, however, agreeing the finances and development of
the Concierto has arguably become more problematic in recent years due
to the emergence of other exacerbating factors too. 
The PNV and Basque technical experts involved in Concierto-related ne-
gotiations argue that they face essentially the same levels of opposition from
both PP- and PSOE-led Spanish governments towards proposals to update
the Concierto to give the Basques growing fiscal autonomy and sovereignty
within Europe, unless the PNV has political bargaining power.119 From this
perspective, both statewide parties are accused of sharing the same politi-
cally centralist ideology regarding the role of the Spanish state in interna-
tional affairs, an issue which has become an increasing source of
Spanish-Basque conflict as the EU context has developed. 
In terms of economic ideology, however, differences between the PSOE
and PP have historically impacted the development of the Concierto. As sta-
ted, the afore-mentioned agreement in 1997 to give the Basques a significant
degree of regulatory autonomy over IRPF was not only for politically expe-
dient reasons but also reflected the PP’s support at the time for the hypothe-
sis that fiscal co-responsibility encourages fiscal discipline. And yet the PP
has since taken a u-turn to become more centralist in economic affairs (as
well as other policy areas such as education), advocating recentralisation as
a form of rationalisation (Bosch and Solé-Ollé 2013). This has been largely
in response to the poor fiscal discipline of many regions under the common
financing regime that became apparent during the financial crisis, and given
the need to comply with EU budgetary targets (see Chapter 7). At the same
time, the PNV has sought ever increasing fiscal autonomy verging on sove-
reignty. Comparisons between the decisions taken by the PNV and the PP
before and after the turn of the century reveal how both have increasingly
moved towards opposite ends of the centralist-autonomist spectrum in their
attitudes towards fiscal matters, which in turn reduces the possibilities for
agreement over the Concierto’s development. While the PNV originally
sought the ability to collect (rather than also to regulate) the main indirect
taxes (as seen in the VAT negotiations of the 1980s), it now aspires to the
greatest regulatory autonomy possible in both direct and indirect taxes. Me-
anwhile, the PP has moved from advocating the sharing of taxation powers
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with the regions back in the 1990s to looking to recentralise fiscal control in
some respects under a new drive for ‘rationalisation’, for example by pro-
posing to take away the power of regional governments to create their own
taxes (a power already limited in practice by legal challenges presented by
the Spanish state towards any such taxes created).
This ideological shift on the part of the PP has coincided with the growing
criticism from other regional governments in Spain and from newer Spanish
parties (first UPyD and then Ciudadanos) towards the Concierto. Although
the Concierto is bilateral in nature, it is far from immune to wider inter-re-
gional pressures and tensions. For most of the 1980s and 1990s the Con-
cierto was the subject of relatively little attention and even less envy from
other regions given the level of responsibility that tax collection entails,
which helped to create the conditions for purely Basque-Spanish bilateral
agreements. For example, at the brief parliamentary debate in 1981 prior to
the approval of the Concierto law drafted by the Spanish and Basque dele-
gations, some parliamentarians raised concerns about whether the Basque
model would be equitable and whether calculations of the cost of assumed
competences and the imputation index were appropriate, but these concerns
at the time did not prove a serious source of resistance (Eduardo Alonso
Olea 2012). This situation would however start to change from the late 1990s
onwards, as reports on the fiscal balances of the regions with the Spanish
state emerged suggesting many regions under the common regime were
getting a poor deal, and as Catalonia began to raise demands for a bilateral
financing arrangement. During the economic boom years when the central
government had sufficient funds to do so, it could partly keep tensions at
bay by reforming the common financing regime in ways which consistently
promised to increase each region’s resources beyond the status quo (León
2009). The last such reform in 2009, however, proved immediately insuffi-
cient as the financial crisis fully set in (see Chapter 7). The severe strain the
common financing regime came under only served to increase long-stan-
ding criticism from other regions towards the ‘exceptionalism’ of the Basque
and Navarran economic agreements, which give them far higher resources
per capita than other regions (see Chapter 3). This climate has compounded
the reluctance of Spanish governments regardless of their political colour
to develop the Concierto any further and to allow for any change that might
result in a reduction of the quota. 
CONCLUSION
Overall, the bilateral relationship governing Spanish-Basque fiscal rela-
tions is much valued by the PNV since it prevents any decisions taken unila-
terally by Madrid, even at times when the PP has had an absolute majority
in the Spanish parliament. The bilateral relationship has been characterised
by significant disagreements over the years, and yet it has also offered con-
siderable scope for deals and payoffs to resolve such disagreements. This,
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in turn, has helped to encourage the PNV’s moderation and pragmatism in
its relationship with Madrid and allowed accommodationist attitudes within
the PNV to persist for longer than in the case of CDC in Catalonia (see Chap-
ter 7). As recently as 2015, ahead of the Spanish elections of December that
year, the PNV was still hopeful of an outcome that would give it some bar-
gaining power to negotiate a deal to resolve the discrepancies over the quota
law that have been ongoing since 2007.  
Nevertheless, Spanish-Basque conflict in relation to the Concierto has in-
creased over the decades. During much of the 1980s and 1990s the Concierto
was developed extensively and disagreements with Spanish governments
over the model’s evolution and annual quota payments tended eventually
to be resolved in a way which aligned with the PNV’s proposals. Since then,
however, the behaviour of both the PP and the PSOE has gradually come to
suggest that they consider the development of the Concierto to have gone
far enough, albeit still with some occasional concessions to the Basques (e.g,
under the Zapatero minority governments). This is in contrast to the PNV
which sees the growth and consolidation of the EU regulatory context as a
prime opportunity to develop the Concierto further as a tool of fiscal sove-
reignty within Europe. This scenario has fed into a growing clash between
the PNV’s strategic territorial agenda and the vision of successive central go-
vernments of the Basque relationship with Spain. 
Political pacts and alliance arrangements between the PNV and the Spa-
nish statewide parties became the main facilitator of agreements over the
Concierto from the 1980s onwards, but they have become increasingly dif-
ficult to secure in the face of other exacerbating factors such as the PP’s ide-
ological shift towards recentralisation, inter-regional competition for
resources and the financial crisis. The mere fact of a bilateral relationship,
while understandably preferable from the Basque perspective to the alter-
native of a relationship determined unilaterally by Madrid or subject to inter-
regional agreement, has not in itself always been able to reconcile disputes
over how much the Basques owe Madrid or over the level of fiscal autonomy
or sovereignty the Concierto affords the Basque region – a problem exacer-
bated by the absence of any consensus over the wider question of the de-
gree of autonomy or even sovereignty to afford the Basque region in a
political sense. These different conceptions cannot easily co-exist in a loose
relationship of mutual tolerance between Spanish and Basque governments.
The development of the Concierto necessarily involves phases of renegotia-
tion or changes de facto as a result of extraneous developments, which has
inevitably brought different conceptions of it into conflict. In this light, the
next chapter looks in more detail at the opportunities and obstacles the EU
framework has posed to the development of substate fiscal authority in the
Basque case and the discrepancies in Spanish-Basque political perspectives
in this regard. 
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CHAPTER 5
SHAPING THE PNV’S CONCEPTION 
OF SOVEREIGNTY (2): 
THE EU AND THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF BASQUE FISCAL AUTONOMY

Through a study of the development of the Concierto in the EU context,
this chapter investigates the opportunities and obstacles that the EU frame-
work has posed to the development of fiscal autonomy verging on sove-
reignty in the Basque region and the implications for the PNV’s territorial
agenda. The trajectory taken by the PNV since the 1990s to encourage un-
derstanding of the Concierto at EU level and to address how to adapt it to
the evolving EU context has been marked by difficulties in both Spain and
Europe. Within Spain, relatively different perspectives held by statewide
Spanish parties and the PNV respectively on the degree of fiscal autonomy
or even sovereignty that the Concierto affords the Basques have, in turn, in-
fluenced views as to how the model should be developed within the EU con-
text. In the 1990s, such Basque-Spanish disputes centred on discrepancies
over the extent to which the Basque treasuries could set different corpora-
tion tax rates, deductions and other incentives from the Spanish treasury –
disputes which spilled over into the EU sphere and resulted in legal challen-
ges against Basque tax measures at EU level. Since the turn of the century,
attention has turned towards the representation of the Basque authorities in
EU decision-making bodies concerning fiscal matters. As Basque govern-
ments and provincial treasuries have aspired to develop the model to give
the region almost the same fiscal powers as Spain itself, they have sought
representation within the Spanish delegation in relevant working groups and
meetings of the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (Ecofin) in recogni-
tion of Basque fiscal competences. And yet successive Spanish governments
have seen the Concierto as remaining clearly subordinate to Spanish legis-
lation and representation, at least until recently considering Basque repre-
sentation in Europe unnecessary given that Basque tax regulations are
subject to wider harmonisation rules with Spain. 
In Chapter 4, I outlined the relatively different political conceptions of the
Concierto in Spain – a model of near fiscal sovereignty versus one of fiscal
decentralisation subordinate to Spanish legislation – and their impact on
Spanish-Basque bilateral fiscal relations. The aim here is to extend this
analysis to focus in more detail on the discrepancies over the Concierto’s fit
within the EU context, going beyond the purely domestic Spanish context
to consider also the opportunities or obstacles at EU level that impact the
development of the Concierto. Nevertheless, the line between the domestic
and the European is not clear cut, since conceptions of the Concierto within
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Spain inevitably influence how the model is adapted to the EU context. Cu-
rrent and former Basque government representatives, and also technical ex-
perts within the Basque treasuries involved in negotiations with their
Spanish counterparts over the development of the Concierto, are clear in
their view that the difficulty of achieving proper understanding of the Basque
Concierto at EU level has been hindered by continual challenges from Spa-
nish authorities to Basque fiscal autonomy.120 They suggest that repeated
opposition from Spanish governments to Basque corporation tax measures,
and later to the participation of Basque representatives in Ecofin, responded
to primarily political motives – namely, a centralist attitude to the role of the
Spanish government both within the Spanish state and in European affairs,
as well as its reluctance to accept the asymmetry which the Concierto and
the Convenio entail for the Spanish state. At the same time, they recognise
that there have been a number of instances where collaboration at a techni-
cal level between Basque and Spanish authorities over the defence of Bas-
que fiscal autonomy at EU level (for example, over the defence of Basque
corporation tax measures in the EU courts against EU challenges) has wor-
ked well despite adverse politicisation and judicialisation pitting the Spanish
against the Basque authorities over the same issues back at home. 
These circumstances raise a number of questions which this chapter
seeks to address: What have been the legal and technical obstacles within
both Spain and the EU that have problematised Basque attempts to seek re-
presentation in fiscal matters at EU level alongside their Spanish counter-
parts? Or have the problems been more political in nature? To what extent
have Basque-Spanish relations at home impacted the development of the
Concierto in the European sphere, or is the EU framework itself the main de-
terminant? And what have been the implications of these debates for the
PNV’s attitudes towards the place of the Basque Country in Europe?
In terms of party attitudes towards the EU in general, despite the fact that
notions of a ‘Europe of the regions’ have disappointed and the EU has re-
mained heavily member state centric, the PNV remains resolutely pro-Euro-
pean. It has a long tradition of involvement in the European project and
continues to advocate the idea of a federal Europe involving the co-existence
of different sovereignties based first and foremost on Europe’s constituent
nations, echoing the still influential vision of the historical leader of the PNV
Manuel Irujo, minister under the Second Republic (Gillespie 2015b). At key
moments of direct debate on the design of Europe, such as the draft Cons-
titutional Treaty, the PNV has contributed actively with clear proposals for
the empowerment of nations over the state level (Gillespie 2015b). The de-
bates concerning the place of the Concierto in the EU context analysed in
this chapter are usually much more technical in nature and tend to take place
between the elite of the party and members of the Basque administration in
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technical positions in the Basque regional and provincial treasuries, rather
than being used as a more general issue by the PNV to galvanise public sup-
port for the party. Indeed, at times, it is the senior technical officers within
the administrations pushing the party for a better deal, rather than vice
versa. Possibly in consequence, the detailed ins and outs of Spanish-Basque
disputes over issues such as whether the Basques require representation in
EU Council working groups on fiscal matters have not featured in other stu-
dies which address the question of the PNV and its attitudes towards Europe
more generally (e.g. Gillespie 2015b, Pérez-Nievas 2006, Keating and Bray
2006). Nevertheless, these technical discussions are important, for the gra-
dualist steps taken by the PNV since the late 1990s to obtain some degree of
representation in EU fiscal decision-making bodies (mainly Ecofin) provide
a key insight into the incrementalist approach used by the party towards its
goal for the Basque Country to be treated as an equal to Spain in Europe in
fiscal matters and beyond, and importantly, the discrepancies with Spanish
authorities in this regard.
The rest of the chapter is structured to consider the two main problematic
areas regarding the application of the Concierto in the EU context since the
1990s: (1) disputes over the use of corporation tax by a region with fiscal au-
tonomy within a member state; and (2) how such a region should participate
in EU harmonisation processes concerning taxation. The first of these areas
received much attention in the 1990s when the Basque region was accused
of implementing regionally selective ‘state aids’ through a series of ‘tax ho-
lidays’ for new firms in the Basque provinces, but the Azores ruling of 2006
helped significantly to resolve the debate by clarifying that a region fulfilling
specific requirements of procedural, institutional and economic autonomy
could set different tax rates from the central state. However, the second area
has been the subject of less attention and is still very much a work in pro-
gress, both for the EU itself as well as for the researcher. The Spanish go-
vernment is the only valid interlocutor for the whole of Spain before the EU,
and yet the Basque provinces have almost exclusive competence over cer-
tain fiscal matters in their territory. In these circumstances, in what ways is
it appropriate for the Basque provincial treasury departments to participate
in the negotiation and subsequent implementation of EU harmonisation me-
asures concerning both indirect and direct taxation? 
BASQUE CORPORATION TAX: CONFLICTS WITH SPAIN AND THE EU
In 1985, the Concierto of 1981 needed to be adapted to take account of
Spain’s imminent joining of the European Community on 1 January 1986.
At this stage, however, only the most urgent change to fit the Concierto to
the European context was dealt with: namely, the agreement that the Bas-
ques would collect VAT in their territory but be subject to the relevant tax le-
gislation set by the Spanish treasury, following the replacement in Spain of
a range of indirect taxes with the new Value-Added Tax (VAT) (also Chapter
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4, p.136). Other potential problems regarding the Concierto’s fit within the
European Community – which were perhaps inevitable, given that there was
no prior precedent of such a fiscal model at substate level in any other Eu-
ropean member state – would begin to be dealt with in subsequent years as
they emerged (Alonso Arce 2010: 31). It would soon become clear that by
far the most significant issues would relate to the Basque treasuries’ use of
their legislative powers over corporation tax. One of the main areas of con-
troversy within Spain itself over the Concierto would become the fine line
between harmonisation and uniformity in relation to corporation tax, with
the Spanish authorities (and entities in regions bordering the Basque
Country) interpreting harmonisation more restrictively than their Basque
counterparts. The internal debate within Spain would soon become enmes-
hed and intertwined with debates at EU level as the Commission started to
raise questions about the compatibility of aspects of Basque provincial cor-
poration tax regulations with the rules of the common market. During the
1990s and early 2000s, then, the Basque authorities would face technical as
well as political challenges both within Spain and at EU level. And the two
dimensions would feed into each other in a series of striking dynamics. 
Legal challenges from the Attorney General for Spain against Basque tax
decisions, alleging that these infringed the internal rules for harmonisation
with Spanish tax legislation, became a regular occurrence as soon as the
Basque provincial treasuries started to make full use of their regulatory po-
wers over corporation tax to introduce a series of tax exemptions, deduc-
tions and other incentives for businesses in 1988, 1993 and 1995. These were
also followed by a comprehensive reform of Basque corporation tax in 1996,
which involved a 2.5% cut in the corporation tax rate compared to elsewhere
in Spain – to 32.5% instead of 35% – as well as other incentives (Carrera Pon-
cela 2000: 5). This created more favourable tax conditions for businesses in
the Basque provinces than elsewhere in Spain. Basque corporation tax me-
asures were not only challenged in court by the Spanish state, but also by
entities (such as business associations, trade unions) in other Spanish re-
gions bordering the Basque one. Under the Spanish Constitution, legislative
measures passed by provincial parliaments or assemblies have the force of
regulations (reglamentos) while regional parliaments and the Spanish par-
liament pass laws (leyes). While regulations can be challenged in adminis-
trative courts by any natural or legal person whose interests the regulation
affects, laws can only be challenged in Spain’s Constitutional Court by the
limited number of institutions and officials listed in Article 162 of the Spanish
Constitution. In large part due to this situation, fiscal and tax rules passed
by the Basque provincial parliaments, which at the time only had the status
of ‘reglamentos’, became subject to continuous litigation in the administra-
tive courts on the grounds of unfair competition. And yet the tax legislation
passed by neighbouring Navarre was free from such litigation since the pro-
vince coincides with the region of the same name and thus its legislation
has the force of law. This context of constant litigation in the 1980s, 1990s
and early 2000s became known as the ‘judicialisation of the Concierto’, and
the Basque authorities were heavily critical of the Spanish authorities for ha-
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ving recourse to the courts so extensively rather seeking to resolve disputes
via political channels. 
Meanwhile, the first hurdle to surmount at EU level would also be almost
immediate once the Basques had started to make use of their regulatory au-
tonomy over corporation tax. A challenge from the European Commission
was lodged against the 1988 Basque tax incentives, at a time when the Com-
mission was starting to contact member states to request changes to their
tax regulations which did not comply with the fundamental freedoms ens-
hrined in the Treaty (see Alonso Arce 2010: 71-80; Zubiri 2000: 191-192). In
1993, the Commission alerted Spain to the fact that tax payers non resident
in Spain, but resident in other EU member states, who operated in the Bas-
que provinces could not apply the Basque provincial corporation tax rates
in the same way as  tax payers resident in Spain, warning that this constitu-
ted a restriction on the freedom of establishment enshrined in the Treaty
under Article 43 (Alonso Arce 2010: 72; Zubiri 2000: 191-192). Under the Con-
cierto agreement in force at the time, the Spanish state had the exclusive
competence to regulate the taxes paid by non residents. Thus it was not the
tax incentive itself that was against EU legislation, but rather the fact that
Basque provincial tax rules could not be applied to non residents, due to the
way the ‘points of connection’ regarding residents and non residents had
been drawn up under the Concierto. A solution needed to be found relatively
quickly to fulfil EU requirements. Following bilateral Spanish-Basque nego-
tiations, the Law on Fiscal, Administrative and Social Order Measures of De-
cember 1994, which was passed as an ‘accompanying law’ to the 1995
Spanish budget, included an additional disposition stipulating that the Spa-
nish government would provide the requisite financial compensation to EU-
based entities non resident in Spain but resident in other member states,
who were thus unable to apply the Basque corporation tax regulations
(Alonso Arce 2010: 75). The Spanish state administration would reimburse
the non resident entity for the difference between the Basque and Spanish
corporation tax legislation, a solution which satisfied the European Commis-
sion. Later, under the 1997 reform of the Concierto (the first major reform of
the 1981 legislation), the problem would be resolved more comprehensively
by changing the relevant points of connection so that non residents would
become eligible to apply the Basque tax legislation directly (Zubiri 2000: 192). 
The first fundamental technical hurdle concerning the fit of the Basque
Concierto agreement with the EU Treaty could thus be resolved relatively
easily, but the outcome ended up further complicating Spanish-Basque in-
ternal political debates over the Concierto’s fit within Spain. The neighbou-
ring region of La Rioja lodged a constitutional challenge before the Spanish
Constitutional Court against the relevant additional disposition of the afore-
mentioned Accompanying Law approved in 1994, arguing that it did not res-
pect the constitutional principles (Alonso Arce 2010: 76). Eight years later, in
April 2002, the Constitutional Court, in sentence 96/2002 of 26 April, sided
with the complainant and declared the compensation for non residents in-
compatible with the Spanish Constitution, on the grounds that the additional
disposition generated a new discrimination against tax payers resident in
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the rest of Spain who could not apply the Basque legislation either (Alonso
Arce 2010: 77). In practice, the sentence of the Constitutional Court did not
ultimately take effect, since by then the Concierto had already been reformed
in 1997 to update the points of connection to equate residents and non resi-
dents. The sentence of the Constitutional Court nevertheless did have on-
going ramifications in that it instilled the idea in certain sectors that the same
parameters for analysing restrictions of freedoms in the EU could also be
applied to the analysis of freedom of movement in Spain under Article 3 of
the Concierto – a conflation of EU and Spanish law strongly disputed by the
Basque authorities (Alonso Arce 2010: 79-80). 
Spanish legal challenges against Basque tax legislation acquired a new
dimension when for the first time the Spanish Attorney General challenged
the Basque tax incentives of 1993 (including the ‘tax holidays’, which offered
total exemption from corporation tax to new companies in the Basque pro-
vinces for the first ten years) on the grounds not only that they infringed in-
ternal Spanish harmonisation requirements, but also Articles 52 (on the
freedom of people and companies) and 92 (on the freedom of competition)
of the EU Treaty. Faced with this challenge, the Supreme Court of Justice of
the Basque Country referred the matter to the European Court of Justice for
a preliminary ruling (see Chacón 1999; Rubí Cassinello 1999; Zubiri 2000:
192-193). It sought clarification on whether the 1993 Basque tax incentives
were compatible with the EU Treaty in two respects: (1) whether the Basque
rules on corporation tax were compatible with article 52 of the European Tre-
aty on free movement within the Union (given that non residents operating
in the Basque region were subject to Spanish rather than Basque tax legis-
lation); and (2) whether the Basque rules on corporation tax were compatible
with article 92.1 of the Treaty (on the prohibition of state aids that could fal-
sify competition by favouring certain companies) given that companies ope-
rating elsewhere in Spain were not eligible to be subject to Basque tax
regulations. The first of these matters was quickly resolved: the Commission,
in its observations, maintained coherence with its previous decision on the
1988 state aids, declaring the question resolved with the 8th Additional Dis-
position of Law 42/94 on the State General Budget for 1995 (Rubí Cassinello
1999). However, the shock for the Basque authorities would come in relation
to the second dimension, when Advocate General Saggio concluded in 1999
that such measures could be considered a territorially selective state aid
since they only applied to one region (the Basque Country) within a wider
state (Spain). This threatened the capacity of the Basque provinces to set
any corporation tax rates or incentives even minimally different from those
of the Spanish state.121
A distinct irony emerged throughout this process as it was the Spanish
Attorney General that had taken the Basque provincial authorities to court
in Spain accusing them of infringing the EU Treaty, and yet at EU level it
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ended up defending the Basque fiscal measures against the idea that they
infringed the Treaty, since the Spanish government is the sole interlocutor
at EU level for the whole Spanish state and thus it was required to represent
Basque interests in this instance (Chacón 1999: 8; Rubí Cassinello 1999). Ac-
cording to technical teams in the Basque treasuries, collaboration between
the Basque and Spanish authorities over the Basque defence at EU level wor-
ked well and the Spanish Attorney General defended Basque interests ap-
propriately, despite the ongoing judicialisation back at home in Spain.122
Given the threat that Saggio’s preliminary ruling posed to the Concierto as
well as the unsustainable level of permanent judicialisation back at home in
Spain, in January 2000 the Spanish and Basque delegations reached a ‘fiscal
peace’ agreement (paz fiscal) under which the Spanish authorities agreed to
withdraw all ongoing challenges against Basque tax legislation and the Bas-
ques would, in return, participate in a new a mechanism for prior exchange
of information on proposed tax measures.123 The agreement meant the Spa-
nish Attorney General would cease his challenge against the 1993 tax incen-
tives within Spain and the question referred to the European Court of Justice
for a preliminary ruling would be archived. 
While the agreement helped to reduce litigation by the Spanish Attorney
General against Basque tax measures, entities in other regions in Spain con-
tinued to challenge Basque fiscal rules. And the surrounding Spanish re-
gions and the Spanish Supreme and Constitutional courts had now acquired
a new weapon in their armoury in the form of Saggio’s preliminary ruling of
1999. In 1996, the business federation of La Rioja had presented a challenge
to the Supreme Court of Justice of the Basque Country against the Basque
1996 corporation tax reform, accusing the Basque authorities of (1) infringing
the harmonisation rules in Spain and (2) infringing EU rules on state aids
(Alonso Arce 2010). In 1999, the Supreme Court of Justice of the Basque
Country responded by only abolishing one provision of the 1996 reform, the
mini tax holidays (since by then the European Commission had declared
these unacceptable state aids) (Alonso Arce 2010: 96). The Basque court dis-
missed the rest of the challenge as inadmissible, arguing that there was no
question of selectivity. Nevertheless, when the business federation of La
Rioja lodged an appeal to Spain’s Supreme Court against the Basque court’s
decision, the tables would turn. The Supreme Court sentence of 9 December
2004, by which time Advocate General Saggio’s preliminary ruling of 1999
was also known, overruled 13 provisions of the Basque regulations on cor-
poration tax, considering that many of these constituted state aids. For the
Basque authorities, this was the biggest blow the Concierto had ever recei-
ved, since it challenged the right of the Basque provincial treasuries to set
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123 For example, ‘La “paz fiscal” sellada entre los Gobiernos central y vasco caduca dentro
de dos años’, El País, 19.01.00. This temporary agreement was however than replaced in the
new Concierto agreement of 2002 with a committee designed resolved to resolve Spanish-
Basque disputes before they reached the courts (see Chapter 4 p.129). See also Alonso Arce
2010: 82-83 and Martínez Bárbara 2012b: 67-69.
any corporation tax rates or incentives even minimally different to those of
the Spanish state (Alonso Arce 2010: 107-150).
The tables would eventually turn with the Azores tax ruling of 2006, which
had clear implications for the Basque provinces in that it asserted the right
of a region within a wider member state in Europe to set different tax rates
from said member state if the region fulfilled specific requirements of pro-
cedural, institutional and economic autonomy, thus contradicting Saggio’s
previous preliminary ruling about regional selectivity (see, for example, Ben-
goetxea Caballero 2010). Essentially, the Azores ruling decreed that legisla-
tive autonomy over corporation tax could only be devolved in the case of
regions which bore the full risk of their own revenue-raising and were not in
receipt of any fiscal equalisation payments that could be construed as a com-
pensation from the state in the event of a shortfall in regional tax collection
– criteria with which the Basque region was considered compliant. After
years of uncertainty, the Azores ruling thus finally clarified that Basque tre-
asuries could set different corporation tax rates and incentives from the Spa-
nish treasury without these being considered regionally selective. The EU
rulings against the Basque tax holidays of the 1990s nevertheless still stood,
but because the incentives were deemed incompatible with fair competition
in the common market for reasons other than regional selectivity. 
The Azores ruling also drastically reduced litigation from the surrounding
regions in Spain, since many of their challenges against Basque corporation
tax measures would become less admissible thereafter, once they could no
longer use Saggio’s preliminary conclusion about regional selectivity in their
defence. Basque provincial tax legislation was also bolstered shortly after-
wards in Spain by the Ley de Blindaje (‘Shield Law’), which upgraded Basque
provincial tax legislation to the same legal status as regional laws for the
first time, thus making it harder for said legislation to be challenged (Erko-
reka 2009; Martínez Etxeberría 2014). The PNV-led Basque government had
presented a draft bill to the Spanish parliament, following unanimous cross-
party approval in the Basque parliament in June 2007, aiming to secure legal
status and protection for the tax rules adopted by the Basque provincial as-
semblies. This is what became known as the Ley de Blindaje (‘Shield Law’)
(see also Chapter 4, p.131). The idea was to consolidate the legislative auto-
nomy of the Basque provinces in fiscal matters. 
It was originally the Basque PP that had been in favour of seeking legal
status for Basque provincial tax and fiscal rules during the Transition, whe-
reas the PNV at the time had been seeking to build the new regional level of
government and only wanted the Basque government to be granted the abi-
lity to pass laws, as was thus included under Article 6 of Law 27/1983 of 25
November on the Historical Territories. By the time the PNV came later to
seek protection for Basque tax rules, however, the PP in Madrid was faced
with conflicting stances within its own party, since the PP-led government
of La Rioja was opposed to the measure while the Basque PP supported it.
Both the PP and the PSOE in Madrid opposed PNV approaches on the sub-
ject from 2005 onwards due to the implications for other regions in Spain,
despite the full support of their respective Basque delegations for such a me-
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asure. It was only when the minority PSOE government needed PNV support
for its 2010 budget that it finally changed its stance and supported the pro-
posed Ley de Blindaje in return. The Law was swiftly pushed through and
passed on 19 February 2010, with the PP (along with UPyD) still voting
against it, while their Basque colleagues in both the Spanish Parliament and
Senate left when the respective votes took place so as not to have to vote
against a measure they themselves had supported in the Basque parliament. 
Overall, the afore-described trajectory towards EU recognition of Basque
fiscal autonomy over corporation tax thus involved some strictly technical
hurdles that could be overcome with relatively simple changes in legislation
– most notably, the need to equate residents and non residents. Slower to
overcome, however, were the political hurdles at both Spanish and European
levels. The Azores ruling did much to clarify and stabilise the position of the
Concierto in Europe, but in reality the political differences over the Concierto
within Spain itself which fuelled conflicts over Basque corporation tax mea-
sures still persist to a large degree today, and shape new debates that have
since become dominant over the Concierto’s development in the EU context. 
There remains a lack of consensus not only between the PNV and Spanish
authorities in Madrid, but also between different parties in the Basque region
itself, as to the exact attribution of blame for the political disputes over Bas-
que corporation tax from the late 1980s onwards.124 PNV interpretations of
what happened tend to regard the corporation tax decisions that were made
in the particularly conflictive decade of the 1990s as fair and appropriate
given the Basques provincial authorities’ regulatory competence over cor-
poration tax in the region. They suggest that they were the victims of ad-
verse politicisation from both Spanish governments and EU authorities, both
of which were reluctant, albeit each for different reasons, to allow for signi-
ficant differences in corporation tax between state and regional level. Accor-
ding to this viewpoint, the views and conclusions detrimental to recognition
of the extent of Basque fiscal autonomy that were voiced from Europe in the
years prior to the Azores ruling – most notably, Saggio’s 1999 preliminary
ruling – were often politically motivated in the sense that they reflected the
Commission’s determination at the time to avoid any risk that member states
might start to abuse fiscal decentralisation as a means to give state aids
(Alonso Arce 2009: 104). And this was exacerbated by opposition within
Spain to the Basques making extensive use of their fiscal autonomy. Al-
though the Basque authorities were represented at EU level by the Spanish
authorities and acknowledge that the collaboration at a technical level in this
regard worked well, there is still a strong feeling within the PNV and indeed
among more technical officials in Basque treasury departments that the lack
of strictly Basque representation ran the risk of an inadequate defence of
their interests (e.g. Martínez Bárbara 2014a: 216). 
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On the other hand, however, political opponents of the PNV argue that
the Basque institutions themselves are first and foremost to blame, sugges-
ting that they exacerbated tensions by being too aggressive in their use of
corporation tax. The Basque provinces repeatedly introduced rates, deduc-
tions and incentives that created more favourable conditions for businesses
in the Basque region than elsewhere in Spain – often seeming to wait until
Spain had introduced its own legislation only then to introduce a better deal
in the Basque provinces. These discrepancies in views over the level of fiscal
autonomy or sovereignty that the Basque Concierto provides, and thus the
degree of subordination Basque tax decisions should or should not have to
Spanish legislation, continue to impact the adaptation of the Concierto to
the EU context today – especially in terms of the question of whether the
Basque authorities should have direct representation in Europe within the
Spanish delegation given their fiscal competences over direct taxation. 
THE QUEST FOR BASQUE REPRESENTATION AT EU LEVEL IN FISCAL NE-
GOTIATIONS
Since the turn of the century, one of the biggest debates in Spain over
the development of the Concierto has become whether the Basques should
have a role in EU decision-making bodies debating fiscal matters, particularly
those debating tax harmonisation between EU member states. The require-
ment in the Concierto of 1981 (as updated in 1997) that the Basque treasury
departments adhere to any international treaties or other agreements signed
by Spain was elaborated upon further in Article 2.1.5 of the Concierto of 2002
to state expressly that they must adhere to the relevant provisions to avoid
double taxation and the rules for fiscal harmonisation in the EU (Martínez
Bárbara 2012a: 72). Where discrepancies in views occur is over the extent to
which the Basque authorities should remain subordinate to Spanish legisla-
tion in the implementation of EU directives and guidance for fiscal harmo-
nisation, or whether they should have a more direct voice and participation
in EU fiscal decision-making bodies, becoming active players and negotia-
tors in EU tax harmonisation processes.125 What have been the main obsta-
cles to securing Basque participation at EU level? To what extent have the
obstacles been practical and technical in nature? Or have they been heavily
influenced by political agendas?
Taxation is one of the areas where EU member states still retain a large
degree of sovereignty, since fiscal harmonisation in itself is not one of the
objectives of the European Union (Martínez Bárbara 2012a: 70). Relevant
steps have nevertheless been taken to prevent discrepancies in tax systems
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125 My perceptions of these discrepancies are informed first and foremost by interviews
with PNV, PSE and PP representatives, as well as senior officials in the Vizcayan treasury de-
partment, 2014. 
where these might hinder the functioning of the single market. Thus EU
member states transferred sovereignty over customs duties to the EU au-
thorities and also over some significant aspects of indirect taxation, to en-
sure harmonisation in these spheres (Trench 2015). Regarding VAT, the most
important indirect tax, the EU sets a standardised tax base, though beyond
this member states still have a degree of freedom to choose between a range
of tax rates. EU legislation includes specific directives for the harmonisation
of indirect taxes under the provisions of Article 113 of the EU Treaty (Martí-
nez Bárbara 2012a: 71). In the case of direct taxes (which include corporation
tax), any harmonisation measures are taken instead under the provisions of
Article 115 (Martínez Bárbara 2012a: 71). Nevertheless, since member state
tax legislation over direct taxes does not generally affect the EU’s own com-
petences in relation to fundamental freedoms or the single market and mem-
ber states are very reluctant to lose sovereignty over direct taxation, steps
towards harmonisation in this regard have been far more limited than over
indirect taxation. A very small number of directives have been approved in
relation to corporate taxation, for example, regarding relations between
company headquarters and their branches in different member states, or bu-
siness restructuring operations, mergers, takeovers within the EU. More
often, however, harmonisation measures over direct taxes – particularly in
the sphere of corporate taxation – have taken the form of recommendations
or soft law (Martínez Bárbara 2012a: 71-72). Such ‘soft law’ measures have
become known in the literature as ‘negative harmonisation’, in contrast to
‘positive harmonisation’ in the form of more concrete and legally-binding
directives.
Under the Concierto, the Basque provincial treasuries do not have regu-
latory autonomy over the main indirect taxes (VAT, the excise duties, and the
tax on company operations) but rather they must apply the relevant Spanish
legislation regarding tax bases and rates. The PNV and some officials wor-
king in the Basque treasuries argue that that they ought to have the right to
regulatory autonomy over indirect as well as direct taxes,126 but in the ab-
sence of such autonomy they approve provincial laws (normas forales) to
adapt the Basque tax systems to EU directives where necessary under iden-
tical terms to the way in which Spain has done so. EU rules allow for the de-
volution of authority over direct taxes to the substate level but they seriously
limit it in the case of indirect taxes (Trench 2015). Most notably, each state
can only apply one VAT rate system, which can be collected but not varied
at the regional government level (as occurs in the Basque case).
In the case of direct taxation where the Basques have regulatory auto-
nomy, on the very few occasions where EU directives are approved with a
view to harmonisation in this sphere, there is some discrepancy (particularly
between rulings of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Basque Country on
the one hand, and the Spanish Supreme Court on the other) as to whether
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126 Personal interviews with Pedro Azpiazu (PNV) and with certain provincial treasury rep-
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the Basque provinces can approve their own provincial laws to apply the re-
levant directive rather than copying verbatim the Spanish legislation, provi-
ded that they respect the framework of the Concierto in terms of the rules
regarding harmonisation and fiscal coordination between the Basque region
and the Spanish government (Martínez Bárbara 2012a: 73-74). Since EU di-
rectives regarding direct taxation are rare, however, the main disputes bet-
ween Spanish and Basque delegations have instead occurred over the
potential for Basque participation in EU decision-making bodies aimed at
negotiating ‘soft law’ measures to encourage a degree of fiscal harmonisa-
tion, especially regarding corporation tax.127
Steps taken by the Basque delegation towards securing Basque repre-
sentation at EU level over fiscal matters date back to the late 1990s. The Bas-
que provincial treasuries are required to respect all international agreements
signed by Spain and the beginnings of steps towards collaboration between
Spanish and Basque authorities over Basque participation in such interna-
tional agreements began with the 1997 reform of the Concierto of 1981,
when a clause (Article 5.3) was introduced specifically establishing that the
Spanish state would arrange mechanisms to enable the institutions of the
Basque Country to ‘collaborate’ in the international agreements that may
have an impact on the application of the Concierto (Martínez Bárbara 2012b:
58). However, no such mechanisms were arranged, leading the Basque de-
legation to request their explicit creation and inclusion at the 2001 negotia-
tions for a new Concierto agreement (to replace the 1981 legislation set to
expire that year) (Martínez Bárbara 2012b: 58; Rubí Cassinello 2003: 38). This
became one of the most controversial topics of the reform process (Rubí
Cassinello 2003: 37; Lucas Murillo 2005: 97).128
The Basque delegation had proposed that the Basque institutions should
participate in Spain’s preparatory meetings for Ecofin and the Spanish dele-
gation to the Ecofin working groups and meetings.129 The Spanish negotia-
ting team under the then Spanish treasury minister Cristóbal Montoro,
however, wanted instead to include the Basque participation within the ge-
neral framework for the participation of the regions in EU matters, through
the Sectoral Conference designated for that purpose (established in Law
2/1997 of 15 March), which gives the regions a weaker legal status and no
direct representation in Europe (Lucas Murillo 2005: 110). Ultimately it was
the Basque side that had to back down temporarily to enable the new Con-
cierto to be approved belatedly in May 2002 under Law 12/2002. On 30 De-
cember, the same relevant section of the text (Article 5.3) from the 1981
Concierto law, as modified in 1997, was approved under Article 4.2 of the
new Concierto in May 2002 under Law 12/2002. 
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129 For a full account of the Basque proposals for participation in Ecofin at the negotiations
for the 2002 reform of the Concierto, see Lucas Murillo 2005: 97-132.
At the Basque delegation’s request, it was nevertheless still requested
that the Joint Commission on the Concierto should reach a bilateral agree-
ment within six months to establish the effective participation of the Basque
institutions in all spheres which impact the Concierto. This would not start
to be achieved, however, until almost nine years later, as part of a package
of transfers from the central to the Basque governments agreed in mid 2010
as a quid pro quo when the minority Socialist government of Zapatero nee-
ded the PNV to support its 2011 budget (Martínez Bárbara 2012b: 58; Martí-
nez Bárbara 2014a: 219). From April 2011, Basque provincial treasury
representatives would start to participate alongside their Spanish state coun-
terparts in three key Ecofin working parties addressing fiscal questions rele-
vant to the competences afforded to the Basque provinces by the Concierto:
D4 on Tax Issues; D5 on the Code of Conduct; and D8 on the Fight Against
Fraud (Martínez Bárbara 2012b: 58; Martínez Bárbara 2014a: 219). In each of
these groups, the Spanish state representative would still be the one to ex-
press the Spanish position, but a Basque representative would be allowed
to attend as part of the Spanish delegation. Within the Basque internal tax
coordination committee, it was agreed that a representative from each of
the three provincial treasuries would participate in one each of the three wor-
king parties, but in practice the provincial governments of Álava and Gui-
púzcoa delegated their respective representation to Vizcaya, thus it
represents the Basque perspective in all three (Martínez Bárbara 2012b:
59).130
The measures taken in these working groups primarily affect corporate
taxes. For example, the Code of Conduct group (on corporate taxation) dates
back to 1 December 1997, when an Ecofin resolution approved to create such
a group to evaluate corporate tax measures that provoke harmful competi-
tion between member states, as one of various measures to reduce such
practices. The resolution was not legally binding (since sovereignty for direct
taxation over companies lies with the member states), but nevertheless it
was a formal political commitment entered into by member state govern-
ments. In late 1999, the group’s first final report about potentially harmful
measures (with 66 identified in the EU in total) included reference to one
Basque tax measure (Martínez Bárbara 2014a: 223). The working party has
remained in operation since then, with Basque representatives joining the
Spanish delegation for the first time in April 2011. One of the most significant
efforts underway within the EU towards some degree of harmonisation or
at least consolidation over corporate taxes, in which the Basque treasury re-
presentatives now participate via working party D4 (on Tax Issues), is the
work towards a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), which
would create a new tax code for the EU (in addition to the already existing
27 national tax codes) (Martínez Bárbara 2014a: 226-229). EU member states
would retain their national competence over setting corporation tax rates,
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but they would develop a set of common rules to determine the tax base of
companies with operations in several member states. 
The Basque provincial treasury representatives who participate in these
Ecofin working groups as part of the Spanish delegation see this as a signi-
ficant step forward in securing proper recognition at EU level of the fact that
the Basques have their own treasuries and design their own legislation on
direct taxes, almost to the same extent as any EU member state. They regard
it as an opportunity to ensure that such fiscal autonomy at regional level as
well as state level should be properly reflected in relevant tax harmonisation
processes (Martínez Bárbara 2014a: 228). Basque provincial treasury repre-
sentatives suggest that the Spanish authorities – in contrast to their German,
Belgian and Austrian counterparts – have not taken advantage of changes
to the EU treaties and legislation that have gradually been made over the
years to make it easier for regions to be represented within the member state
delegation within formations of the Council of the European Union, where
relevant to their competences (Martínez Bárbara 2014b: 99-100; Lucas Muri-
llo 2005: 109-116). Since Maastricht, national community rules rather than
EU law govern the choice of ministerial representation in the Council (Bu-
rrows 2007: 218). Article 146 of the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 introduced the
principle of subsidiarity (that actions should be taken at the most effective
level – be it Union, national, regional or local) and opened the door to the
possibility of member state representatives not necessarily belonging to the
central government taking part in the state’s ministerial representation within
formations of the Council, provided the chosen representative be ‘authorized
to commit the government of that Member State’. This was, however, the
mere start of a long trajectory, and it was not until the Treaty of Lisbon in
2009 that major steps were taken towards recognising the importance of
local and regional government in the Union and enshrining means for their
participation in formations of the Council under the subsidiarity principle. 
Throughout those years from Maastricht to Lisbon, three federal states
in Europe – Germany, Belgium and Austria – took steps in the 1990s to mo-
dify their constitutions where necessary to introduce mechanisms to ensure
that the common position of substate levels of government with relevant le-
gislative competences be taken into account by the state delegation (Martí-
nez Bárbara 2014b: 99-100). All three federal states also signed a declaration
on subsidiarity as part of the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997 to explicitly ack-
nowledge their support for the possibility of regional and local involvement
in key decisions at EU level where the national constitutional structure pro-
vides for a division of competences. Germany made the relevant changes
to its Constitution in 1992 and Austria just prior to joining the EU in 1995,
while in Belgium the 1994 Cooperation Agreement between the federal go-
vernment and the regions would govern the determination and representa-
tion of the Belgian position (including representation of substate level
interests) in the Council. In some cases, these provisions also allow for re-
gional representatives to participate in the state delegation (rather than the
central government representation simply being obliged to reflect the com-
mon position reached previously by the regions): the Austrian constitution
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provides for the possibility that the Länder take part in the Council as co-par-
ticipants with the federal state representative, while the Belgian Cooperation
Agreement foresees regional representatives acting as ‘assessors’ to the fe-
deral spokesperson in Council formations on subjects where they have some
competence, or even a regional spokesperson advised by a federal assessor
in the case of mainly regional competences (Martínez Bárbara 2014b: 99-
100). In non federal but decentralised states too, such provisions have pro-
ved possible: Scottish ministers have on occasion attended Council meetings
as part of the UK ministerial team when devolved matters have been under
discussion, especially the Fisheries Council or the Justice and Home Affairs
Council.
From 2004, Spain would make provisions to allow the participation of re-
gional representatives in EU Council meetings under some of its formations,
thus starting to follow the example of Germany, Belgium, Austria and the
UK (Ramon i Sumoy 2005). At the Conference on Matters Related with the
European Communities (Conferencia de Asuntos Relacionados con las Co-
munidades Europeas, CARCE), which brought together the ministers res-
ponsible for European affairs of each of the 17 regions with the Spanish
minister of Public Administration, it was agreed that regional government
representatives would start to participate in the Spanish delegation at mee-
tings of four out of the nine EU Council formations. These would be ‘Agri-
culture and Fisheries’, ‘Environment’, ‘Employment and Social Policy, Health
and Consumer Affairs’ and ‘Education, Youth and Culture’. The decision as
to which region the representative would come from would be taken on an
ad hoc basis in the case of Agriculture and Fisheries (depending on the issue
being discussed, since some are more relevant to some regions than others),
but on a predetermined rotational basis in the case of the other three – in
line with the procedures used by the afore-mentioned federal states (Ramon
i Sumoy 2005). 
No agreement, however, was reached at the same time in 2004 on the
potential for Basque and Navarran participation in the Ecofin Council. Bas-
que treasury representatives attribute the Spanish authorities’ reluctance to
allow regional representatives to participate in the Spanish delegation in
Ecofin in part to their reluctance to accept the asymmetry which the Con-
cierto and the Convenio entail for the Spanish state. The four EU Council for-
mations to which the Spanish government did agree to regional participation
from 2004 are relevant to the competences of all the regions, whereas only
the Basque and Navarran regions have sufficient fiscal competences to seek
representation in Ecofin. Only when a minority Spanish government needed
the support of the PNV did it finally agree to Basque participation in certain
Ecofin working groups relevant to Basque competences, though at the time
of writing agreement has not yet been reached to officially reflect this in the
Concierto legislation. Legal and technical experts in the provincial treasuries
ultimately aspire to go further and achieve co-representation with the Spa-
nish state representative within the Spanish delegation at Ecofin meetings,
rather than solely the working groups. They nevertheless recognise that the
markedly political character of the Council meetings makes it highly unlikely
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that the Spanish authorities would agree to such a proposal in the foresee-
able future (Martínez Bárbara 2014a: 231). 
Meanwhile, political opponents of the PNV still suggest that the desire of
nationalist-led Basque institutions to participate in Ecofin meetings is moti-
vated to a significant extent by political considerations – the desire for a de-
gree of Basque protagonism in Europe – rather than strict technical
necessity.131 They also argue that the majority of the matters that the Ecofin
Council meetings deal with concern policy areas beyond the Basque regional
and provincial governments’ remit. Taxation issues, where the Basques do
have significant competences, are the only one of the many matters that
Ecofin addresses; others include economic policy coordination, oversight of
member states’ budgetary policies and public finances, financial services
and markets, the single currency, and the coordination of EU positions for
international meetings (e.g. IMF). These matters do not correspond to the
Basque region since the Concierto agreement governs the raising of taxes
and the payment of the Basque annual quota to Madrid only. When it comes
to other financial matters such as budgetary stability and debt issuances and
deficit targets, the Basque region must conform to the same rules set by
Spain for the rest of the country’s autonomous communities, though the
Concierto of 2002 did make preliminary steps to start to introduce provisions
for bilateral Spanish-Basque coordination over some such matters (see
Chapter 4, p.138).
This stalemate makes it difficult to reconcile perspectives on the potential
for Basque participation in Ecofin. Beyond the question of political will and
consensus within Spain itself, however, the primarily state-centric nature of
the EU framework still poses considerable obstacles to the fullest develop-
ment of substate fiscal autonomy such as that sought by Basque nationalist
authorities. As already discussed, for example, the EU framework limits the
possibilities for legislative autonomy over indirect taxation at substate level.
With regard to regional participation in Council formations, if the regional
minister does attend the Council, he/she must represent the view of the state
as a whole and not a regional interest. Agreement between regional and
state ministers over national positions must thus be reached prior to Council
meetings, as the Council is not the appropriate forum to reflect internal te-
rritorial interests or differences within member states. The heavily politicised
nature of many of the disputes between Spanish and Basque authorities in-
ternally within Spain over Basque fiscal decisions could risk having a nega-
tive impact on their ability to reach agreements over the national position
to be reflected in Council formations. 
Moreover, it is not clear whether such a system in which regional interests
may be taken into account when the state delegation forms its position, but
nevertheless must ultimately be subordinate to the position of the state as
a whole, can suffice to satisfy the PNV’s view of the Basque treasuries as al-
most equally sovereign in matters of direct taxation as the Spanish treasury.
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131 Personal interviews with representatives of the Basque PP and PSE, 2014.
At the moment, only the Basque and Navarran treasuries have fiscal auto-
nomy in Spain, thus they alone have sufficient grounds to request represen-
tation in Ecofin. But if other autonomous communities in Spain were to
acquire more extensive fiscal powers in future, the Basques would in that
case likely need to accept that any representation they might achieve in Eco-
fin working groups or meetings might become on a strictly rotational basis
with other regions – as occurs in other matters and in the above-mentioned
federal states such as Austria and Germany, who have regulated the partici-
pation of their regions under the subsidiarity principle. Would this suffice to
satisfy the PNV when it sees the Concierto as a form of fiscal sovereignty in
Europe which grants its treasuries almost the same level of fiscal powers as
member state treasuries?
CONCLUSION
Throughout the 1990s and first few years of the 2000s, after the Basque
provincial treasuries had started to make full use of their legislative powers
over corporation tax from 1988 onwards, they faced various technical hur-
dles to secure recognition of the Concierto at EU level and its fit within the
EU context. The EU required one fairly straightforward change to be made
to the Concierto legislation – to ensure that residents elsewhere in Spain and
residents elsewhere in the EU, but operating in the Basque provinces, would
both be equally eligible to apply Basque corporation tax legislation. More
complex, however, was the task of securing EU understanding of the Basque
treasuries’ right to set different corporation tax rates and incentives from the
Spanish state without these being considered regionally selective state aids.
In this regard, political factors both at EU level and at home in Spain did not
help matters: EU officials seeking greater tax centralisation were inevitably
influenced to some degree by their concerns that member states might use
tax decentralisation as a means to give state aids, while internal disputes
reigned within Spain between Spanish and Basque authorities over the ex-
tent to which Basque provincial corporation tax legislation could differ from
Spanish legislation given the requirement for ‘harmonisation’ with the latter.
At this stage, then, the EU posed both technical and political obstacles to the
Basque Concierto, which were further exacerbated by political differences
back home in Spain over the model.
Since the Azores tax ruling of 2006 confirmed the right of the Basque tre-
asuries to set different corporation tax legislation from Spain without this
being considered regionally selective, the Concierto’s position within the EU
has been safeguarded and strengthened. This, combined with gradual chan-
ges to the EU Treaty over the years to allow for the participation of regional
representatives within state delegations under the principle of subsidiarity
where relevant to their competences, has led members of the PNV and some
senior officials in the provincial treasury departments to argue that the EU
itself no longer poses an obstacle to the development of the Concierto in the
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EU context. Rather, they suggest the main obstacle to representation of the
Basque perspective on fiscal matters in EU decision-making bodies is now
resolutely political opposition from the Spanish authorities, rather than tech-
nical or legal obstacles at the EU or Spanish levels.
Certainly, Spanish-Basque discrepancies in political perspectives on the
Concierto, especially on the degree of fiscal autonomy or even sovereignty that
it affords, limit the ability of the Basque authorities to secure representation in
the Spanish delegation in relevant decision-making bodies and develop the
Concierto as a model of fiscal sovereignty in Europe to the extent that they
would wish. At the same time, however, obstacles to such development – even
if the Spanish state were to agree to it without reservation – still persist at EU
level. The principle of subsidiarity in force encourages state delegations to take
into account regional interests where relevant when forming their position, but
nevertheless the Council is not the place for reflecting internal territorial dis-
crepancies within a member state. This would not be possible for practical re-
asons, thus individual regional interests ultimately remain subordinate to the
position of the state in its entirety. If the PNV seeks to use the bilateral nature
of the Concierto to create a partnership of ‘equals’ (and indeed extend this to
other areas of Basque-Spanish relations beyond the Concierto), it is not clear
how exactly this could be accommodated in the current EU framework. 
The EU thus offers some opportunities but also continues to pose a num-
ber of obstacles to the development of substate fiscal autonomy verging on
sovereignty in EU member states. Importantly, however, the fact that the
PNV focuses on the Spanish state as the main obstacle to a greater Basque
participation at EU level in fiscal and other matters, rather than the EU fra-
mework itself, serves to intensify the clash between the PNV’s pro-sove-
reignty territorial agenda and the more centralist vision of most Spanish
parties. In their analysis of the rise and fall of the Ibarretxe Plan, Keating and
Bray (2006: 362) suggested that ‘Europe, instead of providing a forum where
new ideas such as sovereignty can be discussed, is being utilized as a con-
veniently malleable concept for backing quite different political visions and
ambition’. Several years later, analysis of the Basque trajectory suggests that
this continues to be the case. 
The clash in political perspectives as to what the EU could mean for the
future of the Concierto has become increasingly apparent of late in the res-
ponse of PNV representatives to the challenges made by the centre-right
party Ciudadanos, the Spanish party which most opposes the Concierto. The
views of the PNV and Ciudadanos on what the prospect of a European fiscal
union would mean for the Basque Concierto are polar opposites. PNV spo-
kesperson Josu Erkoreka, for example, has argued that ‘a fiscal union should
be no obstacle to allowing the fiscal and financial powers of the Basques
institutions, by virtue of the Concierto, to keep reaching the same level as
those afforded by the EU to member states in a new context of increasingly
limited fiscal sovereignty’ (Erkoreka 2012)132 – a statement which is emble-
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132 See also ‘PNV reclama que los poderes fiscales tributarios vascos sigan equiparados a
los de estados si se llega a una unión fiscal europea’, Europa Press, 05.08.12.
matic of the vision of the PNV that the process of increasing fiscal harmoni-
sation within the EU will ultimately put the Basque and Spanish treasuries
on an equal footing in Europe. In stark contrast, Ciudadanos has argued that
the fiscal harmonisation process in Europe will eventually result in the Bas-
que and Navarran financing systems being replaced by the common system.
In other words, in a climate of ever increasing fiscal harmonisation among
member states within the EU, it suggests that specific tax systems at subs-
tate level are likely to be rendered ‘obsolete’.133 These different perspectives
have been the source of much controversy.134
At present, the issue of developing the Concierto further within the EU
context is not an immediately pressing one for the PNV, and debates over
questions such as the Basque participation in Ecofin remain primarily at a
technical level. The polarisation in perceptions as to what opportunities or
obstacles the EU creates for the development of shared sovereignty within
a state in fiscal matters and beyond nevertheless points to the challenges
that could lie ahead for Spanish-Basque relations.  
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133 For example, ‘Ciudadanos vuelve a cargar contra el Concierto vasco’, Noticias de Guipúz-
coa, 05.04.16
134 For example, ‘El Gobierno vasco denuncia la ignorancia supina de Ciudadanos sobre el
Concierto Económico’, Deia, 05.04.16; ‘Ciudadanos y el PNV se enzarzan por el Concierto’, El
Diario Vasco, 04.04.16

CHAPTER 6
THE INTRA-REGIONAL DYNAMICS 
OF THE CONCIERTO: 
FISCAL AND POLITICAL RELATIONS 
WITHIN THE BASQUE REGION

The Concierto is a bilateral agreement which governs fiscal relations bet-
ween the Basque and Spanish authorities, but one which is also affected by
complex intra-regional dynamics within the Basque region, since the model
affords tax-raising powers to each of the three provincial governments for
historical reasons, rather than to the regional government. Both the Con-
cierto legislation and the Basque Statute of Autonomy grant tax-raising po-
wers to the Basque provinces, in accordance with the First Additional
Disposition of the Spanish Constitution. Each province raises the revenues
in its territory, which are then distributed among three levels of public ad-
ministration responsible for different areas of spending within the region
(the regional government, the provincial governments, and the municipal or
local authorities), after payment of the annual quota to the central Spanish
government. This chapter is designed to investigate the intra-regional dyna-
mics in relation to the Concierto and their implications for the territorial stra-
tegies and behaviour of the PNV. What are the consequences of the complex
nature of the intra-regional dimension of the Concierto for fiscal and political
relations between different provinces and political forces within the region
itself? And how has this contributed to shaping the PNV’s behaviour regar-
ding not only the balance of powers between provincial and regional autho-
rities, but also the relationship of the Basque region as a whole to Spain? 
The main argument of the chapter is twofold. First, it is argued that the
intra-regional and inter-provincial nature of the Concierto has had a signifi-
cant impact on the PNV’s own coherence, or rather its lack thereof. The he-
terogeneity of the PNV (partly across territories) and the changing political
map at provincial level make strategic consistency difficult for the party, the-
reby reducing the possibilities for shifts from one position to another. Not-
withstanding the diversity of the PNV, the conservative wing most closely
connected with business is strongest in Vizcaya. While pro-independence le-
anings within the party are generally considered strongest in Guipúzcoa,
more moderate, pro-autonomy tendencies are associated first and foremost
with Vizcaya. Conservatism and moderation have traditionally dominated in
Álava too, though it has experienced a more mixed picture with an occasio-
nal shift in the balance of forces (Gillespie 2015c).135 Vizcaya is both the PNV’s
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135 On the PNV in Álava, see De Pablo 2008. This is one of the very few studies of the party
at provincial or local level.
stronghold in the Basque region (the party has governed the province con-
sistently since the first provincial elections of the democratic period in 1979),
and also the one that raises the most revenues, accounting for around 50%
of the Basque region’s GDP (see Table 8). It is argued here that this revenue-
raising power of Vizcaya has given the Vizcayan provincial government a
strong weight and negotiating power within the region as a whole, thereby
contributing to the dominance of the PNV in the region, as well as increasing
the influence of the Vizcayan wing of the PNV within the party. 
TABLE 8: Basic statistics for the Basque provinces and region
Sources: area data from Anuario Estadístico de España, 2000, INE; population data (provisio-
nal) from the Padron 1 January 2016, INE; GDP from the Basque Region Statistics
Agency (Eustat), 2014 advance data
Second, it is argued that the intraregional dimension of the Concierto has
reduced the possibilities for nationalist alignment between the PNV and par-
ties of the Basque izquierda abertzale to advance a pro-sovereignty agenda
for the Basque Country. This is because their discrepancies over left-right po-
litics, which have emerged through their respective uses of the fiscal powers
afforded by the Concierto, have highlighted the competitive dynamic between
them, reducing the possibilities for their collaboration on territorial issues.
Aside from their vision of an independent Euskal Herria, most of the parties
of the izquierda abertzale are also known for their radical anti-capitalist ideo-
logy. After ETA ceased its violence, the izquierda abertzale re-entered formal
politics from 2011 onwards (after bans on previous parties, most notably Ba-
tasuna), winning power in the province of Guipúzcoa that year. The open ques-
tion would become whether a form of pro-sovereignty alliance between the
PNV and Bildu to advance territorial agendas concerning the relationship of
the Basque Country to Spain would become possible. In this regard, there
would be a long list of obstacles, including most notably the still recent history
of violence, the lack of experience of the izquierda abertzale in democratic go-
vernment, and competition between both the PNV and the izquierda abertzale
to lead a pro-sovereignty process, as well as differences between them in the
degree of sovereignty sought and which parts of the Basque homeland this
would embrace. This chapter argues that the experience of the izquierda abert-
zale entering seriously into formal politics for the first time and with a signifi-
cant political presence, governing at provincial level in Guipúzcoa, also drew
attention to the gulf be tween the PNV and the izquierda abertzale on issues of
fiscal and social policy, particularly the use of the fiscal powers afforded by
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Alava Guipuzcoa Vizcaya Basque region
Area (sq km)       3037 (42.0%)       1980 (27.4%)       2217 (30.6%)        7234 (100%)
Population   324036 (14.8%)   717755 (32.8%) 1147302 (52.4%)  2189093 (100%)
GDP (€bn)       10.9 (16.3%)        22.1 (33.0%)        33.9 (50.7%)         66.9 (100%)
the Concierto, which therefore reduced the potential for a nationalist align-
ment more widely too.
The sections that follow start by introducing the debate over the balance
of powers between the regional and provincial levels of government that
has shaped the legislation on the intra-regional dimension of the Concierto.
Next, the chapter analyses the two main areas of how the Concierto works
within the Basque region – (1) intra-regional revenue-raising and resource
distribution and (2) inter-provincial tax harmonisation – and the main unre-
solved areas of controversy in these spheres between different provinces
and different political forces in the Basque Country. These analyses will be
used as a foundation to understand the implications for the PNV’s behaviour
towards the Basque region’s territorial problematics regarding both the ba-
lance of powers within the region and the relationship of the region as a
whole to Spain. 
LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND: THE REGIONAL-PROVINCIAL DEBATE
The Concierto law of 1981, subsequently replaced with a new, updated
version in 2002, focuses primarily on bilateral fiscal and financial relations
between the Basque region as a whole and the Spanish central government.
It is instead the Basque Law of Historical Territories (Ley de Territorios His-
tóricos, LTH) of 1983 that sets the basis for how the Concierto functions wi-
thin the Basque region, in terms of fiscal and financial relations between
regional and provincial administrations and among the provinces themsel-
ves (Reta 2002: 184-185). Article 42 of the Statute of Autonomy stipulated
that the Basque parliament would approve a law to establish the provinces’
contribution to the regional government, which materialised as the LTH. The
Law in its entirety governs both the distribution of competences between
different levels of Basque administration (regional, provincial, municipal),
as well as the principles for how these should be financed. The latter finan-
cial dimension is what concerns us here and is regulated under Part II of the
Law, providing the procedural basis for the intra-regional and inter-provincial
dimension of the Concierto. 
The drafting of the LTH at the start of the 1980s brought to the fore the
clash between different political parties in the Basque region, and indeed wi-
thin the PNV itself, over what the balance of powers between the traditional
provinces and the new regional level of government should be going for-
ward (De Pablo and Mees 2005: 412-421). The First Additional Disposition of
the Constitution, which pledged to ‘respect the historical rights of the foral
territories’, was fundamentally taken as a reference to the historical tradition
of the Basque (and Navarran) provinces in raising their own taxes – the last
vestige of the original ‘fueros’ or legal charters between Castile and each
province to have survived. And yet since the Constitution also created a re-
gional level of government which united the three Basque provinces of
Álava, Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa for the first time, a clash in perspectives would
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ensue regarding to what extent the regional level of government should take
precedence over the provinces going forward. Should the provinces be re-
duced to simply administrative bodies (much like the provinces elsewhere
in Spain) or should they retain greater autonomy and competences? 
The Basque provinces, unlike all other provinces in Spain, retained elec-
ted governments (diputaciones) and parliaments (juntas generales) under
the Basque Statute of Autonomy. The Concierto of 1981 itself had provided
a form of halfway house between regional and provincial administrations: it
respected tradition in the sense that the three Basque provinces would retain
their responsibility for tax collection, and yet bilateral relations under the
Concierto would take place for the first time between Madrid and the Basque
autonomous community as a whole following its creation during the Tran-
sition, under which system the Basque provinces would for the first time
combine to pay one single Basque quota to Madrid. Navarre, where the pro-
vince coincided with the newly created autonomous community of the same
name, largely avoided this complexity. 
Carlos Garaikoetxeta, then PNV head of the Basque government, favou-
red centralising powers at regional government level, putting arguments
concerning efficiency and rationalisation ahead of tradition. The first draft
of the LTH and the Basque government’s first budget, both presented in May
1981, reflected this vision, but he faced a backlash from certain sectors of
his own party and other political forces which sought to retain a greater role
for the provinces and envisaged a more confederal rather than centralised
Basque Country (De Pablo and Mees 2005: 412-421). 
Opposition from within the PNV was led first and foremost by Emilio Gue-
vara, head of the provincial government of Álava and PNV spokesperson
(Castells and Cajal 2009: 359-361; De Pablo 2008: 355-360). The Concierto
agreement of 1981 with the Basque region as a whole was largely made pos-
sible by the fact that the Concierto had never been abolished in Álava, which
explains why the defence of the provincial level during the LTH debate would
be particularly strong from that province. Emilio Guevara was supported in
his stance by the Álava section of the PNV (ABB) and indeed by all parties in
the provincial government at that time (PNV, UCD, PSOE and two indepen-
dents). With regard to the Concierto in particular, Guevara rejected, for exam-
ple, Garaikeotxeta’s proposal (as reflected in the draft budget) that the
Basque government should decide unilaterally the financial contributions
(Aportaciones) that each provincial treasury should make to the regional go-
vernment to cover its spending competences, proposing instead a bilaterally
pacted flow of funds as part of a more confederal vision of the relationship
between the provinces and the regional government. In his opposition to
Garaikoetxeta’s centralising vision, Guevara was also joined by influential
PNV members in other Basque provinces – most notably José María Makua,
head of the Vizcayan provincial government (Castells and Cajal 2009: 359-
361; De Pablo 2008: 355-360).
Ultimately, given the extent of the backlash within the PNV itself, the final
version of the LTH approved in 1983 was a much watered-down version of
the original draft, offering a more confederal rather than centralised vision
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of the Basque region. In many respects the final text was somewhat ambi-
guous rather than rigidly prescriptive regarding the balance of powers bet-
ween the regional and provincial levels, but it left the door open to a greater
role for the provinces than the initial draft had done. The frictions within the
PNV that the issue had caused would prove insurmountable. Garaikoetxeta
would resign from his role as lehendakari in December 1984 (to be replaced
by José Antonio Ardanza from January 1985), leave the PNV and subse-
quently found his own new party, Eusko Alkartasuna (EA) in 1986. The split
was a traumatic one for the PNV which weakened the party significantly. The
PNV immediately lost 11 deputies in regional parliament, and at the regional
elections of November 1986 (the first under Ardanza) it still won but with
only 17 seats, down from 32 at the previous elections in February 1984, when
the party was still united under Garaikeotxeta’s leadership (De Pablo and
Mees 2005: 422). The situation made it necessary for the PNV to enter into a
coalition with the Basque Socialists (PSE) to form a government, an arran-
gement which would be repeated following subsequent elections and thus
become a longstanding one (1987-1996). 
Given the traumatic events that the debate over the provincial and regio-
nal balance of powers had caused, the PNV would thereafter seek to avoid
revisiting the issue, with the result that the ambiguous parameters of the
final draft of the LTH of 1983 still stand today. The PNV has sought to main-
tain a compromise solution balancing provincial and regional powers, by
respecting the role of the provinces as home to the Basque treasuries and
seeking to negotiate agreements between the provinces and the regional
government on fiscal and financial matters, rather than imposing decisions
on the provinces taken unilaterally by the regional government. The fact that
Vizcaya has proved the PNV’s most reliable stronghold in the region (it has
won every provincial election there in the democratic period – see Table 9,
p.174) has inevitably contributed to the continued respect for the autonomy
of the provincial level within the PNV. 
For the Basque PP too, defending the provincial level has remained of
fundamental importance, due to the party’s weight in Álava in particular – a
historical stronghold of the Spanish right which it reclaimed when the PP
won the provincial elections in Álava for the first time in the democratic pe-
riod in 1999, since when it has usually alternated with the PNV in the pro-
vincial government, winning every other election (see Table 9, p.174). The
Basque PP is arguably even more defensive of the provincial level than the
PNV, in the sense that it rejects the PNV’s attempts to develop the Concierto
as an instrument of fiscal sovereignty for the Basque region as a whole as
the basis for ever greater autonomy from Spain, arguing that this distorts
the conception of the original Concierto based on the individual provinces.
In contrast, there has emerged a broad consensus among left-wing parties
in the Basque region – both the PSE (the Basque federation of the Spanish
Socialist Party) as well as EA and the radical left-wing secessionists under
the izquierda abertzale – that one central treasury for the Basque region
would be preferable to separate treasuries at provincial level, privileging re-
asons of efficiency and equality over tradition.
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TABLE 9: Basque provincial election results, 2007-2015
In all cases, however, some nuances are required to these overall party vi-
sions, since much also depends on political circumstances. Party representa-
tives at provincial level inevitably end up defending their own province’s
interests first and foremost, over and above the party’s wider interests or
views in the region as a whole.136 The izquierda abertzale has always been fier-
cely critical of the Concierto as insufficient since it seeks secession for Euskal
Herria and considers the Concierto a form of out-dated subordination to
Spain.137 It also accuses the Spanish government of using the Concierto and
the Convenio during the Transition to seek to separate Navarre from the rest
of the Basque Country, since the three Basque provinces started to make one
joint quota payment.138 Nevertheless, it would need to clarify its views on how
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136 Personal interviews with senior officials in the provincial treasury departments of Vizcaya
and Guipúzcoa, 2014-2015.
137 See, for example, the tirade against the Concierto Xabier Olano (Director of the Treasury
of Guipúzcoa in 2011-2015) delivered in a speech in 2002 (Olano 2002). 
138 Personal interviews with Laura Mintegi (Bildu) and with senior treasury officials in the
Guipúzcoan provincial government, 2014.
it would actually use the Concierto once it won power to govern in Guipúzcoa
for the first time in 2011-2015 and thus took control of the Guipúzcoan trea-
sury. Key representatives of Bildu clearly joined other left-wing parties in cri-
ticising the existence of three separate treasuries in such a small territory as
inefficient, especially given the extent of mobility of capital in the 21st century.
And yet since Bildu had power in Guipúzcoa and had a more left-wing social
and fiscal agenda from the PNV and the PP in power at the time in Vizcaya
and Álava respectively, it would at the same time come to resent attempts by
the overall majority within the region to force Guipúzcoa into line with the
other two provinces’ fiscal decisions, seeking to assert the province’s auto-
nomy. Meanwhile, the Basque PP strongly defends the provincial level of go-
vernment, yet this has not prevented it from favouring tax harmonisation
almost to the extent of uniformity throughout the Basque region as a whole
(to the detriment of provincial autonomy), criticising the afore-mentioned Gui-
púzcoan government for attempting to step out of line with the reigning cen-
tre-right ethos in Vizcaya and Álava at the time.
The fact that the main precepts of the LTH of 1983 have remained unchan-
ged, and that the balance of powers between regional and provincial go-
vernments remains politically controversial, has had significant implications
for the Concierto. Much of the legislation relevant to the intra-regional func-
tioning of the Concierto has barely been updated, if at all, since the 1980s,
given the different political views on the matter. The fact that the three pro-
vinces are responsible for collecting taxes and set their own legislation for
direct taxes raises a number of complex questions within the region. These
include how the revenues should be distributed between regional and pro-
vincial levels of government; what tax harmonisation measures should be
in place to avoid the risk of significant tax distortions between the Basque
provinces; and what means of coordination and collaboration between pro-
vincial and regional governments over fiscal matters are required. Indeed,
many of the controversial issues between the Basque region and the rest of
Spain over the Concierto discussed in earlier chapters – for example, to what
extent the Basques should contribute to revenue redistribution within Spain,
or how rigidly to interpret the harmonisation criteria between Basque and
Spanish tax legislation – bear parallels with some of the sources of conten-
tion within the Basque region itself between regional and provincial admi-
nistrations and between the different provinces. And in both cases
(Spanish-Basque bilateral relations and intra-regional Basque relations), di -
fferent political interests at different levels of government heavily influence
the outcome of such sources of contention in fiscal and financial relations. 
HOW THE CONCIERTO WORKS WITHIN THE BASQUE REGION (1): REVE-
NUE-RAISING AND RESOURCE DISTRIBUTION
Article 22 of Part II Chapter II of the LTH stipulates the basic principles and
procedure that must be followed to decide how the tax revenues raised by
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the three Basque provinces should then be distributed between the regional
government and the provinces to finance their respective competences (the
provinces, in turn, then also make a smaller payment to their respective local
authorities or municipalities). The exact methodology for the distribution of
resources and contribution of each province to the regional government are
decided in meetings of the Basque Council of Public Finances (Consejo Vasco
de Finanzas Públicas), in accordance with the criteria stipulated in Article 22
of the LTH, and then set in a contribution law (Ley de Aportaciones), to be
approved by the Basque parliament.139 The contribution law must comprise
a single article, thus it is not subject to partial amendment. The contribution
law determines how much each province must transfer to the Basque regio-
nal government (their aportación or contribution), as well as how much of
the Basque quota to the central government each must pay. It also recom-
mends a minimum share of revenues each should give to the local authori-
ties in their territory.
Since the Basque regional government has by far the most spending
competences within the region and yet raises almost no revenues of its own
(since revenue-raising powers are almost entirely concentrated in the hands
of the Basque provinces), it is actually the regional government with the least
revenue-raising powers in Spain, even though the Basque region as a whole
has far greater revenue-raising powers than any other region. Under the LTH,
each contribution law originally had to be valid for at least 3 tax years (Article
22.8). Since 1992, however, the contribution laws have been five-yearly so
that they run more or less in tandem with the five-yearly quota laws gover-
ning the payment of the Basque region to the Spanish central government
(Zurutuza 2014: 6). The contribution law is usually negotiated and approved
shortly after the quota law. In practice, all the contribution laws approved so
far have tended to be very similar, since conflicting political interests make
it very difficult to push through any changes to the calculation of the contri-
butions (mirroring the problem with the quota laws).140 The Basque Council
of Public Finances usually meets twice per year, once in February to settle
the final revenues for the previous year and thus the final contributions, and
once in October to draw up the Basque budget (the regional government
needs to collaborate with the provinces over this since the latter raise the
revenues to be spent primarily by the regional government).
The total resources of the Basque region comprise the tax revenues rai-
sed by the provinces and, in much smaller measure, some additional finan-
cing for certain specific competences provided directly to the Basque
regional government by the central Spanish government. These include
funds to contribute to the additional costs of the Basque regional police, the
Ertzaintza (for historical reasons, due to the history of terrorism); and special
financing for specific expenditure policies to cover the cost of policies to pro-
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139 On the technicalities of how the Concierto works internally in the Basque region, see Zu-
biri 2010: 71-78.
140 Personal interviews with senior officials in the provincial treasury departments, 2014.
mote economic development and ensure the political and economic stability
of the Basque region. Once the annual quota has been paid to the central
government (a joint payment to which all three provinces contribute a share
of their revenues), the remaining bulk of the revenues raised by the Basque
provinces provide the common resources to be shared between different le-
vels of government in the Basque region to cover general competences.
These are distributed according to a vertical coefficient (which determines
the total amount the provincial governments must pay to the Basque regio-
nal government) and horizontal coefficients (which determine how the
amount to be paid to the regional government should be split between the
three provinces), with some final adjustments (Zubiri 2010: 74-78; Zurutuza
2014). Lastly, of the common resources that remain in the hands of the pro-
vinces after they have paid the contribution to the regional government, a
proportion also goes to the municipalities or local authorities. Figure 4
(p.179) and the following subsections explain this split in resources in more
detail.
Vertical coefficient
The vertical coefficient determines how much the Basque government
receives of the common resources (i.e. the remaing resources to be used wi-
thin the Basque region after the quota has been paid to Madrid) to fulfil its
general spending competences. This was last set at 70.04% under the 2007-
2011 contribution law, which was subsequently also rolled over from 2012.
In other words, the Basque government is due 70.04% of the common re-
sources for general spending competences in the Basque region, while the
remaining 29.96% remains in the hands of the provincial authorities. The
trend to date has been a gradual increase in the share of the Basque govern-
ment in the common resources, rising from 64.25% under the first contribu-
tion law in force in 1986-1988 to the current level of approximately 70%
(Zubiri 2010: 74). 
Horizontal coefficients
Horizontal distribution coefficients then determine what proportion of the
contribution to the Basque government is covered by each of the three pro-
vinces, as well as what proportion of the quota payment to the central go-
vernment they each pay. 70% of the horizontal coefficient of each province
is based on its income (average provincial GDP relative to that of the region
over the prior four years) while 30% is based on its tax capacity relative to
that of the other provinces. Indicators of tax capacity are used instead of the
figures for actual tax collection, in order to incentivise efficient tax manage-
ment. The horizontal coefficients are calculated each year under the metho-
dology approved in the contribution laws, with Vizcaya (as the largest
province) always accounting for the largest share (typically in the region of
50-52%), followed by Guipúzcoa (around 32%-34%) and then Álava (around
14%-16%) (Zubiri 2010: 76).
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Final adjustments 
Two final adjustments are made to the horizontal distribution in an at-
tempt to ensure the model produces fair outcomes, the first of which aims
to share out indirect tax revenues appropriately using the horizontal coeffi-
cients (Zubiri 2010: 75). For the second adjustment, a General Adjustment
Fund (Fondo General de Ajuste) aims to make sure that the final share each
province receives of total tax collection (after payment of the contribution
and the adjustment for indirect taxes) is equal to at least 99% of its horizontal
coefficient (Zubiri 2010: 75; Zurutuza 2014: 8-9). The Fund is endowed with
contributions from the Basque government (which provides a proportion in
line with its vertical coefficient) and from any province whose final share of
total tax collection is above 99% of its horizontal coefficient. The Fund is re-
latively small since it is designed for final adjustment purposes only, with
its maximum size capped at 1% of the total common resources to be shared. 
Final distribution of resources
The contribution law recommends a minimum transfer to the local au-
thorities of 54.6% of the share of the common resources left in the hands of
the provinces, after both the 70.04% paid to the regional government and
some further deductions specified in the Fourth Additional Disposition of the
contribution law. Ultimately, following the transfers to the central govern-
ment (via the quota), the Basque regional government (via the contribution)
and the local authorities, the provincial governments are left with around
only 18% for themselves of the total revenues they actually collect. The dis-
tribution of total revenues among different governmental levels has remai-
ned broadly consistent since 1997 (when the Concierto was developed to
give the Basque region significant new tax-raising powers), with at least 60%
going to the Basque government, around 18% to the provinces, around 11%
to the local authorities and approximately the same to the central govern-
ment for the quota, though the relative proportion paid to the central go-
vernment declined rapidly during the financial crisis to around 8%, since
state tax collection decreased more rapidly than Basque tax collection) (Zu-
biri 2010: 77-78). It might be expected that this would give few incentives to
the Basque provinces to raise taxes effectively, since they keep so few of the
proceeds for themselves, but the reality of tax collection outcomes suggests
otherwise, since the provincial governments accept their duty to provide the
necessary resources for the Basque public sector in its entirety to benefit
both the individual provinces and the region as a whole (Zubiri 2010: 77-78).
Intra-regional distribution of resources: The controversies
Virtually all the controversies concerning the intra-regional distribution
of resources relate to different aspects of the way in which the horizontal co-
efficients and distribution model work.141 In this regard, the main controversy
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FIGURE 4: Revenue-raising and resource distribution in the Basque region
Source: Own elaboration based on Zubiri 2010: 78 and Article 22 of Part II Chapter II of the Ley
de Territorios Históricos (LTH)
– on which we shall focus here – is the extent of the imbalance in the final
distribution of resources between provinces. The idea behind the design of
the horizontal coefficients, which determine how much each province con-
tributes to the Basque regional government (via the contributions) and also
to the Spanish central government (via the quota), was to incentivise com-
petition in tax collection among the three provinces and thus promote effi-
cient tax management. Nevertheless, there have been criticisms from
Guipúzcoa and Álava since the coefficients have ended up favouring Vizcaya
in the past decade. The figures for the final revenues left in the hands of each
province after payment of the contribution and quota reveal that the model
results in significant differences in levels of resources, both in per capita
terms and as a percentage of GDP. Despite being the province with the lo-
west relative GDP per capita, Vizcaya has ended up with the greatest resour-
ces both as a percentage of GDP and per capita (Zubiri 2010: 76). This has
not always been the case – prior to 1997, the province of Vizcaya had been
disadvantaged, which was the main factor behind the decision reached that
year to create the General Adjustment Fund (originally called the Solidarity
Fund) and also to share out the revenues from excise duties using the hori-
zontal coefficients (a decision which would eventually be applied to VAT too),
in an attempt to alleviate the imbalances negatively affecting Vizcaya.142 For
nearly the past decade, however, Vizcaya has consistently come out on top
even after contributing to the General Adjustment Fund. 
A study by Sebastian Zurutuza Mujika (2014), of the Guipúzcoan provin-
cial treasury department, analyses the results of the horizontal distribution
model over the period 2007-2013, calculating average annual figures for that
seven year period, to highlight the imbalances in the model.143 In that period,
the proportion of revenues raised in each province relative to the horizontal
coefficient of each (after the adjustment for indirect revenues but prior to
application of the General Adjustment Fund) was higher than the horizontal
coefficient in Vizcaya but lower in Álava and Guipúzcoa (see Table 10, p.181).
Since the horizontal coefficients are used to determine how much each pro-
vince contributes to the Basque regional government (as well as to the cen-
tral government via the quota), this means that Vizcaya gets to keep greater
resources for its province than Álava and Guipúzcoa. Furthermore, the Ge-
neral Adjustment Fund has proven insufficient in size to achieve its aim to
ensure that each province would keep resources for use within its territory
(after payment of the quota and the contribution) equivalent to at least 99%
of its horizontal coefficient (see Table 11). If the average results are calculated
in per capita terms, instead of by province as a whole, then this reduces to
some degree Vizcaya’s advantage and Álava’s disadvantage, though Guipúz-
coa remains significantly disadvantaged (see Table 12).     
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142 Personal interview with senior officials in the treasury department of Vizcaya, 7 Septem-
ber 2015.
143 Sebastián Zurutuza and José Luis Hernández Goicoechea, officials in the treasury de-
partment of Guipúzcoa, were also interviewed by the author on 7 October 2014.
TABLE 10: Provincial revenues raised relative to horizontal coefficient
Source: Based on Zurutuza 2014: 12
            TABLE 11: Final provincial revenues relative to horizontal coefficient 
Source: Based on Zurutuza 2014: 14
            TABLE 12: Final provincial revenues per capita
Source: Based on Zurutuza 2014: 14
Another study, by Ignacio Zubiri (2010: 76), shows the imbalances in final
resources taking the year 2008 as an example, providing both the final re-
sources per capita and as a percentage of GDP in each province. What is par-
ticularly interesting to note is the fact that Vizcaya, the region with the lowest
GDP per capita, ends up with the highest resources both per capita and as a
% of GDP. This suggests that the model is overly redistributive of income,
going beyond the recommendations of Article 22.4 of the LTH. The latter sti-
pulates that the criteria and methods used to distribute resources between
regional and provincial administrations in the Basque region should, taking
as a basis the principle of budgetary sufficiency, provide an overall average
expenditure policy per capita that is equitable and shows solidarity.          
181
Province Total revenues raised in province relative to horizontal coefficient 
Álava 96.81%
Vizcaya 104.01%
Guipúzcoa 97.43%
Province Yearly average 2007-2013 (after application of the General AdjustmentFund)
Álava 88.13%
Vizcaya 114.81%
Guipúzcoa 90.51%
Total provinces 102.33% (above 100% due to the contribution from the Basque regio-nal government to the General Adjustment Fund)
Province Yearly average 2007-2013 (in euros)
Álava 1,516
Vizcaya 1,621
Guipúzcoa 1,369
Total provinces 1,524
A number of potential reasons could explain why the distribution model
results in inequitable outcomes for the three provinces (Zurutuza 2014: 15).
Since the horizontal coefficients incorporate indicators of tax capacity (i.e.
what a province should be able to collect) rather than actual tax collection
figures in order to incentivise good tax management, the first factor to in-
vestigate would be whether, or to what extent, different tax legislation or de-
ficits in tax management in some provinces explain the imbalances in
outcomes. There are also several other possible explanations or contributing
factors. Does the methodology used to calculate the horizontal coefficients
(based on 70% income and 30% tax capacity – see p.177) actually properly
reflect the relative tax-raising power of each province? Is the General Adjus-
tment Fund, the total size of which is capped at 1% of the total common re-
sources for the region, large enough to correct distortions in the system?
The Basque regional government, for example, almost consistently contri-
butes the maximum permitted to the Fund under the current rules (approxi-
mately 0.7% of the common resources, since it receives around 70% of these
and the Fund constitutes a maximum 1% of them in total), and yet this has
not proven sufficient to help ensure that each province’s share in total Bas-
que tax collection, after payment of the quota and contribution and following
the final adjustments, reaches at least 99% of its horizontal coefficient. Does
the Basque regional government receive too large a share of the common
resources under its vertical coefficient? 
Beyond the question of coefficients, there are some other potentially pro-
blematic areas too. The Concierto establishes ‘points of connection’ for each
tax that determine whether Spanish or Basque legislation applies in each
case (be it to an individual or a company, depending on the tax). If Basque
legislation applies, however, it does not then specify further rules to deter-
mine which province’s legislation is applicable, which must be decided in-
ternally within the Basque region (Reta 2002: 180-1). With the taxes at risk
of most geographical distortion such as Non Residents Tax and Corporation
Tax (given the complications of deciding where companies are domiciled for
tax purposes), do the current rules determine appropriately which revenues
should belong to which province? 
Addressing these questions properly would require a willingness of all
government levels involved (the Basque regional government and the three
Basque provincial governments) to undertake proper analysis and reform of
the contribution law. There have been seven contribution laws in total, in
force respectively in 1985, 1986-1988, 1989-1991, 1992-1996, 1997-2001,
2002-2006, 2007-2011, the last of which was also rolled over from 2012 due
to the lack of ability to reach a new agreement (mirroring the lack of a new
quota law agreement). Most have remained very similar under each new
version, since conflicting interests between the provinces usually prevent
meaningful changes, since it is essentially a zero-sum game. In 2012 a wor-
king group was initiated to address the need for a proper overhaul of the
law but its progress would prove very slow. Representatives of the provincial
administration of Guipúzcoa would blame political opposition from the Viz-
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cayan provincial government.144 At the time, under the 2011-2015 provincial
parliamentary term, the three provinces were each governed simultaneously
by different parties for the first time: the PP in Álava, the PNV in Vizcaya and
Bildu in Guipúzcoa. As the largest province, home to the region’s largest
companies (mainly energy companies) and thus the financial powerhouse
of the Basque region in terms of total resources collected, Vizcaya can hold
significant weight in intra-regional negotiations over finances and, at times,
considerable sway over the Basque regional government.145 The fact that
Vizcaya has been a PNV stronghold throughout the democratic period (the
party has governed the province consistently since the first provincial elec-
tions of the democratic period in 1979) has also increased its influence over
PNV-led regional governments and within the PNV in general on matters
pertaining to the Concierto. There have been complaints at times from Álava
and Guipúzcoa (particularly when these have been governed by political par-
ties other than the PNV) of relations being centralised around the Basque re-
gional government and Vizcaya to the detriment of the other two smaller
provinces. Or even of Vizcaya seeking to dominate over the regional govern-
ment too and dictate policy, since the regional government is dependent first
and foremost on Vizcaya for financing, giving the latter significant bargaining
power.
Senior officials in charge of the technical functioning of the Concierto wi-
thin the Vizcayan provincial government acknowledge the need for an over-
haul of the contribution law, since Álava and Guipúzcoa have ended up at a
consistent disadvantage for nearly a decade, but they suggest that negotia-
tions at the political level are more challenging.146 The return of the PNV to
govern in all three provinces, in alliance with the PSE in each, following the
2015 provincial elections, did not however look set to promise an easier re-
solution to the matter either. Since each province represents its own interests
first and foremost, experience has shown that achieving agreements over
matters concerning the intra-regional workings of the Concierto between
provincial governments when all three are controlled by the PNV can be
even harder than with governments of different political colours, since in
such circumstances each PNV representative then becomes more defensive
of its province’s interest relative to the overall party interest. Moreover, the
PNV and the PSE, in alliance together in all three provinces, hold very diffe-
rent party views on the question of the balance of powers between regions
and provinces, with the PSE in favour of a revision of the LTH to centralise
powers more at regional level.
These dynamics have had relevant implications for the PNV’s attitude to
the internal territorial problematic of the balance of powers between regional
and provincial institutions in the Basque region. Over the decades since the
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144 Personal interview with Helena Franco and Itziar Miner, 5 September 2014.
145 Personal interviews with senior officials in the treasury departments of Álava and
Guipúzcoa, 2014.
146 Personal interviews with senior officials in the Vizcayan treasury department, 2014.
LTH of 1983 was approved, the PNV has maintained its reluctance to reopen
the question and risk any revision of the LTH that might threaten the powers
of the provinces. The weight of the party in Vizcaya, the importance of the pro-
vincial level for the party and the different party interests in different provinces
are fundamental factors that would certainly make any such revision funda-
mentally difficult, even if some sectors of the party would prefer greater cen-
tralisation at regional level. To some extent, the fact that the Vizcayan
provincial government holds significant weight in financial matters compen-
sates for its relative lack of weight (compared to its population size) in the Bas-
que parliament. The Basque regional parliament has 75 members, with each
province electing 25, despite their very different population sizes (Vizcaya, the
largest, has a population more than three times the size of Álava, the smallest).
This equal distribution of seats was decided upon by Basque forces during
the Spanish transition to democracy as a means of ensuring support for Bas-
que regional autonomy from Álava, the most reluctant province, and to leave
open the possibility of enticing Navarre to join one day too, with the incentive
that it would have substantial seats relative to its small population (a further
25, to make 100 seats in total). Where Vizcaya is thus relatively underrepre-
sented in Basque regional parliament (relative to its population size), the fact
that it raises by far the most revenues in the region nevertheless gives it
weight and negotiating power of a different kind both within the region and
within the PNV itself. This has contributed to the PNV’s dominance in the re-
gion as a whole, Vizcaya’s dominance within the PNV, and in consequence,
the PNV’s continued strong support for the weight afforded to the provincial
level of government. Since the party’s conservatism and pragmatism is stron-
gest in Vizcaya, in part due to the party’s particularly strong links to big busi-
ness there, this also reduces the scope for radical shifts in agenda.
HOW THE CONCIERTO WORKS WITHIN THE BASQUE REGION (2): INTER-
PROVINCIAL TAX HARMONISATION, COORDINATION AND COLLABORA-
TION
Another fundamental and equally controversial question is that of inter-
governmental tax harmonisation, coordination and collaboration within the
Basque region, since each of the three provinces has its own revenue-raising
authority and therefore could in theory establish a separate tax system to a
degree. From the 1980s, one of the key questions regarding the balance of
powers in relation to the Concierto became: To what extent should the Bas-
que parliament exercise a harmonising role over taxation, thereby reducing
provincial autonomy over fiscal decisions, in order to reduce potentially
harmful inter-provincial disparities in legislation? The lack of consensus over
what is meant by harmonisation has added to the complexity of the debate.
It is generally accepted that tax harmonisation within the Basque region itself
between the provinces needs to be even stronger than between the Basque
region and Spanish tax legislation, given the concept of shared risk which
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characterises the intra-regional dimension of the Concierto, whereby all
three provinces collect revenues to provide the common resources of the
region as a whole (Martínez Bárbara 2013: 74-75). But views differ on whe-
ther strong harmonisation should necessarily require exactly the same tax
rates in each province.
The Concierto law stipulates the harmonisation rules with Spanish tax le-
gislation to which Basque tax legislation is subject and provides the frame-
work to create the necessary bilateral bodies or committees to ensure
bilateral Spanish-Basque coordination over the Concierto. Beyond that, ho-
wever, the Concierto does not address what harmonisation or coordination
between tax systems is required within the Basque region itself between the
three provinces. The Basque Statute of Autonomy (Article 41.2.a), followed
also by the Concierto (Article 3.1.4) and the LTH (Article 14.3), put the role of
designing the framework for intra-regional tax coordination and harmonisa-
tion firmly in the hands of the Basque parliament (Reta 2002: 183-184). The
LTH, under Article 14.3, was the first piece of legislation to give an indication
of the level of tax harmonisation to be required in the Basque region. It sti-
pulated that the Basque provincial assemblies, in exercising their legislative
power over taxation, would ‘regulate uniformly the main elements of the di -
fferent taxes’ (Article 14.3). This gave a clear mandate for inter-provincial
uniformity in at least the main aspects of each tax, which would reduce pro-
vincial autonomy over taxation. Nevertheless, the LTH did not have the final
word on the matter, stating in its Third Transitory Disposition that the stipu-
lations of its Article 14.3 would only be applicable once expressly provided
for in the law on coordination, tax harmonisation and collaboration between
the Basque provinces to be drawn up and approved by the Basque parlia-
ment (Martínez Bárbara 2013: 75-76). 
The Basque law on tax harmonisation eventually materialised as Law
3/1989, of 30 May, on Fiscal Harmonisation, Coordination and Collaboration
(hereafter Basque Tax Harmonisation Law) – which was later reformed in
1998 under Law 4/1998 of 6 March, following the significant increase in tax
legislative capacity afforded to the Basque provinces after the reform of the
Concierto in 1997 (Martínez Bárbara 2013: 76-77; Reta 2002: 184). The provi-
sions of the Law were deliberately vague, given the difficult task of reconci-
ling the tax-raising autonomy of the provinces with the harmonising role of
the regional parliament. The preamble of the 1989 Basque Tax Harmonisa-
tion Law is devoted to discussing the dilemma of striking the right balance.
It refers to the difficulties of defining tax harmonisation without going as far
as uniformity, and to ‘the need to address the issue delicately and be res-
pectful of the competences of the different institutions’ as well as to provide
a flexible mechanism, ‘adaptable to the very dynamic of tax legislation’. In
light of this, it explains the decision taken that the Law would not be com-
prehensive or prescriptive, but rather serve as ‘a framework law’ to lay the
bases for the ‘later development of more concrete and specific aspects’.147
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here: http://noticias.juridicas.com/base_datos/CCAA/pv-l3-1989.html#i 
The Law shies away from prescribing what exactly must be coordinated or
what extent of tax harmonisation is required (given the fine line between
harmonisation and uniformity), instead providing a basic framework subject
to future specification and development. In Article 2, the Law echoes the sti-
pulations in Article 14.3 of the LTH, stating that the provisions issued by the
competent authorities of the historical territories ‘will regulate uniformly the
substantial elements of the different taxes’. And yet the same Article also
stresses that the level of harmonisation reached will still allow different le-
gislative provisions in each of the historical territories, ‘provided that these
guarantee a global equivalent fiscal pressure in the whole autonomous com-
munity’ – without defining what it means by the ambiguous term ‘global
equivalent fiscal pressure’. 
The ambiguity of the Law in terms of its definition of harmonisation, and
also regarding the relative weight it affords to the provinces on the one hand
and the Basque parliament on the other, is also reflected in the conflicting in-
terpretations of it that have ensued among Basque politicians, lawyers and
academics. For most taxes, the Law lists what specific aspects of the tax
should be harmonised going forward, ‘when appropriate’ (cuando proceda).
This has lent itself first and foremost to the interpretation that the harmonisa-
tion of such aspects should be prescribed ex ante in further laws approved by
the Basque parliament, prior to the provinces approving their relevant tax le-
gislation in compliance. The Additional Disposition of 1989 specified that the
Basque parliament should approve within one year of the framework law a
series of draft laws to harmonise the aspects of the taxes listed in Articles 3,
4 and 5. Others, however, have instead suggested the term ‘cuando proceda’
implies that the Basque parliament’s role can be ex post rather than ex ante.
Under this interpretation, the Basque parliament only needs to intervene in
specific cases where any provincial tax measures result in a lack of harmoni-
sation requiring correction (Martínez Bárbara 2013: 77-78, 80; 2014b: 196). 
In any case, the debate has been a theoretical one only, since in practice
the Basque parliament has never debated or approved any harmonisation
laws as foreseen in the framework law of 1989 and the updated version of
1998 (Martínez Bárbara 2013: 80). Thus it did not fulfil the mandate given in
the additional disposition of the framework law of 1989 to approve a series
of harmonisation laws in the following year, nor has it approved any other
harmonisation law since. This inevitably reflects to a large degree the PNV’s
desire to avoid the risk of stirring up unresolved political differences over
the relative weight of the provinces and the Basque regional parliament in
the region’s political setup. Nevertheless, representatives of the three pro-
vinces and Basque regional government have usually managed instead to
reach agreements within the Basque Tax Coordination Body (Órgano de Co-
ordinación Tributaria de Euskadi), also created under the provisions of the
Basque Tax Harmonisation Law, to ensure sufficient harmonisation ex ante
generally to avoid major controversies – thus also reducing the need for the
Basque parliament to intervene with legislation (Martínez Bárbara 2013: 81).
The Basque Tax Coordination Body, which comprises six representatives
(three from Basque government and one from each of the three provinces),
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was envisaged in the Tax Harmonisation Law as a means of ensuring that
the provinces complied with the framework Tax Harmonisation Law and any
future laws on specific aspects of tax harmonisation issued by the Basque
parliament. The framework law stipulated that the provincial governments
would each inform the Tax Coordination Body of any changes they intend
to implement to their tax legislation, which would then issue a report within
a month to determine whether the measure complied with the legislation on
tax harmonisation issued by the Basque parliament. In practice, since no
harmonisation laws to develop the original framework law have ever been
drafted, the framework law – which lists the main aspects of the different
taxes that should be harmonised, but does not provide rules for harmonising
them – is the only benchmark the Tax Coordination Body has to use. The re-
ports issued are non binding, but the provincial authorities have tended to
adhere to them on most occasions. Almost all reforms undertaken by the
Basque provinces of the direct taxes, for which they have legislative com-
petence, have been agreed within the Tax Coordination Body to seek suffi-
cient harmonisation between provinces. The work of the Tax Coordination
Body seeks to ensure that any new tax measures introduced by provincial
government are very similar in each of the three provinces and as a result,
this has usually (but not always) avoided the introduction of tax measures
that could cause a serious lack of harmonisation between provinces. 
The Tax Coordination Body undoubtedly gives a greater voice and veto
power to each provincial authority than they would have in a parliamentary
vote on a tax harmonisation law. For those keen to retain and respect the
traditional fiscal competences of the provincial authorities, the work of the
Tax Coordination Body to achieve agreement between provinces over fiscal
decisions, without the imperative need for intervention by the Basque regio-
nal parliament, has been very positive.148 Inevitably, the fact that there has
usually been a similar constellation of political forces in each of the three
provinces and at regional government level has helped to facilitate agree-
ments. Frequently, the PNV has been in power at regional government level
as well as in all three provinces at once, albeit usually with a minority, and
it has usually been able to ally with the PP and the PSE on fiscal matters to
reach a consensus among the provinces. 
Nevertheless, the issue of inter-provincial tax harmonisation and coordi-
nation has still been a source of significant controversy. Both the lack of legal
relevance of the agreements reached by the Tax Coordination Body and the
lack of definitive laws guiding it have inevitably contributed to: (1) a lack of
legal security for taxpayers on occasion, in cases when conflicts of compe-
tence between provinces have emerged over the collection of certain taxes
(Reta 2002: 180-1); and (2) a risk of inter-provincial tax disharmonisation in the
event of serious disagreements between provinces over tax measures. This
has inevitably resulted in criticisms of the lack of a fully developed legal fra-
mework for the inter-provincial dimension of the Concierto, leading to calls to
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set aside the politically conflictive dimension of the question of the balance of
competences between the provincial and regional levels in order to ensure
first and foremost that the Concierto functions a fully developed legal instru-
ment (e.g. Reta 2002: 189). Recently, Pedro Luis Uriarte, who headed the Bas-
que delegation that negotiated the Concierto agreement of 1981 under the
government of Carlos Garaikoetxeta, expressed the view that the Basque Tax
Harmonisation Law of 1989 not only took too long to be introduced in the
1980s, but that its content remains poor and undeveloped to this day, requiring
a full revision (Uriarte 2015: Pt VIII, 48). This in itself reveals the continued dif-
ferences in perspective within the PNV over the question of the balance of po-
wers between the provincial and regional authorities in taxation matters.
Tax (dis)harmonisation: The controversies
Some provincial tax measures in the past decade, in particular since 2007,
have put the existing, non legally-binding procedures for tax harmonisation
via the Tax Coordination Body to the test to a greater extent than previously
(Martínez Bárbara 2013: 82). This has been fundamentally due to opposition
from Guipúzcoa to certain tax measures which have nevertheless secured
the approval of both Vizcaya and Álava, in large part owing to the longstan-
ding relatively greater weight of left-wing political forces in Guipúzcoa – not
just the Basque Socialists but also more radical left-wing political forces
under EA and the izquierda abertzale (see Table 9, p.174). The izquierda
aberztale is characterised not only by its support for the independence of
Euskal Herria but also by its fundamentally anti-capitalist ideology.     
Understanding why desires for different fiscal policies have emerged
from Guipúzcoa in particular in recent years first requires an understanding
of the different political landscape in each province (see also Table 9, p.174).
Throughout the democratic period, Vizcaya has been the PNV’s stronghold:
it has won every provincial election, consolidating its majority at 22 or 23
seats (out of 51) in each of the four provincial elections since 2003 (2003,
2007, 2011 and 2015). In Álava, the dominant political forces have been the
PNV and the PP, the two of which have alternated in government in the past
decade: in 2003 the PP won, followed by the PNV in 2007, the PP again in
2011, and the PNV again in 2015. Meanwhile, in Guipúzcoa, the predominant
force has usually tended to be the PNV but it has also faced far greater com-
petition (relative to Álava and Vizcaya) from both the Basque Socialists (PSE),
EA (the party which formed following the split within the PNV in 1986), as
well as other more radical left-wing, secessionist political parties grouped
under the izquierda abertzale, an umbrella group which EA would also join
from 2009 onwards. Between 1999 and 2007, the PNV and EA had formed a
stable alliance and presented a joint coalition candidature at elections at re-
gional and provincial level to strengthen the nationalist camp and fend off
the threat to nationalist dominance from the Basque Socialists, but increa-
sing differences between the parties – not least on fiscal and social matters
– led the coalition alliance to split from 2007 when EA decided to go it alone
at the provincial and municipal elections that year. From then onwards it em-
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phasised its left-wing credentials more as it moved closer to the secessionist
izquierda abertzale, which it allied with from 2009 onwards as ETA moved
closer to a definitive ceasefire. At the 2011 provincial elections, the izquierda
abertzale would triumph for the first time in Guipúzcoa under the new coa-
lition Bildu, which included EA. Bildu was a formation bringing together par-
ties of the izquierda abertzale spearheaded by Sortu, the new lead political
party of the izquierda abertzale formed in 2011, following the outlawing of
the previous lead party Batasuna in 2003 by the Spanish authorities on ac-
count of its links to ETA (see Terminology section, Chapter 1, pp.36-37).  
This stronger left-wing presence in Guipúzcoa has had a significant im-
pact on political alliances in the province and the behaviour of the PNV there.
Throughout the Basque region, at both regional and provincial levels of go-
vernment, the winning party has never usually won an outright majority of
seats, raising the constant need for formal coalitions or more informal
alliance arrangements to push policies through parliament. In general terms,
the PNV and the PP in the Basque region as a whole are usually quite closely
aligned on fiscal policy, since the PNV is fundamentally a centre-right party
in its fiscal policies. Nevertheless, the PNV often appears almost centre-left
in its social policies, since the fact that the Concierto gives the region higher
per capita resource levels (relative to the rest of Spain) means that the party
has often been able to combine essentially right-wing fiscal policies with
more generous social policies than might normally be expected of a centre-
right party. Since the Basque Socialists, the PSE, are left-of-centre rather than
a radical left party, collaboration between the PNV and the PSE on fiscal and
social policy has also often been possible in the Basque region, especially
given the PNV’s afore-described mix of centre-right and centre-left dimen-
sions. However, specifically in the province of Guipúzcoa, the relative
strength of more extreme left-wing parties under the izquierda abertzale has
had several consequences for party alliances and behaviour. Left-wing allian-
ces against the PNV and the PP have emerged on occasion in Guipúzcoa,
more so than in Álava or Vizcaya. Since the PSE in Guipúzcoa is more ac-
customed to the political presence of the izquierda abertzale than the Socia-
lists elsewhere in the Basque region, it initially proved more inclined to work
with them on social issues when the izquierda abertzale won power in the
province in 2011 under its coalition Bildu to govern for the first time. Indeed,
some former leading members of the PSE from Guipúzcoa, most notably
Jesús Eguiguren, have envisioned a nationalist, left-wing alliance incorpo-
rating the PSE as the way forward for the Basque Country (Eguiguren 2014:
114-115). This, in turn, has also meant that the PNV in Guipúzcoa has had to
be more careful than the PNV elsewhere not to alienate the PSE, EA and the
izquierda abertzale, since there is an increased risk they could ally together
against the PNV. PNV leaders in Guipúzcoa tend to be more inclined to want
to work towards a relationship with the izquierda abertzale than their colle-
agues in Vizcaya and Álava.149
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149 This was evident in the contrasting opinions expressed by Joseba Egibar (Guipúzcoa)
on the one hand and Andoni Ortuzar (Vizcaya) on the other, in interviews held on 8 April 2014
and 10 April 2014, respectively. 
Experiences of tax disharmonisation (1): 2007 corporation tax reform
The different political dynamics in Guipúzcoa compared to Álava and Viz-
caya became clear in 2007 when difficulties emerged in securing Guipúzcoa’s
approval for the corporation tax reform of 2007 (Martínez Bárbara 2013: 82-
84).150 This was the first significant overhaul of corporation tax in the Basque
region since 1996. Tough negotiations within the Tax Coordination Body re-
sulted in each provincial representative agreeing the same new corporation
tax regulation (reflecting the minimum parameters that all could agree on),
which was given the green light by the Tax Coordination Committee at a ses-
sion on 1 February 2007. Among other changes, this set the general rate of
Corporation Tax at 28%. The reform was one spearheaded by the PNV, which
at the time led the Basque regional government, the Vizcayan provincial go-
vernment, and the Guipúzcoan provincial government (in all cases the PNV
was at the time the lead partner in a stable coalition with EA, since the two
parties had presented a joint candidature at the previous regional and pro-
vincial elections). It also had the backing of the PP governing in Álava. In the
following weeks, the three provincial governments approved their respective
new draft corporation tax regulations and submitted them to the provincial
assemblies for debate, amendment and approval. Álava and Vizcaya both
approved their respective regulations in March, but in Guipúzcoa, with a dif-
ferent correlation of political forces in the provincial assembly, various
groups opposed what they considered too low a general corporation tax
rate, thus preventing approval of the regulation. It was therefore withdrawn
in March and, given the proximity of the provincial elections, the reform of
corporation tax remained pending until the new provincial government and
assembly were formed.
The 2007 provincial elections followed, which resulted in the PNV forming
a coalition government in Guipúzcoa with EA for the provincial government
term 2011-2015. This had certainly not been a foregone conclusion: the PNV
and EA had presented separate candidatures at the 2007 elections after the
breakup of their longstanding alliance, and following the elections, which
the PNV won with a relative majority, EA had debated whether it would form
a coalition government with the PNV to enable the latter to govern or whe-
ther it would ally instead with the PSE against the PNV. A coalition with the
PNV was agreed, but as part of the deal, the crucial role of Guipúzcoan tre-
asury minister was assigned to EA (a position assumed by Peio González)
and fiscal policy would become one of the main sources of contention bet-
ween the coalition partners throughout the government term.151 As the fi-
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150 To my knowledge, Martínez Bárbara (2013: 82-84) is the only author to have addressed
this controversy in any detail. Her primarily technical account of the discrepancies in proposed
corporation tax rates is complemented here by further analysis of the political dynamics of the
debate gathered from extensive reading of mainly Basque newspaper reports from the time,
especially in El Correo, El Diario Vasco, Noticias de Guipúzcoa, Gara, as well as Spanish news-
papers such as El País.  
151 See, for example, ‘Pello González calienta las elecciones y arremete contra la gestión
foral de su socio, el PNV’, diariovasco.com, 18.04.11.
nancial crisis set in, the desire for more left-wing tax policies in Guipúzcoa
would make tax harmonisation between the three provinces increasingly dif-
ficult over major taxes such as corporation tax, personal income tax and we-
alth tax.
With the question of corporation tax reform still pending in Guipúzcoa,
the new PNV-EA coalition government proceeded to propose a new corpo-
ration tax reform in September 2007 putting the general corporation tax rate
at 30%, though the Guipúzcoan treasury argued that in practice the gap bet-
ween this and the agreed 28% rate was offset by differences in corporation
tax incentives and deductions being offered to businesses in relation to in-
novation and the environment. This was designed first and foremost to sa-
tisy coalition partner EA (not the PNV, which was more supportive of
harmonisation with the other provinces) and was also expected to count on
the support of the PSE in the provincial assembly. Meanwhile, the provincial
governments of Álava and Vizcaya continued to maintain that Guipúzcoa
should respect the agreement reached within and approved by the Tax Co-
ordination Committee. The 30% proposal nevertheless still failed to get pas-
sed in the Guipúzcoan assembly, and eventually, a year later, in December
2008, the provincial assembly of Guipúzcoa approved a corporation tax re-
form with a general corporation tax rate of 28% (Norma Foral 8/2008 de 23
de diciembre), i.e. the rate previously agreed and approved by all parties to
the Tax Coordination Committee back on 1 February 2007. EA, the coalition
partner which in 2007 had been reluctant to agree to the 28% rate, had chan-
ged its stance in 2008 given that the 30% proposal it supported had been re-
jected by the Guipúzcoan assembly and the existing 32.6% was widely
accepted as too high, leaving the only possibility to negotiate the 28% with
the PNV and seek the support or abstention of the PP in the Guipúzcoan as-
sembly, though it still maintained some of its own specific incentives to en-
courage innovation and employment creation and maintenance, in an
attempt to increase the societal benefit of business. 
Experiences of tax disharmonisation (2): 2008 wealth tax reform
A similar situation occurred with the reform of wealth tax (impuesto sobre
patrimonio), though in this case the extent of disharmonisation was more
substantial  (Martínez Bárbara 2013: 84-85).152 In December 2008, both the
provincial assemblies of Vizcaya and Álava passed regulations to abolish the
wealth tax. Both provincial governments had previously submitted their draft
proposals to the Tax Coordination Body in October that year, which had is-
sued a favourable report. At the same meeting, the representative of Gui-
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152 As per the above, to my knowledge, Martínez Bárbara (2013: 84-85) is the only author to
have addressed this controversy in any detail. Her primarily technical account of the discrep-
ancies in proposed wealth tax reforms is complemented here by further analysis of the political
dynamics of the debate gathered from extensive reading of Basque newspaper reports from
the time, especially in El Correo, El Diario Vasco, Noticias de Guipúzcoa, Gara, as well as Spanish
newspaper El País.  
púzcoa had indicated that the province had not yet taken a decision on the
matter. The province would come under significant pressure at this and sub-
sequent meetings of the Tax Coordination Body to eliminate the wealth tax
in order to harmonise with the other two provinces.153 Eventually Guipúzcoa
abolished the tax a year later, via a provincial regulation approved in Decem-
ber 2009. Nevertheless, in early 2010, when the time came to settle the final
contributions made by the provinces to the regional government for 2009
(once the revenue collection figures for the year were known), an inter-pro-
vincial dispute emerged due to the impact of this tax disharmonisation
throughout 2009 on the amount each province was due to contribute to the
regional government. 
Given the way that provincial contributions to the regional government
are calculated, if one province raises a tax that the other two provinces do
not raise, this increases the total revenues raised and thereby increases the
share that each of the three provinces must pay to the regional govern-
ment.154 This is because the provinces contribute to the 70% of revenues that
go to the regional government according to their respective horizontal coef-
ficients. In this instance, since Guipúzcoa had raised 45 million euros in we-
alth tax in 2009, this disadvantaged Vizcaya in particular, increasing its total
contribution payment due by around 15.8 million (50% of the 70% contribu-
tion for that tax). Given that neither Vizcaya nor Álava had collected any we-
alth tax, this situation had arisen due to the lack of harmonisation over the
tax and the lack of flexibility of the contributions’ model to adapt to tax dis-
harmonisation between provinces. In the absence of an agreement between
Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa (both PNV-led) over how to resolve the matter, the
then Socialist-led Basque regional government mediated at the meeting of
the Basque Council of Public Finances in February 2010, where the final con-
tribution payment of each province to the regional government for 2009 was
to be agreed. The solution reached was a final adjustment to the contribution
payments whereby instead of Vizcaya’s theoretical 15.8 million contribution
would be covered instead by a one-off special contribution of 8.1 million
euros from the Basque regional government itself, 7.4 million euros from
the provincial government of Guipúzcoa and 300,000 euros from the provin-
cial government of Álava (which still ended up making a contribution to
cover Vizcaya while also paying its own share, for other reasons).155
The heads of the provincial governments of Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa, José
Luis Bilbao and Markel Olano respectively, both of the PNV, publically cele-
brated the agreement as one showing the ability of the representatives of
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153 For example, ‘Álava aprueba el Impuesto de Patrimonio y le pide a Guipúzcoa que “re-
nuncie a sus propuestas”’, elEconomista.es, 23.11.2011.
154 Personal interviews with senior officials in the Vizcayan provincial treasury department,
2014.
155 For example, ‘El Gobierno vasco y Guipúzcoa ceden ante Vizcaya y le perdonan 16 mil-
lones’, elcorreo.com, 13.02.10; ‘El gobierno vasco salva un enfrentamiento entre Vizcaya y
Guipúzcoa por Patrimonio’, 12.02.10; ‘La ronda la paga el Gobierno’, elpais.com (Basque edi-
tion), 22.02.2014.
the provinces and the regional government to reach an ‘intelligent’ and ‘sen-
sible’ agreement within the Basque Council of Public Finances, citing this an
example of how well the Council works.156 Nevertheless, it was clear that Viz-
caya had won the battle. It had become clear that given the way the contri-
bution law works, it essentially imposes tax uniformity or very strong
harmonisation since Guipúzcoa could not fully reap the financial benefits if
it decided to have additional taxes or higher tax rates, as it would have to
compensate the other provinces. Olano made declarations acknowledging
that it had become clear one province could not have a different tax from
the other two, yet he also added that he had specifically requested that this
additional financial contribution from Guipúzcoa in lieu of Vizcaya to the re-
gional government be taken into account when the Basque regional govern-
ment applied its anti-crisis plan to the province.157 In other words, rather than
Guipúzcoa simply paying extra to the regional pot on account of the fact that
it was the only province to have raised a wealth tax, it was hoped that some
of that extra payment would be re-invested back into the province. 
Despite Olano’s attempts to put a positive gloss on the matter, significant
dissatisfaction voiced from other parties represented in Guipúzcoa drew 
attention to the contentious nature of the outcome and the ongoing contro-
versies over the contributions’ model, the inter-provincial tax harmonisation
requirements, and the ambiguous balance of competences between provin-
ces and the regional level. While members of the PNV praised the agreement
as a good solution, the PP focused on criticism of Guipúzcoa’s lack of tax
harmonisation in the first place, criticising the PNV-EA coalition for creating
problems to detract from their poor tax collection in general. The reaction
of left-wing EA and various radical left-wing parties under the izquierda
abertzale (Aralar, Alternatiba, etc.), however, was very different. They con-
demned Guipúzcoa’s ‘loss’ of 7.4 million euros on account of the fact that
Vizcaya had not collected the wealth tax, criticising the discrepancy between
the supposed fiscal autonomy of each province and the imposition of fiscal
harmonisation.158
The question of the 7.4 million payment would become one of the many
thorns in the relationship between the PNV and EA coalition partners in Gui-
púzcoa over fiscal and social policy, since EA treasury minister Peio González
was very critical of the lack of guarantee from the regional government that
the extra money paid by Guipúzcoa to it would be reinvested in the
province.159 Thus he echoed the stance of radical left-wing parties in the re-
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156 For example, ‘Vizcaya recibirá 15,8 millones para compensar su aportación al Impuesto
de Patrimonio’, elcorreo.com, 12.02.10. 
157 For example, ‘Vizcaya recibirá 15,8 millones para compensar su aportación al Impuesto
de Patrimonio’, elcorreo.com, 12.02.10; ‘Olano se felicita del acuerdo del CVF para compensar
a Vizcaya por la recaudación del Impuesto de Patrimonio en Guipúzcoa’, Europa Press, 16.02.10.
158 ‘Olano se felicita del acuerdo del CVF para compensar a Vizcaya por la recaudación del
Impuesto de Patrimonio en Guipúzcoa’, Europa Press, 16.02.10.
159 For example, ‘Pello González calienta las elecciones y arremete contra la gestión foral
de su socio, el PNV’, diariovasco.com, 18.04.11.
gion, which maintained that Guipúzcoa should reap the benefits if it chose
to implement higher or additional taxes in comparison with other provinces.
Debates emerged as to whether the agreement reached to settle the contri-
bution payments within the Basque Council of Public Finances was even
legal, with calls for an urgent revision of the LTH to clarify contradictions as
to the respective role of the provinces and regions and also of the contribu-
tion law to rectify its shortcomings.
Experiences of tax disharmonisation (3): Bildu provincial government 2011-2015
Such debates between provinces over tax harmonisation became stron-
ger still following the triumph of the Bildu coalition in the 2011 provincial
elections in Guipúzcoa. This marked the first time the izquierda abertzale –
with which EA had by then joined forces, breaking ties with the PNV – would
win power at provincial level in the Basque Country. After Bildu had formed
a minority government in Guipúzcoa, it would seek an ally in the PSE and
Aralar (the latter of which would later join the Bildu coalition) to push
through its fiscal reform in Gizpuzkoa in December 2011, to take effect from
2012, which fundamentally affected three taxes: personal income tax (IRPF),
inheritance tax (Sucesiones y Donaciones) and wealth tax (Patrimonio).160
The main changes to these included, for example, introducing higher IRPF
rates for the highest earners (applying to incomes from 90,000 euros up-
wards); eliminating the existing exemption to inheritance tax when the reci-
pient of the inheritance is a direct descendent; and reinstating a wealth tax.
In all cases, taxation would be higher in Guipúzcoa than in neighbouring Viz-
caya and Álava under the fiscal reforms both introduced at the same time.
For example, Vizcaya and Álava also reintroduced wealth tax, but they would
both set the same, higher minimum tax-exempt amounts (800,000 euros,
plus 400,000 per main residence) than Guipúzcoa (600,000 euros, plus
300,000 per main residence).161 Guipúzcoa would once again come under at-
tack from PP and PNV representatives in Álava and Vizcaya, which accused
it of taking unilateral decisions with regard to some taxes, without proper
discussion in the Basque Tax Coordination Body beforehand and without its
backing. In the Guipúzcoan assembly, the PP voted against the changes to
all three taxes while the PNV voted against the changes to IRPF and other
taxes apart from Inheritance tax, where it abstained. A definitive left-wing
alliance between both secessionist (izquierda abertzale) and anti-secessionist
(PSE) forces thus seemed underway, with the left-right dimension of political
competition (fiscal and social policy) taking precedence in terms of alliance-
building over the territorial question of the Basque Country’s relationship to
Spain. 
194
160 For example, ‘Bildu y PSE sacan adelante la reforma fiscal para Guipúzcoa’, diariovasco.com,
23.12.11.
161 ‘Euskadi hace su reforma fiscal de urgencia, en que los guipuzcoanos pagarán más’, elE-
conomista.es, 23.11.11.
The fiscal reforms implemented by all three provinces at the end of 2011,
to take effect from 2012, were intended to be urgent reforms to respond to
the crisis but  temporary in nature, until a more coordinated and compre-
hensive reform could be agreed and approved between the three provinces.
Given the different direction that Bildu had taken with the support of the PSE
in Guipúzcoa, there were concerns among the PNV and the PP that a coor-
dinated and harmonised fiscal reform between the three provinces would
be extremely difficult. In 2012, Bildu would continue to make proposals sho-
wing its more left-wing agenda. For example, the Guipúzcoan treasury mi-
nister Helena Franco and other members of Bildu in key treasury positions
would take a heavily critical stance in 2012 towards the PNV’s longstanding
‘neoliberal’ use of corporation tax rates and panoply of exemptions, deduc-
tions and other incentives. They would accuse the PNV of a long tradition of
‘fiscal dumping’ by providing a consistently lower tax environment for bu-
sinesses in the Basque Country relative to the situation in the rest of Spain.162
They made it clear that they wished to overhaul corporation tax by simplif-
ying it, first and foremost by eliminating most of the deductions and incen-
tives except where they would be linked to the creation and maintenance of
employment in Guipúzcoa, to ensure business benefitted society. For such
measures, Bildu hoped in 2012 that it would continue to be able to count on
the PSE in Guipúzcoa for support, following the precedent set at the end of
2011.  
Nevertheless, a fundamental change in political alliances in Guipúzcoa
would soon occur as a result of developments at regional government level.
In 2012, the Basque regional elections returned the PNV to office after three
years in opposition to a PSE-PP coalition government. As a minority govern-
ment, the PNV initially struggled to govern alone without a stable alliance
arrangement with any other party. The tables then turned in 2013 when it fi-
nally struck a deal with the PSE, agreeing a full fiscal reform package with
the latter (a reform which would also ultimately receive the support of the
PP too), in return for which a deal was struck between the PNV and PSE to
form alliances in the regional parliament and three provincial governments
thereafter. After an unusual period of PSE-PP coalition to keep the PNV out
of office in 2009-2012, 2013 thus saw a return to a more traditional PNV-PSE
collaboration. Throughout the Basque region, the PSE was thereafter subject
to the fiscal pact agreed with the PNV for the following three years. In other
words, the PSE in Guipúzcoa, which had until then been allying with Bildu
on matters of fiscal policy, now had to change tack and ally with the PNV
(and also the PP) to ensure the fiscal reform agreed at Basque government
level was also approved in the Guipúzcoan assembly, since it is the provinces
that are responsible for changing and implementing fiscal legislation.163
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162 Personal interviews with Helena Franco and Itziar Miner, 5 September 2014; and with
Xabier Olano, 29 May 2014. See also Olano 2002.
163 For example, ‘La oposición impone a Bildu la reforma fiscal en Guipúzcoa’, Expansión,
15.01.2014.
The potential risk of further inter-provincial tax disharmonisation pro-
blems, stemming from the desire for more left-wing policies from the Gui-
púzcoan provincial government, was thus cut short and the main parties in
opposition in the province (PNV, PSE and PP) pushed through the fiscal re-
form agreed at regional level in the provincial assembly too, against the in-
terests of the minority Bildu provincial government. After the episodes of
disharmonisation experienced since 2007, a return to a period of relatively
more harmonised and harmonious fiscal relations between the three pro-
vinces then looked set to ensue from 2015, when the provincial elections put
the PNV back in government in all three provinces and resulted in stable
PNV-PSE coalition or support arrangements throughout the whole region.
THE IMPLICATIONS FOR POLITICAL RELATIONS AND TERRITORIAL AGENDAS
Decision-making and coordination relative to the Concierto between re-
gional and provincial levels has worked reasonably well in general since the
1980s, despite the absence of a more concrete legal framework and the am-
biguities and shortcomings of the existing legislation, fundamentally the
contribution laws and the Tax Harmonisation Law. Recent years have never-
theless pointed to the pressure that the system is under, particularly at times
when different political forces with different agendas are dominant in diffe-
rent provinces. Disputes over both the intra-regional distribution of tax re-
venues and the level of tax harmonisation required between the three
provinces have put the spotlight on the longstanding, unresolved debate re-
garding the balance of powers between the regional and provincial levels
and also among the provinces themselves – one of the most politically com-
plicated and controversial areas of Basque politics, particularly for the PNV. 
For the PNV, longstanding internal discrepancies within the party over
the balance between provincial and regional levels of government, combi-
ned with the heterogeneity of the party in different provinces, have contri-
buted to the party’s moderation since such complexity makes it difficult for
it to make strategic shifts in position. This situation has contributed to the
party’s continued strong defence of the weight of the provincial level within
the region and as the fundamental basis of the Concierto. The different te-
rritorial interests within the PNV have also resulted in internal debates over
the relationship to the izquierda abertzale, given the varying strength of the
izquierda abertzale in different provinces (its strongest presence is in Gui-
púzcoa), and therefore the need for different alliance arrangements and com-
petition tactics in different provinces. Overall, however, what emerges
strongly is a sense of incompatibility between the PNV and EH Bildu on fiscal
and social matters. The discrepancies between the PNV and the izquierda
abertzale over fiscal policy and the Concierto which emerged during 2011-
2015 suggest wider implications for possible alliances (or a lack thereof) bet-
ween them going forward. As the nationalist or secessionist parties in the
region, they both share a desire for sovereignty for the Basque region but
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with considerable differences in their territorial goals and proposals and also
very different fiscal and social agendas. The experience of the izquierda
abertzale entering seriously into formal politics for the first time and with
significant political presence, governing at provincial level in Guipúzcoa in
2011-2015, drew attention to the differences between the PNV and the iz-
quierda abertzale on issues of fiscal and social policy, particularly the use of
the fiscal powers afforded by the Concierto, with Bildu accusing the PNV of
a neoliberal use of the latter. In attempting to seek allies within the PSE to
make changes to personal income tax and wealth tax in 2012 and subse-
quently corporation tax too in 2013, Bildu sought to distance itself from the
PNV and to carve out a different fiscal vision for the Basque Country starting
in Guipúzcoa, preferring to ally with the Basque federation of a leftwing sta-
tewide party (the PSOE) rather than a centre-right nationalist party.
Ultimately, Bildu’s efforts were thwarted on that occasion by the regional
alliance arrangement sealed between the PNV and the PSE in 2013, which
put an end to Bildu-PSE collaboration on fiscal issues in Guipúzcoa. The
alliance deal saw the PNV and PSE agree a pact on fiscal reform to address
the crisis, which has been described as arguably the first ever proper fiscal
reform in the Basque region, in that it was designed specifically for the re-
gion and preceded its Spanish counterpart, rather than providing a close
version of a fiscal reform previously introduced in Spain but with lower rates
for the Basque region (Zubiri 2014b: 89). Bildu treasury representatives argue
that the work they did with the PSE from Guipúzcoa helped to pave the way
for a proper fiscal reform in the Basque region, albeit not exactly the one
that Bildu would have wanted. Bildu treasury representatives at the time
suggested that their PSE counterparts seemed noticeably uncomfortable
with the change in alliances and fiscal policy agreements, withdrawing from
debates in the provincial assembly on fiscal policy rather than actively par-
ticipating in them, since their hands were tied.164 In these circumstances,
Bildu did not rule out the possibility of reestablishing a left-wing collabora-
tion with the PSE against the PNV and the PP again in the future, seeing the
PSE as its more natural ally on fiscal and social policy, albeit still a left-of-
centre party rather than a radically left-wing one like Bildu.165 Bildu subse-
quently lost power in the province at the 2015 provincial elections, but a
precedent of Bildu-PSE collaboration in Guipúzcoa had nevertheless been
set. The rise of Podemos in the Basque region from 2015 provided another
potential left-wing ally for Bildu and one which is further to the left than the
PSE, though some of Podemos’ success in 2015 and 2016 has come at Bildu’s
expense.  
In addition to the discrepancies over left-right politics that emerged
through the PNV’s and Bildu’s contrasting use of the fiscal powers afforded
by the Concierto, their attitudes towards the Concierto also manifested the
197
164 Personal interview with Helena Franco and Itziar Miner, 5 September 2014.
165 Personal interview with Helena Franco and Itziar Miner, 5 September 2014. 
differences in their territorial goals regarding the Basque Country and its re-
lationship to Spain. Bildu’s criticism of the Concierto as an insufficient basis
for proper self-government clearly differed from the PNV’s praise of the Con-
cierto as the closest current equivalent to the form of ‘bilateral relationship
between equals’ that the PNV seeks in wider Spanish-Basque political rela-
tions. Certainly, the PNV shares with Bildu many of its frustrations over the
Concierto and its ‘limitations’: both political forces consider it very positive
that they have almost full legislative autonomy over direct taxes but criticise
the lack of Basque autonomy over indirect taxes and the fight against tax
fraud, as well as the lack of Basque authority over other areas of competence
crucial to the economy and financial sector such as financial system regula-
tion, society security and labour relations.166 In all these cases, the Basques
remain subject to Spanish legislation. Nevertheless, while the PNV and Bildu
agree on the fact that these are shortcomings, the PNV under Urkullu has
not shared Bildu’s sense of urgency to progress these matters. 
In the view of Helena Franco, Gizpuzkoan treasury minister for Bildu in
2011-2015, in a personal interview with the author in 2014, ‘At a theoretical
level, we in Bildu and the PNV might be in agreement on what still needs to
be done to develop the Concierto, but the practice is another matter. […] Ul-
timately, a part of Basque nationalism represented by the PNV seems quite
comfortable with the Concierto despite its limitations, while for another,
more sovereignty-orientated part of Basque nationalism it seems clearly in-
sufficient to us to guarantee the future of this country.’ Franco cited the
example of the attempts by Bildu in Guipúzcoa to make a push in 2014 at
the Basque Council for Public Finances for a new body to work on establis-
hing a common position between the three provincial governments and the
Basque regional government vis-à-vis negotiations with the Spanish state
on questions of ‘economic sovereignty’, with two particularly urgent topics
on the agenda: (1) discrepancies with the Spanish state over the quota
(which, as of late 2015, had prevented the settlement of any annual quota
payments since 2007 and prevented the agreement of a new five-yearly
quota law for the period from 2012 onwards, resulting in the rolling over of
the 2007-2011 law; see also Chapter 4 pp.135); and (2) discrepancies over
the VAT adjustment between Spain and the Basque Country. Bildu proposed
the creation of this new body at the February 2014 meeting of the Basque
Council of Public Finances, but according to Franco, despite the theoretical
agreement between all representatives present (of the provinces and the re-
gional government), subsequently the PNV-led regional government that
presides over the Council showed ‘little interest’ in putting the body into
practice and holding meetings, unless forced to in response to press releases
or parliamentary questions from Bildu.167
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166 The perceived shortcomings of the Concierto listed by Juan José Ibarretxe in an inter-
view on 28 October 2014 closely matched those listed by Helena Franco and Xabier Olano, in-
terviewed on 5 September 2014 and 29 May 2014 respectively.
167 Personal interview with Helena Franco and Itziar Miner, 5 September 2014.
Although the PNV was dissatisfied with the ongoing lack of agreement
over the quota payments and quota law, it tended to adopt more of a ‘wait
and see’ approach. When interviewed by this author in 2014, one PNV re-
presentative seemed noticeably unconcerned about the matter, suggesting
that it would likely be resolved following the 2015 Spanish general election.
At the time, it was anticipated that one of the two main statewide parties
(the PSOE or the PP, but most probably the latter) would win again but wi-
thout an outright majority, and the PNV representative in question thus an-
ticipated a reopening of the possibility for the PNV to strike deals over
unresolved issues such as the quota in return for giving its support to the
ruling Spanish party in the Spanish parliament on other matters. Such an
attitude reflects the ongoing view among a significant proportion of the PNV
that since the Concierto is safeguarded from unilateral Spanish action by its
bilateral nature, the most feasible way forward regarding any stalemates
continues to be to strike deals when Madrid needs the PNV’s support on
other matters – as has happened on numerous occasions since the first mi-
nority Spanish government of the democratic period was formed in 1996
(see Chapter 4). In this way, the Concierto continues to encourage accom-
modationist behaviour on the part of the PNV today.  
Bildu’s period of government in Guipúzcoa in 2011-2015 thus put the spo-
tlight on differences between the PNV and the izquierda abertzale over the
Concierto, in terms of their views on both the desired fiscal and socioeco-
nomic model for the Basque Country, and whether or not the Concierto itself
provides a suitable starting point to develop Basque self-government. Bildu
sought on many an occasion to stress these differences publically, aiming
to differentiate itself clearly from the PNV as they compete with one another
to lead a pro-sovereignty process in the Basque Country. PNV representati-
ves, on the other hand, downplayed these differences. For example, they
suggested that Bildu over-emphasised and even exaggerated its discrepan-
cies with the PNV on fiscal policy as a short-term competition tactic only, but
that ultimately it was highly unlikely the izquierda abertzale would seek a
longer-term social pact with the Socialists, a statewide party, given their in-
compatibility on the national and territorial question.168 They also suggested
that practical experience of being in government in Guipúzcoa had served
to soften the strength of Bildu’s anti-capitalist ideology, making it increa-
singly difficult for the izquierda abertzale to claim genuinely that it was car-
ving out a radically different fiscal and social path for the Basque region to
that of the PNV. 
Whether or not there was a degree of short-termism in Bildu’s behaviour,
however, it still revealed the extent to which the izquierda abertzale is in
strong competition with the PNV, with both seeking to be the dominant na-
tionalist force in the region. For now at least, this has contributed to reducing
the possibilities for collaboration between the two to advance a sovereignty
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168 For example, personal interview with Joseba Egibar, 8 April 2014.
agenda together for the Basque Country, though it remains to be seen whe-
ther this will continue to be the case going forward given the constantly evol-
ving political landscape.
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CHAPTER 7
FROM THE COMMON SYSTEM TO THE
QUEST FOR A FISCAL PACT AND BEYOND:
HOW REGIONAL FINANCING HAS 
INFLUENCED CDC’S TERRITORIAL 
AGENDA

Given the longstanding dissatisfaction in Catalonia with the region’s tre-
atment under the common financing system, Catalan politicians of different
political affiliations have made repeated calls for a form of bilateral fiscal
pact akin to the Basque Concierto in recent decades, in particular since the
late 1990s. The impasse over regional financing has become one of the key
factors contributing to the deterioration in Spanish-Catalan relations in re-
cent years, particularly in the wake of the financial crisis, which has given
rise to a context of unprecedented pressure on resources. In this context,
the aim of this chapter is to examine how and when the issue of regional fi-
nancing has contributed to shaping shifts in the territorial agenda of CDC.
While some consideration will be given to the period from the Transition on-
wards, the main focus will be on the period from the late 1990s onwards,
starting with the then Catalan president Jordi Pujol’s first explicit shift to-
wards support for a form of fiscal pact in 1998. What explains this turning
point? Why have repeated reforms of the regional financing system, both
before and since then, failed to satisfy CDC despite the leading role
CDC/CiU169 played in negotiating each reform? What role did dissatisfaction
with regional financing play in the quest for a new regional statute for Cata-
lonia and the statute reform negotiations? Why did the 2006 statute reform
fail to resolve the issue of regional financing? And what role has the dissa-
tisfaction with regional financing played in the rapid rise in citizen support
for independence in recent years and CDC’s shift towards a pro-indepen-
dence agenda?        
The debate over the regional financing system in Catalonia has been a
symptom of, and indeed overtaken by, a broader clash between the Spanish
and Catalan governments that is not primarily economic in nature, for the
Catalan pro-independence movement is concerned more widely with secu-
ring sovereignty for Catalonia, and thereby also equality in Catalonia’s rela-
tions with Spain. In this regard, identity factors related to culture and
language, which have traditionally characterised the Catalan nationalist mo-
vement since its nineteenth century origins or even earlier (see Smith 2014),
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169 No differentiation is made in this chapter between the attitudes of CDC and UDC towards
regional financing over the years since this issue in one on which they generally held the same
views while together as a party federation until their split in 2015, as confirmed by party repre-
sentatives when interviewed in 2015 and 2016.
remain a fundamental driver. Nevertheless, demands for the reform of re-
gional financing have been a major theme of Catalan political debate for
more than a decade, thus preceding the recent context of major economic
recession. In a context of longstanding calls from different parties in Catalo-
nia for a better financing deal for Catalonia, this chapter investigates the
evolving attitudes of CDC/CiU towards regional financing and the factors that
have shaped this, as well as how central the issue has been to its articulation
of sovereignty ideas. It is argued that problems with the regional financing
system (in conjunction with the relative lack of Spanish state investment in
Catalonia)170 have played a significant role in shaping and accelerating the
rise of pro-sovereignty sentiment in general in Catalonia, including CDC’s
shift away from accommodationism and towards a pro-independence
agenda. And yet CDC’s demand for a fiscal pact has not always been entirely
clear or committed, thus raising the question of what has driven the party
to make more coherent proposals for a fiscal pact at certain times rather than
others. The chapter is structured in order to analyse four key processes that
have influenced CDC/CiU’s evolving attitudes towards regional financing,
namely the design of regional financing during the Transition, the politics of
accommodationism, the Catalan statute reform, and the financial crisis of
2007-2008 and its aftermath.  
THE DEBATE OVER REGIONAL FINANCING DURING THE TRANSITION
The question of whether or not CDC actually wanted a Concierto-style
arrangement for Catalonia during the Transition – in other words, a system
based on the region raising most of its own taxes – has been subject to con-
siderable dispute and mythologising. Catalonia did not benefit from any spe-
cial recognition in the Spanish Constitution akin to the ‘historical rights’ of
the foral territories recognised in the First Additional Disposition for the Bas-
que Country and Navarre, which made it much more difficult for the region
to seek different treatment. Nevertheless, some members of the PNV have
long argued, based on the recollections of their negotiations with their Ca-
talan counterparts at the time, that CDC was averse to seeking a Concierto-
style arrangement in any case, suggesting that Miquel Roca and other
representatives of the party were wary of the risk of collecting their own
taxes (as well as the fact that such a task could make them unpopular with
their citizens), and that they also thought the Concierto was outdated.171
Pedro Luis Uriarte, for example, recalls a meeting in mid- to late-1980 bet-
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170 The main focus in this chapter is on the regional financing system per se rather than
state spending on infrastructure, but some references will be made to the latter since the two
issues go hand in hand from the Catalan perspective and are usually raised in tandem as griev-
ances, given that Catalonia is perceived to be unfairly treated in both regards. For the Catalanist
view on Spain’s overly centralised infrastructure network and its use as a nationbuilding tool,
see Bel 2012 and 2015: 112-139.
171 Personal interviews with current and former PNV representatives, 2014.
ween himself (then Basque economy minister), Jaime García Añoveros (then
Spanish treasury minister) and Ramón Trias Fargas (then CDC economy mi-
nister for Catalonia), after CiU had won the first Catalan elections earlier that
year. At said meeting, according to Uriarte, García Añoveros offered Trias
Fargas the opportunity of a Concierto-type arrangement shortly before the
first regional financing law (LOFCA) was due to be approved, taking advan-
tage of the fact that this was to include additional dispositions for the Basque
Concierto and Navarran Convenio, but Trias Fargas turned down the offer
(Uriarte 2015: Pt V 101-103). 
Pujol and many others within CDC have nevertheless rejected sugges-
tions that CDC turned down the possibility of a Concierto during the Transi-
tion, arguing that it was not given the opportunity. Pujol himself says he was
called in the late 1970s by then Spanish prime minister Adolfo Suárez, de-
puty primer minister Manuel Gutiérrez Mellado and minister Joaquin Garri-
gues (the latter also a good friend of Pujol) to assure him that the Basque
and Catalan regions would both be granted autonomy statutes with distinc-
tive features. He recalls being told that while the distinctive feature of Basque
autonomy would be the Concierto, that of Catalan autonomy would be the
Catalan language, and a Concierto-style arrangement for Catalonia would
not be possible.172 It is well documented and acknowledged that CDC and
UDC did still make an attempt to secure a Concierto-style arrangement du-
ring the regional statute negotiations of the late 1970s, but they failed not
only due to opposition from the UCD Spanish government but also, impor-
tantly, since they were constrained by the parliamentary predominance of
the primarily left-wing statewide parties in Catalonia at the time.173 Both the
Socialists (PSC) and the Communists (PSUC) opposed any separate finan-
cing deal for Catalonia, since they thought this risked lacking in solidarity
with Spain and they also deemed the Concierto to be out-of-date, given its
origins in the Carlist era. The PSC had won the most seats in the Catalan
provinces at the 1977 and 1979 Spanish elections, followed by the PSUC.
UCD too had won more seats than CDC. The proposals made by CDC and
UDC for a Concierto-style arrangement at the negotiations for the 1979 Ca-
talan autonomy statute were rejected outright by the PSC, PSUC, UCD and
Alianza Popular. ERC, which was in favour of a Concierto, only had a weak
presence in Catalonia at the time. 
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172 Personal interview with Jordi Pujol, 24 February 2016.
173 Pujol recounts this opposition of the left in Catalonia to a Concierto-style arrangement
in his memoirs (Pujol 2012: Pt 4 Chap 9 loc 4027), but it is also reflected in documentation from
the time (as seen, for example, in the documentation on the drawing up of the regional auton-
omy statute published by the historians Sobrequés and Riera: 1982) and widely acknowledged
among Catalan politicians of different political affiliations in Catalonia today. Several intervie-
wees of different political affiliations drew attention to the importance of the predominance of
left-wing forces in Catalonia in the time opposed to a Concierto for Catalonia, including Josep
Huguet (ERC), Antoni Castells (PSC), Germà Bel (formerly PSC, now Junts Pel Sí) and Andreu
Mas-Colell (CDC), among others. 
There nevertheless seems to have been some degree of disagreement
within CDC over whether to push more for a Concierto-style arrangement or
not, with attention focusing on possible discrepancies between Pujol and
his economy minister Ramón Trias Fargas. Trias Fargas himself is known to
have been particularly supportive of the idea of a Concierto-style arrange-
ment in which Catalonia would raise its own taxes, as clearly evidenced by
his writings (e.g. Trias Fargas 2011 [1985]) and widely acknowledged within
Catalonia itself by representatives of different parties.174 While Pujol himself
argues that he and Trias Fargas were on the same page in this regard,175 it
has been suggested that there was some discrepancy within CDC at the time
between party leaders who thought they should accept the regional statute
proposed in 1979 as the best possible in the circumstances, and others (most
notably Trias Fargas) who thought they should be more wary of accepting it
given its suboptimal financing arrangements, among other issues (e.g. Pa-
luzie 2011: 11).176 The generally held view within CDC is that by accepting
the proposed statute, the party behaved in a pragmatic way with a view to
what was possible in the circumstances, and also with the optimism that
there would be scope within the common financing system gradually to
reach a suitable arrangement for Catalonia, if not immediately then within
time, through negotiations with the central government.177 Nevertheless, this
did not stop CiU from lamenting the statewide parties’ opposition to a Con-
cierto-style arrangement for Catalonia in its 1980 regional election campaign,
vowing to seek new negotiations for a Catalan treasury after a transitional
period of a few years.178
Uriarte’s aforementioned account of the subsequent offer made by García
Añoveros to Trias Fargas in late 1980 and the latter’s alleged rejection of it
might suggest that CiU, following the regional elections and its unexpected
win, had by then warmed to – or at least ‘accommodated’ to – the idea of
the common financing system and wanted to use the potential scope for de-
velopment it offered via negotiations with the central government to its ad-
vantage. But given the lack of detail known as to what exactly García
Añoveros offered Trias Fargas in that meeting and in what circumstances, it
is impossible to draw any firm conclusions.179 Arguably, however, even more
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174 For example, in personal interviews held in 2015-2016 with Germà Bel (formerly PSC,
now Junts pel Sí), Josep Huguet (ERC) and Andreu Mas-Colell (CDC).
175 Personal interview with Jordi Pujol, 24 February 2016.
176 In a personal interview with Josep Huguet (ERC), he also recalled that Trias Fargas’ sup-
port for a Concierto-style arrangement was much stronger than that of his party at the time. 
177 Personal interviews with Germà Bel, 27 April 2015 and Andreu Mas-Colell, 25 January
2016.
178 Xabier Barrena, ‘Y los catalanes, ¿Por qué no?’, post published on the blog of Iñaki
Anasagasti, 01.11.11 http://ianasagasti.blogs.com/mi_blog/2011/01/y-los-catalanes-por-qué-
no.html 
179 Neither of the other two participants in that meeting remain alive and, to my knowledge,
there are no other published accounts of the meeting or references to it aside from that of Uri-
arte (2015: Pt V 101-103). 
important than the exact facts of what stance CDC took towards a Concierto-
style arrangement at different stages in the late 1970s and 1980 is how those
years are generally perceived and recalled in Catalonia today. There are dif-
ferent views among Catalan politicians themselves as to whether CDC, and
in particular Pujol, did enough to try and secure a Concierto-style arrange-
ment for Catalonia during the Transition: most back the view of Pujol himself
that it was simply impossible in the circumstances with the predominance
of anti-Concierto left-wing forces in Catalonia at the time and the Spanish
government’s opposition to a different financing arrangement for Catalonia,
but some do argue that CDC in general lacked the foresight to anticipate pro-
perly the benefits of fiscal autonomy and fight sufficiently for this. 
REGIONAL FINANCING DURING THE POLITICS OF ACCOMMODATIONISM
Following the Transition, a pragmatic, accommodationist approach to-
wards regional financing and the common financing system certainly came
to dominate within CiU throughout the 1980s and 1990s under successive
Pujol-led governments, as part of the party’s wider accommodationist ap-
proach at the time (see Chapter 2). CiU collaborated with Spanish govern-
ments and participated fully in reforms of the LOFCA via both bilateral and
inter-regional negotiations, seeking to secure gains in regional financing
when possible. The period from 1980 through to the mid 1990s was one in
which CiU consolidated its dominance in Catalonia and the region remained
the main financial powerhouse of Spain despite the common financing
system,180 thus encouraging an accommodationist attitude towards regional
financing rather than radical proposals for a new system. CiU ceased during
this time to request a Catalan treasury under a Concierto-style arrangement,
focusing its proposals instead on what was possible within the scope of the
Spanish Constitution, the regional autonomy statute and the LOFCA. Thus
in the 1990s it fought increasingly for shares of taxes to be ‘ceded’ to the re-
gions, as the best means of gaining some fiscal powers within the frame-
work of the common financing system, as well as for the amount granted to
the Catalans under the transfers to increase, so as to reduce the Catalan de-
ficit with the Spanish state that was by then becoming apparent. In 1993,
when the PSOE won the general elections again but only with a simply ma-
jority this time, CiU secured its agreement to cede 15% of personal income
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180 In 1980, Catalonia was the richest region in Spain in absolute terms, accounting for ap-
proximately 19% of Spain’s GDP, compared to approximately 14% in the case of the Madrid re-
gion, the second most prosperous in absolute terms, according to the official figures published
by Spain’s national statistics institute (INE). Since then, Catalonia’s relative share of Spain’s GDP
has remained broadly stable at about 19%, but Madrid’s share has gradually increased, even-
tually catching up with and even overtaking Catalonia for the first time in 2015. For an analysis
of the evolution of the Catalan economy relative to that of Madrid in the 1980s and 1990s, the
period under consideration here, see De la Fuente 2007. 
tax to the regions for the first time, albeit without legislative autonomy over
the tax at this stage.181 In its programme for the 1995 regional elections, CiU
included its aim to secure an increase in the share of personal income tax
ceded to it at the next reform of the LOFCA, as well as a share of VAT and
excise duties for the first time.
The fact that CiU was still committed in the early and mid 1990s to at-
tempting to reform the common financing system to increase fiscal co-res-
ponsibility, rather than seeking a Concierto-style arrangement instead,
became evident when ERC proposed a parliamentary commission to study
the possibility of a Concierto for Catalonia in early 1996. Josep Huguet i
Biosca, who led the proposal for ERC, recalls that CiU was not at all in favour
of seeking a Concierto arrangement at the time,182 and transcripts of relevant
parliamentary sessions from the time support this view. CiU did somewhat
reluctantly back ERC’s proposition, and thus the proposal to create a Com-
mittee to Study the Concierto Económico as a Means for the Appropriate Fi-
nancing of Catalan Autonomy was presented jointly by ERC and CiU in the
Catalan parliament on 7 February 1996.183 However, Pujol had been sceptical
from the start. In response to ERC’s original proposal for a commission, he
had argued during the investiture debate on 14 December 1995 that ‘we all
know already’ the conclusion to the question of whether a generalised Con-
cierto for Catalonia too within Spain is feasible – in other words, that it would
not be permitted – but that ‘if [ERC] insists on such a study committee simply
to study the idea, we’ll do it’.184 On 7 February 1996, when Ramón Camp i
Batalla spoke on behalf of CiU to propose the creation of the commission,
his speech was markedly different from that of Josep Huguet on behalf of
ERC, who had preceded him.185 While Huguet spoke unequivocally of the
need for a Concierto to resolve Catalonia’s funding problems under the com-
mon system, Camp was more reticent, insisting that despite the title of the
committee, CiU intended to use the opportunity to explore different finan-
cing possibilities for Catalonia, rather than focusing exclusively on one
system. The main aim, he stated, should be to design a new system under
which all the autonomous communities would receive similar levels of re-
sources per capita for the same level of competences, to correct the imba-
lance whereby Catalonia had been receiving below average levels of
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181 On the history of the taxes ceded to the regions, see, for example, Sánchez Galina et al.
1997: 94-96 and ‘El polémico camino del reparto del dinero’, El País, 02.05.05.
182 Personal interview with Josep Huguet, 9 June 2015.
183 The transcript of the parliamentary debate surrounding the proposal to create the com-
mittee is available here: Diari de Sessions del Parlament de Catalunya, V legislatura, Segon
període, Sèrie P – Núm. 7, 7 de febrer de 1996, pp. 154-162.
184 As recalled by Josep Curto, Catalan PP party deputy, in his criticism of CiU for backing
the creation of a committee ‘to give the impression of doing something only then to do nothing’.
Diari de Sessions del Parlament de Catalunya, V legislatura, Segon període, Sèrie P – Núm. 7,
7 de febrer de 1996, p. 159.
185 Diari de Sessions del Parlament de Catalunya, V legislatura, Segon període, Sèrie P –
Núm. 7, 7 de febrer de 1996, pp. 155-157.
resources in the final distribution. And he argued that from CiU’s perspective,
it should be ‘perfectly possible’ to achieve this by improving the existing
common financing system to increase fiscal co-responsibility – in other
words, by ceding a greater share of taxes to the regions and increasing their
legislative autonomy over these. For CiU, at this stage, the aim was thus still
first and foremost to improve the common financing system, rather than to
seek a Concierto-type arrangement, and it still believed there was scope to
do so. 
The following year, when the PP won the Spanish elections without an
absolute majority of seats and thus needed the nationalists’ support in the
Spanish parliament, this gave CiU the opportunity to strike a deal in this re-
gard: Aznar agreed to increase the share of IRPF ceded to the regions to 30%,
as well as providing some additional powers to the regions over the fully
ceded taxes, under the reform of the LOFCA agreed with the PP in 1996 for
the period 1997-2001.186 Most notably, legislative autonomy over the share
of personal income tax ceded to the regions was devolved for the first time,
marking the first genuine step towards fiscal co-responsibility. Previously,
under the agreement with the PSOE, part of IRPF had been ceded to the re-
gions but without legislative autonomy, in other words, still subject entirely
to the rates set by Spanish legislation (Montalvo Barragán 1997: 148). The
new cession agreed between the PP and CiU in 1996 required an update to
the 1983 Tax Cession Law (Law 30/1983), which was limited in scope in terms
of what taxes could be ceded and under what terms, for example it had not
allowed for the partial cession of legislative autonomy over IRPF under its
provisions. It was therefore replaced by Law 14/1996, the scope of which
allowed for more taxes to be partially or fully ceded to the regions (Mora Lo-
rente 2004: 109-110). 
Thus, from the first LOFCA of 1980 up until 1996, CiU under Pujol remai-
ned committed to seeking improvements in fiscal co-responsibility under
the common financing system in order to provide a suitable financing model
for Catalonia. The aim was to rectify the main problem that had emerged
whereby Catalonia consistently ended up receiving resources below the ave-
rage level for the regions in the final distribution, despite being one of the
main contributors to the system in terms of revenues per capita. The finan-
cing system had always been designed to be redistributive to a degree in
order to ensure sufficient resources in each region for an equal provision of
basic services, but an unintended outcome of the system was that it proved
overly redistributive in some cases (see Chapter 3). CiU’s main reasons for
seeking improvements to the common financing system at the time, rather
than a completely new Concierto-style system based on more substantial
fiscal autonomy, were twofold: (1) the knowledge that achieving a Concierto-
style arrangement was very unlikely to be possible within the parameters of
the 1978 Spanish Constitution and the 1979 regional autonomy statute; and
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186 For example, ‘Aznar logra el apoyo de Pujol para formar Gobierno’, El País, 27 April 1996.
See also Sánchez Galina et al. 1997: 94-96.
(2) the conviction that the common financing system did still offer genuine
scope for improvement, in order to resolve the shortcomings of the existing
system and provide suitable funding for Catalonia. It was envisaged that this
would be achieved primarily by increasing the regions’ fiscal powers within
the system and thus increasing fiscal co-responsibility between the central
and regional governments. Pacts made by CiU with minority central govern-
ments, first the PSOE in 1993 and then in particular the PP in 1996, which
allowed for the cession of shares of some of the most important taxes to the
regions, had seemed to lend support to the idea that the desired improve-
ments to the common system were feasible. 
Despite this, however, Pujol made a volte-face in 1997 to start to request
publicly for the first time a ‘fiscal pact’ for Catalonia akin to the Concierto,
based on Catalonia raising its own taxes and bilateral fiscal relations bet-
ween Catalonia and the Spanish state. He announced that CiU would launch
a campaign in 1998 to seek a ‘radical change’ in regional financing at the
next reform of the common system due in 2001, in order to achieve a similar
system for Catalonia to the Basque and Navarran models.187 The so-called
‘fiscal pact’ would be based fundamentally on bilateral relations between
Madrid and Catalonia, under which the Catalans would raise their own taxes
and then pay a quota to Madrid – in other words, the main principles gover-
ning the Concierto. This change in stance came less than a year after CiU
had praised as a great success the deal to increase fiscal co-responsibility
within the common financing system struck with the PP in 1996. What ex-
plains the sudden turning point at this stage?
By the late 1990s, regional financing – and the related problem of the re-
lative lack of sufficient Spanish state investment in Catalan infrastructure
compared to spending elsewhere in Spain – had become the main source
of contention in Spanish-Catalan relations.188 While CiU had managed to se-
cure pacts in 1993 and 1996 with PSOE and PP governments respectively to
start to cede shares of important taxes to the regions, such developments –
often described by Catalan politicians as ‘parches’ (temporary fixes) – were
not happening fast enough to rectify the fact that Catalonia, year after year,
was receiving below average resources per capita and thus accumulating a
growing fiscal deficit with the Spanish state.189 It was also widely felt that
the developments were not substantial enough to give Catalonia the incre-
ased fiscal powers and financial resources sought by politicians across the
political spectrum to tackle the challenges the region faced in the mid to late
1990s, most notably growing levels of immigration into the region, following
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187 This volte-face was widely reflected in newspaper reports at the time, for example ‘Pujol
reclama un “cambio radical” del sistema de financiación autonómica a partir del año 2001’, El
País, 16.10.97. See also Alonso Olea 2014: 84. 
188 Personal interviews with current and former representatives of PSC, ERC and CDC, 2015-
2016.
189 Personal interviews with current and former representatives of PSC, ERC and CDC, 2015-
2016.
other challenges such as the economic crisis of 1992-1993.190 With the influx
of migrants, Catalonia sought more resources from the centre to reflect its
increased commitments in health and education. 
CiU’s attempts to negotiate reforms of the common financing system via
bilateral bargaining arrangements with central governments, in conflict with
the otherwise inter-regional nature of the system, had also come under in-
tense criticism from the PSOE opposition in Madrid and a number of PSOE-
led regional governments in the wake of the 1996 agreement between Pujol
and Aznar.191 This contributed to the increasing frustration within CiU regar-
ding the inter-regional nature of the common financing system and drew at-
tention to the PSOE’s growing opposition both to bilateral pacts between
CiU and the central government as well as to the concept of fiscal co-res-
ponsibility, which many PSOE politicians perceived as a threat to equality
among Spaniards in terms of ensuring similar resources per capita for the
same competences. While the PSOE had struck a deal with CiU to cede a
share of IRPF to it in 1993, it was heavily critical of the further advances in
this direction taken by the subsequent PP government, including the modi-
fication of the 1983 Tax Cession Law that the PP-CiU deal necessitated. The
PSC persuaded the PSOE in Madrid to abstain rather than vote against the
PP’s cession of 30% of IRPF, since the PSC itself was in favour of the cession
and wanted to avoid criticism from CiU. But other regional branches of the
PSOE were not in favour, and three did not approve the new LOFCA reform
following the PP-CiU deal.192 The strongest opposition came from the PSOE
government in Extremadura, the region which has traditionally benefitted
most from the redistribution of resources under the common financing
system. PSOE headquarters in Madrid was under increasing pressure from
its regional representatives in Extremadura, as well as some other PSOE re-
gional governments, to reduce the possibilities for Catalan nationalists to
agree deals bilaterally over regional financing with the central government.
Such political constraints risked reducing CiU’s ability to negotiate the finan-
cing arrangements it wanted for Catalonia going forward.
More importantly still, while CiU under Pujol was for a long time keen to
try and resolve Catalonia’s financing problems by improving the common
system, by the late 1990s it was also coming under pressure from increased
party competition within Catalonia itself over the issue. Regional financing
is one of the few issues on which there was at the time, and has been since,
a cross-party consensus within the region that the existing provisions of the
common financing system and its outcomes for Catalonia were unsatisfac-
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190 On the rapid growth in immigration in the 1990s and early 2000s, see, for example, Cabré
and Domingo 2007.
191 For example ‘Los congresistas instan a la nueva dirección a reabrir la negociación au-
tonómica con el PP’, El País, 22.06.97 and ‘El PSOE ofrece al Gobierno de Aznar un pacto de Es-
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tory, notwithstanding different political views on how the matter should be
resolved. Although ERC was at the time the only party strongly in favour of
a Concierto (which was consistently rejected by other left-wing parties in Ca-
talonia due to its perceived lack of solidarity and lack of generalisability to
the rest of Spain), there was a general consensus among the other main par-
ties operating in the region on both the left (PSC, ICV) and right (PP) that the
common financing system needed to be improved so as to reduce Catalo-
nia’s financial disadvantage under the system. The main demand made not
only by CiU, but also by PSC, ICV and the PP, was for fiscal co-responsibility,
as a means to resolve Catalonia’s disadvantage while at the same time main-
taining a solidarity contribution to other regions in Spain. The fact that all
the main parties in Catalonia were in agreement that the system needed to
be improved put increasing pressure on CiU, as it came under fire for not
rectifying the situation and faced competition from competing proposals
from different parties as to how to proceed, ranging from ERC’s proposal for
a Concierto to the PSC’s proposal for a more federal system in which the re-
gions would have greater fiscal co-responsibility while still guaranteeing suf-
ficiency and solidarity. This occurred at a time when CiU was facing
increased competition from other parties in general, having lost its absolute
majority at the 1995 regional elections to secure a relative majority of seats
only (see Chapter 2, p.84). The 1999 regional election became the most com-
petitive since 1980, with the PSC coming a close second to CiU (Barrio and
Rodríguez-Teruel 2014). At the time, under Pasqual Maragall (PSC candidate
for regional president at the 1999 elections), the PSC was shifting towards a
more ‘Catalanist’ agenda while the pro-independence ERC was moving more
into the mainstream to adopt federalist agendas and thus also become a
more genuine contender in Catalan party politics. As a result CiU came to
face competition from ‘nationalist’ or ‘Catalanist’ parties offering a left-wing
alternative to CiU (Dowling 2009; Wilson 2012: 135), all of which also offered
competing alternatives to how to improve Catalonia’s financing situation. 
It was in this climate that Pujol made a volte-face from 1997 to request a
fiscal pact similar to the Concierto from the next regional financing reform
in 2001 onwards. The conclusions delivered in 1999 of the aforementioned
parliamentary committee to study the Concierto, which were backed not only
by CiU but all the main parties operating in Catalonia, went considerably be-
yond CiU’s initial proposals outlined by Ramón Camp when the committee
was launched in February 1996.193 Under pressure from other parties and
from the challenges that Catalan society faced, it had become increasingly
difficult in the second half of the 1990s for CiU to argue convincingly that
piecemeal reforms of the LOFCA could ever achieve the radical overhaul in
regional financing that Catalan politicians across the spectrum now felt ne-
cessary. Although the term ‘Concierto’ was never explicitly used in the con-
clusions, these set out the parameters for a desired ‘fiscal pact’ which
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resembled the Concierto in almost all but name, with the important caveat
that Catalonia would still make a meaningful solidarity contribution to the
rest of Spain. The idea, as expressed in the conclusions, was to seek a new
model that would be based strictly on bilateral relations between Catalonia
and the Spanish state, thus superseding the limitations of the inter-regional
LOFCA and CPFF194. Under the proposed model, per capita resources would
progressively reach the same levels as those received by the Basque and
Navarran regions under the foral system for the same competences; the Ca-
talan regional government would have legislative autonomy over all the
ceded taxes, with the increase in legislative autonomy allowing for a model
of shared fiscal sovereignty with the Spanish state and the EU; and a Catalan
treasury would be created to collect all taxes in Catalonia. 
This notwithstanding, doubt has been cast on the sincerity of Pujol’s sta-
ted commitment from 1997 onwards to securing a radically new financing
system for Catalonia. Opposition parties accused Pujol of raising the issue
for electioneering purposes only ahead of the 1999 regional elections.195 In
a similar vein, Pujol was accused of electioneering in his creation of a new
parliamentary committee to study possibilities for improving Catalonia’s self-
government (Comisión de Estudio sobre la Mejora del Autogobierno) in
March 1999, just a few months before the regional elections that year. Des-
pite calling for a radically different fiscal model akin to the Concierto from
1997 onwards, Pujol’s 1999 election manifesto did not demand a Concierto-
type fiscal pact, but rather centred on improving the LOFCA via the usual
methods used by CiU up until then: (1) seeking to increase the share of taxes
ceded to the regions; and (2) increasing the revenue shares afforded to Ca-
talonia to reduce the Catalan fiscal deficit – in this case, the stated aim was
400 bn pesetas (approximately 2.4 bn euros) (Homs 2008: 39). 
Within CDC too, the general opinion is that Pujol remained reluctant in
his final years at the helm of CiU to go beyond his accommodationist tradi-
tion of securing pacts with central Spanish governments in return for gains
in autonomy, within the boundaries of the existing Catalan regional auto-
nomy statute and the Spanish Constitution.196 Given the ongoing prevalence
of such pacts, Pujol was also inevitably constrained by the circumstances,
since CiU in the Catalan parliament was dependent upon parliamentary sup-
port from the PP following both the 1995 and the 1999 regional elections.197
Despite the 1999 conclusions of the parliamentary committee to study the
Concierto, these then had relatively little impact on the 2001 reform of the
LOFCA, which did not entail a radical change in financing for Catalonia. The
more moderate changes secured were instead in line with the more mode-
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rate goals CiU had outlined in its 1999 election campaign and in the same
vein as the changes made at the previous reform of the LOFCA in 1996, fo-
cusing primarly on gradual increases in the taxes ceded to the autonomous
communities in order to gradually increase fiscal co-responsibility, as well
as ensuring sufficient resources. CiU praised the 2001 reform as satisfactory:
some progress had still been made. CiU’s bargaining power to secure a bet-
ter deal was in any case very limited given the parliamentary arithmetic at
the time, with CiU still dependent on the PP to support it in the Catalan par-
liament while the PP in 2000 unexpectedly secured an absolute majority of
seats in the Spanish parliament and thus no longer needed CiU’s support
there. Pushing actively for a Concierto-style fiscal pact for Catalonia in the
late 1990s or early 2000s would have required a sea change in parliamentary
alliances in Catalonia which was not seriously contemplated at the time by
CDC under Pujol, nor indeed by the other main nationalist party ERC. The
left-right axis of competition still dominated Catalan politics at this time over
and above the nationalist-statewide axis, with CiU allying with the PP while
ERC had begun to glimpse opportunities to ‘nationalise’ the left in Catalonia
(PSC and ICV) by creating a more left-wing nationalist alliance in opposition
to CiU.198
Overall, towards the end of the 1990s, the steps CiU started to take under
Pujol towards requesting a radically new financing deal for Catalonia in the
form of a bilateral fiscal pact were thus still only tentative at this stage, given
the difficulties in securing any radical changes to Catalan financing within
the context of the Catalan autonomy statute at the time, the Spanish Cons-
titution and Pujol’s accommodationist tactics. Importantly, however, dissa-
tisfaction with Catalonia’s treatment under the regional financing system,
combined with the perceived lack of sufficient Spanish state investment in
Catalonia, had clearly emerged as the main source of discontent in Spanish-
Catalan relations, shared by all the main nationalist and statewide parties in
the region (CiU, ERC, PSC, PP, ICV). Not only was there a cross-party con-
sensus that the existing financing arrangements were inadequate for Cata-
lonia, but for most parties this was also to end up becoming one of, if not
the main reason for seeking a new statute for Catalonia. ERC, for example,
moderated its pro-independence agenda to focus on what it was possible to
achieve at the time, considering a Concierto-type model a suitable medium-
term goal, and it would find sufficient common ground (notwithstanding sig-
nificant differences in their proposals) with the PSC and ICV in terms of their
goals for financing.199 These three parties (ERC, PSC and ICV), would em-
brace statute reform as convincingly as CiU in the lead up to the 2003 regio-
nal elections. In addition to the beginnings of a decline in scope for
accommodationism, CiU was thus also being pushed along by a wider Ca-
talanist evolution. Even the Catalan PP, the only party in Catalonia that did
not support moves for a new Catalan statute at the turn of the century and
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did not include this as a goal in its 2003 regional election manifesto, had
been supportive of the need for a serious overhaul of financing for Catalonia
since the topic had emerged seriously in the late 1990s.
REGIONAL FINANCING AND THE CATALAN STATUTE REFORM
Regional financing became one of the key issues featuring in cross-party
negotiations in Catalonia for a regional statute reform from 2003 onwards,
along with questions of identity (especially the quest to seek recognition of
Catalonia as a nation) and institutional autonomy (designed to shield Catalan
competences and the institutions which implement them from the risk of
central government interference). After CiU, under the new leadership of
Artur Mas, had unexpectedly ended up pushed into opposition by the left-
wing tripartite coalition comprising the PSC, ERC and ICV following the 2003
regional elections, it found itself initially on the backseat as the coalition go-
vernment took the lead in taking forward statute reform proposals. The lea-
dership succession, which had seen Pujol replaced by Mas ahead of the
elections, did not initially seem to mark a fundamental turning point in
CDC/CiU’s agenda: Mas, more economically liberal than Pujol but not as con-
servative as Duran i Lleida (leader of UDC and an alternative candidate), was
seen as a good compromise in terms of being a leader that could reflect the
traditional moderate centre of the party as well as the beginnings of a sobe-
ranista current, so as not to alienate the one nor the other (Gillespie 2015c,
following Barberà 2011: 267). Mas did defend proposals for a new regional
autonomy statute, including a new financing framework for Catalonia, in the
run up to the 2003 elections, but no more so than his left-wing competitors
who would end up forming the tripartite coalition. It was only once CiU was
pushed into opposition that CiU would then become more aggressive in its
defence of a Concierto-style arrangement for Catalonia, among other mat-
ters. Since CiU’s support would also be needed to push through any statute
reform in the Catalan parliament (since such reforms require approval by
two thirds of deputies), from early on the head of the Catalan government
Pasqual Maragall formed a parliamentary committee, which integrated CiU,
to hold cross-party discussions to agree a statute reform proposal. Members
of the tripartite coalition nevertheless argue that the dynamic became a ne-
gative one, with CiU repeatedly making proposals that were more radical
than what ERC was able to achieve as part of the tripartite government (due
to the compromises that needed to be reached with PSC and ICV), in an at-
tempt to put ERC in a difficult position and portray itself as the most pro-Ca-
talan party.200
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Academics applying ‘outbidding’ theories to the Catalan case have ar-
gued that the party behaviour seen during the Statute reform negotiations,
including CiU’s attempts to outbid the tripartite coalition (which in itself in-
volved parties such as PSC and ICV whose agendas had become increasingly
Catalanist), can be interpreted as an elite-led process of radicalisation in res-
ponse to a climate of increasing party competition (e.g. Barrio and Rodrí-
guez-Teruel 2014). To some degree, this certainly seems to hold true, as CiU
needed strategically to outbid ERC with its proposals, in an attempt to win
popularity for CiU as the most pro-Catalan party and seek its return to power
in subsequent elections. CiU’s outbidding strategy was clear in the area of
financing, where it fiercely defended a Concierto-type model, taking advan-
tage of the fact that ERC had had to water down its proposals in this regard
to reach an agreement with PSC and ICV to form a coalition government (the
Tinell Pact). CiU’s opponents in the left-wing tripartite coalition accused CiU
of tactical behaviour in this regard, particularly since Artur Mas eventually
reduced his financing demands considerably as part of the final Zapatero-
Mas agreement to gain the Spanish parliament’s acceptance of the statute
in 2006, suggesting his commitment to a Concierto-type model was not ab-
solute after all.201 Nevertheless, while some degree of instrumentalism was
inevitably involved, CiU’s behaviour was not purely tactical. The transition
from Pujol to Mas and the generational change within CDC around that same
time, which brought younger, more pro-sovereignty figures into the party,
meant that CDC was starting to evolve beyond the accommodationist tactics
of Pujol’s era.202 In conjunction with this generational shift, there also came
a stronger conviction and determination that if CDC had not done more to
demand a Concierto during the Transition, it had to take the opportunity to
do so now and table a concrete proposal.203
Moreover, the presentation of different financing proposals was not just
a question of outbidding for the sake of it, but rather in response to the ge-
nuine conviction now shared by all parties in Catalonia that regional finan-
cing needed to be seriously improved for Catalonia if the region were to be
able to face its economic and social challenges. While this conviction had
become widespread in the late 1990s, it was also gradually compounded by
the shortcomings of the 2001 reform of the LOFCA that soon became appa-
rent, for it did not make headway towards resolving the problem whereby
Catalonia fell in the regional ranking of resources per capita after the equa-
lisation of revenues. Importantly, the 2001 reform did not include mecha-
nisms to adapt to asymmetric changes across the regions, most notably
uneven population increases, nor did it account for the fact that population
increases would not necessarily automatically result in tax increases (Blöch-
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linger and Vammalle 2012: 114). As immigration soared during the first half
of the 2000s, the regions receiving the most migrants – including Catalonia
– were penalised by the system. 
What a new financing system for Catalonia should look like was one of
the most difficult areas for the three left-wing parties to agree on when dra-
wing up a joint agenda to form a tripartite coalition government in 2003 (the
Tinell Pact).204 ERC, on the one hand, was in favour of a Concierto for Cata-
lonia. The PSC, on the other hand, was against a Concierto and wanted ins-
tead a federal model that would be generalisable to other regions of Spain
too should they so want it, inspired by the German model of fiscal federa-
lism. ICV, meanwhile, was in favour of a so-called ‘Concierto solidario’ (‘so-
lidarity Concierto’), which incorporated elements of both ERC’s and the PSC’s
proposals. 
The federal model envisioned by leading members of the PSC, including
the then Catalan economy minister Antoni Castells, would be based on two
main principles: (1) a strong degree of authority in tax-raising decision-ma-
king (the Catalan government must be able to raise income that corresponds
first and foremost to its own tax decisions) and (2) fiscal equalisation me-
chanisms, to share wealth between the regions, but without over-redistribu-
tion. If these two principles were respected, no region should fall in the
ranking of per capita resources post equalisation of revenues (i.e. if a region
is the third largest contributor of revenues per capita to the system, it should
also come third in the final distribution of resources per capita for homoge-
nous competences).205
The main differences between ERC’s vision of a Concierto and the fiscal
federal model envisioned by the PSC were as follows: under the Concierto,
the Catalan tax agency would raise and collect all taxes paid in Catalonia,
while under the federal model, tax-raising powers would be shared between
Spanish and Catalan governments (in contrast to the existing common
system, where fiscal sovereignty lies heavily with the Spanish state). A Ca-
talan treasury would be created which would have more tax-raising powers
of its own, most notably, the shares of taxes ceded to Catalonia would in-
crease and the Catalan treasury would collect the partially ceded taxes (as
well as those fully ceded and its own taxes), in contrast to the existing com-
mon system, where the shares of taxes partially ceded to the regions were
still collected by the central government. While it would be very difficult to
generalise the Basque Concierto widely to other regions of Spain (for several
reasons including, for example, the fact that the Spanish treasury would no
longer collect any taxes of its own were that the case), the federal model
was designed to create a system for Catalonia that would be generalisable
to other regions too.
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The fact that ERC had to water down its demands for a Concierto and ac-
cept a federal proposal with Concierto-like elements, in order to reach an
agreement with the PSC, created an obvious opportunity for CiU to make
demands specifically for a Concierto in the first half of 2005, when negotia-
tions took place for a cross-party agreement between the tripartite coalition
and CiU on a draft statute. This created tensions within the tripartite coali-
tion, as ERC was uncomfortable being outbid by CiU on the financing ques-
tion. CiU focused on the differences between its proposal for a fiscal pact
specifically for Catalonia and what it described as the tripartite coalition go-
vernment’s aim to use the Catalan statute reform to federalise Spain (e.g.
Homs 2008: 72-73, 158-159). It also differentiated its financing proposal by
focusing on certain specific areas where the tripartite coalition’s proposal
had been more vague or non-committal, due to the PSC’s reluctance in some
areas: for example, CiU was clear in its proposal that the Generalitat should
have exclusive competence over local financing (i.e. the financing of the pro-
vincial authorities and town halls), in contrast to the status quo whereby this
was almost exclusively the competence of the central Spanish government,
which provided funding directly to the municipalities (Tremosa 2007: 16;
Homs 2008: 77).
Despite CiU’s intentional focus on the differences between its proposal and
that of the tripartite coalition government, however, analysis of both proposals
reveals that they overlapped in many respects. They both shared fundamental
principles, including most notably the aim to supersede the inter-regional na-
ture of the LOFCA to establish a bilateral relationship with Spain in fiscal mat-
ters; the aim to increase significantly Catalan decision-making authority over
fiscal powers, establishing a Catalan treasury endowed with significant tax-
raising powers and thus a strong degree of fiscal sovereignty; a proposed an-
nual Catalan contribution to the Spanish state to finance the Catalan share of
state competences; a commitment to solidarity (within certain limits) with the
rest of Spain via an annual solidarity quota payment; and an increase in Spa-
nish state investment in Catalonia. These commonalities inevitably helped in
the end to facilitate an agreement between the tripartite coalition government
and CiU on a financing proposal in September 2005, which was included in
the statute reform proposal approved by all four parties in the Catalan parlia-
ment at the end of the month. While Antoni Castells describes the final finan-
cing proposal included in the September 2005 statute as ‘not a Concierto’,
Josep Huguet, the main negotiator for ERC on financing matters at the time,
describes it as ‘a Concierto in almost all but name’.206 This difference in des-
cription is eloquent, pointing to the extent to which the different proposals
(for a Concierto-type model or a fiscal federal model) had come to share much
in common. CiU was also satisfied with the outcome included in the Septem-
ber 2005 version of the statute since it achieved a substantial Catalan consen-
sus around a proposed ‘unique financing model for Catalonia’ (Homs 2008:
165) which superseded the inter-regional LOFCA. 
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The financing model envisaged in the September 2005 version of the Ca-
talan statute undoubtedly shared much in common with the Basque Con-
cierto in its conception.207 Crucially, the statute approved by the Catalan
parliament in September 2005 removed the reference to the LOFCA as the
framework for Catalan financing, which had been included in the 7th Addi-
tional Disposition of the 1979 autonomy statute. It made provisions for the
creation of a Catalan tax agency, which would collect all taxes originating in
Catalonia (impuestos soportados) and have legislative capacity over these,
except for local taxes. The Catalan government would use some of the re-
venues collected to pay a contribution to the Spanish government to cover
two concepts: (1) services provided by the state; and (2) solidarity with the
rest of Spain. In this way, the Catalan model was designed to entail a Con-
cierto-style ‘quota’ payment, but with an explicit additional quota payment
towards solidarity with Spain too. The model would be governed by bilateral
relations between the Catalan and Spanish governments, with a Mixed Com-
mission to be created for this purpose. Any Spanish-Catalan conflicts over
fiscal matters (e.g. the determination of the annual contribution to the Spa-
nish state) should be resolved bilaterally by the Commission, with existing
legislation to be rolled over in the event of disputes until agreement were
reached. Importantly, however, the Catalan statute would take precedence
over Spanish state legislation in the case of conflicts between the provisions
of each. On the subject of Spanish state investment in Catalonia, it was sti-
pulated that this should be proportional to the weight of Catalonia in Spain’s
GDP and also provide compensation for the existing deficit accumulated. 
While the Catalan statute of September 2005 thus prepared the ground
for a fundamentally new financing model, this then became one of the most
conflictive issues that made it difficult to reach an agreement with the PSOE
Spanish government at the time in order for the statute to be approved in
the Spanish parliament. The final agreement on the wording of the statute
struck between Zapatero and Mas in January 2006 significantly cut back the
provisions of the statute that had been approved by the Catalan parliament
in 2005. The reference to the LOFCA as the framework for fiscal and financial
relations between Catalonia and the Spanish state was reintroduced (Article
201.1) and references to bilateralism were reduced: for example, the clause
‘in agreement with the principle of bilateralism’ was removed in Article 201.3
(Article 202.3 in the original September 2005 statute) when describing the
functioning of the Spanish-Catalan Mixed Commission. The greater impor-
tance of the Spanish state in decision-making was reinstated in various pla-
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ces, for example, the provision stating that the Catalan statute would take
precedence over Spanish legislation in case of disputes was removed, to be
replaced instead by a more vague commitment to the fact that the financing
of the Generalitat should not be discriminatory to Catalonia relative to the
rest of the autonomous communities (Article 201.4). 
Furthermore, the notion in the September 2005 statute whereby the Ca-
talan tax agency would pay a contribution to the Spanish state based on the
valuation of Spanish state services (i.e. centralised competences) and a so-
lidarity contribution, keeping the remainder of the revenues for itself, was
also watered down considerably. Instead, under the 2006 statute, the reve-
nues Catalonia would keep would be determined in accordance with its
‘needs’ (thus reinstating the needs-based principle governing the LOFCA)
and its ‘fiscal capacity’ (thus this principle was introduced, but in an ambi-
guous fashion) (Article 206.1). Adjustments would be made to its revenues
as a result of its participation in fiscal equalisation and solidarity mecha-
nisms, to be determined solely by the Spanish state (Article 206.3), entirely
in-keeping with the existing LOFCA. Instead of collecting all taxes in Catalo-
nia and having legislative autonomy over these (as stipulated in the Sep-
tember 2005 version of the Statute), the new Catalan tax agency would only
collect and have legislative autonomy over its own taxes and the fully ceded
taxes (the latter in cases where the Spanish state has delegated the autho-
rity) (Article 204.1). The partially ceded taxes, which account for the main
bulk of the taxes under the LOFCA, would continue to be collected by the
Spanish treasury, unless it delegated such functions to the Generalitat (Arti-
cle 204.2). In this regard, Article 204.2 of the final statute included the provi-
sion that within the space of two years, a ‘Consortium or other equivalent
body’ would be set up, in which the Spanish tax administration and the Ca-
talan tax agency would participate ‘in equal measure’ – and which ‘could be-
come the [sole] Catalan tax administration’. This was to allow for
Spanish-Catalan collaboration over the ‘state taxes collected in Catalonia’
(i.e. bulk of the taxes, including the partially ceded taxes), but exactly how
such collaboration would work under the ‘Consortium’ was left ambiguous
in the statute.
While the version of the statute approved by the Catalan parliament was
very similar in many respects to a Concierto-style arrangement, the final ver-
sion of the statute – approved by the Spanish parliament and in a referen-
dum in Catalonia – undid many of the key advances and situated Catalan
financing back very clearly in the realm of the LOFCA (Tremosa 2007: 13).
Both the PSC and CiU, in their praise and defence of the final agreement,
nevertheless focused on its possibilities: most notably, the door was in the-
ory open to the creation of a Spanish-Catalan joint Consortium which could
potentially allow for a genuine sharing of tax-raising powers between Spa-
nish and Catalan authorities. In this regard, the percentages of the partially
ceded taxes (50% of IRPF, 50% of VAT and 58% of Excise duties) to be granted
to the Catalans under the new statute were designed specifically in order to
ensure that the revenues raised would be split equally. To achieve a genuine
sharing of these tax-raising powers under a Consortium arrangement, ho-
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wever, the Spanish government would need to delegate both collection po-
wers and legislative autonomy to the Catalans over their shares of the par-
tially ceded taxes – an opportunity which, in the end, would not be exploited
due to Spanish opposition to it at the next reform of the LOFCA in 2009.
Whether the statute reform could suffice to satisfy Catalanist demands
for financing was put to the test with the 2009 reform of the LOFCA (see also
Chapter 3, pp.108-112). This reform was primarily motivated and necessita-
ted by the fact that Catalonia’s new regional autonomy statute required a re-
vision of the regional financing system. The Catalan statute had stipulated
that a reform of the LOFCA would be agreed by 9 August 2008 to implement
the provisions of Chapter VI on the financing of the Generalitat. The eventual
reform agreed in July 2009, after tough bilateral negotiations between Spa-
nish and Catalan governments over the period of a year, was inevitably sub-
ject to different political perspectives in Catalonia, with the PSC-led Catalan
government praising it as a good agreement that at least achieved the mini-
mum progress deemed necessary, while CiU, given its position in opposi-
tion, took the opportunity to criticise the reform from the outset as
insufficient. The reform as initially agreed and first implemented in 2009 was
generally perceived from the Catalanist perspective as a good one, and thus
CiU’s immediate criticism of it in 2009 seems to have been first and foremost
tactical and electorally-motivated. Within a year, however, the reform would
end up disappointing the PSC too since it did not achieve the intended out-
comes due to unforeseen factors (most notably the extent of the economic
crisis, as well as lack of central government compliance with some provi-
sions of the reform). Criticism of the reform therefore became more wides-
pread. What problems characterised the negotiations for the 2009 reform of
the financing system and why did the reform quickly prove inadequate to
satisfy not only CiU but also the tripartite coalition government that had
agreed it?
Throughout the prolonged reform negotiations in 2008 and 2009, the PSC
(as lead negotiator for the Catalan government) sought to achieve the model
based on two pillars which had characterised its vision of a fiscal federal
model during the statute reform negotiations: (1) an increase in fiscal co-res-
ponsibility, to give the Catalan government greater fiscal authority and res-
ponsibility for its own decisions; and (2) solidarity with the rest of Spain, but
within clearly established limits (in other words, the Catalan fiscal deficit was
to be reduced). Although the LOFCA remained an inter-regional law, nego-
tiations for its reform took place bilaterally between the Spanish and Catalan
governments in 2008 and 2009, which in itself would become a source of
political dispute when the reform was agreed in July 2009, since other re-
gions rejected the privileged role that Catalonia had had in negotiations for
a reform that the Spanish government would then seek approval for in all
regions. 
The reform finally agreed between the Spanish and Catalan governments
in July 2009 was praised by the then Catalan economy minister Antoni Cas-
tells as a excellent agreement which met the minimum requirements the
PSC had sought. The main positive aspects of the agreement from the PSC’s
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perspective were as follows.208 Firstly, the final amount of resources the Ca-
talans received annually was to increase by EUR 3.8bn over a three year pe-
riod, a significant amount (much more than the EUR 2bn proposal Zapatero
had made in December 2008). Secondly, for the first time, the equalisation
of resources between regions was to be partial rather than complete, since
75% of revenues (rather than 100%) were to be pooled into the Fund for the
Guarantee of Fundamental Public Services (the new main vehicle for equa-
lisation, which replaced the Sufficiency Fund under the 2001 reform). This
meant that the Catalans (and other regions) would reap some of the benefit
of their own fiscal efforts if they raised greater revenues per capita compared
to other regions. And, in relation to this final point, fiscal co-responsibility
was also increased by raising the shares of taxes ceded to the regions, as
envisaged in the new Catalan statute: the share of IRPF ceded to the regions
reached 50%, VAT reached 50% and excise duties 58%. As a result of these
and other developments, in the first year of implementation of the model
(2009), Catalonia’s financing position appeared to improve significantly: whe-
reas the region’s per capita resource levels were ranked at 94 in the year
2007 (where the average of the common regime regions is 100), in 2009 they
reached 102.3 (Castells 2014: 285). In those same years (2007 and 2009), the
tax capacity of Catalonia was 121.1 and 119.2 respectively (Castells 2014:
285).  
This notwithstanding, the agreement fell short from the Catalanist pers-
pective relative to what it had been hoped could be achieved within the
scope of the new statute. CiU, taking advantage of its position in opposition,
therefore criticised it from the outset. Most notably, due to Spanish opposi-
tion, the reform did not achieve the Spanish-Catalan bilateral ‘consortium’
on fiscal matters that had been envisaged in the Catalan statute, since the
power to collect the partially ceded taxes was not transferred to the Catalan
authorities. They remained only able to collect the fully ceded taxes and their
own taxes, which account for a very small share of total tax revenues. A con-
sortium could in theory still have been set up in these circumstances, but it
would have been a bilateral consortium in name only, with tax-raising po-
wers still very heavily weighted towards the Spanish authorities. Moreover,
the improvement in resource levels which Catalonia experienced in 2009 did
not endure thereafter, due to ongoing problems with the nature of the equa-
lisation mechanism included in the system; the extent of the impact of
Spain’s shift to austerity measures from 2010 onwards; and the Spanish go-
vernment’s lack of compliance with some of the provisions of the Catalan
statute and new LOFCA relative to financing. As a result, by 2010, the PSC’s
initial satisfaction with the reform had also waned. 
The fact that the new LOFCA very quickly ended up disappointing Catalan
officials in terms of the resource levels provided to Catalonia was in part a
result of the complex way in which the way the equalisation mechanism was
designed, in order to satisfy different regions’ interests (see Chapter 3). Thus
222
208 Personal interview with Antoni Castells, 25 March 2015.
this pointed to the continued difficulties in trying to achieve a bilateral Spa-
nish-Catalan deal over financing within an inter-regional financing system
applicable to 15 of Spain’s 17 regions. The problems with the equalisation
mechanism were exacerbated further by other unexpected factors such as
the full extent of the impact of Spain’s debt reduction strategies on resource
levels from 2010 onwards, which also contributed to the central govern-
ment’s decision to delay making payments from the Competitiveness Fund.
By the autumn of 2009 Spain was under intense pressure from the EU and
the financial markets to reduce its debt burden and cut public spending,
which meant a sharp reduction in public spending from 2010 onwards. This
effect on resource levels had not been properly anticipated during the reform
negotiations between mid 2008 and mid 2009, when the PSOE government
was implementing fiscal stimulus measures.209
While a reduction in resource levels was widespread across the regions,
the main Catalan complaint in 2010 was that Catalonia was affected relatively
more than most, due to the Spanish government’s lack of compliance with
with some of the provisions of the new reform and the Catalan statute, in
part due to the financial difficulties it was facing in the context of an unpre-
cedented crisis in resources. Under the common financing system, each
year, the regions receive provisional transfers of funds from the central go-
vernment (known as entregas a cuenta) based on provisional revenue esti-
mates for that year, which are later revised when the regional financing
system is finally settled (liquidado) 18 months after the end of the year in
question. In 2009 and 2010, payments from the Competitiveness Fund were
made as part of these entregas a cuenta in the relevant year. However, for
2011, the central government decided instead that it would make the pay-
ments from the Competitiveness Fund when the system was settled (i.e. 18
months after the end of the year in question) rather than during the relevant
year itself. Aside from the financing system itself, the Spanish government
also planned changes to investment spending in 2010 which meant that Ca-
talonia, as a result, would not receive a share of investment spending pro-
portional to its share of Spain’s GDP, as had been stipulated in the Third
Additional Disposition of the new regional statute.210
2010 was also the year of the Constitutional Court ruling on the Catalan
statute. The scope for a new regional financing system for Catalonia had al-
ready been significantly reduced under the changes agreed in 2006 by Za-
patero and Mas to secure the Spanish parliament’s approval for the Catalan
statute, but some additional changes were then made in 2010 by the Cons-
titutional Court. These served to reduce further the fiscal authority afforded
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debt reduction strategies from late 2009 onwards in Spain, see Salmon 2010a and 2010b. 
210 Complaints about these matters (the Competitiveness Fund and changes to investment
spending) were made by Catalan economy minister Antoni Castells to Spanish economy min-
ister Elena Salgado in a letter dated 23rd September 2010, a copy of which was provided by
Castells to this author.
to the Generalitat and to emphasize the principality of Spanish state deci-
sion-making.211 For example, under the statute of 2006, Article 206.3 of Chap-
ter VI had stated that the financial resources of the Generalitat could be
adjusted for reasons of equalisation and solidarity, to ensure that all regional
governments can provide similar levels of provision for essential state ser-
vices such as health and education, ‘provided that they [the regional govern-
ments] also make a similar fiscal effort’. This was designed to ensure the
LOFCA would encourage fiscal accountability and responsibility on the part
of regional governments, so that those which raised lower revenues due to
poorer fiscal efforts (rather than, simply, to having a poorer population)
would not automatically be bailed out by additional resources contributed
by regions which made a greater fiscal effort. The Constitutional Court, ho-
wever, ruled that this clause  (‘provided that…’) was inadmissible, arguing
that it is the prerogative of the Spanish state only to decide what fiscal effort
each region must make. 
The other part of the statute related to financing which the Constitutional
Court omitted was the part of Article 218.2 which had established that the
Generalitat would have legislative competence to establish and regulate the
taxes of local governments. In so doing, the Constitutional Court made it
clear that the state would continue to have sole and exclusive power over
local financing. The other changes made by the Constitutional Court to the
financing provisions in the statute were clarifications of meaning, providing
a more strict interpretation where the statute had left open a wider scope
for interpretation. For example, it clarified that the functioning of the bilateral
Mixed Commission on Economic and Fiscal Matters between the Spanish
state and the Generalitat would be subordinate to the inter-regional mecha-
nisms and committees governing financing (in other words, the traditional
CPFF).
Thus, by the time CiU returned to power in Catalonia following the regio-
nal elections in late 2010, it had become clear that the statute reform and
the subsequent reform of the LOFCA had not served to create a financing
system that would provide the increased resources or fiscal authority sought
by parties across the spectrum in Catalonia. This situation would then con-
tinue to worsen from 2010 onwards as Catalonia’s financial predicament de-
teriorated as a result of the financial crisis. Concerns over the fiscal
indiscipline of many of Spain’s regions throughout the crisis amplified ten-
sions over the regional financing system. The following section looks in de-
tail at the impact of the financial crisis on regional resources and funding
mechanisms, focusing in particular on the impact on Catalonia, before a final
section looks more specifically at the implications for CDC’s agenda. 
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211 The changes to the statute required by the Constitutional Court are indicated in the con-
solidated text of the statute published by the Catalan parliament in February 2013. Available
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REGIONAL FINANCING AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
Catalonia’s financial situation – along with that of the central and other
regional administrations in Spain – deteriorated in particular from 2010 on-
wards once the markets had lost confidence in Spain, which found itself
under intense pressure from the EU to reduce its debt and deficit. As one of
the largest regions and therefore one with particularly high financing needs,
the Catalan government became increasingly reliant upon centralised fun-
ding mechanisms created by the Spanish government when it lost access
to the markets to raise funding to supplement its revenues from taxes. These
centralised funding mechanisms, in turn, required Catalan adherence to
strict deficit targets set by the Spanish government for regional governments
in Spain, in order to meet the overall targets set by the EU authorities. And
yet Catalonia became one of the most frequent underperformers in terms of
meeting these fiscal targets. This scenario served to exacerbate already exis-
ting tensions between Spanish and Catalan authorities over regional finan-
cing, creating extensive debate over a number of questions, such as: To what
extent has the regional financing system been to blame for Catalonia’s fi-
nancial woes, relative to discretionary spending decisions taken by the Ca-
talan government? Has the Spanish government’s recentralisation of funding
mechanisms and control over regional spending corresponded purely to the
economic motive of meeting the fiscal targets set by the EU for Spain, or
has it also taken advantage of the opportunity to impose recentralisation to
further its ideologically centralist motives? And, in this regard, has the split
of deficit targets between the different levels of administration in Spain, as
decided by the Spanish government in order to meet the EU’s overall target
for Spain, been fair? The aim here is not to provide any definitive answers
to these questions, which is not the focus here, but rather to explain the na-
ture of these debates in order to consider how this has contributed to the
pro-sovereignty movement in Catalonia and the evolution of CDC’s territorial
agenda. 
At the start of the crisis in 2007, Spain’s total public sector debt as a per-
centage of GDP was among the lowest levels in Europe but it rapidly grew:
total government debt (which comprises that of the central government, the
regional governments, the local authorities and the social security system)
rose from 35.5% of GDP at the end of 2007 to almost double that (69.5%) by
the end of 2011, before reaching nearly 100% (99.3%) at the end of 2014, me-
asured according to the EU’s Excessive Deficit Procedure.212 Borrowing by
the regional governments in particular ballooned at an unsustainable rate
and thus regional government debt came to be seen as one of the main obs-
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are published by the Bank of Spain here: http://www.bde.es/webbde/es/estadis/infoest/htmls/
cdp.html (figures cited as accessed on 12 March 2016). 
tacles to Spain’s deficit reduction targets (Bosch and Solé-Ollé 2013: 7). Prior
to the crisis, the total debt held by the 17 regions as a percentage of GDP
had hovered consistently around the 6% mark between 2000 and 2006 before
declining slightly to 5.7% in 2007. These figures were not surprisingly very
low, given that Spain’s regional governments had only been in existence
since the early 1980s. Low interest rates following Spain’s entry to the euro,
combined with the availability of European structural funding and the cycli-
cally elastic nature of regional tax revenues, had encouraged a rapid growth
in real expenditure during the years of the construction boom, for which
windfall revenues compensated (Von Hagen and Foremny 2013: 24). When
the crisis hit, however, regional debt doubled both as a percentage of GDP
and in absolute terms in only three years between end 2007 and end 2010,
increasing from 5.7% (EUR 61.1bn) to 11.4% (EUR 123.4bn) in that period
(see Table 13). These debt figures were exclusive of billions of euros accu-
mulated by the most cash-strapped regions throughout the crisis in unpaid
bills to suppliers, particularly in the most indebted regions. By the end of
2011, before the central government intervened to provide loans for repay-
ment, these were estimated to have reached as much as EUR 30bn. By the
end of 2015, regional debt had reached 24.2% of GDP (EUR 261.5bn). Cata-
lonia stands out as the third most indebted region in terms of debt as a per-
centage of GDP, reaching 35.3% at the end of 2015, behind Valencia (41.3%)
and Castilla La Mancha (35.6%) (see Table 14, p.227). Catalonia is also by far
the most indebted in absolute terms (EUR 72.3bn at the end of 2015). At the
opposite end of the spectrum, the Madrid region had the lowest level of debt
as a percentage of GDP at 13.6% (at the end of 2015), followed by the Basque
region with 14.4%. 
TABLE 13: Evolution of public debt in Spain (as % of GDP, 
according to Excessive Deficit Procedure), 2007-2015
Source: Bank of Spain
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Total Central government
Regional 
governments
Local 
authorities
Social security
system
2007          35.5          29.5            5.7            2.7            1.6
2008          39.4          33.0            6.6            2.8            1.5
2009          52.7          45.2            8.6            3.2            1.6
2010          60.1          51.0          11.4            3.3               1,6
2011          69.5          58.3          13.6            3.4            1.6
2012          85.4          73.1          18.1            4.2            1.6
2013          93.7          81.3          20.3            4.1            1.7
2014          99.3          86.0          22.7            3.7            1.7
2015          99.2          87.0          24.2            3.2            1.6
TABLE 14: Public debt by region (as % of GDP, 
according to Excessive Deficit Procedure), 2007 and 2015 
Source: Bank of Spain
Concerns grew over regional finances in particular from 2010 since the
spirit of austerity was late in filtering through to the regions once Spain had
come under pressure from late 2009 to drastically cut its spending (e.g. FUN-
CAS 2012: 46). The combination of extensive devolved spending powers and
a primarily centralised revenue-raising system is a well known risk for wea-
kening fiscal discipline (Rodden 2006). The regions had started to suffer the
fall in tax revenues in 2008 but the reaction to adjust expenditure accordingly
did not begin until 2010 (Leal Marcos and López Laborda 2013: 34). While
this matched the trajectory taken by the central government, the difference
was that many regional governments then remained reluctant to reduce
spending once the Spanish government had made the shift to austerity me-
asures. The regions faced a tougher task than the central government to trim
their budgets: they manage around one third of state expenditure213 but
around two thirds of this amount goes towards the fundamental policy areas
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from 1978 to 2010.
2007 2015
Andalusia                       4.8                     21.6
Aragon                       3.4                     20.5
Asturias                       3.2                     18.0
Balearic Islands                       6.9                     30.2
Canary Islands                       3.7                     15.8
Cantabria                       3.4                     22.0
Castile-La Mancha                       4.7                     35.6
Castile and León                       3.4                     19.5
Catalonia                       7.8                     35.3
Extremadura                       4.5                     20.3
Galicia                       6.6                     18.6
La Rioja                       3.5                     18.0
Madrid                      5.2                     13.6
Murcia                       2.3                     27.4
Navarre                       3.6                     18.2
Basque Country                       1.0                     14.4
Valencia                     11.3                     41.3
of health, education and social services. These were far harder to control de-
mand for and cut than areas being slashed at the time by the central govern-
ment, such as public investment in infrastructure, civil servants’ salaries and
the foreign office budget. At the same time, however, many regions showed
reluctance to make cuts in more feasible areas too, and there were concerns
this would persist ahead of the regional elections of May 2011. Moreover,
regional tax revenues from the ceded taxes, which had been increased under
the 2009 financing system, suffered a greater fall as a result of the crisis than
the transfers derived from non-ceded taxes, which had decreased (Leal Mar-
cos and López Laborda: 30). In this climate, by mid 2010, the EU authorities
were starting to focus their attention on the threat that regional finances in
Spain posed to the country’s overall financial health and debt sustainability,
as the rapid growth in regional debt made it the main obstacle to Spain’s de-
ficit-reduction targets.214
In this context, the Spanish Socialist government at the time first began
to attempt a crackdown on regional government spending and borrowing
in the second half of 2010, beginning to exercise its right to ban regions fai-
ling to comply with new deficit targets from issuing new debt. Since Article
156 of the Constitution gave the regions the authority to design their own
budgetary policies, the central government was not authorised to impose a
budgetary ceiling on them and the stamp of approval for debt issuances was
therefore the only significant lever it had on the finances of the fifteen re-
gions under the common regime at the time. A few months later, under pres-
sure from the EU to ensure the sustainability of Spain’s public finances, the
then prime minister Zapatero promised to come up with Spain’s own equi-
valent of a German debt brake. He committed to introducing a budgetary
ceiling limiting spending by the central government to nominal GDP growth
to avoid a growing structural deficit. He nevertheless resisted pressures from
both European officials and the opposition PP to make this rule binding for
the regional governments too, preferring instead to seek a consensus within
the intergovernmental CPFF on the matter in order to respect the regions’
competences in the budgetary sphere. 
In August 2011, however, once Spanish bond yields were reaching un-
sustainable highs due to investors’ distrust of the country’s finances, Zapa-
tero did reluctantly agree to a very unpopular pact with the PP to reform
Article 135 of the Spanish Constitution to oblige all tiers of government in
Spain (autonomous communities included) to adhere to the budgetary sta-
bility principle. Henceforth (with effect from 27 September 2011) neither the
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plicitly guaranteed by the Spanish government, the widespread view was the central govern-
ment could not let a region default. Concerns about regional finances therefore negatively
impacted Spanish bond yields throughout the crisis. In this regard, Spain fits the model pro-
pounded by Rodden (2006) whereby expectations that central governments will assume re-
sponsibility for bailing out their subnational governments are strongest in the countries where
the latter rely on revenue sharing and transfers rather than independent regional and local tax-
ation.
central nor the regional governments would be allowed to incur a structural
deficit exceeding the margins set by the EU without incurring a penalty (Her-
nández de Cos 2011). Crucially, while the overall annual deficit target for
Spain was to be set by the EU authorities, the split of the target between the
different levels of administration in Spain (central, regional, local) was to be
decided thereafter by the Spanish government. In early 2012, the new PP
government presented a new Budgetary Stability and Financial Sustainabi-
lity Law (approved on 27 April 2012) to implement the constitutional reform
of Article 135 agreed with the PSOE in September 2011, but with significantly
tougher regulations than those the PSOE had conceded to then. For exam-
ple, the new Law established a stricter deficit ceiling than had been envisa-
ged (no structural deficit would be allowed after a transition period) and set
out the Spanish government’s right to take control over the finances of any
region that failed to comply with the fiscal targets it set, among other mea-
sures (Hernández de Cos and Pérez 2013). 
The fact that most of the regions – including Catalonia – could still access
some forms of financing for much of the period of Socialist central govern-
ment gave them a crucial degree of autonomy, even if they needed the cen-
tral government’s permission to issue debt. Nevertheless, securing financing
rapidly became harder from the second half of 2010 onwards, especially for
the largest and most indebted regions with the greatest financing needs.
Prior to the crisis, Spain’s regional governments had met their financing
needs primarily via bank loans (most often extended by the cajas de ahorros)
and, in the case of the largest regions with the greatest needs (e.g. Andalu-
sia, Valencia, Catalonia, Madrid), bonds issued on the public debt markets.
These were subscribed by both Spanish and international institutional in-
vestors such as pension and insurance funds, as well as banks for their own
portfolios. That was when regional bonds were considered solid investment
grade by ratings agencies, in line with the rating of Spanish government
debt at the time. However, the situation rapidly changed over 2010 and 2011
as investors became increasingly aware of the perilous state of Spain’s re-
gional finances and ratings agencies drastically downgraded many of the
regions from strong investment grade to junk or near junk status. Only the
relatively healthier regions like Madrid and the Basque Country managed to
cling onto the lower rungs of investment grade status, broadly in line with
Spanish government debt at the time. Short-term retail bonds at expensive
rates, credit lines from domestic banks and private placement notes tailored
to specific investors became the new norm for many of the regions when
the majority were almost completely shut out of the wholesale public debt
markets from mid 2010.215
For many of these instruments the regions ended up paying at least dou-
ble (often triple) the rates the Spanish Treasury was paying for central go-
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vernment debt of the same duration, even as Spanish bond yields rose dra-
matically too. More than 75% of the roughly EUR 30bn financing secured by
Spain’s 17 regions throughout 2011 was short-term financing due to mature
in under three years as they struggled to access longer-term financing. Mo-
reover, approximately 37% of the financing secured that year was in the form
of retail bonds (dubbed ‘patriotic bonds’) issued to largely unsuspecting in-
dividual investors, with the remainder split between short-term loans
(c.36%), private placement notes (c.17%), new public bond issues for insti-
tutional investors (c.5%) and taps on existing bonds (c.5%).216 Struggling to
issue debt to institutional investors, Catalonia had been the first region to
launch retail bonds to individual domestic investors – usually Catalan citi-
zens, thus the name ‘patriotic bonds’ – in October/November 2010. Yet the
rate the Catalan government had to pay for such issuances was very high –
a return of 4.75% plus bank commission of 3%, amounting to 7.75% (around
triple the rate paid by the Spanish government for Treasury bills of the same
duration at the time). Other struggling regions – the Balearics, Valencia, An-
dalusia and Murcia – would follow suit. These regional governments had lit-
tle other option, but selling these retail bonds to the unsuspecting general
public unaware of the full extent of the regions’ debt problems was akin to
the scandal of the regional cajas de ahorros (savings banks) selling prefe-
rence shares to customers as though they were as safe as deposits (on this,
see for example Domínguez Martínez 2012). 
By the time the PP government came into power following the general
elections held on 20 November 2011, many of the regions’ access to funding
had by then almost completely dried up as they were struggling to continue
to find demand for ‘patriotic bonds’ and could not afford to keep issuing
such expensive instruments, with the final such issuance taking place in May
2012. The 17 regions’ total gross financing needs in 2012 totalled around
EUR 40bn, with Catalonia accounting for over a quarter of this amount. Mo-
reover, the regions had by now also accumulated billions of euros in unpaid
bills to suppliers, to the extent that the National Association of the Pharma-
ceutical Industry in Spain (Farmaindustria) warned some pharmaceutical
companies were starting to shy away from supplying medicines in certain
Spanish regions. Faced with this situation, Spain’s new central government
thus took action from January 2012 to avoid a potential regional government
default. Since it had relatively greater access to financing than the regions
(and at lower rates), it secured funds to make loans guaranteed by the Spa-
nish Treasury to the regions. In this context, the situation changed substan-
tially throughout 2012 as the new PP central government became the holder
of the purse strings for several regional governments that became reliant
upon loans from it. 
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by the regions. For more information on the evolution of regional debt and financing options
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This was a key turning point as all but the healthiest regions would soo-
ner or later become reliant upon the centralised funding mechanisms crea-
ted by the central government. These funding mechanisms were as follows:
in January 2012 the government set up a EUR 10bn credit line (extendible
to EUR 15bn) from the Official Credit Institute (ICO) to help the regions cover
debt maturity needs and repay outstanding bills to suppliers. This was then
superseded by two funds: (1) a EUR 30bn (extendible to EUR 35bn) Fund for
Financing Payments to Suppliers (Fondo para la Financiación de los Pagos
a Proveedores, FFPP) set up in March 2012, to lend money to the regions in
need to pay outstanding invoices to suppliers that year; and (2) an EUR 18bn
Regional Liquidity Fund (Fondo de Liquidez Autonómica, FLA) set up in July
2012 to lend money to the regions primarily to cover debt maturities, with
some limited funds to cover new financing needs and payments to suppliers
too. Via the ICO, the FFPP and the FLA, Catalonia borrowed the second lar-
gest combined total (following Valencia) of nearly EUR 9bn out of over EUR
35bn used by the regions in 2012.217 While the amounts originally allocated
to these funds were designed for 2012 only, both the FLA and the FFPP
would be replenished and extended in 2013 and 2014. In return, the regions
borrowing from the Funds would have to adhere to a strict adjustment pro-
gramme to meet the regional deficit targets set by the central government,
among other conditions. Similar funding mechanisms providing loans with
strict conditions for adjustment were also provided to the local authorities. 
While the Funds were initially meant to be temporary, until the regions
could regain market access and return to borrowing of their own accord, the
central government took steps to make these more semi-permanent in na-
ture under Royal Decree Law 17/2014, of 26 December. This established a
new and unified Fund for the Financing of the Autonomous Communities
(Fondo de Financiación a Comunidades Autónomas, FFCA) – as well as an
equivalent Fund for the local authorities – which was designed to centralise
the different funds providing liquidity support from the central government
to the regions under one main umbrella Fund from 2015 onwards.218 The
Fund comprises four tranches: the Liquidity Fund, which is a continuation
of the previous FLA, lends money to the regions that breach deficit reduction
targets, and thus comes with the most stringent conditions; the Financial Fa-
cility Fund (Fondo de facilidad financiera) lends money to the regions which
comply with the stability targets; the Social Fund (Fondo social) provides
funds to the regions that have accumulated payables owed to the munici-
palities as part of social expenditure agreements; and the Fund in Liquidation
for Paying Suppliers to the Regions (Fondo en liquidación para la financia-
ción de los pagos a proveedores de las comunidades autónomas) continues
the role of the original FFPP. 
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is given in De la Fuente 2013b: 18.
218 Martín (2015) gives a full account of the setting up of the new funding mechanism and
its different tranches.
Through these Funds, regional governments are offered loans from the
central government at very low interest rates: usually 0% in the initial years,
and less than 1% thereafter (Martín 2015: 10). In 2012, 2013 and 2014, the re-
latively healthier regions, which still had some market access to raise funds
of their own, had sought to avoid at all costs tapping the FLA, which was
perceived as a form of undesirable central government bailout for regions
unable to finance themselves. From 2014, the PP central government never-
theless encouraged even those regions still accessing funds of their own ac-
cord to apply instead for the centralised funding mechanisms, seeking to
entice them by offering interest rates far lower than market rates (Martín
2015a and 2015b; Jiménez and Cantalapiedra 2016). The distinction between
the FLA for non-compliant regions, and the Financial Facility for compliant
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TABLE 15: Regional debt lent by the Spanish government 
(as of the first quarter of 2015) 
Source: Martín 2015b: 38 and Bank of Spain
Region Total debt (EUR mn) 
Of which, debt lent by the
Spanish government (via
the different funds set up
since 2012) (EUR mn)
Andalusia                     29,822                    18,286
Aragon                       6,626                         809
Asturias                       3,789                      1,282
Balearic Islands                       8,260                      4,642
Canary Islands                       6,483                      3,339
Cantabria                       2,547                      1,369
Castile-La Mancha                     13,138                      7,754
Castile and León                     10,386                      1,718
Catalonia                     66,813                    40,119
Extremadura                       3,391                         580
Galicia                     10,210                      1,599
La Rioja                       1,390                         143
Madrid                     26,341                         945
Murcia                       7,467                      4,551
Navarre                       3,586                         321
Basque Country                       9,903                             0
Valencia                     40,085                    25,455
TOTAL                   250,237                  112,913
regions, was designed in part to encourage compliant regions to tap the cen-
tralised mechanisms, by providing a system which differentiated them from
the regions with greater financial problems. By the 20 January 2015 deadline
to apply for funds for 2015, all of the regions had chosen to apply apart from
the Madrid region, the Basque region and the Navarran region (Martín
2015a: 8). The change in government in Madrid following the 2015 regional
elections gave the PP central government a new opportunity to apply politi-
cal pressure, with the result that the Madrid regional government too finally
agreed to use the centralised funding mechanisms. Thus, by then, the only
regions still accessing funding of their own accord were the two regions
under the foral financing system, and almost half of regional debt was in the
hands of the Spanish central government (see Table 15, p.232). The discre-
pancy in level of financial autonomy of the regions under the common
system and those under the foral financing system thus reached new
heights.
This centralisation of funding mechanisms from 2012 onwards, and the
opportunity it gave the central Spanish government to tighten its control
over Catalonia’s finances, intensified Spanish-Catalan government tensions
over regional financing. The Catalan government quickly became very hea-
vily dependent on the central Spanish government for funding. In 2012,
when the FLA was first created (following lengthy disputes between the Spa-
nish and Catalan governments over the conditions attached to loans from
it), the Spanish state owned 16.58% of Catalan debt at the time (EUR 8.685bn
of a total 52.354bn). And yet by the end of 2015, the share of Catalan debt in
the hands of the central government had increased to 59.97% (EUR 43.343bn
of EUR 72.274bn), according to figures published by the Bank of Spain.219
This served to reignite the debate over the level of financing afforded to Ca-
talonia under the common system, since the Catalan government has con-
sistently argued that Catalonia would have sufficient resources without
needing to depend on loans from the central government, were it to be allo-
wed to keep more of the revenues raised in its territory. And CDC and other
Catalan parties are very clear that they would rather have the resources allo-
cated to them in the budget in the first place, rather than as loans from the
central government, since the latter constitute a ‘source of dependence’ on
the central government.220
The pressure on resources has not only fuelled longstanding Spanish-Ca-
talan disputes over whether Catalonia receives sufficient funding in the pre-
sent under the regional financing system, but it has also served to reignite
debate over the so-called ‘historical debt’ which Catalan nationalists claim
is owed to Catalonia for issues such as a historical lack of sufficient state
spending on infrastructure in the region, as well as the under-financing of
competences such as health and education when these were first devolved.
In 2014, the repayment of so-called ‘historical debt’ – the existence or extent
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219 As reported in ‘El Estado duplica la deuda que posee de la Generalitat en apenas dos
años’,  Expansión, 26.03.16.
220 Personal interview with Andreu Mas-Colell (CDC), 25 January 2016.
of which is in itself subject to dispute – constituted one of CiU’s proposals to
alleviate the financial predicament of the Generalitat and other regional go-
vernments.221 On the other hand, however, critics taking a more centralist
stance have suggested that the Catalan government has exaggerated the ex-
tent to which the regional financing system is to blame for the region’s fi-
nancial predicament. For example, when the central government published
the Territorialised Public Accounts (Sistema de Cuentas Públicas Territoria-
lizadas, SCPT) for the first time in mid July 2014 – a new methodology to
show the fiscal balances of each region with the central government, which
Catalan nationalists do not readily accept (see Chapter 1, p.15) – this sparked
a flurry of media articles in the Spanish press arguing that the results sho-
wed that Catalonia was not unduly prejudiced by the financing system.222
Those wishing to challenge suggestions that Catalonia’s financial woes
could be attributed to the financing system have frequently argued that the
comparison between the Madrid region and Catalonia suggests otherwise.
Both the Madrid and Catalan regions are among the largest regions in Spain
in terms of population size and among the richest regions in terms of GDP
and fiscal capacity per capita, and both suffer from the overly redistributive
nature of the common regime financing system – indeed, successive studies
have shown that the Madrid region is more penalised than Catalonia (e.g.
De la Fuente 2012b and 2013a). Yet Catalonia ended up far more in debt than
Madrid and they became poles apart in terms of fiscal discipline and their
appeal to investors in the wake of the crisis, suggesting poorer financial ma-
nagement by the Catalan authorities. Nevertheless, Catalan nationalists re-
fute such comparisons, arguing that while the regions of Madrid and
Catalonia are more or less comparable in terms of population size and GDP
levels, in other respects the comparison falls flat, since Madrid has benefitted
from factors related to the fact that it is the capital, such as increased infras-
tructure spending and other investments, as well as the fact that it has by
far the largest number of civil servants. They also argue that transfers to the
Madrid region for competences such as health and universities are also re-
latively more recent than to Catalonia, resulting in lower levels of accumu-
lated debt. 
Another argument concerns the provincial administrations (diputacio-
nes): since the Madrid region only has one province, the region benefits
more directly from the funding of the diputación too (which, importantly,
has had more problems with indebtedness than the regional government),
in contrast to Catalonia where there are four diputaciones.223 Finally, Catalan
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ABC, 27.07.14. 
223 These comparative factors were listed by Andreu Mas-Colell (CDC) when interviewed
on 25 January 2016.
nationalists suggest that comparisons between the Madrid and Catalan re-
gions are a ‘distortion’ in any case, due to the allegedly ‘artificial’ way in
which regions were created during the Transition: according to this argu-
ment, even though the Madrid region itself appears to be the most penalised
by the common financing system (in terms of the fall in its resources per ca-
pita following the equalisation of revenues), other regions within the tradi-
tionally Castilian area (especially Castilla y Léon and La Rioja) benefit from
the system, thus overall, the traditional Castile benefits from the financing
system.224
Ultimately, there has thus been a stalemate in political perspectives as to
what extent the regional financing system has been to blame for Catalonia’s
financial woes (together with related factors such as the relative lack of Spa-
nish state investment in Catalonia), relative to discretionary spending deci-
sions taken by Catalan governments. While there is undoubtedly a link to
some extent between the treatment of Catalonia under the regional financing
system (combined with other related factors such as levels of investment
spending) and the region’s level of indebtedness, the link is far from straight-
forward. Economists have shown that other factors such as regional varia-
tions in revenue and expenditure behaviour have also played a significant
role in determining the indebtedness of each region (e.g. Leal Marcos and
López Laborda 2013). Indeed, CiU itself recognised this in its campaign to
regain control of the Catalan government at the 2010 regional elections,
when it attributed Catalonia’s financial woes not only to the regional finan-
cing system, but also to the spending behaviour of the left-wing tripartite
coalition that had governed the region since 2003.225 The complexity of the
situation has created ambiguity as to what factors exactly have caused the
indebtedness and fiscal indiscipline of the Catalan government. The convo-
luted nature of the regional financing system in itself creates an accountabi-
lity gap, in particular in terms of its complicated division of revenue and
expenditure responsibilities which is little understood by the general public
(Bosch and Durán 2008: 15). Yet this has been intensified in the wake of the
crisis by the opaqueness of the causes of the regions’ varying levels of bud-
getary compliance and the degree to which these relate or not to the finan-
cing models – all of which have served as fuel for disputes between the
central and Catalan governments, giving them scope to offer different figures
and interpretations.
The debate over financing levels has also become part and parcel of the
related dispute over whether, or to what extent, the Spanish central govern-
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early years of the crisis, were in fact not dissimilar from the behaviour of the PSOE government
in Madrid, which applied one of the largest fiscal stimulus packages in the EU in those years
(Salmon 2010b: 84). This was at a time when fiscal stimulus measures were being used through-
out the EU to combat the crisis, before a shift in trend to debt reduction strategies set in from
late 2009 onwards.  
ment has used arguments of rationalisation for economic purposes as a
guise for ideologically-motivated recentralisation due to the party’s Spanish
centralism (Bosch and Solé-Ollé 2013; Muro 2015). On the one hand, the Spa-
nish central government has been under repeated pressure from the EU au-
thorities to meet budget deficit targets, with explicit requests from the EU
authorities to rein in regional government spending as one means to achieve
this. On the other hand, however, several regional governments including
Catalonia have accused the PP government in particular of shifting too much
of the fiscal burden of adjustment onto the regions in its split of the annual
deficit target between the central government, the regional governments,
the local authorities and the social security system. 
According to CDC, the split of the deficit targets has consistently put the
burden of adjustment too heavily onto the regional governments since the
share of the total deficit target for Spain they have been allotted has not been
proportional to their share of total government spending.226 In Spain, the
central government accounts for approximately 22% of total government ex-
penditure, while the regional governments are responsible for approxima-
tely 38%, the local authorities for approximately 10%, and the social security
system for approximately 30%. The deficit targets set by the central govern-
ment, however, always allow the central government to incur the highest
deficit: in 2012, for example, the new PP government set targets of 4% for
the central government, 1.5% for the regional governments, 0.3% for the
local authorities and 0% for the social security system. The Catalan govern-
ment has also argued that the strict conditionality tied to the central govern-
ment loans has constituted a de facto intervention since the regions using
these have only been lent sufficient funds to remain compliant with the de-
ficit targets and were banned from incurring additional debt from other sour-
ces. Representatives of the Mas government have thus accused the central
government of a policy not just of ‘austerity’ but of ‘asphyxiation’ towards
the regional government.227 Such arguments are refuted by the central go-
vernment, which argues instead that the fiscal discipline it requires of the
regional governments is necessary in order to meet the targets set by EU
authorities, which have put pressure on the Spanish government to control
and reduce regional government spending. 
The reality would seem a complex combination of both sides of the coin.
The almost complete lack of central government controls over regional spen-
ding at the start of the crisis created a situation in which it was very difficult
to enforce austerity cuts on regional governments, which were needed in
order for Spain to meet EU deficit targets. Moreover, despite the lack of an
explicit central government guarantee on regional government debt, it was
widely expected that the Spanish government would be forced to bail out
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El Periódico, 08.04.16. 
227 Personal interview with Andreu Mas-Colell (CDC), 25 January 2016.
any regional government unable to repay its debt. In such circumstances, it
was to be expected that the Spanish government would seek to recentralise
control to some degree over regional government spending. On the other
hand, however, there are signs that the PP government’s recentralisation of
control over regional government borrowing and spending has been inten-
sified due to the party’s centralist stance. For example, while the centralised
liquidity mechanisms to lend money to regional governments have been ne-
cessary to keep many of the regions afloat, the fact that the central govern-
ment has encouraged even those regions that were still managing to finance
themselves to use them points to a degree of recentralisation for ideologi-
cally centralist motives. The centralised funding mechanisms offer the ad-
vantage of very low financing costs since the central government charges
interest rates that are far lower than market rates, but nevertheless economic
experts suggest that such centralised mechanisms offering loans at very re-
duced rates to the regions relative to market rates should only be temporary
in nature and should not be seen as preferable to borrowing on the markets
where possible (Martín 2015a; Jiménez and Cantalapiedra 2016). Such loans
are perceived as not economically desirable in the long-term since they di-
minish the fiscal accountability of regions, reduce the diversity of their pos-
sible funding sources (the longer the regions are absent from international
debt markets, the harder it will be for them to return), and risk encouraging
them to seek a write-off of the debt owed to the central government rather
than repaying it.
CDC/CiU’S SHIFTING STANCE IN A CONTEXT OF FINANCIAL CRISIS
The developments during the financial crisis and its aftermath analysed
above played a significant role in intensifying pro-sovereignty sentiment in
Catalonia, to the extent that it is in fact difficult to differentiate the impact of
these developments and context on CDC/CiU’s trajectory from the impact on
the wider Catalanist movement, since by this stage CDC/CiU was caught up
in a wider Catalanist evolution involving several parties and civil society
groups, and dissatisfaction with the financing provisions for Catalonia during
the crisis was widespread. Nevertheless, the following influences on
CDC/CiU’s behaviour can be identified.
The shortcomings of 2009 regional financing reform finally removed one
approach short of a fiscal pact. Since CiU was in opposition at the time in
Catalonia, it could take advantage of this position to be the first in Catalonia
to be the most critical of the reform, before the members of the tripartite co-
alition government, who initially praised it until it became clear within a year
that this reform too could not suffice to meet Catalanist expectations. CiU
then used this need for a new financing agreement for Catalonia as a key fe-
ature of its 2010 regional election campaign. Ahead of the 2010 regional elec-
tions, CiU focused its campaign on the financial crisis and the steps needed
to reduce public spending, capitalising on its previous reputation for good
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economic management and criticising the tripartite coalition’s handling of
Catalonia’s finances (Rico 2012: 221). At the time, survey data collected from
before the referendum showed that after the protracted debacle of the sta-
tute reform, ‘only 13 per cent of respondents mentioned either self-govern-
ment or the related issue of regional financing as one of the region’s two
most important problems, while unemployment or the economy was named
by 90 per cent’ (Rico 2012: 221). CiU nevertheless found an obvious way to
link the economic and territorial dimensions by focusing its 2010 campaign
on proposals for a new Concierto-style financing system for Catalonia as a
means of addressing the region’s economic predicament. 
Once CiU was back in power at the end of 2010, the continued deteriora-
tion of Catalonia’s financial situation and the increasingly centralised con-
trols over Catalan finances (via centralised funding mechanisms and the
strict conditions attached to them) resulted in an escalation of demands for
a new financing model for Catalonia from both politicians and citizens, as it
became increasingly clear that the new financing model negotiated in 2009
could not suffice to satisfy Catalan demands. CiU was not only increasingly
convinced itself by now of the need for a new model, but also under pressure
from ERC, now back in opposition and therefore able to put pressure on CiU,
thereby reversing the roles that both had played when ERC formed part of
the tripartite coalition government and CiU was in opposition. In this context,
CiU backed ERC’s proposal in 2011 to create a ‘Committee to Study a New
Financing Model Based on the Concierto Económico’ in the Catalan parlia-
ment,228 the second such committee of its kind in the Catalan parliament fo-
llowing the previous ‘Committee to Study the Concierto Económico as a
Means for the Appropriate Financing of Catalan Autonomy’ fifteen years pre-
viously, in 1996 (see pp.208-9). In a similar fashion to what had happened in
1996, ERC was the main driving force behind the creation of a new commit-
tee in 2011, but in a marked difference, this time round CiU backed the pro-
posal for a committee to study the Concierto wholeheartedly, in contrast to
the reticence it had shown back then. 
In another significant difference, whereas the 1996 committee had been
characterised by a shared cross-party consensus of the need for a new fi-
nancing system notwithstanding the different proposals presented, what
best characterised the 2011 committee was instead a clear division between
nationalist (i.e. CiU and ERC) and non-nationalist parties from the outset,
which was indicative of the new alliances now emerging in Catalonia. In the
opening intervention, Joan Puigcercós (ERC) laid out his party’s views that
a Concierto for Catalonia would avoid the current problems experienced by
the region under the 2009 regional financing reform, such as the lack of pay-
ments from the Competitiveness Fund and the insufficient state spending
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on infrastructure in the region. While Jordi Turull i Negre (speaking on behalf
of CiU) backed Puigcercós’ intervention as a ‘rather good’ explanation,229 the
spokespeople for PSC, PP and Ciudadanos declined to back the creation of
the committee, criticising it as a purely nationalist-led initiative which sought
to create a model purely for Catalonia rather than one that would work for
both Catalonia and the rest of Spain. ICV, meanwhile, did back the creation
of the committee but insisted in traditional fashion on the need for federal
elements including a solidarity commitment.
By the time Artur Mas went to Madrid to make a last ditch request for a
fiscal pact for Catalonia in 2012, which was promptly rejected again by Rajoy,
the pro-independence wave in Catalonia was already surging. Artur Mas’
journey to Madrid in 2012 to demand a fiscal pact was a crucial step in CDC’s
‘radicalisation’ process: the fact that securing a different financing system
for Catalonia again proved to be unviable pushed CDC into joining the rising
pro-sovereignty wave increasingly demanding not just the ‘right to decide’,
but also independence. Traditional Catalan nationalists who had long fought
for greater recognition for Catalonia’s language and culture were by now in-
creasingly being joined by a new wave of disaffected Catalans who were not
necessarily traditional nationalist party supporters but had come to resent
Catalonia’s economic treatment at the hands of the Spanish state and the
austerity measures being imposed during the crisis – as well as the levels of
corruption not only among Spanish but also Catalan nationalist politicians.
Political disputes between central and Catalan governments over regional
financing during the crisis and its aftermath have thus coincided with a rise
in Catalan citizens turning to support independence not just for traditional
reasons of culture and identity, but also for economic motives.
Studies analysing public opinion data have shown that economic consi-
derations have played a role in the increase in support for independence
among Catalan citizens in recent years, in addition to more traditional ex-
planatory factors such as identity (e.g. Boylan 2015; Muñoz and Tormos
2015). The rise in mass mobilisation in Catalonia, which was crucial to CDC’s
explicit shift towards a pro-sovereignty lexicon in 2012 and eventually a pro-
independence stance, in fact started out in its beginnings with demonstra-
tions and marches protesting over local infrastructure problems, such
complaints over toll roads and poor local rail networks (see Chapter 2). In
this regard, political agency and grassroots mobilisation have gradually fed
into one another, since CDC and other parties in favour of the ‘right to decide’
or independence have sought to draw citizens’ attention to the Catalan fiscal
deficit and the relative lack of state investment in Catalonia, which has in
turn contributed to higher levels of mobilisation. 
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CONCLUSION
In the view of Andreu Mas-Colell, Catalan economy minister from Decem-
ber 2010 to January 2016, and thus probably the Catalan politician best ac-
quainted with Catalonia’s financial woes in that period, the pro-sovereignty
drive in Catalonia would still have occurred even without an economic crisis,
albeit not necessarily quite so rapidly.230 This would seem an appropriate re-
flection of the fact that economic and financial matters – including the regio-
nal financing system and its impact on Catalonia – have not been the only
driver of the recent pro-sovereignty drive in Catalonia and the previous tra-
jectory towards it, but have nevertheless significantly influenced, intensified
and shaped the timing of it. 
Many, including Mas-Colell himself, see the origins of the current pro-so-
vereignty drive in the first absolute majority Spanish government of Aznar
in 2000-2004, which marked the beginnings of a reassertion of the Spanish
nationalist vision of ‘one nation’ and a move towards recentralisation. Ne-
vertheless, the problems with the regional financing system and the related
matter of the relative lack of Spanish state investment in Catalonia had alre-
ady played an important role in starting to influence territorial agendas in
Catalonia prior to that first absolute majority PP government from 2000 on-
wards. In the mid to late 1990s, dissatisfaction with the regional financing
system was the main Catalan complaint regarding Spanish-Catalan relations,
and one shared by all the main parties in Catalonia. This dissatisfaction with
regional funding arrangements was in fact initially one of the most important
factors at the turn of the century that propelled the move among Catalan
parties towards demands for a new Catalan statute, some time before con-
cerns would start to intensify about the implications of the PP’s recentralising
drive for Catalan language and culture and other devolved areas such as
education. Regional financing is one of the few issues on which there was
at the time, and has been since, a cross-party consensus within the region
that the existing provisions of the common financing system and its outco-
mes for Catalonia were unsatisfactory, notwithstanding different political
views on how the matter should be resolved. The question, unresolved by
the Catalan statute reform and the subsequent regional financing reform of
2009, would contribute significantly to the rise in pro-sovereignty sentiment
when the impact of the economic crisis of 2007-2008 hit society in particular
from 2010 onwards, once the Spanish government’s debt reduction strate-
gies were underway. This resulted not only in a drastic decline in resources
but also the centralisation of regional funding mechanisms and control over
regional finances.
Specifically in the case of CDC, Jordi Pujol’s explicit but still tentative
move towards requesting a fiscal pact for Catalonia from 1997 onwards, and
Artur Mas’ more avid defence later on of a Concierto-style arrangement for
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Catalonia during the statute reform negotiations, were indicative of a gro-
wing conviction within the party that the common financing system was re-
aching its expiry date for Catalonia. However, the timing of such shifts in
party stance was not only influenced by the declining opportunities for ac-
commodationist behaviour given the evolving political context in Madrid,
but also in part by the need to outbid other parties in Catalonia, given the
cross-party consensus that the regional financing model had become inade-
quate. CDC/CiU thus became caught up in a broader Catalanist evolution
whereby the majority of parties in Catalonia from the late 1990s onwards
came to consider the existing regional financing arrangements inadequate. 
This broader Catalanist process would have a significant influence on
CDC/CiU, pushing it to define more clearly its vision of a fiscal pact for Cata-
lonia, reducing the scope for its non-committal attitude that had prevailed
during prior periods of accommodationism, and encouraging a new kind of
tactical behaviour in response to party competition within Catalonia over
proposals for new financing models. Ultimately, CiU’s inability to achieve a
suitable fiscal pact for Catalonia in 2012, in a climate of rising pro-sove-
reignty sentiment in Catalonia and a context of economic deterioration,
would prove a decisive moment for the party federation, as it shifted its po-
sition clearly in favour of support for the right to decide, and eventually, in
the case of CDC (but not UDC), independence for Catalonia. The issue of re-
gional financing has thus played a significant role in influencing CDC’s shift
from accommodationist to pro-sovereignty politics. As well as the evolving
nature of relations with Madrid, intra-regional factors such as party compe-
tition and pressures from civil society have had a significant bearing on the
timing of CDC’s shifts in attitude towards the financing question and beyond. 
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION

The fact that regional financing concerns have played a greater role in in-
fluencing the rise in pro-sovereignty demands in Catalonia than in the Bas-
que Country in recent years is widely acknowledged and to be expected,
since the Concierto affords the Basque region far greater autonomy and sig-
nificantly more resources than the equivalent levels afforded to Catalonia
under the common system. Beyond this general observation, however, what
more detailed conclusions can we draw regarding the implications of the
two different regional financing systems for the evolution of the territorial
strategies and behaviour of the mainstream nationalist parties in each re-
gion, in particular since the late 1990s? The first section of this conclusion
outlines the main findings of this thesis. It starts by summarising how the
two regional financing systems have influenced the timing of shifts in pro-
sovereignty agendas, before drawing other conclusions specific to each case
study based on each chapter’s main findings. This, in turn, allows for com-
parative comments regarding, for example, the differences in intraregional
patterns of competition and alliance behaviour over regional financing and
fiscal matters in each case; or, alternatively, the similarities in the two parties’
views and behaviour towards the EU. The second section then suggests
where this thesis makes a contribution to knowledge, addressing both the
individual contributions of each case study, and then the benefits of the com-
parative approach. A final section points to further avenues for research ari-
sing from this project. 
MAIN FINDINGS
Regional financing has influenced the timing of shifts in territorial
agendas:
In both cases, albeit to different degrees, the regional financing systems
and the different levels of fiscal autonomy and financial resources they pro-
vide have played a role in influencing the timing of the shifts in territorial
agendas undertaken by the PNV and CDC, and the prospects of one agenda
or the other being adopted, especially when a party is already under pres-
sure to change. In the Basque case, the fiscal autonomy model and the res-
ponsibility it entails put the onus on the Basque government to focus first
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and foremost on the economy in times of economic difficulty, since it cannot
easily look to Madrid for additional financing or blame Madrid for the re-
gion’s financial woes (in contrast to Catalonia). Thus one of the contextual
factors that contributed to Ibarretxe’s ability and determination to take for-
ward a pro-sovereignty agenda in the late 1990s and early 2000s was preci-
sely the fact that the Basque economy was by then much stronger than it
had been during the years of Ardanza government in the 1980s and early
1990s and the Basque region was by then financially self-standing (as well
as more fiscally autonomous after the 1997 reform of the Concierto), in con-
trast to earlier periods where Madrid had made contributions towards rein-
dustrialisation in the region to help surmount the crisis of the 1980s. In more
recent times, when the PNV first returned to govern the Basque region in
2012 after a three-year period in opposition, Urkullu put the PNV’s territorial
agenda temporarily on the backburner again to focus first and foremost on
ensuring the Basque Country would emerge from the financial crisis of 2007-
2008. Like everywhere the Basque region has suffered during the crisis, but
in comparative terms, it has fared significantly better than much of the rest
of Spain. This situation, which has been facilitated in part by the fiscal auto-
nomy and greater resources enjoyed by the region, has contributed to the
fact that securing a new status for the Basque Country has not been an im-
mediate priority in recent years for many within Basque society nor indeed
for many within the PNV itself. 
This is in stark contrast to Catalonia, where the problems of the regional
financing system as applied to Catalonia have significantly accelerated CDC’s
shift to a pro-sovereignty agenda in the recent context of economic deterio-
ration (see Chapter 7). Demands for the reform of regional financing have
nevertheless been a major theme of Catalan political debate for more than
a decade, thus preceding the recent context of major economic recession.
The economic context faced by Catalonia in the late 1990s, with the cha-
llenge of unprecedented levels of immigration, was also one of several fac-
tors that played a role in influencing the timing of shifts in agendas. By then,
it was already clear that Catalonia received below-average resources under
the common system despite being one of the main contributors in terms of
per capita revenues, and the fact that the regional financing system at the
time did not include suitable mechanisms to provide increasing revenues in
regions with higher levels of immigration compounded the problem, since
regions such as Catalonia did not receive additional resources to reflect their
increased commitments in matters such as health and education. Moreover,
these key competences, which were now under increasing pressure, had ori-
ginally been transferred to Catalonia with what was perceived from the Ca-
talanist position as a deficient level of funding in the first place. The Catalans
had not fought as hard as the Basques to secure funding to improve the exis-
ting substandard infrastructure in terms of schools and hospitals when the
competences were originally transferred, believing that there would be
scope for further deals in future – scope which did not eventually materialise.
This context contributed to the growing cross-party dissatisfaction with the
regional financing system from the late 1990s onwards, as the Catalans
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sought to keep more of their revenues to be able to face increased commit-
ments in health and education, as well as other areas such as deteriorating
local rail and other infrastructure networks. Importantly, regional financing
thus became one of the main grievances that contributed to fuelling calls
from several parties for a new autonomy statute for Catalonia from the turn
of the century, in order to address a new financing model for the region,
among other matters.
Regional financing has influenced conceptions of sovereignty:
Although regional financing in the Basque case has not become a strong
point of contention as in Catalonia, the bilateral nature of the Concierto has
nevertheless still influenced the PNV’s territorial agenda in other ways, by
shaping the conception of sovereignty that it seeks for the Basque region,
since the Concierto is the closest current equivalent to the form of ‘bilateral
relationship between equals’ that the PNV seeks in wider Spanish-Basque
political relations, under the vision articulated by the Urkullu government
(see Chapter 4). On the one hand, bilateral relations over the Concierto have
facilitated and encouraged accommodationist behaviour on the part of the
PNV, since they have offered considerable scope for deals and payoffs to re-
solve disagreements. This bilateral relationship, combined with the greater
resources that the Concierto affords to the Basque region, has allowed such
accommodationist attitudes within the PNV to persist for longer than in the
case of CDC in Catalonia. It is very significant that a substantial deal such as
the new Concierto law of 2002 was even possible under a Spanish nationalist
like Aznar when he governed with an absolute majority and therefore did
not need the PNV’s support (see pp.138-9). On the other hand, however, Spa-
nish-Basque conflict in relation to the Concierto has still increased over the
decades, with the PNV seeking to develop the Concierto as a model of fiscal
sovereignty in Europe (in which the Basque treasuries would have essen-
tially the same fiscal powers as Spain or any other member state treasury),
in contrast to the Spanish authorities which continue to see the Concierto
as subordinate to Spanish tax legislation (Chapters 4 and 5). At present, the
issue of developing the Concierto further within the EU context is not an im-
mediately pressing one for the PNV, and the debate over issues such as the
scope for Basque participation in EU decision-making bodies over fiscal mat-
ters such as Ecofin often remains at the technical level rather than being of
widespread concern for the PNV. It nevertheless points to the ongoing pola-
risation in perceptions between the PNV and Spanish authorities as to what
opportunities or obstacles the EU creates for the development of shared so-
vereignty within a state in fiscal matters and beyond.  
Regional financing has influenced intraregional political dynamics
and thereby parties’ territorial strategies and behaviour:
The way in which the Concierto works internally within the Basque region
has also had significant implications for the PNV’s territorial strategies and
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behaviour (see Chapter 6). The heterogeneity of the PNV (partly across te-
rritories) and the changing political map at provincial level make strategic
consistency difficult for the party, thereby reducing the possibilities for party
shifts from one position to another on territorial matters. The Concierto,
given the weight it affords to the provincial governments as the tax-raising
authorities in the region, contributes to this complexity. For example, Vizcaya
is both the PNV’s stronghold in the Basque region and also by far the largest
province, and thus the one that raises the most revenues. While the province
of Vizcaya is relatively underrepresented in the Basque regional parliament
(relative to its population size), the fact that it raises by far the most revenues
in the region nevertheless gives it a weight and negotiating power of a dif-
ferent kind both within the region and within the PNV itself. In addition, the
different territorial interests within the PNV have also resulted in internal de-
bates over the relationship to the izquierda abertzale, given the varying
strength of the izquierda abertzale in different provinces (its strongest pre-
sence is in Guipúzcoa), and therefore the need for different alliance arran-
gements and competition tactics in different provinces. 
Overall, what emerges through an analysis of the use of the powers af-
forded by the Concierto in different provinces is a sense of incompatibility
between the PNV and EH Bildu (originally Bildu) on fiscal and social matters.
The discrepancies between the PNV and the izquierda abertzale over fiscal
policy and the Concierto which emerged during 2011-2015, the first time the
izquierda abertzale gained power under Bildu in Gizpuzkoa, suggest wider
implications for possible alliances (or a lack thereof) between them going
forward. While governing at provincial level in Guipúzcoa in 2011-2015, Bildu
sought to distance itself from what it perceived as the PNV’s traditionally
‘neoliberal’ use of the Concierto and to carve out a different fiscal vision for
the Basque Country, preferring to ally with the Basque federation of a left-
wing statewide party (the PSOE) in Guipúzcoa rather than the PNV. In addi-
tion to the discrepancies over left-right politics that emerged through the
PNV’s and Bildu’s contrasting use of the fiscal powers afforded by the Con-
cierto, their attitudes towards the Concierto also manifested the differences
in their territorial goals regarding the Basque Country and its relationship to
Spain. Bildu’s criticism of the Concierto as an insufficient basis for proper
self-government clearly differs from the PNV’s praise of the Concierto as the
closest current equivalent to the form of ‘bilateral relationship between
equals’ that the PNV seeks in wider Spanish-Basque political relations.          
What such attitudes and behaviour towards the Concierto reveal is a per-
petuation of the historic divide in nationalism which originally came about
through violence and resulted in the predominance of the PNV as the main
nationalist actor in the region. Although ETA has ceased its violence, a strong
divide between the PNV and the izquierda abertzale still persists and mani-
fests itself in many areas, including questions of fiscal policy, the territorial
organisation of the Basque Country and the relationship of the Basque
Country to Spain, as seen in the contrasting attitudes of the PNV and the iz-
quierda abertzale towards the Concierto. The PNV’s ultimately still conser-
vative use of the Concierto, both in terms of is respect for the weight it gives
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to the provinces and its privileging of essentially centre-right fiscal policies,
has contrasted with the aims and intentions manifested by the izquierda
abertzale. This is one among several factors that has contributed to the on-
going division between nationalist forces in the region, as well as increasing
the potential for the izquierda abertzale to ally with statewide left-wing forces
in the region, against the PNV. 
The contrast with Catalonia in terms of alliance behaviour is striking. In
Catalonia, the lack of fiscal autonomy and thus the lack of need or ability to
draw up concrete fiscal agendas, combined with the wider Catalanist phe-
nomenon which has often generated consensus rather than conflict among
different parties and civil society groups, helped to make possible the deci-
sion reached between the centre-right CDC and left-wing ERC in 2014-2015
to subordinate their differences over left-right politics to their common po-
sition on territorial politics. Thus they combined forces on a joint platform
and in a single electoral list (Junts pel Sí) to seek independence for Catalonia
at regional elections on 27th September 2015, intended by the pro-indepen-
dence forces as a plebiscite on independence. 
Inevitably, this was not without considerable obstacles: the lack of com-
mon ground on social policy between CiU, on the one hand, and ERC and
other left-wing independents, on the other, was one of a number of factors
that contributed to the difficulties in securing an agreement on a single list.
And once the agreement was secured, the programme presented in the run-
up to the elections was inevitably very vague on issues of traditional right-
left politics such as social policy, with those leading the list proving
non-committal or even contradictory on the matter, trying to shift emphasis
instead onto the common goal of seeking to create an independent state as
a first step. Similarly, reaching an agreement with the radical left CUP to en-
sure a stable government once Junts pel Sí had won but without a sufficient
majority to govern was a lengthy and complicated affair, finally resulting in
the need for Mas to resign and be replaced by a figure of greater consensus
in the form of Carles Puigdemont, previously mayor of Girona. Despite such
obstacles and somewhat tenuous unity between the right- and left-wing
components of the electoral list and subsequent government, however, the
fact remains that an alliance of sorts between parties of traditionally radically
different left-right orientation was possible. In this regard, one among va-
rious facilitating factors was the fact that Catalonia does not currently have
its own proper treasury or any significant fiscal powers, thus making it more
feasible for an alliance of left- and right-wing parties to present a common
front postponing decisions on and arguments about such issues to the fu-
ture. 
The longstanding Catalanist phenomenon (p.34) has had a significant im-
pact on the evolution in the attitude of CDC/CiU towards regional financing
and ultimately its shift towards pro-sovereignty agendas. CDC’s demand for
a fiscal pact has not always been entirely clear or committed, thus raising
the question of what has driven the party to make more coherent proposals
for a fiscal pact at certain times rather than others. A number of factors have
contributed to this, including the decline in scope for accommodationist
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practices from the late 1990s due to the changing nature of governments in
Madrid, generational change within CDC/CiU, and changes in economic con-
text. However, the wider Catalanist phenomenon is also important, since
party competition within the Catalanist sphere (most notably with ERC, but
also at times from other left-wing parties) and pressures from civil society
have at times reduced CDC/CiU’s room for manoeuvre and thus contributed
to influencing the timing of shifts in its agenda. CDC/CiU became caught up
in a broader Catalanist evolution whereby a majority in Catalonia from the
late 1990s onwards came to consider the existing regional financing arran-
gements inadequate. This broader Catalanist process pushed CDC/CiU to de-
fine more clearly its vision of a fiscal pact for Catalonia, reduced the scope
for its non-committal attitude that had prevailed during prior periods of ac-
commodationism, and encouraged a new kind of tactical behaviour in res-
ponse to party competition within Catalonia over proposals for new
financing models. Such tactical behaviour included, for example, taking a
more determined stance in favour of a Concierto-style model during the sta-
tute reform negotiations and then a particularly critical attitude towards the
2009 reform of the LOFCA, in both cases when it was in opposition to the
left-wing tripartite coalition government and could thereby put pressure on
its main competitor ERC in government. 
Ultimately, CiU’s inability to achieve a suitable fiscal pact for Catalonia in
2012, in a climate of rising pro-sovereignty sentiment in Catalonia and a con-
text of economic deterioration, proved a decisive moment for the party fe-
deration, as it shifted its position clearly in favour of support for the right to
decide, and eventually, in the case of CDC (but not UDC), independence for
Catalonia. The issue of regional financing has thus played a significant role
in influencing CDC’s shift from accommodationist to pro-sovereignty politics.
As well as the evolving nature of relations with Madrid, intra-regional factors
such as party competition and pressures from civil society have had a signi-
ficant bearing on the timing of CDC’s shifts in attitude towards the financing
question and beyond.
Supranational dynamics have influenced regional financing and the-
reby parties’ territorial strategies and behaviour:
In recent years, in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2007-2008, CDC’s
(amid wider Catalan) dissatisfaction with the regional financing system has
also been impacted by dynamics at EU and international level, since the de-
ficit targets set by the EU authorities for Spain have, in turn, also required
adjustment by Spain’s regional authorities, and the financial crisis resulted
in most regions being shut out of the public debt markets, thus forcing them
to become reliant upon loans from the central government. The Spanish-Ca-
talan and inter-regional dynamics within Spain that have traditionally im-
pacted regional financing negotiations have thus been influenced to an
unprecedented extent by developments at the supranational and internatio-
nal level. As the financial crisis took hold in Spain, Catalonia’s financial si-
tuation – along with that of the other central and regional administrations in
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Spain – deteriorated in particular from 2010 onwards when the full impact
of Spain’s austerity cuts hit and the international markets lost confidence in
Spain. As one of the largest regions and therefore one with particularly high
financing needs, the Catalan government became increasingly reliant upon
centralised funding mechanisms created by the Spanish government when
it lost access to the markets to raise funding to supplement revenues from
taxes. These centralised funding mechanisms, in turn, required Catalan ad-
herence to strict deficit targets set by the Spanish government for regional
governments in Spain, in order to meet the overall targets set by the EU au-
thorities. And yet Catalonia became one of the most frequent underperfor-
mers in terms of meeting these fiscal targets. This scenario served to
exacerbate already existing tensions between Spanish and Catalan authori-
ties over regional financing, not only reigniting the debate over the level of
financing afforded to Catalonia under the common system, but also raising
a dispute over the question of to what extent the Spanish central govern-
ment has used arguments of rationalisation for economic purposes as a
guise for ideologically-motivated recentralisation due to the party’s Spanish
centralism. 
Interestingly, however, even on occasions where clear messages have
been issued by the EU authorities to the Spanish authorities to crack down
on regional spending to help rein in Spain’s overall deficit, these have had
little or no perceptible impact on CDC’s attitude towards the EU, with its
blame for the need to rein in spending focused almost exclusively on the
central government. This bears a parallel with the PNV’s behaviour vis-à-vis
its own interests in relation to the EU context, in the sense that, despite the
fact that the EU continues to pose a number of obstacles to the development
of substate fiscal autonomy verging on sovereignty in EU member states,
the PNV focuses on the Spanish state as the main obstacle to a greater Bas-
que participation at EU level in fiscal matters and beyond, rather than the
EU framework itself (Chapter 5). In part, this may be tactical, since it serves
both CDC and the PNV’s purpose to focus their criticisms on the Spanish
state as too centralised, but it is not just a question of instrumentalism. In
both cases, the nationalist parties remain strongly pro-European despite the
obstacles.
CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE
This thesis hopes to have contributed to a fuller understanding of how
political dynamics in relation to the Basque Concierto have influenced the
PNV’s territorial strategies and behaviour. The predominant focus in both
the media and academia on the politicised debate over whether or not the
Concierto is a ‘privilege’ in comparison with the common financing regime
has neglected a fuller analysis of political behaviour and dynamics in relation
to the Concierto itself, which this thesis has investigated. This has involved
extensive interviews to understand how bilateral relations between Madrid
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and the Basque region over the Concierto have played out in recent decades,
what the main areas of dispute have been, and what this has meant for the
PNV’s evolving agenda (Chapter 4). The PNV is well known for being a pro-
EU party resolutely in favour of European integration, but apart from a few
exceptions (e.g. Gillespie 2015b), there have been few in-depth analyses of
the evolution of its relationship to Europe and the party’s objectives in this
regard, which is perhaps a reflection of the fact that its goals for greater par-
ticipation in Europe are rather vague, gradualist and open-ended in any case.
This thesis hopes to have provided a new dimension to the question of the
PNV in the EU context by providing an analysis (in Chapter 5) of the PNV’s
attempts to develop the Concierto increasingly as a model of fiscal sove-
reignty in Europe and the implications of this for its wider sovereignty
agenda. The detailed ins and outs of Spanish-Basque disputes over issues
such as whether the Basques require representation in EU Council working
groups on fiscal matters are often very technical matters dealt with by the
relevant Basque treasury administrations and the upper echelons of PNV go-
vernment, rather than more general issues used by the PNV to galvanise pu-
blic support for the party or indeed understood by the PNV in its entirely.
Nevertheless, the gradualist steps taken by the PNV since the late 1990s to
obtain some degree of representation in EU fiscal decision-making bodies
(mainly Ecofin) provide a key insight into the incremental approach used by
the party towards its goal for the Basque Country to be treated as an equal
to Spain in Europe in fiscal matters and beyond, and importantly, the dis-
crepancies with Spanish authorities in this regard. 
The thesis has also shed light (in Chapter 6) on the hitherto largely unex-
plored terrain of the intraregional and inter-provincial political dynamics con-
cerning the Concierto within the Basque region itself, given the complexity
of the situation whereby each of the three provinces raises its own taxes.
The way the Concierto works internally within the Basque region is, in many
ways, very opaque, in terms of relations between the Basque government
and the provinces, and among the provinces themselves. Very little of what
goes on in the meetings of the Basque Council of Public Finances and the
Basque Tax Coordination Body emerge into the public domain. By drawing
on interviews with treasury officials from the provincial administrations, this
thesis hopes to have made a start at shedding light on the complexity of the
internal dynamics within the region regarding the Concierto given the ex-
tensive fiscal and financial powers it affords to the provinces, and what the
implications of this situation have been for the PNV’s territorial strategies
and behaviour. This certainly marks a fundamental contrast to the Catalan
case, where local financing (i.e. to the provincial level and municipalities) is
heavily centralised and controlled by the central Spanish government,
bypassing the regional government, and the issue has therefore become a
bone of contention for Catalan nationalists who want local financing to be
under regional government control.
In the Catalan case, as discussed in earlier chapters, a number of studies
have analysed the under-funding of the region both in terms of resources
from the common system and infrastructure spending, while others have
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used public opinion data to show how economic considerations have played
a role in the increase in support for independence among Catalan citizens in
recent years. This thesis has contributed a different dimension to the ques-
tion of the relationship between financing concerns and pro-sovereignty sen-
timent in Catalonia by focusing instead on party attitudes towards regional
financing and their evolution over a long time period, since demands for re-
form of regional financing have been a major theme of Catalan political de-
bate for more than a decade. It has analysed how CDC’s attitudes towards
regional financing have evolved since the Transition, the factors that have
shaped this, and the consequences for its evolving territorial agenda. 
To provide context for CDC’s (and wider Catalanist) recent behaviour, this
thesis has also provided a substantial analysis of the nature of the financial
crisis of 2007-2008 as it impacted Spain’s regions, including especially Cata-
lonia, and the consequences for the rise in pro-sovereignty sentiment in Ca-
talonia. Few studies have looked in any depth at the complexity of the
interrelationship between international pressures on Spain during the crisis
(in the form of the EU’s deficit reduction requirements for Spain and the be-
haviour of the international markets towards Spain) and central-regional ten-
sions within Spain itself (as a result of Spain’s division of deficit targets for
different levels of government and its provision of funding mechanisms for
cash-strapped regional and local authorities shut out of the markets). This
thesis has therefore studied this interrelationship and the implications for
pro-sovereignty agendas in Catalonia.
Finally, as well as providing insights into each of the two case studies in-
dividually, the comparative approach taken in this thesis has helped to shed
further light on the main research question. For example, an in-depth analy-
sis of the bilateral dynamics of the Concierto within a genuinely bilateral
model, in contrast to the ‘bilateral’ negotiations between Madrid and Cata-
lonia within the context of an inter-regional financing model, has helped to
explain why accommodationist attitudes have ultimately been able to persist
for longer within the PNV than in the Catalan case. It is not just a question of
the fact that the Basques receive more money than the Catalans since the
Concierto is based on their fiscal capacity rather than estimated needs. What
is also fundamentally important is the fact that there has been significantly
more scope for deals and trade-offs in bilateral negotiations over the Con-
cierto than in Spanish-Catalan negotiations over the inter-regional financing
system, and this becomes much clearer through a comparative analysis. 
Moreover, the comparative analysis has brought out the importance of
the differences in internal political dynamics within the two regions. Internal
political dynamics within the Basque region (and indeed within the PNV it-
self) in relation to the Concierto and its inter-provincial dimension have en-
couraged the PNV’s moderation and also reduced the scope for nationalist
alignment with the izquierda abertzale, given their very different views on
the Concierto and fiscal agendas. This provides a strong contrast to Catalo-
nia, where the longstanding consensus that regional financing needs impro-
ved has not only led to competitive and tactical behaviour by CDC to outbid
others, but also more of a united front to seek a better deal for Catalonia.
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It is primarily via this analysis of internal political dynamics within the
Basque and Catalan regions in relation to regional financing that this thesis
hopes to have contributed to the existing literature on regionalist-nationalist
party behaviour outlined in Chapter 1 (pp.38-44). As I stated there, the lite-
rature on the behaviour of regionalist-nationalist parties as they move into
mainstream politics has sought to address the question of what impact en-
gaging with everyday left-right politics has on their territorial agendas, and
how their stances on socio-economic issues feed into their vision of the so-
ciety they wish to create. However, the analytical frameworks which have
started to emerge in this regard have so far tended to neglect an analysis of
the implications of competing socioeconomic visions between different na-
tionalist parties within individual regions, in favour of more wide-ranging
cross-country comparative conclusions. For example, Massetti and Schakel
(2015) carry out a cross-country comparative study which leads them to
argue that ‘the relative economic position of a region is a key variable for
explaining how regionalist parties acting in relatively rich regions tend to
adopt a rightist ideology, while regionalist parties acting in relatively poor
regions tend to adopt a leftist ideology’ (2015: 865). They carry out a large-
scale quantitative study to demonstrate this, and then reassert their findings
through a more in-depth qualitive study of two parties, the Lega Nord (LN)
in Italy and the Scottish National Party (SNP) in Scotland, but they do not go
further to consider in any detail what happens when more than one regio-
nalist-nationalist party is competing within a region, potentially with very
different socioeconomic visions.  Similarly, Alonso et al. (2015), in their in-
vestigation into parties’ electoral strategies in a two-dimensional political
space, carry out a large-scale multinomial logistic model to to find that ‘in
contrast to the niche party thesis, regionalist parties strategize simultane-
ously along the territorial and the economic dimension of competition’ (2015:
851). They examine ‘the repertoire of party strategies in a two-dimensional
space’ and develop ‘some tentative explanations of the circumstances in
which the parties use one or another strategy’ (2015: 859), but in so doing
they focus on the interaction between regionalist and statewide parties and
how this conditions regionalist party behaviour, rather than the implications
of competition between regionalist parties within the region itself for regio-
nalist party behaviour. 
This thesis hopes to have contributed new insights to this literature by
examining the internal dynamics between competing regionalist-nationalist
parties within regions themselves, how this internal competition has impac-
ted the way in which regionalist-nationalist parties subsume the left-right di-
mension of politics into the centre-periphery dimension, and how different
levels of fiscal decentralisation can impact their strategies in this regard. It
has pointed tentatively to the idea that regionalist-nationalist parties opera-
ting in regions with greater levels of substate fiscal autonomy must develop
stronger fiscal and economic policy agendas than their counterparts in re-
gions with lower fiscal authority. This, in turn, suggests that competing fiscal
agendas between regionalist-nationalist parties within the same region can
pose more of an obstacle to their collaboration on wider territorial goals,
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whereas in regions with less fiscal autonomy and therefore less of a need
for strongly developed fiscal policy agendas, it is more possible for regio-
nalist-nationalist parties to subordinate their differents on left-right politics
to achieve collaboration on wider territorial matters. Similarly, this thesis
has shown that even if the relative economic position of a region may often
determine a regionalist-nationalist party’s stance on left-right issues (as ar-
gued by Massetti and Schakel 2015), it is not an impediment to reigonalist-
nationalist parties developing different agendas on the left-right axis of
competition, and indeed using these to compete against each other to the
detriment of their possible collaboration on territorial issues, as seen in the
case of the PNV and EH Bildu in the Basque Country. 
Of course, this thesis has only studied the cases of the Basque and Cata-
lan regions, and a much larger number of cases would need to be studied in
order to see if the findings in relation to these two regions have wider rele-
vance. The vastly different levels of fiscal decentralisation in different states
and the often idiosyncratic nature of sub-regional political systems would
also pose problems to wider comparison (the Basque case, with three trea-
suries at provincial level, is certainly unique). Nevertheless, this thesis has
demonstrated that internal political dynamics within individual regions and
the individual characteristics of these regions themselves can have an im-
portant bearing on regionalist-nationalist party behaviour, and that one of
the structural factors that can influence such internal political dynamics is
the type of regional financing system in place in the region in question. Such
an analysis of the implications of what happens below the regional level has
tended to be neglected to date in the emerging frameworks seeking to
analyse regionalist-nationalist party behaviour, which usually take the regio-
nal level of party competition itself and its interaction with statewide com-
petition as the main focus of analysis.
FURTHER RESEARCH
While this thesis has focused on identifying ways in which regional finan-
cing has influenced shifts in the territorial strategies and behaviour of the
mainstream Basque and Catalan nationalist parties, there are inevitably li-
mitations to the role of this variable. Most notably, regional financing was
not a major factor in the PNV’s decision to break its longstanding alliance
with the Socialists to form a nationalist alliance instead with the Basque ra-
dical left under the Lizarra Pact, nor its subsequent decision to forge ahead
alone with the Ibarretxe Plan once the alliance with the radical left had been
broken. This shift away from accommodationism corresponded first and fo-
remost to other factors addressed in Chapter 2, including the PNV’s attempt
to find a means to address the ongoing problem of terrorist violence; its frus-
tration with the limits to the advances in autonomy for the Basque region
that could be achieved while the terrorist problem persisted; and the atmos-
phere of increasing confrontation and competition between Basque natio-
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nalists and the Spanish PP. In the Catalan case too, despite the clearer link
between dissatisfaction with regional financing arrangements and the rise
in pro-sovereignty agendas in recent years, the longstanding debate over
the regional financing system in Catalonia has been a symptom of, and in-
deed overtaken by, a broader clash between the Spanish and Catalan go-
vernments that is not solely or primarily economic in nature. One obvious
area of further research would thus be to widen the scope of analysis to refer
more to other factors (cultural, social, political and economic), in addition to
regional financing, that also help towards a fuller understanding of what ex-
plains the shifts in territorial agendas undertaken by these parties since the
late 1990s.231
Another area for future research would be to undertake a more in-depth
study of the PNV at local and provincial level, and the implications for its co-
herence, strategies and behaviour. This thesis has made a start in investiga-
ting the heterogeneity of the PNV across territories by looking specifically at
the implications of the Concierto for the PNV’s behaviour in different provin-
ces as well as for its overall coherence, but there is plenty of scope for further
work on the party at local or provincial level, given the lack of studies in this
area (De Pablo: 2008, on the history of the party in Álava, is a notable excep-
tion). Regarding the intraregional dimension, there is also scope for work in-
vestigating the dynamics between the PNV and civil society in the Basque
region – and whether these vary across provinces. This thesis has made a
contrast between the fluid relationship that has emerged between CDC and
civil society organisations in Catalonia on the one hand, and the more isola-
ted behaviour of the PNV on the other, as seen, for example, in the fact that
the Ibarretxe Plan was very much a party-led initiative. However, while the
relationship between parties and civil society in Catalonia is certainly more
explicit, a fuller exploration of the relationship between the PNV, nationalist
trade unions and social movements in the Basque region in recent decades
could possibly shed further light on the PNV’s behaviour. The Basque region
is unusual in that it has historically had two very political trade unions – ELA
(usually associated more with the PNV) and LAB (usually associated more
with the izquierda abertzale) – which have at times sought to exercise pres-
sure on the PNV and the izquierda abertzale with regard to their territorial
agendas. Similarly, two social platforms – Elkarri, created in 1992, and its
successor Lokarri, created in 2006 – aimed to pursue a peaceful solution to
the Basque conflict via dialogue. Have these trade unions and social move-
ments played a role in influencing the PNV’s territorial strategies and beha-
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231 The research for this thesis has been linked to a wider ESRC-funded research project led
by Richard Gillespie on ‘The Dynamics of Nationalist Evolution in Contemporary Spain’
[ES/J007854/1] which constituted an initiative in this direction, aiming to investigate the different
factors that have impacted shifts in Basque and Catalan nationalist party agendas. Work in this
regard gave rise to a special issue of Nationalism and Ethnic Politics (21:1) co-edited by Profes-
sor Gillespie and myself, also published in book format (Gillespie and Gray 2015). 
viour, particularly in the late 1990s?232 Such dynamics within the Basque re-
gion and their potential influence on the PNV have tended to be overlooked
in analyses of the party traditionally focused instead on its behaviour in elec-
tions and vis-à-vis Madrid.
A third area of research would be to investigate the impact of the wider
political transformation currently taking place in Spain at central government
level (which has made forming a government impossible following the De-
cember 2015 elections) on the evolution of the Catalan and Basque territorial
problematics. This thesis has discussed how traditional Catalan nationalists
who had long fought for greater recognition for Catalonia’s language and
culture were increasingly joined in the wake of the crisis by a new wave of
disaffected Catalans who were not necessarily traditional nationalist party
supporters but had come to resent Catalonia’s economic treatment at the
hands of the Spanish state and the austerity measures being imposed during
the crisis, as well as the levels of corruption not only among Spanish but
also Catalan nationalist politicians. While the traditional nationalist party
CDC, seen as part of the traditional establishment and associated with co-
rruption, consistently declined in support, the pro-independence movement
overall still gained momentum due to the alliance with left-wing pro-inde-
pendence parties ERC and the CUP and civil society groups. And yet left-
wing Podemos, the new Spanish party that has captured much of the protest
vote against the traditional Spanish parties in Spain, fared very well in Ca-
talonia in the 2015 general elections, winning in Catalonia as part of an
alliance with other left-wing parties there. It also challenged the dominance
of the PNV in the Basque region by very nearly winning there, capturing the
most votes, but falling one seat short of the PNV. The possibility mentioned
in Chapter 6 of left-wing alliances between the izquierda abertzale and other
progressive left-wing forces in the Basque region, against the more conser-
vative PNV, thus did not look beyond the realm of possibility. This context
calls for an in-depth analysis of the mutual interaction effects between
Spain’s political crisis in general and the Basque and Catalan territorial pro-
blematics, and what this means for the PNV and CDC as well as the wider
Basque and Catalan nationalist movements. 
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232 My interest in this question was sparked by interviews with Xabi Anza, member of the
executive of ELA, on 25 April 2014; and Jonan Fernández, founder of Elkarri, on 21 May 2014.

APPENDIX 1 - LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
Name, date(s) of interview(s), party affiliation (where relevant) and brief bio-
graphy
AGIRRE, XABIER, 7 April 2014
PNV president of the province of Álava 2007-2011. Member of the Basque
parliament for Álava 2004-2007.
AGUIRRE, CARLOS, 13 October 2014
PSE Basque Economy and Treasury Minister 2009-2012, under the Basque
government of Patxi López. Previous positions of responsibility from 1987
onwards, during the years of PNV-PSE Basque coalition governments, in-
cluded Director of Planning for the Economic and Planning Department
(1987-), Director of Analysis and Studies in the area of Social Affairs
(1991-), and Director of Economy and Planning for the Department of Jus-
tice, Economy, Work and Social Security (1995-).
ANASAGASTI, IÑAKI, 7 March 2014
PNV spokesperson in the Spanish parliament for 18 years from 1986 to
2004. Most recently, senator for Vizcaya in the Spanish Senate (upper
house of parliament), 2004-2015. Previously, deputy for Vizcaya in the
Spanish parliament 1986-2004 and member of the Basque parliament for
Vizcaya 1980-1986.  
ANZA, XABI, 25 April 2014
Member of the executive committee of the Basque trade union ELA.
ARANBURU, MIKEL, 5 May 2014
Member of the technical team of the Navarran treasury department since
1980. Since 2015, Treasury and Financial Policy Minister of the Navarran
regional government.
ARDANZA, JOSÉ ANTONIO, 10 April 2014, 28 April 2014
PNV President (lehendakari) of the Basque regional government 1985-
1999. Previously, president of the provincial government of Guipúzcoa
1983-1985 and mayor of Mondragón (Guipúzcoa) 1979-1983.
ARRIETA, SABINO, 2 April 2014
Businessman affiliated to the PNV. Deputy interior minister for the Basque
government in the 1980s.
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AZPIAZU, PEDRO, 15 September 2014
PNV deputy for Vizcaya in the Spanish parliament since 2000 and econo-
mic spokesperson (including on Concierto-related matters).
BEL, GERMÀ, 27 April 2015
Deputy for Junts pel Sí in the Catalan parliament since October 2015 after
running as head of the Junts pel Sí list for the province of Tarragona in
the Catalan regional election of 27 September 2015. Previously affiliated
to the PSOE/PSC, and PSC deputy for Barcelona in the Spanish parliament
2000-2004. Also Professor of Applied Economy at the University of Bar-
celona, known for his work on infrastructure spending in Spain, in which
he argues that Spain has used infrastructure as a ‘nationbuilding’ tool,
creating a centralist transport network that has had a detrimental econo-
mic impact on Catalonia (see Bel 2012). 
BELOKI, JOSÉ RAMÓN, 27 February 2014, 8 April 2014
PNV deputy for Guipúzcoa in the Spanish parliament 2004-2011. 
BOSCH, JAUME, 19 March 2015
ICV deputy for Barcelona in the Catalan parliament 2003-2015. ICV spo-
kesperon during the Catalan statute reform negotiations.
CASTELLS, ANTONI, 25 March 2015
PSC Catalan Economy and Finance Minister 2003-2010, under the two
left-wing tripartite coalition governments in Catalonia. Professor of Public
Policy at the University of Barcelona, known for his work on fiscal fede-
ralism.
COLOMINES, AGUSTÍ, 23 March 2015
Director of the Fundació Catalanista i Demòcrata (Catdem) 2007-2013. Cat-
dem was a foundation linked to CDC, created by Artur Mas to refound Ca-
talanism, who appointed Colomines as its director. Previously, Colomines
had been associated with left-wing and pro-independence parties, orga-
nisations and movements, for example he participated in the founding in
1979 of the party Nacionalistes d’Esquerra in favour of self-detemination
for Catalonia, which dissolved a few years later into Iniciativa por Catalo-
nia. Professor of Contemporary History at the University of Barcelona,
specialising in the history of the Catalan nationalist movement.
COROMINAS, LLUÍS, 27 January 2016
CDC. First vicepresident in the Catalan parliament since 26 October 2015.
Second vicepresident in the Catalan parliament 2012-2015 and 2008-2010.
Deputy for Barcelona in the Catalan parliament since 2003. 
DAMBORENEA, ANTÓN, 9 July 2014
President of the Basque PP in Vizcaya since 2008.
EGIBAR, JOSEBA, 8 April 2014
PNV deputy for Guipúzcoa in the Basque parliament since 1990, and PNV
spokespeson in the Basque parliament since 1998. Also president of the
executive of the PNV in Guipúzcoa since 1987.
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ERKOREKA, JOSU, 14 March 2014
PNV. Since 2012, Basque government spokesperson and Director of Pu-
blic Administration and Justice. Previously, PNV deputy for Vizcaya in the
Spanish parliament 2000-2012, and PNV spokesperson in the Spanish
parliament 2004-2012. 
FERNÁNDEZ, JONAN, 21 May 2014
Founder of the Basque social movement Elkarri in 1992 (dissolved in
2006), designed to help achieve a peaceful end to the Basque conflict
through dialogue.
FRANCO, HELENA, 5 September 2014 (interviewed together with Itziar Miner)
Bildu Treasury minister, provincial government of Guipúzcoa, 2011-2015.
GOIKOETXETA, IÑAKI, 10 April 2014 (interviewed together with Andoni Ortuzar),
7 July 2014
Member of the PNV executive and in charge of the party’s international
relations. Substantial involvement with the PNV since the 1980s.
HERNÁNDEZ GOICOECHEA, JOSÉ LUIS, 7 October 2014 (interviewed together with
Sebastián Zurutuza Mujika)
Head of the Service for Regulatory Development and Legal Advice, Trea-
sury of Guipúzcoa (technical team).
HOMS, FRANCESC, 28 January 2016
Deputy for Barcelona in the Spanish parliament since January 2016 and
spokesperson for the Catalan parliamentary group of Democracia i Lli-
bertad (CDC refounded). Previously, spokesperson for the Catalan govern-
ment 2010-2015 and minister for the presidency of the Catalan
government 2012-2015, among other roles. CDC deputy in the Catalan
parliament 2003-2010, and CiU lead spokesperson for negotiations for the
new 2006 Catalan autonomy statute in that period. 
HUGUET, JOSEP, 9 June 2015
Affiliated to ERC since 1989, after previously forming part of other pro-
independence left-wing parties and movements in the 1970s and 1980s.
Catalan Minister for Innovation, Universities and Business in 2006-2010
under the second tripartite coalition government, and Minister for Busi-
ness, Tourism and Consumer Affairs in 2004-2006 under the first tripartite
coalition government. Key spokesperson for ERC on the reform of regio-
nal financing during the statute reform negotiations under the first tripar-
tite government, as well as a key referent within ERC in the 1990s pushing
for a Concierto for Catalonia. Other roles have included ERC spokesper-
son in the Catalan parliament 1999-2004, and member of the Mixed Com-
mission for Transfers between the Spanish state and the Catalan
government 1993-1995.
IBARRETXE, JUAN JOSÉ, 8 April 2014, 28 October 2014
PNV President (lehendakari) of the Basque regional government 1999-
2009. Previously, Deputy President and Minister of the Treasury and Pu-
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blic Administration of the Basque government 1995-1999. Other roles
have included president of the provincial parliament of Álava 1986-1991.
LARREA, PEDRO, 20 June 2014
PNV Deputy Basque Treasury minister in the mid 1980s and previously
Treasury minister for the provincial government of Vizcaya.
LARREINA, RAFAEL, 7 April 2014
EA deputy for Guipúzcoa in the Spanish parliament since 2011. Member
of the Basque parliament 1990-2009.
MARTÍNEZ BÁRBARA, GEMMA,  4 April 2014, 16 May 2014, 8 October 2014 (inter-
viewed together with José Rubí Cassinello on all three occasions)
Head of the Fiscal Policy Service, Treasury of Vizcaya (technical team).
MAS-COLELL, ANDREU, 25 January 2016
CDC Catalan Economy Minister 2010-2016 under the two governments of
Artur Mas. Previously, Minister for Universities, Research and Information
Society in 2000-2003. Leading academic specialising in microeconomics.
MEDIAVILLA, KOLDO, 9 April 2014
Member of the PNV executive, responsible for institutional matters since
2012. First Secretary of the provincial parliament of Vizcaya since 2011.
Previous roles included General Secretary of the Presidency, provincial
government of Vizcaya, 2003-2011.
MINER, ITZIAR, 5 September 2014 (interviewed together with Helena Franco)
Bildu Director of Fiscal Policy in Guipúzcoa, 2011-2015
MINTEGI, LAURA, 7 April 2014
Spokesperson for EH Bildu in the Basque parliament, 2012-2014. 
MONTERO, TXEMA, 11 March 2014
Formerly member of HB in the 1980s, expelled from HB in 1992 for his
stance against ETA. Has since collaborated with the PNV, though without
becoming affilliated to the party. Expert in the politics and sociology of
the Basque region. 
MÚGICA, GONZALO, 18 July 2014, 28 August 2014
PSE legal adviser to former deputy lehendakari Ramón Jáuregui regar-
ding the transfer of competences to the Basque government and social
security matters in the 1980s and early 1990s.
OLABARRIA, EMILIO, 11 April 2014
PNV deputy for Álava in the Spanish parliament, 2004-2015 and 1986-1996.
Member of the Basque parliament for Álava, 2001-2004 and 1984-1986. 
OLANO, XABIER, 29 May 2014
Bildu Director of the Treasury of Guipúzcoa, 2011-2015. EH Bildu candi-
date for President of Guipúzcoa at the 2015 provincial and municipal elec-
tions (stood unsuccessfully). Longstanding affiliation to the izquierda
abertzale.
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ORTUZAR, ANDONI, 10 April 2014 (interviewed together with Iñaki Goikoetxeta)
Head of the PNV executive since 2013. Previously, head of the Vizcayan
executive of the party 2008-2013.
PADROL, HERIBERT, 13 July 2015
Lawyer. Has acted on occasion in an advisory capacity to Artur Mas, in-
cluding on regional financing matters. CiU deputy for Barcelona in the
Spanish parliament 2000-2002. 
PUJOL, JORDI, 24 February 2016
CDC/CiU President of the Catalan government 1980-2003.
RUBÍ CASSINELLO, JOSÉ, 4 April 2014, 16 May 2014, 8 October 2014 (interviewed
together with Gemma Martínez Bárbara on all three occasions)
Technical Secretary General, Treasury of Vizcaya (technical team).
SALINERO, MANUEL, 2 September 2014
PSE General Secretary of the Basque President 2009-2012, under the go-
vernment of Patxi López. In and out of politics since the 1980s. Legal advi-
ser on issues concerning social security and the transfer of competences
to the Basque government at times in the 1980s and 1990s. Strong invol-
vement on behalf of the PSE, for example, in the drafting of the Zubia Re-
port (Informe Zubia) of 1993 by the then PNV-PSE Basque government, on
the competences still to be transferred to the Basque government.   
URIARTE, PEDRO LUIS, 11 April 2014
PNV Basque Economy and Treasury Minister under the first Basque go-
vernment of 1980-1984. Lead Basque negotiator for the Concierto agree-
ment of 1981.
URIBESALGO, AITOR, 10 October 2014
PP Treasury minister, provincial government of Álava, 2011-2015.
URIETA, AITOR, 22 May 2014
Bildu town councillor for Zeberio (Vizcaya).
ZABALETA, IÑAKI, 8 April 2014
One of the founders of Sortu. Long history of involvement with the iz-
quierda abertzale.
ZURUTUZA MUJIKA, SEBASTIÁN, 7 October 2014
Various technical roles within the provincial government of Guipúzcoa.
Most recently, Head of the Service of Institutional Commitments, 1993-
2015. Previously, Head of Section responsible for the Quota and Financial
Contributions, 1992-1993. Also worked as an economist for the provincial
government in 1987-1992. 
Academic consultations
In addition to the above interviewees, I would also like to thank the follo-
wing academics for meeting with me more informally at various stages of
this project to answer questions, in particular:
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Ander Gurrutxaga, University of the Basque Country (specialist in the so-
ciology of the Basque Country)
Ignacio Zubiri, University of the Basque Country (specialist in the Con-
cierto)
Eduardo Alonso Olea, University of the Basque Country (specialist in the
Concierto)
Fernando de la Hucha, Public University of Navarre (specialist in the Con-
cierto and the Convenio)
Juan Cruz Allí, Public University of Navarre (specialist in the Convenio
and Basque-Navarran institutional relations, also with significant previous
political experience in this regard)
Roldán Jimeno, Public University of Navarre (specialist in the Convenio)
Hugo López, Public University of Navarre (specialist in the Convenio)
Ángel de la Fuente, FEDEA (specialist in regional financing)
I would also like to thank financial experts and analysts at Madrid-based
economic consultancy firm Analistas Financieros Internacionales (AFI) (es-
pecially César Cantalapiedra) and also BBVA’s credit research team in Lon-
don (especially Agustín Martín) for providing me with relevant data and
reports on Spain’s regions. 
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APPENDIX 2 – PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET
The following information sheet was emailed to all interviewees when
they were first contacted to request an interview:
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Los nacionalismos en España:
La evolución de las propuestas territoriales en el País Vasco y Cataluña
INFORMACIÓN PARA PARTICIPANTES
Se le invita a usted a participar en un estudio de investigación. Le ruego
que se tome el tiempo de leer la siguiente información y no dude en contac-
tar con la investigadora (datos abajo) si desea más información. 
1. El proyecto
Caroline Gray (doctoranda de la Universidad de Liverpool) está investi-
gando la evolución de los proyectos territoriales de los partidos políticos en
el País Vasco y Cataluña desde los años ochenta hasta la actualidad. Su es-
tudio incluye un análisis del impacto de los distintos acuerdos de financia-
ción autonómica (el concierto económico frente al régimen común) en las
propuestas territoriales de los partidos nacionalistas. Esta investigación está
financiada por el Consejo de Investigación Económica y Social del Reino
Unido (Economic and Social Research Council, ESRC), proveedor principal
de fondos en dicho país para investigaciones académicas en el campo de
las ciencias políticas, económicas y sociales. Es co-investigadora en un pro-
yecto más amplio sobre la evolución de los nacionalismos vasco y catalán
dirigido por el profesor Richard Gillespie, Catedrático de Ciencias Políticas
en la Universidad de Liverpool. La información sobre dicho proyecto titulado
“The Dynamics of Nationalist Evolution in Contemporary Spain”, que dura
del 2013 hasta finales de 2015, se encuentra en la siguiente página web: 
nationalismsinspain.com
Caroline Gray está residiendo e investigando durante varios meses tanto
en el País Vasco como en Cataluña, sobre todo para entrevistar a miembros
de partidos políticos y otros expertos con conocimientos especializados en
la materia, con el fin de conocer sus opiniones sobre la evolución de los mo-
vimientos nacionalistas en España, especialmente en los últimos 30 años. 
2. Propósito de la investigación
El propósito de este proyecto basado en la Universidad de Liverpool es
llegar a entender mejor por qué los movimientos nacionalistas periféricos
han tenido distintas relaciones con el Estado español a lo largo del tiempo,
variando entre un acercamiento entre los gobiernos central y autonómico
en algunos períodos y la búsqueda de un mayor nivel de autonomía o inde-
pendencia en otros.
Se centra sobre todo en examinar los distintos factores políticos, econó-
micos y sociales que han contribuido a la evolución de los proyectos terri-
toriales de los partidos políticos en el País Vasco y Cataluña. Esto implica
analizar una serie de dinámicas que incluyen el impacto de los distintos
acuerdos financieros que tienen las dos comunidades autónomas con el Es-
tado español; sus relaciones con los sucesivos gobiernos centrales en Ma-
drid; la competición y las alianzas entre partidos políticos a nivel
autonómico; y la relación entre los partidos políticos y la sociedad civil, entre
otros factores. 
3. ¿Por qué está usted invitado/a?
Se le invita a participar debido a sus conocimientos y/o experiencia de
los procesos políticos y movimientos nacionalistas en el País Vasco y/o en
Cataluña o de sus respectivos sistemas de financiación.
El objetivo de Caroline Gray es entrevistar en persona a varios miembros
de cada partido político (vasco, catalán, español), que se elegirán por su área
de responsabilidad (actual o pasada) dentro del partido o porque se les con-
sidera representativos de una tendencia o corriente definida dentro del par-
tido. También tiene la intención de entrevistar a miembros de la sociedad
civil y académicos y técnicos especializados en la materia.
4. ¿Qué pasará si participo?
Se propone el uso del castellano en las entrevistas ya que Caroline Gray
lo habla con total fluidez.
Se grabará la entrevista a no ser que el participante manifieste una pre-
ferencia en contra. La grabación de las entrevistas no es imprescindible, pero
debido a las ventajas prácticas de hacerlo se le agradecería su permiso. Si
prefiere que no se grabe, se tomarán algunas notas durante la entrevista.
Toda grabación de las entrevistas se anonimizará antes de su almacena-
miento y, al igual que los apuntes que se hayan tomado, sólo se guardará
hasta la publicación de los resultados de la investigación y sus traducciones. 
266
El tiempo solicitado para una entrevista será normalmente de una hora
aproximadamente. Las entrevistas normalmente tomarán lugar en las ofici-
nas del participante.
Se le invita a participar con la esperanza de que le interese el tema de las
entrevistas y considere útil el proyecto. La participación no conlleva benefi-
cios económicos.
5. ¿Qué se hará con los resultados del estudio?
Los planes de publicación de Caroline Gray incluyen: 
– Una tesis doctoral
– Varios artículos de investigación sustanciales que se remitirán a revistas
académicas  de prestigio internacional
– La co-edición (junto con el profesor Richard Gillespie) de un volumen
de artículos  basado en los debates celebrados en talleres de investiga-
ción que se prevé organizar
No se citará textualmente ninguna de las respuestas de los participantes
en ninguna publicación generada por el proyecto, a no ser que den su con-
sentimiento expreso para ello. Se respetarán plenamente las solicitudes de
preservar el anonimato.
Los participantes tendrán la posibilidad de solicitar copias de los artículos
de investigación según se vayan publicando o detalles bibliográficos de los
mismos.
6. Preguntas
Si tiene cualquier pregunta sobre el proyecto o sobre cualquier aspecto
de su participación en el mismo, por favor, no dude en contactar con Caro-
line Gray para más información:
email: xxx
teléfono: xxx
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APPENDIX 3 – SAMPLE INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRES
A selection of five interview questionnaires is provided in this Appendix
as follows, to give an indication of the range and breadth of interviews con-
ducted. 
pp.270-272: Sample interview questionnaire 1 – Juan José Ibarretxe (8
April 2014, 28 October 2014)
pp.273-274: Sample interview questionnaire 2 – Helena Franco and Itziar
Miner (5 September 2014)
pp.275-276: Sample interview questionnaire 3 – Antoni Castells (25
March 2015)
pp.277-278: Sample interview questionnaire 4 – Josep Huguet (9 June
2015)
pp.279-280: Sample interview questionnaire 5 – Andreu Mas-Colell (25
January 2016)
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Sample interview questionnaire 1 – Juan José Ibarretxe (8 April
2014, 28 October 2014)
Initial general interview on the PNV and Basque politics on 8 April 2014: 
La época de Ibarretxe
1) Bajo su presidencia del partido, el PNV intentó reformar el estatuto de
Gernika. ¿Cómo analizaría usted los orígenes de aquella acentuación
del soberanismo dentro del partido? 
2) Hay ciertos análisis que se refieren a su iniciativa como algo ‘desde
arriba hacia abajo’. ¿Es cierto, o había presiones desde la sociedad
vasca para cambiar el marco estatuario?
3) ¿Hay que ver el Plan como algo dirigido por su propio liderazgo o con-
taba con el compromiso total del partido? 
4) ¿Cómo le parece el argumento que dice que ‘la radicalización que se
percibió dentro del nacionalismo vasco fue, en parte, consecuencia de
un resurgimiento del nacionalismo español o de una recentralización
del Estado español’?
5) Durante sus presidencias, ¿era la experiencia del Tripartito en Cataluña
un punto de referencia para el PNV?
6) Para explicar el auge de soberanismo durante aquellos años, ¿es rele-
vante solamente el marco vasco-español, o hay otros factores que tam-
bién ayudan a explicarlo como, por ejemplo, la evolución política de
la Unión Europea o ciertas tendencias globales o internacionales?
7) Visto desde hoy, ¿le parece que se cometieron errores en la forma de
buscar más autogobierno bajo sus presidencias?
8) ¿Qué influencia sigue teniendo su Plan en la actual política vasca?
9) ¿Y qué influencia cree usted que ha tenido el Plan en el actual giro so-
beranista en Cataluña?
La vida interna del partido
10) La elección de Josu Jon Imaz como presidente del partido, ¿supuso
un verdadero revés para el sector más soberanista del PNV?
11) ¿Sintió usted la necesidad de suavizar el Plan siguiendo los resultados
de las elecciones de 2005? 
12) La posición del sector más soberanista del PNV, ¿fue debilitada por
la decisión de Eusko Alkartasuna de poner fin a la alianza electoral
entre los dos partidos?
13) El PNV, ¿está condenado a vivir con la tensión interna entre autonomistas
y soberanistas, o se ha podido superar bajo el liderazgo de Urkullu? 
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14) ¿Cuál fue la naturaleza del Pacto dentro del PNV que resultó en la elec-
ción de Iñigo Urkullu como presidente del partido en el 2007? 
15) Urkullu quitó de la agenda cualquier plan para un referéndum, por lo
menos a corto plazo. ¿Cree usted que sigue existiendo la posibilidad
de un referéndum sobre temas de soberanía en los años que vienen?
16) ¿Qué espera usted del planteamiento del ‘nuevo estatus político’
anunciado por el Lehendakari Urkullu?
17) Una pregunta sobre el contexto territorial de la política vasca. La im-
portancia del nivel provincial, ¿en qué medida dificulta el desarrollo
de cualquiera estrategia del PNV, teniendo en cuenta las diferentes
estructuras de competición electoral en cada provincia?
18) ¿Siguen existiendo ciertas discrepancias dentro del PNV sobre la di-
visión de competencias (incluyendo el poder recaudatorio) entre las
diputaciones y el gobierno autonómico? 
El PNV y la política vasca
19) A la hora de decidir las prioridades políticas del PNV, ¿suele prevale-
cer el debate interno del partido o hay influencias por parte de aso-
ciaciones, lobbies o grupos afines? 
20) ¿Por qué no ha sido posible aquí una colaboración entre nacionalistas
y socialistas para intentar reformar el estatuto, como en Cataluña?
21) ¿Cómo va a influir la ausencia de ETA en el planteamiento de la cues-
tión nacional por parte del PNV, y en su política de alianzas?
22) ¿Ve usted posible una unificación de fuerzas independentistas en el
País Vasco, es decir Bildu más fuerzas soberanistas del PNV?
23) La legalización de la izquierda abertzale, ¿ha tenido algún impacto en
la posición de los sectores más soberanistas dentro del PNV, teniendo
en cuenta que vuelven a ser competitores electorales?
Follow-up interview on 28 October 2014 specifically on the Concierto and
the PNV:
El Concierto Económico
24) ¿Que implicaciones tenía para el Concierto Económico su propuesta
sobre un nuevo Estatuto Político para Euskadi? 
25) A su juicio, ¿Cómo se ha podido usar el Concierto para construir Eus-
kadi?
26) Algunos dentro del PNV sostienen que “El Concierto confiere las fa-
cultades de un Estado”. ¿Qué opina usted sobre esta consideración?
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27) Bajo el Concierto son las diputaciones que recaudan, pero dentro del
PNV históricamente ha habido momentos en los que se ha propuesto
una mayor centralización en el gobierno. ¿Cuál ha sido su visión sobre
el balance de poderes entre el gobierno central y las diputaciones?
28) ¿Cómo valoró usted la reforma del Concierto en el 2002 durante la
cual usted era lehendakari?
29) ¿Cómo funciona el encaje de las haciendas vascas dentro del contexto
de la Unión Europea?
30) ¿Cómo se suelen resolver los asuntos conflictivos entre el gobierno
vasco y el gobierno español en relación al Concierto? ¿Cómo funciona
esa relación bilateral?
31) ¿Cómo funcionan las relaciones internas entre las diputaciones en re-
lación con el Concierto? A su juicio, ¿cuáles son los aciertos y las ca-
rencias del funcionamiento interno del Concierto? ¿Y cuáles son las
implicaciones para las dinámicas políticas en el País Vasco?
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Sample interview questionnaire 2 – Helena Franco and Itziar Miner
(5 September 2014)
1) Históricamente el Concierto Económico ha sido algo que la izquierda
abertzale ha querido superar ya que no cuadra con su visión de un Eus-
kal Herria independiente. A mí me interesa ver cómo ha ido evolucio-
nando la visión de Bildu sobre el Concierto desde que tomó las riendas
de la hacienda de Guipúzcoa. ¿Qué piensan ustedes sobre el modelo
ahora que habéis tenido la experiencia de gestionarlo directamente?
¿Cuáles son los aciertos y las carencias del modelo, según Bildu?
2) Según la visión de Bildu, ¿cómo se podría o se debería desarollar más
el Concierto? 
3) ¿Qué opinan sobre el hecho de que el gobierno vasco puede crear im-
puestos pero las diputaciones no?
4) ¿Cómo se comparan las visiones del PNV y de Bildu sobre el Concierto
Económico y el nivel de poder regulatorio sobre los impuestos que da
a las diputaciones? ¿Los dos partidos estáis de acuerdo en lo que son
las carencias del modelo y en lo que falta por desarrollar? ¿O no? 
5) ¿Qué opinan ustedes sobre el uso del Concierto por parte del PNV y
cómo se compara con la visión que tiene Bildu?
6) El sindicato ELA ha publicado bastantes informes criticando lo que con-
sideran como un uso neoliberal del Concierto por parte del PNV. ¿Hasta
qué punto está de acuerdo Bildu con estas valoraciones?
7) ¿Hasta qué punto es posible que Bildu propugne un model fiscal dis-
tinto desde Guipúzcoa cuando se requiere cierto nivel de coordinación
y armonización entre las tres diputaciones (y dentro de España y Eu-
ropa también)?¿Cuáles son los grandes logros del gobierno de Bildu
en materia fiscal en Guipúzcoa, a su juicio? 
8) Si Bildu recauda más que las otras diputaciones vascas mediante la
creación de más impuestos en Gipuzkoa, según tengo entendido el di-
nero extra recaudado se tiene que repartir entre las tres diputaciones
debido a la manera en que funciona el modelo de aportaciones. ¿Qué
opinan ustedes sobre ese aspecto del funcionamiento interno del Con-
cierto?
9) ¿Cómo han reaccionado los empresarios en Guipúzcoa a las medidas
fiscales que ha introducido el gobierno de Bildu? 
10) ¿Cómo reaccionan ustedes a las críticas de otros partidos que acusan
a Bildu de haber exagerado los cambios que ha hecho a la política fis-
cal? 
11) En el curso de verano sobre la fiscalidad organizado por la Universi-
dad del País Vasco en San Sebastián el verano pasado, Helena, usted
sugirió que el hecho de introducir nuevos impuestos en Guipúzcoa
como el de grandes fortunas no recauda mucho dinero en sí en tér-
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minos relativos, sino que sirve para legitimar el sistema fiscal ante
los ciudadanos y así reducir el fraude. ¿Hasta qué punto cree que se
va consiguiendo este objetivo? 
12) ¿Ustedes ven posibilidades de colaboración entre Bildu y el PSE en
Guipúzcoa en cuanto a políticas de izquierdas?
13) ¿Hasta qué punto son importantes los temas sociales y fiscales para
Bildu en comparación con la agenda territorial y nacional? Como es
la primera vez que la izquierda abertzale está gobernando en una di-
putación, me interesa saber hasta qué punto la experiencia de gober-
nar ha ido influyendo en sus prioridades. 
14) En el 2013 el PP, el PSE y el PNV en Guipúzcoa todos pactaron juntos
en contra del proyecto de presupuestos para el 2014 que Bildu pre-
sentó, así que Bildu al final ha tenido que implementar los presupues-
tos que acordaron los otros partidos. ¿Cómo ha sido esta experiencia
para Bildu? 
15) Si Bildu hubiera tenido mayoría absoluta en Gipuzkoa en vez de ne-
cesitar el apoyo de otros partidos, ¿qué medidas fiscales habría in-
troducido?
16) Desde 2012, las tres diputaciones vascas están gobernadas por tres
partidos distintos: el PP en Álava, el PNV en Bizkaia y Bildu aquí.
¿Cómo afecta esta situación a la coordinación entre las tres haciendas
vascas? ¿Hay discrepancias sobre temas de política fiscal y el Con-
cierto entre las diputaciones? 
17) A su juicio, ¿cuáles son las ventajas y desventajas de tener tres ha-
ciendas vascas en vez de una? ¿Qué opinan sobre la organización te-
rritorial de Euskadi y el balance de poderes entre el gobierno
autonómico y las diputaciones?
18) En las negociaciones bilaterales entre los gobiernos vasco y español
sobre el Concierto y el cupo, en la comisión mixta, ¿hasta qué punto
tienen voz las tres diputaciones? 
19) ¿Cómo reacciona Bildu a las críticas de otras comunidades autóno-
mas sugiriendo que el sistema del Concierto no es lo suficientemente
solidario con el resto de España? 
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Sample interview questionnaire 3 – Antoni Castells (25 March 2015)
1) Durante la Transición, ¿qué modelo de financiación buscaban los so-
cialistas para Cataluña y cómo se comparó con la visión de otros par-
tidos en aquel entonces?
1) Durante su último mandato, Jordi Pujol se convirtió públicamente a la
idea de una especie de Concierto para Cataluña en el 1997 y luego en
el 2000 se creó la Comisión de Estudio para la Mejora del Autogo-
bierno. Así, en aquel entonces, ya se empezaba a hablar de cambios
sustanciales al nivel de autonomía de Cataluña y a su sistema de fi-
nanciación. ¿Cómo reaccionó el PSC entonces? 
2) ¿Cuándo empezó el PSC a contemplar la idea de un gobierno catala-
nista y de izquierdas? ¿Qué conflictos causó dentro del partido entre
los sectores más y menos catalanistas?
3) Como parte del Pacto del Tinell para formar la coalición de izquierdas
en el 2003, los tres partidos constituyentes llegaron a un acuerdo sobre
sus objetivos en cuanto a la financiación autonómica. ¿Cómo se logró
conciliar las perspectivas distintas sobre la financiación autonómica de
los tres partidos? Sobre todo, ¿cómo se acercaron posiciones el PSC y
ERC?
4) ¿Cuándo empezó el PSC a plantear un nuevo modelo de financiación
autonómica? ¿Qué quería exactamente? Según entiendo el PSC siem-
pre ha sido muy reticente sobre la idea de un Concierto catalán: ¿Cómo
pensaba el partido que se podía lograr cambiar el régimen común de
manera satisfactoria para Cataluña? 
5) Durante todo el proceso de negociación sobre el Estatuto, entiendo
que el Instituto de Estudios Autonómicos desempeñó un papel clave,
proporcionando propuestas e informes sobre todo tipo de temas in-
cluyendo la financiación autonómica. ¿Qué opinaba el PSC sobre las
propuestas que venían del IEA en cuanto a la financiación y sobre el
papel del IEA?
6) Se discutieron muchos temas importantes en las negociaciones del Es-
tatuto, el reconocimiento de Cataluña como nación, el blindaje de las
competencias catalanas, etc. ¿En qué momentos de las negociaciones
y debates sobre el Estatuto fue tema clave la financiación autonómica? 
7) Las negociaciones para el nuevo Estatuto causaron una batalla entre
ERC y CiU para ser el partido que propusiera las propuestas más avan-
zadas para una Cataluña autónoma. ¿Cómo afectó esta batalla concre-
tamente al tema de la financiación autonómica?
8) ¿Cuándo empezó CiU de verdad a pedir un pacto fiscal para Cataluña?
Y, a su juicio, ¿por qué?
9) Un Concierto a lo catalán: ¿en qué se diferenciaría del Concierto vasco
según la visión que se tiene desde Cataluña?
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10) Uno de los últimos obstáculos en el 2005 que casi impedía el acuerdo
en el parlamento catalán sobre el nuevo Estatuto fue el tema de la fi-
nanciación autonómica, que luego se resolvió con un acuerdo entre
Maragall y Mas. ¿Qué pasó?
11) Luego en el parlamento de Madrid también, el tema de la financiación
seguía siendo un obstáculo a un acuerdo sobre el texto del Estatuto,
y al final se resolvió el tema a último momento con un acuerdo entre
Zapatero y Mas. ¿Por qué Mas aceptó rebajar tanto sus objetivos para
la financiación?
12) Usted negoció la reforma de financiación de 2009 dentro del marco
del nuevo Estatuto. ¿Cómo se desarrollaron las negociaciones para
la reforma? ¿Cómo valora la reforma?
13) ¿Cuál fue la perspectiva del PSC en la comisión parliamentaria que
hubo en 2011 para estudiar la posibilidad de un nuevo modelo de fi-
nanciación basado en el Concierto?
14) A su juicio, ¿hasta qué punto el hartazgo con el sistema de financia-
ción autonómica ha influido en el auge independentista en Cataluña
en los últimos años?  
15) ¿Cómo interpreta usted el viaje que hizo Artur Mas a Madrid para
pedir un pacto fiscal en el 2012 tras la Diada?
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Sample interview questionnaire 4 – Josep Huguet (9 June 2015)
1) Durante la Transición, ¿qué modelo de financiación buscaba Esquerra
para Cataluña y cómo se comparó con la visión de otros partidos en
aquel entonces?
2) La reforma del régimen común de 1996 fue el primer salto cualitativo
ya que se amplió considerablemente el abanico de cesión de tributos,
incluyendo una parte importante del IRPF. ¿Cuál fue la reacción de Es-
querra a esta reforma? ¿Le pareció un avance cualitativo? 
3) Usted había trabajado en los años anteriores, de 1993 a 1995,  como
representante de Esquerra en la Comisión Mixta de Transferencias
entre el Estado español y la Generalitat. Además, en los años 90 en-
tiendo que usted se especializó en temas económicos y de financiación
en su trabajo para Esquerra y defendió la necesidad de un nuevo mo-
delo de financiación para Cataluña. ¿Cuáles fueron sus experiencias
en cuanto a lo que funcionaba y lo que no funcionaba con la financia-
ción autonómica en aquel entonces? ¿Hasta qué punto la reforma de
1996 del régimen común pudo arreglar los problemas que había?
4) CiU pareció contento con la reforma de 1996 en un primer momento,
pero no duró su satisfacción. A partir de 1997 Jordi Pujol se convirtió
públicamente a la idea de la necesidad de una especie de Concierto bi-
lateral para Cataluña. ¿Cómo vivió usted desde Esquerra la evolución
de la perspectiva de CiU sobre la financiación autonómica a lo largo
de los años 90?
5) A finales de los 90 y a principios del siglo nuevo, usted y algunos otros
representantes de Esquerra promovieron el acercamiento entre los
grupos de izquierdas para facilitar una alternativa al gobierno de CiU.
¿Cómo se logró resolver las diferentes perspectivas sobre la financia-
ción autonómica entre el PSC, Iniciativa y Esquerra para llegar al
acuerdo entre los partidos de izquierdas? 
6) Como parte del Pacto del Tinell para formar la coalición de izquierdas
en el 2003, los tres partidos constituyentes llegaron a un acuerdo sobre
sus objetivos en cuanto a la financiación autonómica. ¿Cómo se logró
conciliar las perspectivas distintas sobre la financiación autonómica de
los tres partidos? Sobre todo, ¿cómo se acercaron posiciones el PSC y
ERC?
7) Después de las elecciones catalanas de 2003, como parte del acuerdo
de gobierno entre los partidos de izquierdas, había que llegar a un
acuerdo sobre la financiación. Me contó Antoni Castells cuando le en-
trevisté que él redactó junto con usted un acuerdo de diez puntos sobre
la financiación un fin de semana en diciembre (6 y 7) para reconciliar
perspectivas del PSC y Esquerra. La inspiración de Castells y su partido
era claramente un modelo federal, no el Concierto, pero hicieron algu-
nas concesiones para que Esquerra pudiera estar de acuerdo. ¿Cómo
vivió usted estas negociaciones? ¿Cuál fue su perspectiva?
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8) Se discutieron muchos temas importantes en las negociaciones del Es-
tatuto, el reconocimiento de Cataluña como nación, el blindaje de las
competencias catalanas, etc. ¿En qué momentos de las negociaciones
y debates sobre el Estatuto fue tema clave la financiación autonómica? 
9) Las negociaciones para el nuevo Estatuto causaron una batalla entre
ERC y CiU para ser el partido que presentara las propuestas más avan-
zadas para una Cataluña autónoma. ¿Cómo afectó esta batalla concre-
tamente al tema de la financiación autonómica?¿Cómo logró Esquerra
reconciliar presiones distintas ya que tenía el Partido Socialista de Ca-
talunya por un lado que no quería pedir un Concierto, y CiU por otro
que quería pedirlo?
10) Un Concierto a la catalana: ¿en qué se diferenciaría del Concierto
vasco según la visión que se tiene desde Cataluña y según Esquerra?
11) Uno de los últimos obstáculos en el 2005 que casi impedía el acuerdo
en el parlamento catalán fue el tema de la financiación autonómica,
que luego se resolvió con un acuerdo entre Maragall y Mas. ¿Qué
pasó? 
12) Luego en el parlamento de Madrid también, la financiación seguía
siendo un obstáculo a un acuerdo sobre el texto del Estatuto, y al final
se resolvió a último momento con un acuerdo entre Zapatero y Mas.
¿Cómo se logró el acuerdo? ¿Estuvo Esquerra al tanto de lo que pa-
saba?
13) ¿Cómo funcionó la negociación del nuevo sistema de financiación au-
tonómica de 2009 después del Estatuto?¿Qué pensó Esquerra del des-
arrollo de las negociaciones para el acuerdo, del acuerdo en sí y de
su posterior desarrollo?
14) ¿Cuál fue la perspectiva de Esquerra en la Comisión Parlamentaria
que hubo en el 2011 para estudiar la posibilidad de un nuevo modelo
de financiación basado en el Concierto?
15) A su juicio, ¿hasta qué punto el hartazgo con el sistema de financia-
ción autonómica ha influido en el auge independentista en Cataluña
en los últimos años?  
16) ¿Cómo interpreta usted el viaje que hizo Artur Mas a Madrid para
pedir un pacto fiscal en el 2012 tras la Diada?
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Sample interview questionnaire 5 – Andreu Mas-Colell (25 January
2016)
1) Durante la Transición, ¿hubo discrepancias dentro de Convergència
sobre el modelo de financiación que se quería buscar para Cataluña?
Se ha hablado de posibles diferencias entre Jordi Pujol y Ramón Trias
Fargas. ¿Cuál es su punto de vista sobre este asunto?
2) En 1997, Pujol empezó a hablar públicamente de la necesidad de una
especie de Concierto catalán. ¿Por qué entonces, justo después de la
reforma de financiación de 1996? CiU pareció contento con la reforma
de 1996 en un primer momento. ¿Por qué no duró su satisfacción?
3) Se creó la Comisión de Estudio para la Mejora del Autogobierno en el
2000. Luego llegó el gobierno tripartito de izquierdas al poder en el
2003 y empezó el proceso de la reforma estatutaria. ¿Hasta qué punto
influyó la decepción con el sistema de financiación en los deseos de
revisar la autonomía catalana e intentar mejorarla, en comparación con
otros factores?
4) ¿En qué momentos y hasta qué punto fue un tema clave la financiación
autonómica en los debates para un nuevo Estatuto autonómico? 
5) Las negociaciones para el nuevo Estatuto causaron una batalla entre
ERC y CiU para ser el partido que presentara las propuestas más avan-
zadas para una Cataluña autónoma. ¿Cómo afectó esta batalla concre-
tamente al tema de la financiación autonómica? 
6) Durante todo el proceso de negociación sobre el Estatuto, entiendo
que el Instituto de Estudios Autonómicos desempeñó un papel clave,
proporcionando propuestas e informes sobre todo tipo de temas in-
cluida la financiación autonómica. ¿Qué opinaba Convergència sobre
las propuestas que venían del IEA en cuanto a la financiación?
7) Cuando Convergència proponía un Concierto a la catalana durante los
debates sobre el Estatuto: ¿en qué se diferenciaba del Concierto vasco? 
8) Uno de los últimos obstáculos en el 2005 que casi impedía el acuerdo
en el parlamento catalán fue el tema de la financiación autonómica,
que luego se resolvió con un acuerdo entre Maragall y Mas. ¿Qué
pasó?
9) Luego en el parlamento de Madrid también, la financiación seguía
siendo un obstáculo para un acuerdo sobre el texto del Estatuto, y al
final se resolvió en el último momento con un acuerdo entre Zapatero
y Mas. ¿Cómo se logró el acuerdo? ¿Por qué Mas aceptó rebajar tanto
sus objetivos para la financiación? 
10) ¿Cómo funcionó la negociación del nuevo sistema de financiación au-
tonómica de 2009 después del Estatuto? ¿Qué pensó CiU del desarro-
llo de las negociaciones para el acuerdo, del acuerdo en sí y de su
posterior desarrollo?
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11) Hubo una comisión de estudio en el parlamento hacia finales de 2011
sobre un nuevo modelo de financiación para Cataluña basado en el
Concierto Económico. ¿Cuál fue la perspectiva de Convergència en
aquellas negociaciones?
12) ¿Cómo interpreta usted el viaje que hizo Artur Mas a Madrid para
pedir un pacto fiscal en el 2012 tras la Diada?
13) El Fondo de Liquidez Autonómica y los otros fondos como el de Pro-
veedores que se crearon en el 2012 debían ser temporales, pero al
final parece que se han convertido en algo más permanente. ¿Qué
cree usted de la situación? 
14) Catalunya depende totalmente de los fondos de financiación creados
por el gobierno central de momento. ¿Por qué, en su opinión, ha aca-
bado Cataluña en una posición financiera mucho peor que la de la co-
munidad de Madrid? ¿Hasta qué punto se debe a las injusticias del
sistema autonómica? ¿O demasiado gasto en Catalunya durante los
años del tripartito, etc?
15) Hay un debate sobre hasta qué punto la recentralización del PP en
cuanto a la financiación de las CCAA corresponde a los imperativos
de reducción del déficit impuestos por la UE, o hasta qué punto co-
rresponde más bien a motivos ideológicos del PP. ¿Qué opina usted
sobre el asunto?
16) ¿Cómo valora usted el reparto de los límites de déficit entre el go-
bierno central y los gobiernos autonómicos?
17) ¿Está pendiente una nueva reforma de la LOFCA. ¿Participará plena-
mente Cataluña en el proceso?
18) Usted ha hecho comentarios a periódicos últimamente sugiriendo
que Mas ha dado demasiadas concesiones en temas ecónomicos a
la CUP. ¿Cuál es su perspectiva sobre las negociaciones que han te-
nido lugar últimamente para formar un gobierno en Cataluña?
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Across Europe, the 21st century has witnessed a rise in demands
for political sovereignty from nationalist parties that had previously
seemed reconciled to seeking greater devolution rather than full in-
dependence. Spain is a particularly interesting case where pro-
sovereignty movements have gained traction in both the Basque and
Catalan regions, yet with important differences in the objectives pur-
sued. Both the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) and Democratic Con-
vergence of Catalonia (CDC), the traditional mainstream nationalist
parties in each region, have sought a fundamental reconfiguration
of their respective territories’ relationship with Spain at different
times since the late 1990s. What factors explain the differences in
the nature and timing of their shifts away from accommodationist
politics within Spain and towards pro-sovereignty agendas?
This study investigates the different regional financing systems in
Spain as a significant factor influencing the evolution of the natio-
nalist parties’ territorial strategies and behaviour. While Catalonia
forms part of the common financing system (régimen común de fi-
nanciación), which gives the regions relatively limited tax-raising
competences and involves substantial revenue transfers from cen-
tral government, the Basque region raises almost all of its own taxes
under a separate system of extensive fiscal autonomy (the Concierto
Económico or Economic Agreement). Spain thus offers the oppor-
tunity to compare two different models of fiscal decentralisation and
their significance for the political evolution of two contrasting natio-
nalist movements.
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